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Synopsis: 
The Role of National Parliaments (NPs) in EU policy-making has become a source of 
great interest in the EU in recent years due to the problems related to the legitimacy and 
the democratic deficit of the Union and partly because of the recognition given to NPs in 
the latest EU Treaties. This comparative research proceeds from a question concerning 
the factors that affect the participation of National Parliaments in the UK, Finland, 
Poland and Estonia in the Eli policy process in Justice and Home Affairs, and more 
particularly in immigration questions. This research analyses the Europeanization of NPs 
in two dimensions; first, how the NPs were able to 'upload' their national preferences to 
EU level policy-making and secondly, hoxv EU level outcomes were 'downloaded' at tile 
national level. This research starts off with an expectation that the pal-licipation of NPs in 
the EU policy-making would vary. This thesis hypothesises that four factors would affect 
the Europeanization of NPs; (1) legal traditions; (2) administrative resources; (3) the 
socio-economic level of the Member State; and (4) geopolitical location. This thesis 
argues that the four NPs have all developed similar instruments, which offer effective 
ways for participating in EU policy-making but in the immigration field, the evidence 
suggests that these instruments were not effectively used, except in the case of tile House 
of Lords. In this respect there was relatively little difference between 'new' and 'old' EU 
Member States. This research suggests that the main explanation for the similar 
behaviour of the four NPs was the dominance of the elite, which is due to 'the 
Europeanization process. However, this thesis suggests that this elite dominance could 
have serious implications for the democracy of the EU in particular in the field of JHA, 
which touches the fundamental rights of individuals. 
In order to increase the role of NPs in the EU policy process in this particular policy 
field, this research argues that the main tool for parliaments is to develop their dii-ect 
influence channels independently of their governments. NPs should increase their 
channels to NGOs in the immigration field and intensify their connections with civil 
society. This would help NPs to transfer more effectively the views of citizens to the 
formal decision-making level. Another effective way for the NPs to increase their dil-ect 
injIluence would be to intensify their cooperation with Committees at the European 
Parliament (EP). The findings will contribute not only to a more nuanced and enhanced 
understanding of the participation of NPs in the EU policy process but also to a more 
nuanced view of problems related to the field of JHA, in particular, to tile democratic 
control in that field. 
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Chapter 1. National Parliaments in the EU Policy Process in the field of 
JHA 
Introduction 
This research will examine the factors that affect the Europeanization of National 
Parliaments (NPs) in the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia in the EU's policy process, in 
the specific field of Justice and Horne Affairs (JHA). It will examine the EU policy on 
Internal security, and more specifically, on 'immigration-related' issues. The aim of this 
research is first to analyse whether National Parliaments in these four countries have been 
able to 'upload 12 their preferences to the EU level and if so, ]low successfully. Tile 
second dimension of this research is to examine how these EU level 'policy outcomes' 
are then 'downloaded 53 at the national level and what role the NPs have in that process. 
Europeanization is understood here as influencing at two different levels, that which 
forms policy at the supranational (EU) level; and that which adapts EU outcomes at the 
domestic level. Parliaments have two options for exercising their influence; they can do 
so either indii-ectly (through their Governments) or dii-ect1j, by influencing EU institutions 
such as the. European Parliament or the EU Commission. Given the premise that 
Europeanization varies 4 across these countries, the goal is to examine how and to explain 
why, which will be discussed at length below. 
The main reasori for examining the Europeanization of National Parliaments in this 
particular policy field is that Member State citizens are represented at EU level through 
their National Parliaments. 5 The Ministers, who make decisions in the Council of 
Ministers, are accountable to their respective NPs. Nevertheless, the existing literature 
has argued that democratic and judicial control mechanisms are largely marginalized in 
1 Here policy is understood as a process that includes formation of binding norms, non-binding norms, 
goals and aims that might in the long term bind EU legislation (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004). 
2 The term 'uploading', where it comes from and how it has been used in tile literature will be explained in 
the section 'conceptual framework'. 
3 The term 'downloading' will also be explained in the section 'conceptual framework' 
4 The reason why this research expects variation among the National Parliaments is explained later in this 
section. 
5 How National Parliaments make use of 'direct' /'indirect' influence will be discussed in length in chapter 
5. 
the field of JHA policy for many different reasons (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005; Monar, 
2002), which are explained and analysed in depth in this research. There are several 
important reasons for analysing the Europeanization of NPs in this particular policy field; 
first, the EU still does not have a common immigration policy, and secondly, immigration 
issues have long belonged to the core questions of national policy-making; these are the 
main reasons to assume that NPs have a strong interest in participating in these questions. 
A third reason, which links the NPs and JHA policy-making together, is that tile debate 
on the democratic legitimacy of the EU, which began with the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty (which also created the EU's JHA policy), brought NPs to the centre of 
European discussions for the first time (Norton, 1996: 8). European leaders discovered 
that more citizen involvement and legitimacy was required for European integration to 
develop further as a political union and more importantly, that public support could no 
longer be taken for granted (ECPRD, 2003: 7)6. Increasing participation of tile NPs in EU 
policy-making (including JHA policy) was deemed to be one of the best ways to promote 
that goal. However, attempts to increase citizensý involvement and the democratic control 
of EU policy-making, particularly in the field of JHA, has changed dramatically since tile 
terrorist attacks of II th September 2001. The recent trend in this policy sector has been to 
create internal security strategies with logic similar to that applied to external security 
issues (Pellerin, 2004; Lavenex and Wallace, 2005; House of Lords, 2006b). This means 
that an ever growing amount of policy-making is conducted in intergovernmental groups 
among (some) EU Member States, whereas the EU institutions and democratically 
elected institutions such as NPs are excluded, which is a great danger for tile democratic 
development of the EU. 
1.1. The Research Rationale 
As mentioned above, the Maastricht Treaty is an important starting point for 
understanding the Europeanization of National Parliaments and for developments in the 
EU's JHA policy field. The NPs and JHA policy have many overlapping elements, which 
6 ECPRD is European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD) and its publication 
from 2003 'Eui-opean Affaii-s Committee: The Influence of National Pai-liamenis on Politics, an Ovei-viell" 
will be refered here as 'ECPRD'. 
2 
this research aims to explore. For instance, from the Parliaments' point of view tile Treaty 
of Maastricht and the debate on the democratic legitimacy of the EU brought NPs to tile 
centre-stage of public as well as academic interest. 7 Since then the main argument 
expressed by the existing literature has been that reinforcing Parliamentary scrutiny and 
control of the NPs at the EU level would contribute to a more democratic Europe, and 
that increasing Parliamentary -participation would offer 
the best way to correct the 
'democratic deficit'8 (Benz, 2004; Raunio, 2001 and 2006; Benz and Auel, 2005). 
However, so far, questions about Europeanization on the one hand and the role of 
National Parliaments in EU policy-making on the other are still under-researched 
(Dimitrakopoulos, 2001: 422). 
One main explanation for this lack of research is the presumption that National 
Parliaments have a very small role in EU policy-making, and in the JHA field in 
particular, if they have any role at all (Maurer, 2001 and RaUnio, 2004). 9 This 
conventional understanding considers NPs as 'passive' objects of tile EU policy process 
rather than 'participants' in it. As examples of Europeanization studies will demonstrate 
in chaptei 2, and further in chapter 3, the field of JHA is dominated by administrative 
elitelo at the cost of democratically elected actors. In this research 'elites' are taken to 
mean 'administrative elites' and are defined as administrative actors operating mostly at 
the Governmental level such as civil servants and experts from the Ministries of Interior 
and from other Ministries or from international organisations who have particular 
knowledge of immigration and border control questions and who can participate 
independently in EU policy-making process (for instance in the EU working groups or in 
intergovernmental groups where many important and far reaching issues are agreed) 
' This development is to be seen also from the recent Treaty changes: (Tile Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
amended Protocol considering the role of National Parliaments, The Treaty of Nice and its Declaration 23, 
The Declaration of Laeken). 
8 This term is explained in chapter four, but briefly, it means that citizens of member states (who are 
represented by National Parliaments) do not participate effectively enough in the process of EU's decision- 
making 
9 Besides the limited number of research undertaken on the roles of NPs in tile EU policy-process, some 
authors have examined the affect of Public Opinion to the Europeanization of EU's immigration regimes 
(Lahav, 2004b; Lahav and Messina 2005; Luedtke, 2005) and Statham and Gray (2005; Saurugger, 2005) 
and ho%v the immigrant NGO sector has responded to Europeanization. 
10 However, the literature on elites is extensive, and there is a large quantity of research undertaken with 
different types of elites. These questions were beyond tile purposes of this thesis. 
3 
(Bottomore, 1993); Lahav, 2004a; Statham and Geddes, 2006). Elected politicians can 
also form elite, but as chapters 3,5 and 6 will demonstrate in immigration field this has 
so far not been the case and for this reason this research project does not include 
politicians in its definition of the concept. Another reason to differentiate between the 
(immigration) elite and 'politicians from the Member States' in this particular policy field 
is that the administrative elite can operate fairly autonomously compared to the Ministers 
who, are normally politically elected and therefore accountable for their action in the 
Council of Ministers. This is because they represent their 'Member State' at the EU level. 
The main consequences of the 'dominance of administrative elites' are that the 
transparency and accountability of the EUs decision-making are under threat, especially 
after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, if that dominance is not controlled more 
effectively by democratic institutions (such as NPs or the European Parliament). 
However, there are a very limited number of studies in which these issues have been 
analysed, and this research aims to contribute that gap. These are important questions not 
only for the Parliaments but for the democratic development of the EU as a whole. 
An overwhelming concern of the still limited amount of literature which has analysed the 
role of the NPs in the EU policy process has been the ways in which NPs have adapted to 
European integration. " Having said that, however, there are a few recent studies which 
have pointed to the ways in which the EU has helped NPs to expand their legislative 
powers beyond this traditional field (Benz, 2004; Duina and Oliver, 2005; Raunio and 
Duina, 2007 forthcoming), which means that not all authors consider NPs as ; passive 
objects' in the EU policy process. With this view, they argue that the EU has fostered an 
environment for learning and socialising' 2 which has resulted in knowledge that has 
helped NPs to design more effective domestic legislative frameworks (Duina and Oliver, 
2005). 
Further argument for considering NPs more than just 'passive' objects of tile 
Europeanization rrocess is that there are numerous recent EU studies that have focused 
" The way in which this research understands Europeanization and how it has been used in the literature 
will be analysed in depth in chapter 2. 
12 How this research defines learning, and socialising are explained in section 'concepts and framework' 
4 
on the question of how, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace and at what point 
of time 'Europe Matters' for domestic institutions and actors. This means that tile most 
recent EU studies admit that the relationship between the EU and its Member States is 
not a 'one-way street' but rather an interactive process (136rzel, 2002 and 2005). Member 
States are not only passive receivers of European demands for domestic change but they 
can proactively shape European policies, institutions, and processes which they can later 
adopt (136rzel, 2005: 62). According to this logic, the NPs should also proactively be able 
to shape European policies. 
Having said that, however, most of tile existing literature has still focused on how a 
certain EU policy outcome is formed at the EU level or how it is adapted domestically 
(Kassim, 2003, Schimmelfennig, 2001 and 2003; Checkel, 2001b, Checkel, 2001c; 
Lewis, 2001; Bulmer and Burch, 2001). The enlargements literature has also deployed 
the concept of Europeanization in certain extent in examining how EU norms, rules and 
practices have been adapted in Central and Eastern European States (CEEs). These 
studies have tended to stress the 'hierarchical' aspects of domestic adaptation, fostered by 
'conditional ity' in the CEEs (Grabbe, 2003 and 2006; Goetz, 2005). In addition, these 
studies have found 'top-down' - as opposed - to 'bottom-up' -dynamics as more 
prominent role in shaping Europeanization in the recent accession states when compared 
to the long-standing members (Lippert el a., 2001; Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c; Grabbe, 
2006). This means that an overwhelming majority of the literature has analysed the 
Europeanization effect from a 'top-down' perspective 13 (Haverland, 2003; Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 1999; Wessels et al., 2003) and to a lesser extent from the 'bottom up' 
perspective (136rzel, 2002). Only a very few research projects have combined both 
perspectives (i. e. how the EU impacts on member states and how member states respond 
to the EU by using the 'uploading' and 'downloading' dimensions in the same research) 
(Bbrzel, 2005; Monar, 2001a). This research will explore this question further by 
analysing both perspectives and will investigate whether the existing understanding 
13 The difference between 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' perspectives in the Europeanizaticn literature will 
be explained later in chapter 2 as that chapter reviews the development of Europeanization and the 
literature which has used Europeanization. 
5 
which separates 'uploading' and 'downloading' dimensions from each other is useful in 
explaining the Europeanization of the NPs in the EU's policy process in the field of 
immigration. 
Further, there are very few studies that compare the nc%v Member States of the EU with 
older members, and even fewer that deal with the Europeanization of the National 
Parliaments in these new states. 
However, the main gap is in the literature that considers the link between National 
Parliaments and JHA issues generally. This link became particularly salient after the 
terrorist attacks in 2001 because these attacks brought internal security issues to the 
centre of EU policy, and immigration and asylum issues became linked to a great extent 
to internal security threats (Huysi-nan, 2006). After 2001 it seems that the goals of 
'increasing democratic control of NPs in EU policy-making' and 'bringing the EU closer 
to the citizens' have disappeared from the aims of the EU at least in tile field of JHA. 
Policy-making in this particular field has taken much from the logics of' external security 
issues, which emphasize the role of Member States, elites and secrecy, thus creating 
serious implications for the fundamental rights of individuals and to the applications of 
the principle of subsidiarity. 14 Further, this recent . trend in the field of JHA also underrate 
the aims stated in Nice Declaration 23, which highlighted the role of NPs in the 
'European architecture as one of the prime matters for consideration' in pursuance of its 
aims to enhance the Union's legitimacy. For these abovementioned reasons the 
European izati'On of National Parliaments in the field of JHA has been chosen as an 
empirical object for this research. 
1.2. Aim of the Research 
The central aim of this thesis is to investigate certain factors that affect the 
European ization of National Parliaments in the EU policy process in the JHA field, and 
more specifically in immigration and border control qUestions in the UK, Finland, Poland 
14 The term subsidiarity and the Nice Declaration are explained in chapter 4 
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and Estonia. This thesis explores Europeanization at two- levels: first, are NPs able to 
upload their preferences to the EU policy process and if so, llo%v successftilly. Secondly, 
what role, if any, do the NPs have when EU policy outcomes are downloaded at the 
national level and what factors affect that process. 
As mentioned in the previous section, a few recent studies have pointed to the ways in 
which the EU has helped NPs to expand their legislative powers beyond their traditional 
field. With this view they have suggested that the EU has fostered an environment for 
learning and socialising, 15 which has resulted in knowledge that has helped NPs to design 
more effective domestic legislative frameworks (Duina and Oliver, 2005). This project 
aims to expand this understanding further by examining and comparing these domestic 
frameworks which NPs have established to participate in the EU policy process more 
. effectively, 
from where these frameworks are derived, how they function, and in 
particular, how they work in a specific policy issue (JHA). 
The existing literature has identified variations in tile Europeanization of NPs but none of 
it has engaged itself with questions of whether NPs have succeeded in uploading their 
preferences to the EU level of Policy-making and if so, hoxv these EU outcomes were 
subsequently downloaded to the domestic level and which factors affected that process. 
Therefore, the aim of this research is to look at these factors in a more systematic way 
than has been done in the past. This comparison will be conducted by examining two 
particular issues: immigration and asylum policies, and border control matters. 
The field of JHA policy is chosen for investigation because it is the policy field where 
NPs have traditionally been left out of EU level policy-making, contrary to the political 
aims stated in the recent Treaty documents (Nice Declaration, Laeken Declaration, 
16 Convention, and Constitutional Treaty) , which highlighted the need to enhance the 
Union's legitimacy by bringing it closer to the citizens. However, the recent trend in the 
JHA policy field is to reduce the possibilities of democratically elected actors to be 
These terms are explained in section 'concepts and framework' 
These Treaties are examined in chapter 3 (from the point of JHA view) and in chapter 4 (from the point 
of National Parliaments' view) and further explained why these Treaties are important. 
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involved in EU policy-making and this thesis aims to explore that problematic by 
analysing whether policy-making differs in the JHA field and if so, how it impacts on the 
participation of NPs. 
1.3. Research Question and Hypotheses: 
The research question for this project is the following: 
Which factors affect the Europeanization of National Parliaments in EU policy in 
thefield of Justice and Home Affah-s? 
Formulated from the Europeanization literature and from the empirical investigations 
below, there are four potential factors that affect the Europeanization of National 
Parliaments in the EU policy process in the field of JHA. The hypotheses will be 
examined in accordance with the research design and the methodological approach, both 
of which are outlined below. 
As mentioned earlier in this section, only a few comparisons have been undertaken in EU 
studies on the role of NPs in the EU's policy process. One of the most comprehensive of 
these was done by Wessels, Maurer and Mittag (2003). They categorized NPs in EU 
states either as 'strong' or 'weak' adaptors according to their reaction to ongoing 
challenges of the developing EU system at both the national and the EU level. Their main 
argument was that some Parliaments are more able to make use of opportunities to 
influence EU-level policy-making than others, but compared to other domestic actors 
such as Governments or interest organisations, NPs are considered 'passive' (Wessels ef 
al., 2003: 431- 433). They argued that political context, state structure and legal traditions 
were main factors affecting the capacities of NPs to participate in the EU policy process. 
Based on the abovementioned empirical findings, this research will hypothesise that legal 
traditions have some explanatory power over the Europeanization of NPs in the EU's 
policy process in tile field of Justice and Home Affairs. 
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HYPOTHESIS 1: 
Legal traditions affect the Europeanization of National Parliaments in the EU's 
policy process in thefield ofJustice and Home Affairs. 
The Europeanization literature has argued that member states can proactively influence 
European pol icies, institutions and processes to which they have to adapt later (Bbrzel, 
20033: 3) Bbrzel argued that the capacity of Member States to respond to European 
demands differs greatly and has an impact on how Member States are able to 'upload' 
EU policies. She named the offering of expertise to EU institutions as one effective way 
for member states to increase these capacities. But more effective is being active in the 
different networks that prepare and accompany the EU negotiation processes both at tile 
national and EU levels (Bbrzel, 2003: 7). Furthermore, Bbrzel discovered that the 
effective downloading of EU policies and decisions required similar resources to tile 
Uploading EU policy. She concluded that the socio-economic level of each member state, 
together with the political and administrative resources available to member states, 
greatly affect lio%v member states are able to 'upload' their national preferences to the EU 
level. Based on these findings, this research will hypothesise that that the administrative 
resources available for NPs and tile socio-economic level of member states will help to 
explain the Europeanization of NPs. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: 
The administrative resources available to National Parliaments affect the 
Europeanization of National Parliaments in the EUs Policy process in the field of 
Justice and Home Affairs 
HYPOTHESIS 3: 
The socio-economic level of each Member State affects the Europeanization of 
National Parliaments in the EUs policy process in the field of Justice and Home 
Affairs. 
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Moreover, Monar has examined more specifically the 'uploading' and 'downloading' 
dimensions of Europeanization and the factors affecting this process in the field of JHA. 
He argued that the process of European integration has shown examples of Member 
States pushing for common action in certain areas in order to solve certain national 
problems through a process of 'Europeanization' (Monar, 2001a: 756 Monar, 2003a: 
310). There are two potential 'gains' for Member States in this process: first, they can 
upload their problems to the EU level and secondly, after the issues have effectively been 
brought on to tile European agenda, they can try to hide behind the weighty screen of 
collective EU action (or lack of action) (Monar, 2003a: 756). Monar demonstrated that 
the main drivers at tile national level for 'uploading' national preferences to tile EU level 
in the field of JHA were the experts from the Ministries of the Interior (i. e. those working 
in the field of law and order) (Monar, 2003a: 320). In his case study, lie demonstrated 
that these officials succeeded first by convincing the national. Government of the threat 
linked with the' 'internal security-zone', which in his case study, was related to the 
geographical location of Germany and then, this national view was further transferred to 
the EU level. 17 As a consequence of expert influence, the German. Government started to 
push for that policy goal at the EU level (Monar, 2003a: 322). To support Monar's 
findings, Grabbe (2006) has shown that the salience of border control issues for Germany 
and France had an impact on the EU enlargement process in 2004 by identifying internal 
security and border control issues as one the most important criteria for EU candidates to 
fulfil. Based on these empirical investigations this research hypothesises that geopolitical 
location has some explanatory power in explaining tile participation of NPs in tile EU 
policy process in the JHA field. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: 
" Monar found evidence that the geography influenced significantly in the case ofGermany its desire to 
'upload' national preferences to EU level: being in the position of 'frontline' state to central and Eastern 
Europe, three factors became more significant and they all Nvere related to Germany's geographical 
position: illegal immigration, organized crime, and the smuggling and trafficking of persons. All these 
threats originated from central and Eastern European neighbouring states and from Russia (Monar, 2003a: 
310-311). 
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Geopolitical location affects the Ein-opeanization ofAlational Pal-liallients ill the EU's 
policy pi-ocess ill thefield ofAstice and HomeAffah-s. 
To sum Lip, each of the four hypotheses that this research is going to test are derived from 
a particular set of empirical findings, although only the hypothesis on legal traditions has 
been linked to the role of National Parliaments. Nevertheless, there are a number of 
potential factors which might explain the capacities and motivations of EU Member 
States or National Parliaments in the EU Member States to influence EU policy-making 
in the field of JHA. However, so far, the debates on the 'uploading' and 'downloading' 
perspectives of Europeanization and on the other hand, the role of NPs in the EU policy 
process in the field of JHA have not been linked. 
1.4. Conceptual Foundations 
Introduction 
This section will define the concepts used in this research. It will begin by explaining the 
main argurnents for choosing an institutionalist perspective to study the concept of 
Europeanization and after that, it will explain the concept of Europeanization and how 
such terms as 'uploading', 'downloading', 'influence, ' 'impact', 'participation', 
'socialising' and 'learning' are understood and deployed in this research. With the help of 
the variety of understandings of Europeanization explained below (and in more detail in 
chapter 2 which reviews the existing literature) this research aims to connect tile concept 
of Europeanization to the participation of National Parliaments in tile EU policy process 
in the JHA field. In this research, participation is understood as including both the 
'uploading' aspect, which relates more to the influence of NPs on EU policy-making, and 
the 'downloading' aspect which relates more to the impact of the EU on NPs. 
1.4.1. The Institti tiona list Perspective 
Before defining the Europeanization concept, it is important to understand hoxv and Nvhy 
this research links to the institutionalist perspective. This will be done briefly in this 
section by introducing different strands of institutionalism. Chapter 2 will demonstrate 
the variety of empirical applications of the concept of Europeanization used under these 
institutional approaches. In each of these applications institutions play a key role. Tile 
main reason for reviewing these different strands of institutionalism is that it can provide 
insight into the different mechanisms of Europeanization, such as norms, learning and 
socialising, and how they apply in the participation of National Parliaments in tile EU 
policy process. 
The main reason for linking Europeanization to the institutionalist perspective is that 
Europeanization is not itself a theory. Rather, Europeanization is a phenomenon which 
needs to be explained (Bulmer, 2007: 47). Theory thus comes in to answer how European 
policies, rules and norms are affecting domestic political systems (Vink and Graziano, 
2007: 13). Europeanization scholars have reverted almost without exception to the broad 
spectrum of theories that fall Linder the umbrella of 'institutionalism' (Vink and Graziano, 
2007: 13). The main reason why the concept of the Europeanization became linked to the 
'umbrella of institutionalism' was thai traditional theories of integration were not 
adequate to describe or explain developments at the European level and how they affect 
domestic levels (Caporaso, 2007: 24). For these reasons, the concept of Europeanization 
offered a tool for explaining domestic adaptation to the EU and how tile Member States 
responded to the EU. 
Institutional approaches are characterised most concisely by the phrase 'instit. utions 
matter'. Institutions are classically understood as the formal rules, standard operating 
procedures and organisations of Government (Vink and Graziano, 2007: 13). In 'newer' 
understandings they may also encompass informal rules, routines and conventions which 
govern the behaviour of two or more individuals (March and Olsen, 1989). 18 They have a 
social purpose and permanence (Hay, 2002; Lowndes; 2002; March and Olsen, 1989; 
18 The two institutional logics of March and Olsen (1998), those of consequentiality and of appropriateness 
are explained in chapter 2. The difference of these logics is important because these two main logics of 0 
change are usually distinguished when applying institutional approaches to Europeanization research. 
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Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001; Peterson and Shackleton, 2002). The abovementioned 
definitions form the basis for analysing the Europeanization of National Parliaments. 
There are three main strands -of institutionalist approaches: rational choice; which is 
concerned with the Nvays in which actor preferences are oriented towards institutional 
settings or rules. It highlights bargaining power and maxii-nising benefits (Tsebelis and 
Garett, 2001). The second strand is historical institutional isrn; it is concerned with tile 
role of time and patterns of long-term change (Pierson, 2000). The third strand is 
(constructivist) sociological institutionalism; it accounts for change by pointing at norm 
entrepreneurs and cooperative informal institutions mobilising in favour of adaptation 
(JUpille el aL, 2003). With this last strand, socialising and learning may thus be very 
relevant mechanisms of Europeanization although so far, an under-researched topic 
(Laffan, 2007: 128; Lavenex, 2007: 309). 
Most of the studies on Europeanization which investigate the impact of European 
integration on Governments, politics in domestic political systems, and how domestic 
actors respond to European integration, have been conducted using institutional 
approaches (Monar, 2001a and 2003a; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Goetz and Hix, 2003; 
B6rzel, 2002; Bbrzel and Risse, 2003; Schimmelfermig 2003; Lewis, 2003; Mbrth, 2003; 
Bulmer and Burch 2001; and Kassim, 2005). The main reason is that all these studies 
were interested in institutions in a broad sense, and the institutional perspective offered a 
suitable tool for studying that subject. Second, such an approach helps to clarify the links 
between pressures for change and patterns of national adaptation, which are also key 
interests of this research. Third, institutionalist approaches can link together institutions 
and the successful implementation of rules, norms and legal principles (Wiener, 2006: 
54) which is also an interest of this research. 
Finally, there have been some discussions in the literature of whether the three strands of 
institutionalism can be synthesised. Some authors (Checkel, 2001-a; 2001b; 2003; Jupille 
et al., 2003; Lewis 2003) have argued that there is a potential for combining elements 
from different strands of institutionalism. This means that important features of the 
13 
impact of European integration on Governments and politics in domestic political 
systems and how they respond to the EU can be captured more comprehensively with a 
combined approach than with one that is purely based on rational choice or constructivist 
arguments (Bbrzel, 2005; Sedelmeier, 2005; Schimmelfermig el aL, 2005). This insight is 
especially helpful for this study, as it allows for both rational and constructivist 
mechanisms of European ization to be investigated within the same research project. 
1.4.2 The Concept of Europeanization 
The concept of European ization is more appropriate than theories of European integration 
to answer the research question because theories of European integration are generally 
concerned with political and policy development at the supranational level and not with 
the domestic context. In addition, most integration theories, such as liberal 
intergovernmental ism, are based on material rational assumptions ignoring social factors, 
which this research assumes to be relevant in explaining the Europeanization of NPs in 
the EU policy process in the JHA field. When comparing structures which NPs have 
established for participating in the EU policy process and examining whether they have 
similar policy goals with regard to the EU's immigration and asylum policies, this 
research assumes that the rational approaches based on maximizing individual benefits 
might not be fully able to explain these processes. Some of the literature reviewed in 
chapter 2 supports this assumption (Schimmel fennig, 2003; Checkel, 2001b, Lewis, 
2003). 
In addition, most traditional integration theories tend to see EU developments as a 'top- 
down' process, where the EU is the highest hierarchical level. This is, however, not the 
case in the EU today. As those who work in the field of EU governance (Hix, 1998; 
Scharpf 1999; Jachtenfuchs and Koliler-Koch, 2004; Pollack, 2005) have argued, the EU 
is becoming more and more an interactive place where different layers of polipy-making 
emerge arriong different groups, with different internal rules of the game in each sector 
(Kohler-Koch, 2004). This means that governance at the EU level is no longer in the 
hands of the Governments or in the hands of the EU institutions. Instead, governance is 
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broader than Government, covering non-state actors from the public, private, and 
voluntary sectors and in this sense, the boundaries of the state have become shifting and 
opaque (Pollack, 2005: 37). The limitation of these governance approaches is that they, 
too, expect that actors at different layers behave rationally, calculating their benefits. This 
is the main reason for assuming that governance approaches also cannot explain the 
participation of NPs in EU policy process. The EU is part of EU policy-makers' cultural 
and social environment, which means that the decision-making environment can 
influence preference formation (Sedelmeier, 2005). This research assumes., based on tile 
literature reviewed in chapter 2, that a decision-making environment is an important 
factor in the Europeanization of NPs. The rational choice approaches ignore the 
importance of the learning and socialising that takes place in the decisio n-making 
environment, as will be shown in the literature review in chapter 2 (Clieckel, 2001b; 
Lewis, 2003; B6rzel, 2002). 176rthermore, this research is also interested in whether 
learning and socialising might be important elements in explaining the structures that 
have been developed for NPs participation in the EU policy process. However, as 
mentioned in the previous section, socialising and learning as mechanisms of 
Europeanization are under-researched issues, (Laffan, 2007: 139). They could, however, 
-provide more information about the adaptation of the individuals within the Parliaments, 
and not only about structures. 
Claudio Radaelli's definition of Europeanization is the most precise and useful definition 
of Europeanization for the purposes of this research (2006). Radaelli identified 
Europeanization as a set of processes whereby rules and procedures are constructed and 
defined in the EU policy process and then incorporated into the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures and public policies (Radaelli, 2006: 57). In this 
research, influence is combined with an 'uploading' dimension, which relates more to-a 
'bottom-up' perspective, whereas impact or adaptation are linked more to the 
"downloading' perspective, which is combined with to the 'top-down' dimension. 19 This 
understanding follows the approach developed by 136rzel (2002) and Lavenex (2007), 
19 The difference between 'top-down' and 'bottom-tip' dimensions is explained later in this section 
(1.4.3). 
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NvIlo have both examined Europeanization as a broader understanding, which highlights 
Europeanization as a 'circular process' by reiterating its interactive nature ( B6rzel, 2005; 
Lavenex, 2007). This means that at the centre of their studies is the changing nature of 
Europeanization (Lavenex, 2007: 319). 
As chapter 2 will illustrate, most Europeanization scholars emphasize that the process of 
Europeanizati on differs between Member States, which tells us that there is little 
consensus among scholars about how to account for variation in the processes, degrees 
and outcomes of domestic change. Later, in chapter 4, this research aims to link together 
empirical investigations of Europeanization and National Parliaments. It is worth noticing 
that the sectoral balance of theoretically informed work is somewhat skewed in the 
Europeanization literature; environmental policy is prominent, whereas 
intergovernmental policy sectors, such as foreign and security policy, and justice and 
home affairs have received much less attention (Bulmer, 2007: 57). 
Finally, as chapter 2 will show, there are many other possible ways of using 
Europeanization, and the aim of this research is not to argue that the way chosen here is 
the only one. Moreover, these differences in definitions must not be overdrawn and 
should not be understood as evidence of the emergence of rival schools of thoughts 
(Dyson and Goerz, 2003, Olsen, 200 1). 
1.4.3. Definitions of Uploading and Downloading Perspectives 
As mentioned above, this research considers Europeanization as a 'two-way process', 
which means that Member States are not merely passive recipients of European demands 
for domestic change but that they can also influence EU outcomes in different ways 
(136rzel, 2005; Radaelli, 2006). In this 'two-way process', the term 'uploading' is linked 
to tile term 'influence' and 'downloading' is linked to the term 'impact'. Having said this, 
separating the 'down-loading' and 'uploading' perspective is not always possible or even 
useful when analysing Eu ropean i zati on's effects and they might have many overlapping 
elements. Nevertheless, there are certain differences between 'downloading' and 
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ýuploading' perspectives. The former sees Europeanization in a narrower sense than the 
latter, i. e., it is related more to the 'top-down' approach (see chapter 2). This means that 
the 'downloading' perspective examines tile impact of tile EU from a rýore passive or 
coercive perspective, which stresses tile hierarchiýal relationship between the EU and its 
Member States (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 15). In empirical studies, the emphasis is on 
how EU laws (for instance directives) norms, and policies are adapted domestically. 
The 'uploading' perspective, on the other hand, is broader than tile 'downloading' 
perspective, as it highlights Europeanization as part of a dynarnic and interactive process 
where the start and end points are difficult to identify (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 15). For 
example, at the domestic level, actors pressure their national executives to pursue certain 
policies at the European level that are fiIVOUrable to their interests, and at the EU level, 
executives try to make other EU Member States accept these interests (Dyson and Goetz, 
2003; Bulmer and Burch, 2001; Kassim, 2003; B6rzel, 2005; Goetz, 2005; Bulmer, 
2007). According to this understanding, the main motivation for 'uploading' domestic 
preferences to the EU level is to reduce the adaptive pressures when 'downloading' these 
policy outcomes at the domestic level (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 15; Bbrzel, 2005: 6' )). 
1.4.4. Mechanisms of Europeanization 
This section will briefly introduce the different mechanisms of Europeanization, i. e., tile 
mechanisms through which Europe can affect the Member States, and how the change 
occurs. They will be explained in more detail in chapter 2. The reason for introducing 
these mechanisms of Europeanization is that this thesis will investigate which of them 
best apply in the case of National Parliaments. 20 The main mechanisms whereby EU 
policy is put into practice at the domestic level are governance by negotiations, and 
governance by positive or negative integration, and facilitated coordination (Bulmer and 
20 However, the literature has identified many different models, through which Europe can affect the 
Member States (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999, have distinguished between institutional compliance and 
changing domestic opportunity structures; some others have emphasised judicial review (Weiler, 1999), 
through regulatory competition (Kerwer and Teutsch, 2001). The purpose of this research is not to review 
all the mechanisms which literature as pointed. This research assumes that the softer forms of 
Europeanization are most important in explaining the factors affecting to the participation NPs in tile field 
of JHA. 
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Radaelli, 2004: 5). Especially the mechanism of negotiation and facilitated coordination 
include learning and socialising. 
This research understands learning and socialising as a situation where actors are 
socialized within institutional settings that define informal rules and procedures. This 
includes situations were actors can learn by. observing the behaviour of others and the 
outcomes of those behaviours. An important contribution to the extensive literature on 
6social learning' or 'policy learning 21 in social science is by Hall (1996). His definition 
is relevant for this research, because lie has defined learning as a process which includes 
'deliberate attempts to adjust the goals of techniques of policy in the light of 
consequences of past policy and new information' (Hall, 1993: 273). Hall speaks of 
learning when policy change occurs after such as process. However, as stressed in 
literature, the main difficulty of analysing learning and socialising is to define the starting 
and ending points of that process (Hall, 1993: 275). 
Turning back to the definitions of different mechanisms of Europeanization, the first one 
is the process of negotiation: When actors negotiate to formulate a certain EU policy, the 
process can include different types of bargaining: not only about the context of the policy 
but also bargaining about sanctions and interpret ations of rules related to that policy. In 
that process, domestic actors formulate expectations of what the result of the negotiation 
may be; they may have rational calculations of that process or their preferences may 
gradually change in the context of long processes of negotiation (Radaelli, 2006: 69). 
Because learning and socialising are elements that have horizontal effects, they can be 
linked to negotiation and softer forms of EU policy making, Such as to facilitated 
coordination as explained below (and in more detail in chapter 2). 
The other mechanisms of Europeanization based on Bulmer and Radaelli's categorisation 
21 The idea of learning can be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s where Helco defined political learning as 
'a relatively enduring alternation of behaviour that results from experience and/or new information 
concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives' (Helco, 1974: 306). Since that, the idea of 
learning has be popular in social science (Hall, 1996: Olsen et aL, 1996) and the recent attempts have 
linked it in particular with the Open Method of Coordination and social policy at the EU level (De ]a Porte, 
2001; Radaelli, 2004; Casey et aL, 2005; Kr6ger, 2006). However, 'charting' the whole literature on 
learning is beyond this research. 
18 
are positive and negative integration: in both cases the EU governs hierarchically: In the 
case of positive integration, this mechanism can produce policies that 'correct', for 
instance, the results of the internal market. In the case of negative integration, the EU 
functions in the opposite way by striking down the barriers of the market (Bulmer and 
Radaelli, 2004: 5). The key difference between these two mechanisms and the 
mechanisms of negotiations and facilitated coordination is that of the presence or absence 
of the EU model and the hierarchical position of the EU. 
The fourth mechanism is called facilitated coordination. When this mechanism is used, 
the EU only operates as a forum for discussions and as a platform tor policy transfer 
without having any hierarchical superiority. The main difference compared to the 
mechanisms of the negative and/or positive integration is that tile EU organises 
cooperation among Member States, but does not produce European legislation (Radaelli, 
2006: 70). It only produces opportunities for learning and socialising. 
Table I. I. Mechanisms of Europeanization (Radaefli, 2006) 
Mechanism of Outcome of Examples 
Europeanization Europeanization 
Negotiation / Bargaining Formulation of EU policies Binding or non binding EU 
(learning and socialising) policies 
Positive integration Market correcting rules, EU Binding legislation, for 
policy templates instance in the 
environmental and 
competition policy field, 
that corrects the market 
situation 
Negative integration Market-making rules, Binding legislation that 
Absence of EU policy 'fills' the gap: for instance 
templates rules against discrimination 
between residents and non- 
residents 
Facilitated coordination Benchmarking, Action plan for legal 
(learning and socialising) Open-Method of migration, 
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1.4.5. Europeanization and National Parliaments 
In practical terms, this research will look at whether NPs are able to 'upload' any of their 
national pref6rences to the EU level and if so, how successfully. It will look at whether 
and hoxv NPs are using their 'indii-ect'and Vh-ect' opportunities to influence EU policy- 
making, the difference being that indii-ect influence takes place through national 
Governments whereas dii-ect influence means that NPs are trying to affect the EU 
institutions directly. This examination will take place in chapter 5. The other dimension, 
'downloading, ' will be analysed in chapter 6 by concentrating on the questions of 
whether the EU has changed domestic policies in this particular policy field and if it has, 
how much and how did these chang*es take place. This thesis will investigate the 
mechanisms introduced above and whether they apply to the Europeanization of NPs. 
Based on the existing literature, this research assumes that the mechanisms through 
which the EU impacts function simultaneously at different levels: i. e. part of the adoption 
can take place through learning and socialising, but some also through more coercive 
methods. To sum up: this section has given reasons why this research assumes that the 
concept of Europeanization, understood in a broad. sense (including 'uploading' and 
'downloading' dimensions), can offer the best conceptual framework for explaining the 
factors that affect the Europeanization of NPs in the EU policy process in the JHA field. 
1.5. Research Design 
Before explaining the research design, the timeframe for this project needs some 
clarification. The starting point for this research is the Maastricht Treaty, which came 
into effect in November 1993. The end point is end of year 2006. The reasons for 
choosing'I 993 as a starting point were the following; firstly, it was the Maastricht Treaty 
that created the EU's policy field of JHA; and secondly, tile Treaty had two Declarations 
attached to it which established a basis for the participation of NPs in the EU policy 
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process. 
22 Since then, every EU Treaty change has included a mention of how important 
it is for NPs to be involved more effectively in the EU's decision (and policy) making. In 
addition, since the Maastricht Treaty, the development of JHA policy has been very rapid 
and today it is one of the most important policy fields of the EU (Monar, 2003a; Ucarer, 
2003; Lavenex and Wallace, 2005). 
The timeframe for examining tile 'downloading' effect (i. e. how the EU has impacted on 
the domestic immigration and border control structures) is longer, in the case of Finland, 
Poland and Estonia, than tile timeframe for examining the 'uploading effect', because 
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only actual EU membership offers opportunities to 'upload' issues to the EU level . 
However, EU influence did not stop with existing members, but reached the surrounding 
states as well, as this research demonstrates. In order to be considered as potential 
candidates, Finland, Estonia and Poland had started to make significant changes to their 
national structures, corresponding to EU membership criteria. For these reasons this 
research assumes that the downloading of EU policies started in Finland, Poland and 
1 24 Estonia long before their actual membership began . 
In order to investigate the hypotheses outlined earlier. in this section, it is necessary to 
clarify the relationship between the premise (that the Europeanization of National 
Parliaments varies between the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia) and the research 
question (what are the factors that affect Europeanization). Legal traditions, geopolitical 
location, administrative resources available to Parliaments and the socio-economic level 
of each member state are all independent variables, 25 while the Europeanization of 
National Parliaments in the EU-policy process is regarded as a dependent variable. 
22 The context of Declarations 13 and 14 of Maastricht Treaty are explained and analysed in detail in 
chapter 4. 
23 As mentioned earlier, the EU's JHA policy field was first created in 1993, but at that time, of the 
countries chosen for this comparative study, only the UK was a member of the EU. In addition, in 1993 
Finland was already negotiating for its accession to the EU and in 1995 became a member. Poland and 0 Estonia made their EU applications a few years later, but they had clearly expressed their wish to be 
members of the EC/EU as soon the Communist regimes fell at the end of the 1980s. 
24 It is difficult to give an exact timeframe for examining 'downloading' but the literature has often named 
the year 1989 as a starting point for Eastern European countries, because at that time tile Communist 
regimes began to fall. For the UK and Finland, it is much more difficult to say when tile 'downloading' 
effect began. 
25 Institutions as independent variables include norms, ideas and values, such as notion of the EU 
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In order to validate the hypotheses, it is necessary to define causal mechanisms and 
causal processes through which the independent variables might have affected the 
dependent variable (Hay, 2002: 48). For this research, this means examining the factors 
that have affected the Europeanization of Parliaments in the EU policy process (ill the 
field of JHA), the conditions that may have facilitated tile possible influence exerted and 
the possible r easons why this differs between the four countries. The key question is to 
identify whether the variation between four different Parliaments ill participation in the 
field of JHA is caused by 1) legal traditions 2) geopolitical location 3) administrative 
resources available for National Parliaments or 4) socioeconomic level, by a combination 
of the four, or by none of the above (the null hypothesis). 
L6. Research Strategy and Methods 
The empirical focus of this study is a comparison of the Europeanization of National 
Parliaments in the EU's policy process in the JHA field and more particularly on 
immigration related questions. This research is based on a comparative approach that 
analyses similar processes and institutions in a limited number of countries selected for 
analytic reasons (Peters, 1998: 10). 26 In this research, the interesting question is 
comparing empirically whether and how successfully the NPs have 'uploaded' their 
preferences to the EU policy process, and the other dimension; and what role, if any, they 
have had in downloading these policy outcomes. The comparative approach has been 
chosen because it displays the highest level of relevance to this particular type of 
research. 
(1) Case Selection Criteria 
representing democratic ideals. Institutions as independent variables are mainly examined through the 
sociological and historical variants of institutionalism (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2001: 3). 
26' In addition, this research is based on qualitative 2, as opposed to quantitative research. The primary 
methods of qualitative research are participant observation and unstructured or semi -standard ised 
interviews (Gilbert, 2001: 124). This study uses the unstructured and semi-structured interviews as is 
explained later in more detail. 
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The countries used in this comparative study have been chosen on the basis of the 'most 
different system' 27 (Peters, 1998: 37) criteria: to have different legal traditions, different 
Parliamentary systems, disparities in size, socio-economical level, historical background, 
and in geopolitical location. The 'interesting question' in this research is an assumption 
that these countries are as different as possible in such a homogenous group as the EU, 
and therefore it is hoped that this project will produce some new knowledge. 
The four countries selected for this research are the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia. 
The aim is to compare whether and how the Europeanization of NPs varies between older 
and newer Member States. Further, these four EU Member States also have different 
historical backgrounds, which is partly related to their geopolitical location (Poland and 
Estonia are ex-communist states which has an impact on how immigration questions are 
understood in these countries). Moreover, the four EU Member States have different legal 
and political structures which have an impact on how 'indil-ect'and 'dh-ect' influence are 
exercised in these countries, and their legal traditions and different legacies are highly 
connected to their socio-economic level. 
The United Kingdom represents an example of an 'older' member state; Finland 
represents an example of a member state with more than ten years of experience as an EU 
state (and before that of being a member of EFTA); and Poland and Estonia are examples 
of the 'newest' EU member states. More than that, these four countries have been chosen 
to contribute a gap in the existing literature; there is no research comparing the 
Europeanization of NPs among the older and new member states; nor a comparison of 
their participation in the EU policy process in the JHA field. This research aims to find 
some interesting generalizations about the Europeanization of NPs in this particular 
policy field by looking at very different EU member states. The UK and Finland are 
countries with high socio-economic, levels, long traditions of democracy and well 
developed state structures. In addition, the existing literature has argued that the UK and 
Finland (along with Denmark and Netherlands) have the most effective systems for their 
27 The most important aspect of formulating either the most similar or the most different design is to select 
cases that make it possible to conclude something interesting about one's research question (Burnham et 
aL, 2004: 62). 
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Parliaments to participate in EU policy-making (Wessels et aL, 2003; Maurer and 
Wessels, 2001). Poland and Estonia, on the other hand, are former Communist countries, 
with lower socio-economic levels, and with new state institutions and structures. There is 
no comparative research done yet on their Parliamentary participation in EU policy- 
making. 
The structure of the four Parliaments differs as well. The UK has two Houses in its 
Parliament, both with different functions. Poland has also created a Parliamentary system 
similar to the UK with two Houses, although the functions are different compared to tile 
UK. Estonia's Parliamentary traditions, since it regained its independence from the 
Soviet Union are closer to those of Finland, with both countries having a one-charnber 
Parliament. In addition, the structure of Estonia's Parliamentary participation in EU 
affairs is similar that of Finland, as explained in this research. 
However, compared to Finland and the UK, Estonia and Poland have certain similarities 
besides their communist past. Both countries have been occupied by Russia and Germany 
and these experiences are assumed to have implications for how they consider, for 
instance, cooperation in the EU's common visa policy or how they define 'immigration' 
(Iglicka, 2004a: 2). 
Size and geopolitical location, which this research assumes to have some impact on the 
Europeanization of the four Parliaments, are as follows: Finland and Estonia are small 
EU nations with external borders, and are so called 'frontline' states to Russia; the UK is 
an island; Poland is the largest new EU member state also with a long EU external 
borderline. Finland is a member of Schengen Treaty28 , but the UK has 'opted OUti29 Of 
that core part of the JHA field. Further, despite Poland and Estonia having adopted all 
28 Schengen agreement was signed in 1985 between Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Germany and 
France in order to lifi: the border control between these countries. Later, other members of EU joined the 
agreement. In the Amsterdam Treaty, the Schengen agreement was incorporated as part of EU legislation. 
After Amsterdam, it also included common rules regarding visa questions, asylum-policy and control of the 
movement of third country nationals in the EU area. 
29 The UK and Denmark are not part of Schengen system; they chose to opt out or in on an issue -by issue 
by issue basis when the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed. 
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the existing Scheiigen acquis, they are still not allowed to participate in it. Therefore C, 
Finland is the only country fully participating in Schengem 
The relevance of this comparison could be questioned, as new member states, Poland 
and Estonia, do not have the same experience of membership obligations and rights as the 
UK and a relatively new member state like Finland. However, there are good reasons for 
choosing these countries for comparison. As already mentioned, Poland and Estonia have 
had almost all the obligations of EU membership before their membership in tile EU, so 
the domestic effects of transferring policies and institutions to them are likely to be 
comparable to the effects of the EU on its current member states (Grabbe, 2003: 302; 
Goetz, 2005: 275). In addition, compared to previous enlargements, when the UK and 
later Finland joined the EU, Poland and Estonia had far fewer possibilities for negotiating 
their accession to the EU in particular in the field of JHA as it became one of the most 
salient Policy fields of the EU when they were negotiating for their membership (see 
chapter 3). This had implications for how intensively these states worked to fulfil the 
membership criteria required by the EU. Further, Finland is a good example of a country 
thathas been an active participant of the EU policy process from the very beginning of its 
membership (Wessels, et aL, 2003; Maurer 2003). This means, however, that length of 
membership of the EU alone does not alone explain differences in participating in the EU 
policy process. 
(2) Data Collection 
The methods to be used in this project involve the analysis of secondary literature, 
official docurnentation, and journalistic sources, with the use of confirmatory semi- 
structured interviews to complement the content of these written sources. In the case of 
Poland and Estonia, interviews 30 played an important role in receiving information, 
together with official (Government, Parliament and EU institution) documents. This is 
30 The interview questions (see Appendix 6 and 7) are a little different in case of Poland and Estonia than in 
the case of the UK and Finland. This is because there were so limited resources available on the 
participation of NPs in Estonia and Poland that some questions which were found from literature in case of 
the UK and Finland simply did not exist in case of these two countries and therefore were asked in 
interviews. 
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because there is hardly any written academic material on their Parliamentary participation 
-in EU affairs. Moreover, there was no academic 
literature available regarding the 
Europeanization of NPs in the EU policy process in JHA field in these countries. 
In order to answer the research question, i. e. what are the factors that affect the 
Europeanization of these four Parliaments in the EU's policy process in the JHA field, 
required the use of a wide range of primary sources e. g. documents from NPs, their 
reports and statements, Parliamentary debates, annual reports, docurnents from the EU, 
national Government reports, statements, press releases and a relatively large body of 
secondary sources. 31 The secondary sources included statements from different NGOs 
(Statewatch, Refugee Councils in all four countries, and from ECRI), public opinion 
surveys, newspaper reports, speeches and academic publications. Statements of political 
parties were not analysed, because this research assumed that political differences are not 
that significant when considering the ways in which NPs participate in the EU's JHA 
policy process at EU level. This assumption is based on existing literature, which has 
argued that party differences are not a dividing issue when considering the EU's JHA 
field (Geddes, 2004; Raunio, forthcoming 2007; Verges and McLeod, 2006). 32 This is 
the main justification why this research does not to analyse the role of Political parties in 
this policy field. 
The main primary source for examining the role of each national Parliament was the 
individual national constitution and other legal documents, which defined the basis of the 
Parliaments' participation in the European policy process. The second important category 
of legal sources consisted of the EU Treaties, which proved to have given incentives for 
member states to improve their structures to integrate NPs rpore effectively into EU 
policy-making (such as the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam and-the 
Treaty of Nice). 33 
31 According to Kumar, secondary sources include 'Government or semi-Government publications', 'earlier 
research' and personal records (Kumar, 1996: 124). 
32 Exploration of this particular assumption might be something that could be done in separate study on this 
subject, but which was no possible in this research. 
33 The Treaty of Maastricht created EU's JHA field, and its Declarations mentioned the role of NPs for the 
first time. The Treaty of Amsterdam created the area of Freedom, Justice and Security which is important 
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The data for the main project, which examines the reasons for the participation of NPs in 
the EU policy-process, required access to information related to 'every-day practices' of 
NPs and EU institutions. This means that this research made use of a selected group of 
actors and experts because the abovementioned formal documents or existing literature 
did not provide that kind of information. Therefore, 'semi-structured interviews' 34 were 
conducted on the basis of an interview guide in each of the four Parliaments (London, 
, 
Helsinki, Warsaw and Tallinn) and with the-European Parliament. The first interviews in 
Helsinki and Tallinn were conducted between March and July 2003 and they were 
supplemented in 2005 and 2006 (a week in Brussels in June 2005, a week in Warsaw in 
October/November, a week in Helsinki in December 2005). In March/April 2006 a three 
weeks visit together in Helsinki/Tallinn/Warsa%v was spent conducting interviews with 
civil servants and Parliamentarians in these three countries. In the same year I spent two 
days in Brussels in July conducting further interviews. Between January and the end of 
March 2006 1 did several day trips to London where I visited both Houses of Parliaments 
in London, and had many email and phone conversations with the clerks of the House of 
Commons and House of Lords. I kept a record of all communication of this kind. In 
addition, I interviewed some British Parliamentarians on other occasions in 2006. Most of 
these interviews were complemented by phone/ernail correspondence (see the appendix 
for full lists of interviews). 35 
in the JHA field and further improved the roles of NPs in EU policy-making as explained in detail in 
chapter 4- The Treaty of Nice created a major role for NPs because it included Declaration 23 with a 
purpose to ensure the Union's capacity to act as an enlarged Union and increase the importance of National 
Parliaments in the EU's decision/policy making. 
34 To obtain in-depth information for the research question and to be aware that answers might include 
confidential information, a face-to face interview provided a room for speaking more freely, and 
guaranteed the confidentiality and flexibility with time spent on the interview (Robson, 2002: 272). 
Therefore the main technique applied to obtain this kind of supplementary information for this research was 
the elite interview method. One defining characteristics of elite intcrviewing is that some respondents may 
count more than others in terms of their influence on the decision-making process (Burnham et aL, 2004: 
205). The main advantage with this most common research technique is that parts of the interview will 
follow a prepared list of questions while other parts will leave room for opportunities for the respondents to 
expand on their views independent of any structure (Burnham et aL, 2004: 205-206). 
35 However, it is difficult to say exactly how many interviews I conducted because I interviewed many 
persons, such as tile clerks in the Finnish, Estonian and Polish Parliaments several times and the interviews 
were complemented with email correspondence. The same applies to the Finnish and Polish liaison officers 
in Brussels and to the clerks in the British Parliament. I have listed all the interviews and the main 
phone/email correspondence in the appendix. Of course there were some other occasions where I carried 
out the interviews in a more informal atmosphere: an example is the trip to Warsaw on 25-26 April 2006, 
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The target groups 36 for these interviewS37 were the Parliamentarians, clerks of the 
Parliaments, other civil servants of the Parliaments, experts (civil servants) in JHA 
38 questions both at the EU and at the national level. These experts were mainly from 
national Ministries of Justice and Home Affairs, from Ministries of Justice and Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs. Especially in the case of Finland, the Prime Minister's Office proved 
to have an important role in coordinating the EU policy at the highest level nationally 
because it is also the institution that is in the first instance responsible for giving 
information to Parliament in Finland and for this reason some key officials-in the Prime 
Minister's Offices (in Finland) were also interviewed. 
In addition, several academics and researchers from certain research-centres (CEPS, 
ECRI, Polish Foreign Affairs Institute) (see the appendix) were interviewed and the 
statements produced by these institutions were reviewed in order to gain more 
independent and potentially critical points of view than in the case of having only 
Parliamentarians and experts who work within the institutions (Parliaments and EU 
when I was able tojoin a delegation of the Finnish Grand Committee which was visiting the Polish 
Parliament. 
36 To obtain in-depth information for this research it meant conducting either semi-structured or 
unstructured interviews with key members of each Parliaments including civil servants for special 
committees, key Parliamentarians, their political advisors and civil servants in different ministries that 
deliver information to Parliaments. From personal experience of being a civil servant, the most useful civil 
servants were the 'middle level ones' because they have the best knowledge of specific questions. 
Moreover, compared to the directors and high level officials, they normally have more time for interviews 
and can be reached more easily. The disadvantage is that they might be too cautious to give any personal 
opinions. To overcome this limitation, certain key high-level officials (or their personal advisers) were 
interviewed as well. 
37 Another advantage of using the senni-structured method is that it allows the opportunity for interviewees 
to open up new topics that may lead to areas of inquiry that had not been previously considered (Burnham 
etal., 2004: 213). Since the aim of this thesis was to name the factors that affect the Europeanization of 
National Parliaments in order to make comparisons between differences, the elite interJews proved to be 
an effective way of carrying out large numbers of elite interviews. 
38 As part of that civil servant class, I have good contacts to most of the institutions that this research 
needed for information gathering. As a native Finnish speaker, I was able to use original documents in 
Finnish and use Finnish for interviews. This applied to a great extent to Estonia as well, because most of 
civil servants and Parliamentarians speak excellent Finnish or English. The only language problem 
emerged in the case of Poland. To overcome this challenge, I used English language and some translation 
services. In addition, central Polish documents were already translated into English as a consequence of EU 
membership. 
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institutions). In addition, either to compensate for disadvantages of the interview method 
or to establish additional interview possibilities, a 'snowball method' was employed. 39 
(4) Data Analysis 
The multiple sources of information gathered as outlined above were used to examine 
factors that in fluence the Europeanization of the four National Parliaments in the EU 
policy process by creating a narrative in order to answer whether the participation varied 
and to explain why. The analysis of this narrative tried to identify which of the 
hypotheses were able to explain the data. This research looked at special articles and 
amendments of legal acts and Parliamentary documents which defined the role of 
National Parliaments in the EU policy process as indicators in order to prove or disprove 
whether legal traditions influence the Europeanization and if so, how. For the second 
hypothesis, human resources i. e. the number of staff working for the Parliaments, the 
ftinding available for Parliamentarians for recruiting staff and creating informal 
connections with NGOs and other Parliaments or EU institutions; tile information 
resources of Parliaments (for instance data-banks, access of information, cooperation 
with other Parliaments and the EP, Governmental data-bases) were used as indicators 
proving or disproving whether the administrative resources contribute as a factor in 
explaining the Europeanization of NPs in the EU's policy process. After that, tile general 
employment situation in a particular country, the number of immigrant workers and 
general treatment of immigrants and asylum-seekers at domestic level (including how 
each of the four member ýtates is taking care of asylum-seekers and immigrants) or how 
interesting the Parliamentarians consider the immigrant theme as a political topic, were 
used as indicators to prove or disprove whether the socio-economic level of member 
states chosen for this comparative study influences the Europeanization of NPs in the 
JHA field. However, the socio-economic level of each member state is linked to 
immigration questions and to the role of National Parliaments more broadly because 
Parliaments mirror the values of 'ordinary people' which Governments are less likely to 
39 The advantage of the snow-ball method is that it can establish additional interview possibilities, meaning 
that interviewees will be asked to name some other key individuals that could be relevant for the particular 




do. Finally, the indicators to prove or disprove the fourth hypothesis: i. e. geopolit 
, 
ical 
location made use of certain geopolitical features such as 'external borderline' (or 
'frontline state'), non-European Union state or EU border land or island as indicators 
explaining whether the hypotheses matter. In practical terms the indicator was captured 
from Parliamentary debates, from interview data and from the Parliamentary debates and 
minutes of meetings. 
The collection of information from a variety of sources (documents from Parliaments, EU 
institutions, reports, Parliamentary debates, Parliamentary minutes of meetings, 
statements, elite interviews, web-sources) provided a way to triangulate and validate the 
reliability of information in the event of an overlap in content. This 'triangulation AO 
strategy was chosen in order to produce an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in 
question (Devine, 2002: 198-199). The advantage of using this 'triangulation strategy' is 
that it allows the use of two or more methods of data collection in order to test the 
hypotheses and measure variables (Landman, 2003: 19). It also prevents reliance upon a 
single piece of information and decreases the possibility of incorrect findings (Bryman, 
2001: 274). Therefore, by means of triangulation, this research compared: 
Interview findings with other sources of data (constitution, treaties etc. ); 
2) Responses offered by different interviewees on the same set of questions 
3) Views found from Parliamentary debates and from Parliamentary minutes of 
meetings. 
I am aware, however, of the limitations of a comparative study approach and the dangers 
of having four different countries for comparison and applying Europeanization as the 
conceptual framework. My aim was however, not to provide a unique explanation of how 
the four Parliaments form EU policy in JHA questions: rather it was to examine an under- 
40 , Triangulation' is defined as cross checking the existence of certain phenomena and the veracity of 
individual accounts by gathering data from a number of informants and sources and subsequently 
comparing and contrasting one account with another to produce as fully balanced study as possible (Peters, 
1998: 97-99). 
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researched dimension of EU policy-making and thereby to contribute to a Nvider literature 
and provide a more rounded account that includes Parliaments in JHA-qucstions. 
1.7. The Structure of the Thesis 
Following the logic of this research project, chapter 2 will review the recent literature on 
Europeanization and how it has been used to explain a wide variety of effects oil tile 
national scene with a direct EU source or indirect EU influence or impact. The chapter 
begins by exploring the link between the institutional theory and the concept of 
Europeanization and it then introduces various definitions of Europeanization. It will 
argue that the Europeanization of the Member States is not uniform but differential, 
which means that there is little consensus among scholars as to how to account for 
variation in the processes, degrees and outcomes of the domestic change. 
Having established the conceptual viability of this research in chapters I and 2, chapter 3 
will begin by explaining EU Justice and Home Affairs, which is now known as the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and how this policy field has developed from 
loose transnational cooperation to one of the most important and dynamic policy domains 
of the EU (Monar, 2001 a and 2004; Apap, 2002 and 2004; Lavenex and Wallace, 2005). 
It will argue that National Parliaments have traditionally been left out of this policy field 
because of tile dominance of elites and will explain why. In addition, this chapter aims to 
illustrate why it is important for NPs to be better engaged in this policy field.. This 
chapter will illustrate what problems the ever-growing tendency of creating more 
serniautonomous special agencies at the EU level can bring to Parliamentary 
participation. Further, this chapter will explain how secrecy in policy preparations in this 
policy field and the autonomy of elites within the Member States have impacted on the 
ways in which this policy field is Europeanized. In addition, this chapter will show that 
the democratic and judicial control mechanisms are largely marginalized in tile field of 
JHA policy and will give some explanations as to why this is so. 
Chapter 4 focuses on how the NPs have engaged themselves in EU policy-making and 
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how the EU has had an impact on them. It will explain why the existing literature 
considers NPs as the main losers in European integratign and analyse the reasons for 
categorizing them as 'passive' rather than 'active' institutions in tile EU policy process 
(Wessels et aL; 2003; Maurer 2003; Bengtson 2003; and Raunio 2001,2004; Kassim, 
2005; Holzhacker, 2006). This chapter will argue, first, that tile role of tile NPs has 
significantly increased in the EU policy process since late the 1980s beyond their natural 
task of influence and secondly, that the NPs have developed nexv methods of scrutiny, 
intensified mutual cooperation' among other NPs and created structures for networking 
and lobbying which all demonstrate evidence of Europeanization. 
Chapter 5 will examine how National Parliaments have made use of their opportunities to 
'upload' national preferences to the EU level. This chapter first compares the methods 
which the NPs in the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia have developed to participate in 
the EU policy process and introduces the channels they use to exercise their influence. 
This chapter will examine empirically their participation by comparing how these four 
Parliaments responded to one particular EU proposal (the Green Paper of Economic 
Migration)4 1 and with what implications. Further, chapter 5 will analyse other 
immigration-related Parliamentary debates in the four NPs chosen for this research in 
order to look at whether and how the NPs have used their influence opportunities to 
upload their preferences to the EU level. This chapter will argue that tile four Parliaments 
have institutional structures which offer adequate opportunities for influencing EU policy 
making and these structures have many similarities. It will examine whether that 
assumption is due to the process of Europeanization. Secondly, it will argue that, the 
questions considered by the NPs in the immigration field are relatively similar in the UK, 
Finland, Poland and Estonia. It will argue that NPs are mainly interested in issues that are 
restrictive: i. e. aimed at controlling immigration or preventing illegal immigrants from 
entering the EU area. It suggests that this is due to the process of Europeanization. 
The objective of chapter 6 is to look at the 'downloading' effect; that is how European 
policies have been incorporated into national structures in immigration-related issues in 
41 Commission of European Communities, 2004 (c) G)-een Papei- on an EU apIn-oach to managing 
economic inigi-ation, COM (2004) 811, final, I I. January 2005. 
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the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia and to analyse what role, if any, NPs have had in 
-that process. This chapter will first examine ho%v the adaptation process took place in 
each of the four Member States and after that which factors facilitated or delayed the 
process. Tile interesting question for this chapter is to what extent immigration and 
border control issues have changed at the national level due to the Europeanization 
process and what role NPs had in this process. This chapter will first show that the EU's 
'downloading' dimension is not always easily separated from the 'uploading' dimension, 
in particular in cases where the NPs have had a rather modest role in forming EU policy 
as has been the case in the field of immigration and border control issues. Secondly, it 
will show that the EU's rapidly growing JHA agenda has influenced Poland and Estonia 
more than the UK or Finland, but that the role taken by Parliaments is limited in each of 
the countries chosen for this comparison. 
Finally, chapter 7 draws together the conclusions of this comparative study, which 
concerns the participation of the National Parliaments in EU's policy-making process in 
the field of JHA and more particularly, on immigration-related questions. The main focus 
of this research is to explain the factors that affect the Europeanization of NPs in the EU 
policy process in the field of JHA and to analyse how NPs influence EU policy-making. 
The chapter will first explain the main findings of this research, and after t hat, link them 
back to the variables presented in chapter I in order to tell us whether they have any 
explanatory power. The findings will contribute not only to a more nuanced and 
enhanced understanding of the participation of NPs in the EU policy process but also to a 
more nuanced view of problems related to the field of JHA, in particular, to democratic 
control in that field. This chapter will conclude that in order to be more effectively 
involved in EU policy-making, in particular in the field of JHA, the NPs should make 
more use of their direct influence opportunities. With these concluding remarks this 
research aims to contribute to a wider literature and provide a more rounded account that 
includes Parliaments in JHA-questions. 
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Chapter 2. Review of Literature on Europeanization 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews tile recent literature on Europeanization: how it has been used to 
explain a wide variety of effects on the national scene with a direct EU source or indirect 
EU influence, and how the national actors, policies, ideas and structures influence back to 
the EU. The main aim is to examine how the concept of Europeanization can help to 
explain the increasing participation of National Parliaments (NPs) in EU policy-making. 
it will concentrate on explaining Nyliat Europeanization is, from where it comes and tile 
reasons why it became popular in EU studies. As mentioned in previous chapter, most 
Europeanization scholars agree that the impact of Europeanization on the Member States 
is not uniform but differential and there is little consensus among tile scholars on how to 
account for variation in the processes, degrees and outcomes of the domestic change. 
Having said that however, there are certain shared understandings of Europeanization, for 
instance, that it is an interactive process rather than a simple process of unidirectional 
reaction to 'Europe' (Bbrzel, 2005; Saurugger, 2005; Radaelli, 2006). 
This chapter will provide further arguments as to why the concept of Europeanization 
provides a useful tool for analysing the participation of National Parliaments in the EU's 
policy process in the field of JHA. This concept provides lenses to explore the roles of 
different actors and their interaction both at European and dornestic levels. Consequently, 
the concept of Europeanization can be understood as a process through which beliefs, 
norms, and values are diffused and institutionalized (Radaelli and Parquier, 2007: 43). 
Because of that understanding, the concept of Europeanization allows for an exploration 
different mechanisms of Europeanization, such as socialising and learning in tile EU 
system (Laffan, 2007: 139). With help of these mechanisms the aim is to produce more 
information about the adaptation and influence of domestic political actors, such as 
Parliaments. However, as mentioned earlier, research on domestic political actors and 
Europeanization is almost non-existent and in particular in the field of JHA. 
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This chapter begins by exploring the link between institutional theory and tile concept of 
Europeanization, which was briefly introduced in chapter 1, after which it will discuss 
different definitions of Europeanization. After that it will demonstrate how different 
understandings of Europeanization have been used in empirical EU studies by reviewing 
some of the most relevant contributions using the concept of Europeanization on EU 
policy-making and the ad aptation of policy outcomes at the national level. However, this 
assessment is not intended to rank these contributions according to which definition is tile 
best. Instead, the assessment in this chapter is to point the significant gaps in tile existing 
literature by focusing on two questions; 
1) How helpful is the concept of 'Europeanization' in explaining the participation 
of National Parliaments in the EU policy process? 
2) How do these different understandings of Europeanization fit with the 
particular policy-field of JHA? Do these explanations help to explain how 
National Parliaments 'upload' (i. e. influence) their national interest to the EU 
level) and how they 'download' the EU policy-outcomes (i. e. impact) 
domestically. 
2.1. Introduction to the Concept of Europeanization 
Since the beginning of the European integration process most of the dominant theories 
explaining European integration have been borrowed from the field of international 
relations. Theorizing has mainly been divided between two rationalist models of 
European integration: neo-functionalist explanations (Haas 1958, Lindberg and 
Scheingold 1970) and the realist criti4-ue of liberal intergovernmental ism (Moravcsik 
1993 and 1998). Both schools tried to explain the creation and stability of a case of 
interstate cooperation and the public policies that were consequentially produced at the 
supranational level (Jacquot and Woll, 2003: 1). With the progress of European 
integration, in particular after a decentralized balance of power system was transformed 
to European polity, it became clear that traditional theories of integration were no longer 
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adequate to describe or to explain developments at the European level (Caporaso, 2007: 
24). They were occupied with the viability of the sovereign state by approaching that 
question via the study of how a regional institution as EU with a supranational legal order 
has evolved (Vink and Graziano, 2007: 14). In questioning state to state, therefore, tile 
concept of Europeanization responded better to the question of 'unit variation' (Vink and 
Graziano, 2007: 14). 
The phenomenon of Europeanization became popular in political science relatively late, 
in the early 1990s, simply because the impact of the EU integration process on the 
Member States could no longer be ignored (Auel, 2005: 304). Since the Single European 
Act (SEA) in 1986, the EU was producing around 500 political decisions, directives and 
regulations each year, which not only affected the Member States but also their Politics 
and polities. The extent of the European impact on domestic levels due to legislation, 
norms and practices offers a strong argument to deploy the concept of Europeanization as 
explained in chapter 1. 
The focus of this literature review is on studies and concepts of Europeanization that 
draw on institutionalist arguments as briefly explained in chapter 1. Tile main reason is 
that Europeanization is not itself a theory. In addition, there is no common definition of 
Europeanization (Olson, 2002; Featherstone, 2003; Radaelli, 2006: Lavenex, 2007). As 
long as a 'grand-theory' of Europeanization is missing, most authors accept that there is 
not just one correct way to investigate Europeanization and its influence. Therefore, 
different conceptions of Europeanization complement rather than exclude each other 
(Olsen, 2002: 923, Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 15, Featherstone, 2003: 5, Jupille et aL, 2003: 
2; Radaelli, 2006: 57; Bulmer, 2007: 48), which is the main reason for its popularity 
among EU scholars. What follows is that-there are many possible approaches to 
Europeanization, depending on specific questions and different research topics of 
different disciplines. This section tries not to introduce them all but rather gives the 
reader a view of the broad variation of definitions and studies related to the concept of 
Europeanization. It begins by explaining the difference between rational and 
constructivist understandings. 
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-The main difference between rationalist and constructivist strands of institutionalism 
relates to their ontological assumptions, which in turn leads them to conceive of different 
logics of action (Sedelmeier, 2005: 18). Rational choice and historical institutionalism 
emphasize institutions as a set of rules which actors create and use rationally, and the 
action is driven by expectations of consequences (Aspinwall and Schneider, 200 1: 1). Key 
elements in policy-making which consider this logic of action are bargaining between 
states, coalition formations, exchange, and voting rules. They are all based on individual 
rationality and the action is driven by calculation of its consequences (March and Olsen, 
1998: 950). The main weakness of this logic is that it ignores problems of exogenous 
uncertainties, such as the negotiation environment (March and Olsen, 1998: 950). 
Tile constructivists, on the other hand, see institutions as forming identities and 
preferences - helping actors to interpret and give meaning to appropriate behaviour 
(Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 1). This type of action is seen as rule based. Human 
actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular. identities to particular 
situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities 
between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and 
situation (March and Olsen, 1998: 951). In the case of European integration, 
constructivist approaches call thus conceive of the EU as a cultural and social 
environment that shapes actors' identities and interests (Sedelmeier, 2005: 18). The 
purpose of action is associated with identity more than with interests, and more with the 
selection of rules than with individual rational expectations. This logic of action takes 
identities and rules, constitutive and regulative, and melds them through social interaction 
and experiences (March and Olsen, 1998: 952). The key elements in policy-making when 
following this logic of action are negotiations, which are based on true consensus- 
seeking, persuasion, social learning, socialising, and rule compliance. Actors are assumed 
to be egoistical rather than utility maximizers, contrary to the logic of consequences; but 
they apply self-restraint. As mentioned in chapter 1, the recent trend in Europeanization 
literature is to link both abovementioned logics to empirical investigations in order to 
Capture more comprehensively the ways in which the EU level decision-and policy- 
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making processes happen. The last section of this chapter will show empirical examples 
where both logics are used simultaneously. 
2.2. Many Definitions of Europeanization 
Most scholars see Europeanization as the EU's impact on the Member States. But there 
are differences of emphasis in these studies (Bache and Marshall, 2004: 1). Ladrech was 
the first to provide a precise, and since then widely cited, definition of Europeanization. 
He defined Europeanization as 'a process reorienting the direction and shape of politics 
to the degree the EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational 
logic of national politics and policy-making' (Ladrech, 1994: 69). For Radaelli, 
Europeanization consists of a process of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
and 'ways of doing things' (Radaelli, 2006: 59). It also 'consists of shared beliefs and 
norms that are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political 
structures and public policies' (Radaelli, 2006: 59). For Featherstone, Europeanization is 
a process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and 
interests (Featherstone, 2003: 1). 
Common to all these understandings is that Europeanization is an interactive process 
which means that it is much more than a 'top-down' notion of the impact of the EU on 
domestic systems. ' It is broadly accepted that various change processes occur 
simultaneously and at numerous levels, but opinion is divided among scholars on how 
these changes take place and what kind of impact they produce. Most Europeanization 
I The impact of Europeanization on domestic institutions has been investigated from different points of 
view, first to what extent Europeanization influences public policies; ( Ladrech, 1994, Radaelli, 2000, 
2004, Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999, Cowles, 2001, Heritier, 2001, Risse and Bbrzel, 2003, Bbrzel, 2002 and 
2004, Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003, Haverland, 2003, Monar, 2001a, 2003b), second, on national 
institutional structure (Meny el aL, 1996, Kassim, 2003 and 2005, Giulliani, 2003, Bulmer and Burch, 
2001, Bache and Marshall, 2004, Olsen 2002, Dyson and Goetz, 2003), third, on national identities, ( 
Checkel, 2001c and 2003, Risse, 2001, Wiener, 2000 and 2006), policy-formation and discourses; 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001 and 2003, Lewis, 2003, B6rzel, 2004, Morth, 2003, Sedplmeier, 2005, Grabbe, 
2006). Besides these, the impact of Europeanization has been applied to many other fields which cannot be 
covered here. 
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studies emphasize institutions, and more specifically their mediating effects (136rzel, 
2002 and 2005; Cowles et al., 2001). Others have argued that the European integration 
process has impacted on ideas, beliefs and role orientations of different actors (Mth, 
2003; Auel, 2005). In addition, attempts have been made to find evidence that 
Europeanization can be conceptualized in a way that makes it possible to compare 
European dynamics with other systems of governance, to demonstrate that 
Europeanization is not a unique process and a sid genei-is phenomenon (Olsen, 2002: 
922). 
Europeanization research has not been restricted to EU Members States only, but has also 
included non-members Switzerland and Norway (March et al. 2002) and candidate 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005 
and 2006; Grabbe, 2001,2003 and 2006; Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004; Dimitrova, 
2005). Most of these studies have explored the mechanisms by which EU rules have been 
adopted in accession countries by stressing three main mechanisms: 'external incentives 
model', 'social learning model' and 'lessons-drawing model'. In addition, these studies 
have emphasised the role of 'conditionality' and they have stressed tile 'top-down' 
approach (Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004; Grabbe, 2003 and 2006). 2 
As already mentioned in chapter 1, Europeanization poses several ontological difficulties 
such as how to explain processes and outcomes. This is considered a problem for some 
authors, because many Europeanization studies define processes and outcomes botlý as 
'Europeanization' without separating them from each other (Caporaso, 1996: 30). 
Another difficulty with European ization studies is that cause and effect in the 
Europeanization process can be deceptive; for example, relatively 'small' and technical 
EU obligations may have widespread domestic ramifications in certain/settings and be a 
subterfuge for further changes (Featherstone, 2003: 4). Moreover, the relationship 
between structure and agency is by no means simple; there could be different types of 
2 Term conditionality in the context of EU enlargement is understood as the desire of most CEECs tojoin 
the EU, combined with the high volume and intrusiveness of the rules attached to its membership 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2006: 12). This development has allowed the EU to influence on the 
restructuring of domestic institutions and entire range of public policies in the CEECs. 
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actors: individual, collective, or corporate, and their action might overlap (Featherstone, 
2003: 4; Radaelli, 2006: 61). Furthermore, and particularly relevant for Europeanization 
studies of National Parliaments (NPs), is how to measure accurately institutional change 
over time without having the propýr tools to do it (Holzhacker, 2007: 15 1). To sum up, 
all this tells us that Europeanization as a conceptual framework is not easy to define. 
2.3. Two Generations of Europeanization Studies; 'Top-down' and 'Bottom-up' 
Perspectives 
As explained in the conceptual section in chapter 1, most recent Europeanization studies 
recognize Europeanization as a 'two-way process', or as a 'process of interaction' which 
involves the evolution of European institutions that impact on the political structures and 
processes of the Member States (B6rzel, 2002: 193). This means that domestic actors 
often have discretion to use Europe in many different ways: for instance they may see EU 
as discursively creating impacts, or they may draw on Europe as a resource without 
specific pressure from Brussels, or they may become trapped in European discourses and 
sOcialisation, processes that cannot be captured by a narrow notion of impact (Radaelli, 
2006: 59). 
This leads to a discussion of the two approaches to Europeanization (top-down and 
bottom-up). First generation of Europeanization research can be traced back to the early 
1970s and. It took a 'top-down' perspective, where the focus was to understand how 
Member States were 'downloading' European policies (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 16; 
Radaelli, 2006: 60). Typical for early 'top-down' research was a narrow, linear notion of 
'impact' (of the EU on the domestic system). This perspective expected to find a strong 
'mismatch' between European and domestic levels, particularly between legal 
institutional, and procedural factors. Tile early 'top-down' perspective emphasized the 
reactive and involuntary nature of adaptation by mainly focusing on policy and polity 
dimensions (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 15-16). This perspective also defined 
Europeanization in substantive terms and was focused on 'end state' effects (Dyson and 
Goetz, 2003: 15-16). However, this classical 'top-down' approach, which is still present 
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in current research projects is put in the figure (see table 2.1. ) (Radaelli, 2006: 59). In this 
table the pressure is expected to come mostly from European level 'Brussels' to domestic 
level and where the domestic actors are mainly 'downloading' or adapting to European 
policies without responding back to the EU level. 
Table 2.1. The pressure for change (Radaciii, 2006: 59) 
'Pressure' from Europe on Member States > intervening variable > reaction and change 
The second generation of Europeanization studies (i. e. the 'bottom-up' perspective) 
which emerged in the 1990s has different approach. This 'Bottom-up' perspective 
emphasizes changes in informal institutions such as norms and values. Instead of starting 
from European policies (or politics) as the independent variable and tracking down the 
consequences for domestic actors and policies, it starts and finishes at the level of 
domestic actors (Radaelli, 2006: 60). It also highlights the system of interaction at both 
levels (i. e. at the national and at the EU level). It differs from the first generation by 
emphasizing more voluntary adaptation through policy transfer and learning. It a lso notes 
the differential impact of Europe and does not expect to see an increase in cross-national 
convergence dynamics (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 15). This approach tries to answer 
whether, when, and how the EU provides a change in any of the main components of the 
system of interaction (Radaelli, 2006: 59-60). Also, compared to tile earlier 'top-down' 
approach, the second generation studies combine existing concepts and theories, often 
borrowed from comparative politics and theoretical policy analysis (Featherstone and 
Radaelli, 2003: 340). 
As explained earlier, one explicit link between these two understandings that has arisen 
from the 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' dimensions is to consider Europeanization as a 'two 
way process' (B6rzcl, 2002; B6rzel, 2005). According to this understanding the 'bottom- 
up' dimension, which could be also termed as 'uploading' is about constructing the EU 
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system of governance, whereas the 'top-down' dimension ('downloading') is about 
domestic impact (B6rzel 2002; B6rzel, 2005). The main advantage in separating 
cuploading' and 'downloading' dimensions is to analyse whether Member States (or any 
actors represented through Member States, such as National Parliaments) are able to 
bring their policy models to the EU level and if so, how these outcomes are later 
'downloaded' in domestic level (Bbrzel, 2002; B6rzel 2005). 
. 
2.4. Mechanisms of Europeanization 
The section above aimed to explain how the concept of Europeanization has evolved 
together with the European integration process and why it has became a widely used 
concept in EU studies. Chapter I explained briefly that there are different mechanisms of 
Europeanization (i. e. the mechanisms through which Europe can affect the Member 
States, a nd how the change occurs). This section explains what the mechanisms of 
Europeanization are and how they are used in Europeanization studies. The main 
challenge related to (any) mechanisms of Europeanization is, how to know whether 
domestic change is correlated or caused by EU influence and not by some other variable 
such as globalization or as an input of domestic politics (Wallace, 2005: 31). This is 
particularly problematic, because Europeanization is more a process than an end-state 
(Radaelli and Rasquier, 2007: 39). Consequently, it cannot be measured until the criteria 
used to track Own the process and its outcomes are spelled out explicitly (Radaelli and 
Pasquier, 2007: 39). 
One explanation of mechanisms of Europeanization is put forward by Bulmer and 
Radaelli (as briefly explained in chapter 1), who define the change (i. e. Europeanization) 
as about governance and processes. It covers both cases where EU policies exist, and 
other cases where EU-Ievel discussion does not end up with policies, yet domestic actors 
reorient their behaviour because 'Europe' has become the common grammar (Radaelli, 
2006: 69). The mechanisms whereby EU Policy is Put into practice at tile domestic level 
are governance by negotiations, governance by positive and negative integration and 
facilitated coordination (BUlmer and Radaelli, 2004: 5). According this categorization, 
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learning and socialising are strongly present in negotiations and in facilitated 
coordination. 
2.4.1. Negotiations 
The first mechanism of Europeanization understands the EU as a constant state of 
negotiation across multiple policy areas. It suggests that in each case in which the EU 
takes a decision, whether it is legally binding or not (for example a political Declaration), - 
it is the culmination of a process of negotiation (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 4). This 
understanding suggests that the link between negotiations and Europeanization is the 
negotiation process itself, which again highlights the interactive process of 
Europeanization. According to this understanding the negotiations and bargaining can be 
regarded as one mechanism of Europeanization. This means that at the practical level 
Europeanization of national policy often requires several rounds of negotiation and 
legislation as part of the process of building up a shared understanding of new 
arrangements. As the empirical examples will demonstrate in chapter 3, for instance the 
decisions in immigration and asylum policies have hardly even been created in a single 
negotiation round. 
The creation of shared understanding of policy through learning on the part of 
participants is important for the potential success of Europeanization, in particular when 
policy comes to be put in to practice (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 5). This means that 
bargaining and negotiations are not exclusively policy formation. There could be a lot of 
bargaining at the level of dornestic actors and between different actors (for instance 
between Governments and the EU, interest groups, Parliaments and civil society) when 
EU outcomes are 'downloaded' to domestic legislation norms, and practices. Compliance 
can also be seen as negotiation; actors can bargain over sanctions or about the 
interpretation of the rules (Radaelli, 2006: 69). When actors bargain, the main mechanism 
of Europeanization is adaptation as a result of anticipated reaction (Radaelli, 2006: 69). 
Alternatively, the bargaining can be seen as a sid geneils process of socialization and 
learning, as the preferences may change in tile context of negotiations. 
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2.4.2. Negative / Positive Integration 
Second mechanism of Europeanization is called positive integration. It takes place where 
EU obligations prescribe an institutional model to which domestic arrangements have to 
be adjusted but where the legal competence lies at national level (Bulmer and Radaelli, 
2004: 5). This type of integration is typical in economic policy areas where positive 
gration generally entails market-correcting rules. 
That is to say, EU policy is designed integ 
to limit the damaging effects of the market process (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 6). The 
policy outcome has been negotiated at the EU level and the outcome is an agreed policy 
rule. The key interest here is that the agreed policy template has to be 'downloaded' to 
the member state level. A third mechanism of Europeanization is called negative 
integration. This mechanism occurs where EU legislation alters the domestic rules of the 
game; a good example of this kind of integration is single market legislation - the 
competence to make binding decisions is exclusive by the EU, and national actors have 
no choice except to adapt (i. e. to 'download' it). In practice, this type of mechanism is 
directed to policy areas where the removal of national barriers suffices to create a 
common policy (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 6). These two perspectives demonstrate well 
the coercive pressure that Dyson and Goetz argue is typical for 'downloading' 
perspective of Europeanization (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 15). However, in the field of 
JHA, there is very small number of policy 'templates' that has to be 'downloaded' to the 
Member States and where the competence to make binding decisions is exclusively by 
the EU, which is typical for the these two abovementioned mechanisms. 
2.4.3. Facilitated Coordination 
As new forms of policy-making and governance emerge in the EU context and softer 
forms of integration such as facilitated coordination, the 'Open Method of Coordination' 3 
3 According to Presidency conclusions of Lisbon European Council, 23-24 March 2000, the OMC is 
defined as EU guidelines combined with specific timetables; action to be undertaken at the national and 
regional level; benclimark-ing and sharing of best practice; qualitative and, when appropriate, quantitative 
indicators.. 'period monitoring, evaluation, and peer review organized as mutual learning processes'. The 
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(OMC) or benchmarking, which all are used in the field of EU immigration and border 
control policies, become more importapt, the role of the EU as the superior legislator is 
reduced (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 6; Wallace 2005: 30, Duina and Raunio, 2007; 
forthcoming). This means that the EU offers a platform for testing new ideas, to search 
-for best practices and a place to socialise and learn from each other. Therefore, one 
important mechanism through which the EU produces change at the domestic level is 
through learning and socialising, although, as mentioned in chapter one, learning and 
socialising can have horizontal dimensions as well. Consequently, Europeanization can 
be understood as a catalyst for recasting integration by seeking to 'upload' domestic 
institutional models, policy preferences and 'ways of doing things' to the EU level before 
institutionalizing them to domestic structures (Dyson and Goetz, 2003: 14, Wallace et aL, 
2005b: 30). Through this mechanism of Europeanization European policy alters the 
beliefs and expectations of domestic actors. This may in turn involve a change of 
preferences and strategies, as well as institutional adaptation at tile domestic level. This 
mechanism demonstrates clearly the interactive process of the EU's influence, which can 
include both perspectives of Europeanization; first 'uploading' national preferences or 
practices to the EU level and convincing other Member States of them and later, possibly 
'downloading' them domestically. With this mechanism there is no binding or forcing 
effect from the EU, but attitudes might change and in the long term produce either 
positive or negative integration. Typical for learning and socialising as mechanisms of 
Europeanization is that supranational institutions have very weak powers; they cannot act 
as strong agents promoting certain goals as is the case with the mechanisms of Positive 
/negative integration where tile EU policy outcomes are binding legislation (Bulmer and 
Radaelli, 2004: 7). On the other hand, these softer mechanisms of Europeanization 
(learning and socialising) highlight the voluntary and non-hierarchical character of tl ie 
term OMC was first used in Lisbon European Council in 2000 and its aim was to provide a definition for 
modes of policy-making that emerged recently in different policy areas (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 11). It 
aims to spread best practice and achieve convergence towards EU goals by using the EU as an arena for 
developing common views. As such, it hinges on horizontal mechanisms of governance rather than on the 
vertical imposition of models coming from the EU (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 11). For instance, in the 
field of the EU's JHA, and more specifically in questions related to the EU's immigration policy, ONIC 
works in conjunction with traditional, legislative EU instruments. In other areas, however, the OIMC helps 
the EU to enter new policy domains, where there is no legislation and where Member States consider that 
there is no scope for legislative action at the EU level (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 11 
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EU policy-making which in the long term can produce shared policy principles or 'ways 
of doing things' (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 7). 
2.4.3. 'Goodness of rit' Model 
Tile last, rather different attempt to conceptualize the mechanisms of Europeanization is 
the 'goodness of fit' model. Different from the abovementioned mechanism, this model 
has been used in several studies to measure the domestic change that the EU has 
produced (136rzel, 2002; 2005, Cowles et al, 2001). According to this understanding, tile 
issue whether 'Europe' produces 'domestic change' is not problematic: according to this 
approach the study of Europeanization exists only insofar as there is a clear 'EU origin, 
(policy or politics) (136rzel, 2005: 50). This model is briefly discussed here because it was 
one of the first applications that tried to understand both the processes by which 
European integration produces domestic change and the outcomes of that change. 
'Goodness of fit' is a strongly criticized concept because it stresses adaptational pressure 
as a condition for change: there must be some degree of misfit or incompatibility between 
EU-1eivel processes and national ones (136rzel and Risse, 2003: 57). In other words, in 
order to create domestic change, this model expects _'Europe' 
to be somewhat 
uncomfortable for domestic institutions. (136rzel, 2005: 50). 
This model is criticized for being useful only for measuring the effects of 
Europeanization when an EU model exists which is. to be implemented (for instance the 
EU's environmental regulations, i. e. mainly in positive integration) (Knill and Lellmkuhl, 
2002: 260; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 9; Radaelli, 2006: 64). In addition, this model 
ignores the cases where EU policy has been an absolute innovation for domestic 
institutions (i. e. sometimes the input for change is produced at the national level before 
the EU even begins preparing something similar) (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 9). For 
instance there are examples where some Member States have established certain policies 
(such as environmental policies) based on their domestic needs and it has taken a long 
time before similar issues have been created at the EU level. Moreover, there are a 
number of examples where Member States have been under little adaptational pressure 
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from EU regulation but have still used new European policy to justify and legitimize 
A ornestic change (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 9). Heritier et al. for instance have 
presented empirical evidence of European policies leading to domestic reforms even in 
the absence of adaptational pressure (Heritier et al., 2001: 2 88_89). 4 They argue that 
European policies can be exploited by national actors engaged in policy reforms even if 
European and national arrangements are compatible (Heritier et al., 2002: -289). Finally, 
the . 
'goodness of fit' model does not predict how countries will respond to 
Europeanization; one country might be under strong adaptational pressure and still be 
able to implement EU policy without problems. 
To surn up, in tile light of the existing literature the 'goodness of fit' model is relevant 
only for measuring domestic change when an EU model exists. This means that a 
Member State has just one option: to 'download' these at the national level. This model is 
therefore not the most suitable model for explaining both aspects; the 'uploading and 
downloading' perspective' of Europeanization. 
2.5. Outcomes of Europeanization 
This section aims to explore the outcomes of Europeanization. As mentioned earlier, 
explaining the outcomes, together with the mechanisms of Europeanization, are the most 
controversial parts of this concept, because it is difficult to determine whether domestic 
change is correlated with or caused by Europeanization and not by some other factors i. e. 
it is not always clear what is the effect and what is the outcome (Radaelli, 2006: 66; 
Wallace, 2005: 30). To decide whether outcome is produced by Europeanization, 
Radaelli (2006) has suggested that Europeanization must lead to a change at the domestic 
level. However, this is not as simple to measure as it sounds, because as the previous 
section clearly demonstrated, Europeanization often covers slow processes of 
socialisation combined with other mechanisms of change not only at the domestic level 
4 This applies for instance to the development of environment policy in Spain and the most recent example 
of this is the transfer of the EU's competition policy to certain new Eastern Member States where no 
competition policy existed before the EU 'aquis' was transformed. 
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but also at the EU level. For example, a ministry can have organisational restructuring in 
order to cope with EU obligations or the outcome of Europeanization can be a legal 
transposition of an EU Directive into national legislation. In both examples the change 
can occur after a long time period, and it might be difficult to track back exactly by 
whom the change was initially produced, because sometimes Member States 'download' 
policies without necessarily thinking that they are EU policies. On tile other hand, this 
situation can also be interpreted as successful Europeanization, because in this case 
national actors have adapted 'the ways of thinking' so well that these practices are not 
considered as 'European' issues any longer but as 'national'. 
Therefore, the definition of Europeanization is important for how the outcomes are 
described. Those scholars who refer to Europeanization more as a process of' adaptation 
(i. e. the change is produced by adaptational pressure), have named five possible 
outcomes of Europeanization regarding the scope or degree of change: inertia, absorption, 
accommodation, transformation and retrenchment (Bbrzel 1999, Green Cowles et aL, 
2001, Knill and Lehmkul 2002, Schmidt 2002). Inertia is when no change occurs, 
generally if the lack of fit is too big (i. e. if national policy, institutions, practices, norms 
are too different from those promoted by the EU). Absorption is described as limited 
adaptation, where Member States incorporate European requirements into their domestic 
institutions and policies with substantial modifications of existing structures and the logic 
of political behaviour (136rzel, 2005: 59). The third outcome is accommodation, where 
Member States accommodate European pressure by adapting existing processes, policies 
and institutions in their periphery without changing core features and the underlying 
understandings attached to them (Bbrzel, 2005: 59). The fourth possible outcome is 
transformation, which implies a major domestic adjustment (change of party system, of 
macroeconomic policies, of cognitive structure). The last outcome, retrenchment, means 
that the resistance to change may have the paradoxical effect of increasing rather than 
decreasing misfit between the European and domestic levels. 
Table 2.2. Outcomes of Europeanization (source: Bbrzel, 2005) 
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No Change Low Change Medium Change High Change 
Reaffirmation 
Inertia 
Absorption Accommodation Transformation 
However, those authors who have argued that outcomes of Europeanization do not 
necessarily arise out of adaptational pressure, have different views of the outcomes. For 
instance Mbrth (2003), who examined how EU ideas and paradigms were translated into 
national policies, argued that some policies are more adjustable to EU effects than others. 
For her, the outcomes of Europeanization were the ways in which national policies were 
strengthened due to the impact of the EU and how the EU impact gave additional 
legitimacy to domestic reformers in search of justifications for various reforms. Further, 
M6rth argued that it is misleading to think that we can always establish the EU's impact 
on domestic politics (Mbrth, 2003: 173). Instead, the processes at the EU and domestic 
levels are mutually constitutive and they cannot be studied as separate processes (2003: 
173). In addition, as argued by Bulmer and Radaelli, (2004) at the every day level, 
Member States hardly ever succeed in 'uploading' their preferences to other partners at 
the EU level and therefore the most likely EU level outcome in practical terms is a 
synthetic construction arising from different national approaches (Bulmer and Radaelli, 
2004: 5) 
2.6. Empirical Investigations of Europeanization 
This last part of the chapter will demonstrate the variety of different empirical 
applications of the concept of Europeanization combined with institutioDalist approaches. 
In each of these applications institutions play a key role. The other aim of this part is to 
show how differently elements from rational choice institutionalism and from 
constructivist strands of institutional approaches as explained in chapter I have been 
applied in practice together with the concept of Europeanization. In addition, this part 
will demonstrate how the concept of Europeanization has been deployed in a variety of 
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policy fields, and demonstrate how the perspectives of 'downloading' and 'uploading' 
have been empirically tested. However, empirical investigations of Europeanization and 
National Parliaments are not dealt with in this chapter. Instead, the Europeanization and 
the NPs are analysed in their own chapter (chapter 4). 
2.6.1. Europeanization Combined with Rational Choice and Constructivist 
Combinations 
As mentioned in the previous section, Europeanization can be understood as a discourse, 
where policy-makers and stakeholders construct Europe thorough language and 
communication. According to this understanding, discourse can change the prererences of 
actors or reformulate policy problerns (Radaelli, 2006: 65) An empirical example of 
research of this kind is that of Schimmelfermig's (2003) work, where he analysed tile 
reasons why the EU decided to enlarge to Central and Eastern Europe (CEEs). The 
discourse is here understood as 'rhetorical, ' meaning that Member States used arguments 
strategically based on the constitutive values and norms of the EU to compensate for their 
bargaining power. The 'rhetoric' was used in order to create moral pressure to make the 
2004 enlargement take place. Schimmelfennig's work is interesting for another feason; he 
combined the concept of Europeanization together with certain elements from rational 
and from constructivist strands of institutionalism. In his work lie demonstrated how 
national preferences that form the basis of the EU policy process are based on national 
preferences (cost/benefit calculations) and how Member States in practice try to 'upload' 
these at the EU level by using 'rhetoric'. Schimmelfermig argued that against the purely 
rationalist assumptions, the final decision to enlarge to CEEs cannot be explained on the 
basis of preferences, bargaining power or by formal decision-making rules. However, it 
cannot be explained by constructivist assumptions either, because it did not follow the 
logic of appropriateness, or result from a true consensus after a norm-regulated 
interaction or a truth-seeking discourse among the participating actors (Schimmelfermig, 
2003: 179). Rather, the outcome highlighted the informal, cultural side of the EU 
institutions and the soft mechanisms of institutional effects and rule enforcement that are 
typical for EU politics taken in the community environment (Schimmelfermig, 2003: C 
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179). These are the reasons why he concluded that the process that led to enlargement 
-was characterized by the strategic use of norm-based arguments and the opponents' mere 
acquiescence to enlargement tinder moral pressure (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 179). What 
this work demonstrated was that the best way to explain EU negotiation outcomes was to 
combine elements from both rational and constructivist schools. 
Another way to combine elements of the rational and constructivist approaches together 
with the concept of Europeanization was developed by Clieckel (2001b). He compared 
facto rs that affected how two different states (Germany and the Ukraine) adapted 
domestically to a new norm that was developed by the Council of Europe (i. e. how a 
European level policy outcome was 'downloaded' to dornestic structures). His approach, 
contrary to the previous one, highlighted more the process or learning and socialising. 
Checkel argued that the mechanism that produced the change was the interaction between 
agents. This kind of interaction can lead to mutual learning and to the discovery of new 
preferences. He argued that if the environment is favourable for mutual learning, this 
learning process can change previous preferences, even if they were based on rational 
calculations (Checkel, 2001b: 551). Further, Checkel argued that social learning and 
normative diffusion can explain key aspects of Europeanization more completely than the 
rational choice approach does alone (Checkel, 2001 b: 19). In order to prove his argument, 
he combined elements from both schools to catch the dynamics of norm diffusion in 
various settings, and found evidence that social learning can explain why European 
identity changes. But lie also noticed that domestic politics - in particular, the 
institutional and historical context - can delimit the causal role of persuasion and social 
learning. This was the result of his first case study, where the 'downloading' of European 
norm was not based on learning but on the more coercive pressure coming from the 
5 European level. Nevertheless, Checkel's empirical investigations provided another view 
5 In the case of Germany, Checkel draws strongly on assumptions made by historical institutionalism by 
. saying that norms, once 
institutionalized, gain a particular staying power and political influence (Checkel, 
2001: 565). In practice, this means that historically constructed domestic identity norms create barriers to 
agent's learning from regional and international norms. In Germany, the concept of citizenship was based 
on ethnic ideas that differed greatly from the idea of citizenship policy created by the Council of Europe. 
The resistance of social learning in such a case is strong and the state compliance is expected to take place 
through sanctioning and cost/benefit analysis (i. e. by rational rationalist explanations of state compliance 
based on shaming effects). On the other hand, historical legacies in the Ukraine facilitated compliance 
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of how the outcome of Europeanization (i. e. the domestic change) can be a product of 
rational calculation together with learning and socialising. 
The third example analysing llo%v the decision-making environment influenced the final 
outcome belongs to Lewis (2003). He examined how EU policy was formed in 
COREPER 6 and how the negotiation process altered the attitudes of the negotiators. This 
study highlighted the more voluntary viewpoint of European ization, where learning and 
altering policy-beliefs were stressed. Lewis demonstrated that in the context of daily EU 
decision-making, neither image (rational or constructivist) by itself, fully captured the 
logic of interaction or causal impact of the institutional environment (Lewis, 2003: 120). 
This is because there was not a particular clear-cut instance to be found when members in 
COREPER changed preferences during the course of negotiations. Instead, he found 
evidence of strong self-restraint during the negotiations (Lewis, 2003: 120). What this 
finding tells us, is that constructivist assumptions can sometimes explain the story of EU 
decision-making better than rationalist ones. Institutional and normative environments, 
especially those that operate at the high level of issue density and insulation, can produce 
changes in identities, attitudes and roles, which can lead to value in the system of 
collective decision-making itself, but as the example of Lewis' other case study 
7 demonstrated, this is not always the outcome (Lewis, 2003: 106). Again, this example 
showed that there are certain limitations to the Europeanization effect. In this case, it was 
because the Ukraine did not have clear national identity as is the case in Germany (Checkel, 2001: 573). 
This lack of historical context made it easier for the Ukraine to learn and accept new norms, because there 
were no contradictory norms against the new ones 
6 Coreper is one of the earliest institutions of the EU and an important legislative level of EU decision- 
making just below the heads of state and Governments consisting of ambassadors of the permanent 
representation of the EU being. posted in Brussels. It prepares the upcoming ministerial meetings and tries 
to solve problems before the Council meetings. It is one of the least visible layers of governance in the EU 
system and it is highly confidential. 
7 Lewis compared the negotiation histories of two EU legislative acts: the first case concerned the electoral 
rights of citizens (EC94/80) and the second one, working time directive (93/104/EC). The latter example 
revealed the limits of norm compliance under conditions of partial socialization (Lewis, 2003: 119). The 
domestic visibility of that particular subject in the UK made it mainly impossible to be decided in the 
Coreper. In this case the UK used publicity against the 'informal nonns' followed in the Coreper (to avoid 
publicity with issues at preparation stage) from egoistic national reasons (strong domestic pressures). The Z, 
strategy that the UK used in the preparation of this directive, led to the lowest common denominator which 
is completely consistent with rationalist expectations of bargaining and consensus seeking (Lewis, 2003: 
119). 
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the strong national public interest, which meant that learning and socialising were not 
possible mechanisms for Europeanization when a strong national resistance existed. 
2.6.2. Europeanization and Institutional Adaptation 
This section will review literature which has analysed hoxv the domestic institutions have 
adapted to the EU in order to show how the concept of Europeanization has been used in 
this context. In addition, the following examples will demonstrate how the concept of 
Europeanization is understood as a process or 'two-way street'. The first approach 
developed by Bulmer and Burch is undertaken in the light of historical institutionalism by 
'comparing how Governments in two of the largest EU Member States (Germany and the 
UK) have adjusted to Europeanization, and whether the domestic institutional structure 
has been 'Europeanized' and if so, how deeply. They also identify the process of 
Europeanization as a highly interactive and iterative process, which is typical for studies 
that include 'downloading' and 'uploading' processes, as explained earlier in this chapter. 
For them, historical and sociological (constructivists) strands of institutional isms are 
linked - the continuous process of the adaptation of central Governments to 
Europeanization consists of informal institutional features along with norms and these 
features have considerable significance (Bulm6r and Burch, 2001: 75). Their main 
argument is that the adaptation of central Governments in these two countries has 
changed significantly as a result of EU/EC membership (Bulmer and Burch, 2001: 75). 
Further, they name two possible ways for policy adaptation to occur; the first one is to 
make domestic policy compatible with the requirements of EU policy as defined in 
. passive terms, 
i. e. 'downloading' and the more active way is to seek possibilities to 
'upload' domestic poligy models, ideas and details to the EU. 
Bulmer and Burch observed that the development of EU policy-making in these two 
Member States was influenced by three initial elements: by tile circumstances of 
accession; by the political context in these two countries; and by their state structures and 
legal traditions. The effects of these initial elements continued to impact the adaptation 
process of central Governments significantly over long tirne period (Bulmer and Burch, 
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2001: 82)8 . They argued that the British adaptation is compatible with the requirements of 
EU policy but that the UK has not succeeded in 'uploading' domestic policy models, 
ideas and details to the EU (Bulmer and Burch, 2001: 82). On the other hand, their 
comparisons demonstrated that Germany had been more effective than the UK in two 
respects; first, by projecting ideas into the EU arena; and secondly, in 'uploading' its 
domestic institutional arrangements to the EU - with the European Central Bank one 
successful example of that (Bulmer and Burch, '2001: 91). Their final argument was that 
national co-ordination matters, but not as much as the history of a particular state. The 
historical and cultural context are of particular importance; the design of central 
Government institutions for handling EU policy has been strongly influenced by 
circumstances in the past (Bulmer and Burch, 2001: 93). 
Another attempt to combine in a more concrete way the 'uploading' and 'downloading' 
perspectives of Europeanization is undertaken by 136rzel who examined how Member 
State responses to Europeanization feed back into EU institutions and policy processes 
(Bbrzel, 2002). She developed an approach that links conceptually two previously 
mentioned ('bottom-up' and 'top-down') perspectives of Europeanization. This approach 
focused on the ways in which member state Governments both shape ('upload') 
European policy outcomes and adapt ('download') to them (136rzel, 2002: 193). Her aim 
was to identify the factors that define the capacity of Member States to 'upload' and 
'download' EU policies and then she tested her hypotheses in the field of the EU's 
environmental policy. She argued that the main motivation for Member States to 'upload' 
national preferences to the EU level is to find a balance between maximizing the benefits 
and minimizing the costs of these policies. This means that influencing EU policies at the 
EU level reduces the need for legal and administrative adaptation when 'downloading' 
them nationally; the more European policy 'fits' the domestic context, the lower tile costs 
of adaptation in the implementation process (B6rzel, 2002: 193). Secondly, and 
especially in the case of environmental policy, there is a significant economic reason as 
well; influencing EU policies can prevent competitive disadvantages for domestic =1 
8 The analysed the adaptation process in case of Germany since tile establishment of EC and in the case of 
the UK, since it applied first time membership in the EC. 
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industry (Bbrzel, 2003: 4). Finally, participating in the process of EU policy-making can 
help national Governments address problems which cannot be effectively dealt with at 
the domestic level any more due to powerful domestic opposition or because of the cross- 
border dimension (Bbrzel, 2003: 4). 
As a consequence, Member States are not merely passive takers of European demands for 
domestic change. Rather, they can proactively influence European policies, institutions 
and processes to which they have to adapt later (136rzel, 2003: 3) For Bbrzel, national 
executives hold a key position in that two-way process. She argued that there are three 
different categories of Member States regarding their capacities and interests which all 
have impact on how they have responded to Europeanization: (1) pace-setting (2) foot- 
dragging and (3) fence-sitting. - 
An important way for Member States to be able to 'upload' EU policy is to offer 
expertise and information to'the EU Commission in drafting of policy proposals. 
Moreover, being active in different networks that prepare and accompany the EU 
negotiation processes both at the national and at the EU level is another effective way to 
influence the policy outcome (136rzel, 2003: 7). However, offering expertise, information, 
and being present in different networks demands money and resources which Member 
States do not have equally available (Bbrzel, 2003: 7). She discovered that the effective 
'downloading' of EU policies and decisions required similar resources as the 'uploading' 
of EU policy; implementation problems often arise when there is no effective 
coordination of EU policy at the national level and when there are not enough civil 
servants or they are not credible in enforcing EU policies domestically. She argued that 
there is a strong link between administrative resources and the administrative legitimacy 
of the Member States and their opportunities to influence EU policies. She observed that 
the most influential Member States shared a low level of administrative fragmentation, 
had a high amount of administrative resources available and enjoyed a high level of 
administrative legitimacy (136rzel, 2003: 12). The six environmental pace-setters were the 
most influential 'uploaders' of the EU's environmental policies and they had also 
'downloaded' the EU's environmental policies most effectively. The 'foot-draggers' 
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could not 'upload' national preferences to the EU level as they had 'downloaded' the EU 
policies ineffectively. 'Fence-sitters' had 'downloaded' better than they 'uploaded' EU 
policy (Bbrzel, 2003: 12). 
To sum up, these two empirical examples demonstrate that the EU policy process can be 
understood as an interactive process where the Member States are no longerjust passive 
'takers' of EU policies but also effective 'shapers'. In these studies the 'uploading' 
perspective was about constructing EU policy whereas the 'downloading' dimension 
illustrated the link to domestic impact. 
2.6.3. Europeanization and Justice and Home Affairs 
Finally this part of the chapter reviews how the concept of Europeanization has been 
deployed in the policy field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). However, as mentioned 
earlier, the sectoral balance of theoretically informed work in Europeanization studies has 
been dominated first pillar matters, such as environmental policy, whereas 
intergovernmental studies, in particular in the field of JHA, have received far less 
attention (Bulmer, 2007: 57). As chapter 3 will explain, the JHA field is one of the 
newest and politically most controversial policy fields. Without going into tile special 
nature of this policy field this section will show what limited research has been done 9 on 
this policy, using the concept of Europeanization, which follows the approach in the 
-section above (i. e. how change at dornestic level takes place due to the EU effect)'O. This 
9A small part of the literature concentrates on the economic consequences9 of immigration and the 
Europeanization, on the problems with external border-controls and their Europeanization9, or on 
democratic deficit problems with the new institutions such as EuropoI9 or Eurojust. 
'0 Further, there is the large number of studies investigating the impact of tile courts on the evolution of EU 
institutions (Stone Sweet, 2003, De Burca, 2003). However, the role of the Courts in the JHA field 
(nationals and the EJC) has been minimal because of the very limited role of ECJ - it was excluded totally 
from third pillar issues until the Treaty of Amsterdam. Moreover, a few studies have investigated the 
ability of European nation-states to control migration and have compared their methods and whether they 
are Europeanized (Boswell, 2003; Lahav, 2004a). Stetter (2000) for instance explains with the help of neo- 
institutional theory the regulation of immigration policies in the EU. He uses principal-agent-theory 
combined with the insights of regulation theories to explain the institutionalization of this policy domain. 
For him neither economic and legal spill-over models nor models of migration pressures are the best factors 
in explaining the specific institutions and procedures which have been established in this policy area 
(Stetter, 2000: 97). Sciortino and Pastore have explained the difficulties in immigration policy by the 
tension between i nterG overn mental and 'European' approaches; these are not only organizational issues 
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part will concentrate only on the research that has investigated the participation of 
different (national) actors and on the roles they have had in the EU policy process in the 
JHA policy field. The aim is to demonstrate how the concept of Europeanization has been 
used in examining the EU's JHA policy. In addition, this section will review studies that 
have investigated the imbalance between the security approach and the liberal 
humanitarian approach. These studies suggest that EU asylum and immigration policies 
are characterized by a competition between two partly conflicting policy frames: the 
security approach, which emphasizes the need to tighten up territorial borders and to fight 
illegal immigration and which is deeply Europeanized, and the humanitarian approach, 
which incorporates the human rights-based notion of freedom of movement and refugee 
protection, and which is less Europeanized. (Lavenex, 2001a: 24; Andersson, 2004: 12; 
Guild, 2003; 331; Boer, 2004: 2; Huysmans, 2006: 16). 11 However, the purpose of this 
section is to review only empirical studies that have tried to explain, with help of tile 
concept of Europeanization, why it has been so difficult to establish a common 
immigration policy for the EU. In addition, this following section will demonstrate how 
the 'uploading' and 'downloading' dimensions of Europeanization have been used in the 
JHA policy field and how the softer mechanisms of Europeanization (i. e. learning and 
socialising) are important factors influencing policy-making in this particular policy field. 
'First, Givens and Luedtke argued that national level factors are the main reasons for the 
failure to establish a common EU immigration policy. European immigration policy has 
faced a puzzle: a discrepancy between liberal immigration policy harmonization for EU 
nationals moving within the single market, and the failure to achieve the same levels of 
harmonization (and sometimes harmonization of any kind) in other areas of immigration 
policy (Givens and Luedtke, 2004: 160). The main difficulty in establishing a common 
immigration policy is national resistance in some Member States, which explains the low 
levels of Europeanization of this policy field (Givens and Luedtke, 2004: 160). Givens 
but they have produced an entirely new set of rhetorical structures and binary oppositions that have become 
embedded in. the institutional debate. The *rhetoric behind their approach is that the problem of European 
immigration policies is less connected with the contemporary migration flows than the delusion embedded 
in the framework employed to interpret them (Sciortino and Pastore, 2004: 206). 
11 See also (Trechsel, 2004, Peers, 2000, den Boer, 2001, van der Klaauw, 2004) who have all analysed 
the tension between internal security issues and human rights aspects. 
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and Luedtke argued that there are'two contradictory approaches that have impact on the 
immigration policies: supranationalism and state-centricism. Tile first explains the loss of 
state control that took place mainly after the Single Europmn Act (SEA) and which led 
EU Member States to cooperate oil immigration policy. Tile other approach, tile state- 
centric model that is based on intergovernmental theories, explains the political 
difficulties and the variation in harmonization (Givens and Luedtke, 2004: 162). Because 
of these elements, the harmonization of EU proposals in high-salience policy areas (such 
as immigration) is less likely to be successftil, and if it is successful, it is less likely to be 
expansive (Givens and Luedtke, 2004: 161). Further, they observed that a country with 
strong domestic institutions to protect immigration rights (such as Germany) is more 
likely to support the restrictive harmonization of high-salience issues, while countries 
with weaker domestic institutions protecting immigration rights (such as tile UK), is 
likely to oppose harmonization altogether because there is no pressure coming from 
domestic institutions. The main finding from this research is that national factors 
determine the success or failure of the Europeanization of tile EU's common immigration 
policy which indicates that at least some national institutions or actors have a strong 
interest in 'uploading' their national preferences to the EU level. 
Which institutions or actors have the greatest interest in 'uploading' national preferences 
to the EU level and have they been successful? Guiraudon and Monar, in different ways, 
have both argued that Member States have succeeded in 'Europeanizing' certain national 
problems in the field of JHA. Guiraudon argued that state actors strategically use EU- 
level organizations to pursue national policy goals. She describes these strategies as 
'venue shopping'. She argued that the 'transnationalization' of immigration control is not 
a response to the evolution of migration patterns nor a consequence of the single market 
project because the settings for transgovernmental co-operation on security-related issues 
existed before the development of EU immigration policy started (Guiraudon, 2000: 
259). On the contrary, the rationale behind 'venue-shopping' is the power distribution 
between different national actors involved in the management of immigration issues. 
Those actors are civil servants in the Ministries of the Interior and civil servapts in 
Foreign Ministries, and in some Member States, participants of NGOs (Guiraudon, 2003: 
58 
268). She argued that typical in the European immigration domain is the strong vertical 
network of experts, consultants, and liaison officers from the Ministries of the Interior 
and the absence of democratically responsible actors. The reason for keeping issues under 
the control of transnational channels where immigration elites have a dominant position 
is that that way the political actors are less encumbered than in national or federal 
settings, where the number of institutions, the levels of Government or social groups can 
act as 'veto points' and prevent reforms (Guiraudon, 2000: 261). Moreover, she argued 
that decisions taken in European settings have also diminished the role of national courts 
in policy implementation. Because of this imbalance in structure, where elites from the 
Ministries of the Interior have such a dominant position compared to any other national 
institutions, Guiraudon concluded that certain domestic actors bypass the process of 
interest aggregation by mobilizing transnational venues (Guiraudon, 2000: 268). What 
follows is that the failure to harmonize the EU's immigration policy is a consequence of 
power competition among (national) actors in the same field, and the elites from the 
Ministries of the Interior have, so far, 'won' the battle. The implication is that the shift 
from liberal to restrictive immigration policy took place as these abovementioned elites 
achieved a dominant position in immigration policy-making (Guiraudon, 2063: 268). 
They succeeded in emphasizing the technical nature of the JHA field that required their 
expertise, compared to other domestic actors. Further, the institutional set-up at the EU 
level favoured them, as will be explained in detail in chapter 3. To conclude, this research 
demonstrated how the elites from the Ministries of the Interior have taken a dominant 
position both at the national and at the EU level in immigration issues and this dominance 
has led to the situation where the security-related approach has become more 
Europeanized than the humanitarian approach. 
The other example of Europeanization research in the field of JHA comes from Monar, 
who also argued that certain groups of actors have successfully 'uploaded' national 
preferences to the EU level. He argued that full implementation of the 'four freedoms' 
generated cle facto a common internal security zone (Monar, 2001 a: 754). Moreover, 
besides the 'spill-over' effects from economic integration he demonstrated that the 
process of European integration has shown examples of Member States pushing for 
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common action in certain areas in order to solve certain national problems through a 
process of 'Europeanization' (Monar, 2001a: 756). There are two potential 'gains' for 
Member States in this process: first, they can upload their problems to the EU level and 
second, after the issues have effectively been brought on to the European agenda, try to 
hide behind the weighty screen of collective EU action (or non-action) (Monar, 2001a: 
756). 
According to Monar, on the other hand, in analysing the impact of European legislation 
(and policy goals) on the national legislation, he found less evidence of a significant 
Europeanization (Monar, 2003a: 319). He argued that the impact of the rapidly growing 
EU JHA agenda in tile national setting has so far remained limited. The impact of the 
EU's JHA has been applied to'eases where either the impact of EU legislation has been 
absolutely inevitable because of existing or newly adopted EU decisions (i. e. coercive 
measures), or where the EU dimension could be invoked as a convenient additional - 
albeit never primary - reason for change at the national level (Monar, 2003a: 318). 
Therefore, his argument is that at'least in the case of Germany, that there was a great 
imbalance between the 'uploading' and 'downloading' dimensions of Europeanization. 
As examples of Germany's success in 'uploading' national preferences to EU level, 
Monar mentioned tile Schengen agreement and Europol (Monar, 2003a: 320). Similar to 
Guiraudon's findings, Monar too argued that the main drivers for 'uploading' national 
preferences to the EU level at the national level were the elites from the Ministries of the 
Interior (i. e. expert in immigration questions) (Monar, 2003a: 320). He demonstrated that 
first these officials succeeded in confirming the threat for the German Government, and 
then the Government started to push for that policy goal at EU level (Monar, 2003a: 322). 
Other political actors at tile national level were passive, which he explained partly by the 
lack of transparency in decision-making in the JHA field in the EU and partly by the 
complexity of the issues. In addition, in most cases, the consequences of EU level 
decisions reach the national level indirectly and after a long time period (Monar, 2003a: 
312). The main argument in Monar's study was that the main agent of Europeanization in 
Germany was the federal Government itself, which was 'fed' by immigration elites from 
the national level. 
60 
To sum up, both Monar and Guiraudon found evidence that some parts of the JHA field 
are 'Europeanized' but not all. Member States are willing to 'upload' their national 
problems to the European level and let them be solved there, but are reluctant to give up 
their individual power to choose which European level solution they will adopt at the 
national level. This is also in line with research from Givens and Luedtke, who argued 
that national resistance is the strongest obstacle for Europeanizing the EU's immigration 
policy. Further, all three studies reviewed here gave evidence that the immigration elites 
have a strong influence on the process of policy-making in the JHA field. This chapter 
has not reviewed the literature on the Europeanization of National Parliaments because 
chapter 4 will concentrate on the question of how the NPs have responded to 
Europeanization and how their role in the EU level policy process has developed parallel 
to the evolution of the EU. 
Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter was to provide further arguments as to why the concept 
of Europeanization is assumed to offer a useful tool for analysing the participation of 
National Parliaments in the EU's policy process in the field of JHA. This chapter first 
explored the link between institutional theory and the concept of Europeanization, and 
explained why this concept is best linked with different strands of institutionalism. The 
last parts of this chapter showed how the studies using concept of Europeanization have 
successfully combined elements from different strands of institutional approaches. In 
addition, this chapter aimed to show how broad the field of Europeanization studies is 
with help of empirical examples; in these studies Europeanization can be seen as 
governance, as institutionalization and as discourse and tile outcomes can be understood 
differently depending on hoxv the concept of Europeanization is used. 
Furthermore, this chapter sought to map the different understandings of Europeanization 
and identified the most common definitions of that concept, all of which define it as an 
interactive process or 'two-way street' (B6rzel, 2002; 2005). When considering 
Europeanization as a 'two-way process' it entails a 'bottom-tip' and a 'top-down' 
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dimension (Bbrzel 2002; Bbrzel 2005). With that understanding, the 'bottom-up' 
dimension refers to an 'uploading' dimension which is about constructing the EU pplicies 
whereas the 'top-down' dimension is connected to the 'downloading' dimension which is 
about the domestic impact (B6rzel, 2002: Bbrzel, 2005). This separation is assumed to be 
important in order to explore the factors that affect the Europeanization of National 
Parliaments in the EU policy process in JHA field. By separating these two perspectives 
of Europeanization this thesis hopes to produce more information how different political 
actors participate in the EU policy process. 
This chapter further emphasized the fact that Europeanization is not a theory but rather a 
phenomenon which cannot be captured easily in the maps of traditional theories 
. explaining European integration (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007: 43). This chapter 
demonstrated that Europeanization can be considered as an area of enquiry as much as a 
concept. Consequently, the concept of Europeanization can be understood as a process 
through which beliefs, norms, and values are diffused and institutionalized (Radaelli and 
-Parquier, 2007: 43). Because of that understanding, this concept allows for an exploration 
of socialising and learning in the EU system, one of the key mechanisms identified in the 
literature of Europeanization (Laffan, 2007: 139). 
By introducing the different mechanisms of Europeanization which the literature has 
identified, the aim was to show how most studies have concentrated on tile question how 
Europeanization produces domestic change. As the empirical examples illustrated most 
of these studies have concentrated on policy issues where legal competence lies at the 
national level but where EU obligation prescribes an institutional model to wh ich 
domestic arrangements have to be adjusted. This review on Europeanization showed that 
much less attention has given on the question how domestic political actors adapt due to 
the Europeanization and even less how domestic actors influence back to the EU level. 
These observations gave further justifications to investigate the mechanisms of 
Europeanization which apply best in the field of JHA. This policy field is interesting 
because the EU has less power to prescribe institutional models than in questions whic 11 
are dealt with in the first pillar. By examining different mechanisms of Europeanization, 
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this thesis hopes to produce more information about the adaptation and influence of 
domestic political actors, such as Parliaments on the EU. However, research on domestic 
political actors and Europeanization is almost non-existent and in particular in the field of 
JHA. 
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Chapter 3. EU's Justice and Home Affairs 
Introduction 
As explained in chapter 1, National Parliaments (NPs) and Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) have many overlapping elements, at which they interact and this research aims to 
explore these points. This chapter begins by briefly explaining what is meant by the EU's 
Justice and Horne Affairs (which is now known as the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ) as explained later in this chapter) and how this policy field has developed 
from loose transnational cooperation to one of the most important and dynamic policy 
-domains of the EU (Monar, 2001 and 2004; Apap, 2002 and 2004; Lavenex and Wallace, 
2005). It will demonstrate the fact that National Parliaments (NPs) have traditionally 
been left out of this policy field and explain why. In addition, this chapter aims to 
illustrate why it is important that NPs are better engaged with this policy field. In order to 
explain the reasons for a lack of participation of NPs in this policy field, it is important to 
understand how this policy field differs from other EU policy areas. The main difference 
is that immigration, border control issues and policing are areas which are deeply linked 
to national sovereignty and statehood. The implication is that Member States are 
unwilling to give up their decision-making power in these areas, although they are no 
longer able to control these issues domestically. This chapter will explore the difficulties 
which have arisen from these contradictory. elements. Another characteristic of this policy 
field is the growing tendency to establish serni-autonomous special agencies at EU level, 
with relatively large duties, which has reduced the possibilities for democratically chosen 
actors to be effectively involved in the policy (and decision) making processes at EU 
level. The last challenge which this chapter aims to analyse, is the dominance of a small 
group of policy-makers (i. e. immigration elite) both at the national and at EU level. 
Particularly since the terrorist attacks of II September 2001, the growing tendency has 
been to develop internal security strategies with a logic similar to that applied to external 
security issues. This chapter will argue that the autonomy of the abovementioned elite in 
the Member States, together with intergovernmental decision-making structures, are the 
main reasons for the rapid Europeanization of this policy field. Decisions in this policy 
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field can have major and direct implications for EU citizens and therefore how the NPs 
are involved in this policy-making process is highly relevant. This concern is particularly 
essential, because many important policy issues such as 'biometric passports' are under 
discussion, and strategies are established in small groups like the G6 (explained in this 
chapter) without informing the NPs at all about these plans. However, EU citizens are 
represented in the EU level policy-making through their National Parliaments, but as this 
chapter will show, the democratic and judicial control mechanisms are largely 
marginalized in the field of JHA policy and further weakened by the 'dominant trend' of 
developing internal security strategies with the structures of external security issues. This 
chapter will argue that the different levels of policy-making, together with complicated 
decision-making structures, have further reduced accountability and transparency in this 
policy field with the implication that the opportunities for NPs to be effectively involved 
in this policy field have lessened. 
3.1. The Humanitarian Approach and the Securitising Approach 
Justice and Home Affairs covers a field that concerns the internal security of the EU and 
free movement of persons within it. The free movement of persons is one of the 
. 
fundamental aims of the European Communities, although this policy area was not 
covered in the 1957 Treaty of Rome (Ucarer,. 2003: 295). However, the removal of 
external borders was written into the Treaty, but became relevant only ill the 1970s when 
cross border movements increased within the European Communities. This development 
also increased fear of trarisnational crime and created the need for a deeper cooperation 
between Member States in these matters. Today the JHA field comprises policy areas 
such as immigration (legal and illegal), asylum questions, external border-control and 
cooperation between police and customs, and judicial cooperation in civil and criminal 
matters (such as international crime and drug trafficking). 
However, this chapter will concentrate on JHA developments which are relevant to 
immigration and border control questions. These two issues have been chosen for 
analysis because the research assumption is that immigration and border control issues 
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are important for NPs and individual Parliamentarians because they touch on core 
questions of sovereignty. In addition, because tile EU still does not have a common 
immigration policy it is assumed that the NPs are interested in participating-in the process 
of establishing it. Based on these assumptions, issues such as cooperation in civil law and 
other parts of the JHA field that are more related to free circulation of goods and capital 
in the single market (i. e., commercial questions) will not be covered in this chapter, nor 
in the study as a whole. However, as this chapter aims to show, the questions linked to 
immigration and border control questions have many contradictory elements, which have 
'significantly 
influenced the priorities of the JHA sector. The first and most important 
contradictory element is the battle between the 'humanitarian' approach and the 
'securitising' approach. The first approach highlights fundamental human rights that 
constituted the post-war refugee regimes and which were dominant until 1980s (Lavenex, 
2001a: 857; Van der Klaauw, 2004: 236). However, at the end of the 1980s it was 
challenged by a more 'securitising' approach. This securitising approach replaced the 
'humanitarian' approach in the 1990s as the rising number of refugees and asylum- 
seekers was increasingly perceived as a threat to national stability (Guild, 2003: 331). 
This change of thinking both at the national and at EU level reduced further the 
willingness of the Member States to give more decision-making power to the EU 
institutions i. e., it increased the contradiction between 'intergovernmental' and 
communitarised methods. Lastly, the change in the discourse in immigration and border 
control issues had implications for actual EU policies to the extent that thinking on 
combating terrorism and international crime have now became almost inseparable from 
immigration, as this chapter aims to illustrate. 
3.2. Strong National Interests and Conflicting Priorities 
The conflict between the humanitarian and securitising approach at EU level was not the 
only problem for this policy field. The conflicting priorities at EU level not only reflected 
the different ambitions among EU level actors, but also disparities at the national level. 
Immigration as a policy issue has never been in the competence of just one national 
ministry because it touches many different policy fields Such as labour, economics, 
66 
foreign affairs, social affairs and internal affairs (Guiraudon, 2003: 266; Lahav and 
Guiraudon, 2006: 208). Therefore, questions relating to immigration have been dealt with 
by different Ministries at national level which has often led to difficulties in establishing 
a nationally coherent viciv that could then be brought to EU level. Secondly, it continues 
to be widely held that issues related to the JHA area are matters of national sovereignty. 
This creates obstacles for developing a common European immigration policy. These 
questions are deeply embedded in the national cultures and histories (Apap and Carrera, 
2004: 2; Pellerin, 2005: 106; Lahav and Messina, 2006: 852). Further, the immigration 
-literature has argued that in post-war Europe there were two categories of countries; first, 
the immigration countries, mostly in the Northern Europe, such as Germany and the UK, 
with developed immigration infrastructures; and secondly, the emigration countries such 
as Spain and Portugal, mainly located in Southern Europe, with undeveloped immigration 
infrastructures (Lahav, 2003a: 30). However, there were some exceptions, such as Ireland 
and Finland, that were northern countries but with undeveloped immigration 
infrastructures. However, these relations between sending/receiving countries are linked 
to historical, cultural, economic, and/or political affinities as well as ex-colonial relations 
(Lahav, 2004a: 34). The implication of these legacies is that tile EU Member States have 
different ideas of what common immigration policy should be. For instance, the 
economic situation and the labour market in Germany, France and the Netherlands 
required in the 1950s and 1960s a cheap and flexible workforce that. did not exist in the 
domestic markets (Huysmans, 2000: 753). The geopolitical context of these immigration 
dynamics has left permanent differences in the perceptions of immigration issues among 
the EU Member States (Lahav, 2004a; Geddes, 2005; Pellerin, 2005). This means that the 
Southern European states have always been more concerned about the immigration 
pressures coining from North Africa, whereas the Northern European States saw the main 
pressure coming form Eastern Europe until tile last enlargement. However, this post- 
Second World War categorization has been supplemented by new and more diverse 
migration flows from Central and Eastern Europe (Geddes, 2005: 791). Thi. s 'geopolitical 
widening' of immigration flows has had an impact on EU policy as well by bringing 
more diversity onto the policy-making level of the EU. For instance, a particular concern 
in Central and Eastern EU Member States has been the development of irregular (illegal) 
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immigration flows and the people smuggling and the human trafficking networks that 
have developed around them (Geddes, 2005: 791). The consequence is that it has become 
more challenging than ever to define what a common immigration policy between EU 
Member States should be. 
3.3. The Role of the Immigration Elites 
Thq multiple actors in the JHA field have diverse political, legal and police systems. 
They differ not only in structure but also function differently (Lavenex and Wallace, 
2005: 462). This means that the national policy-making priorities in the immigration field 
are based on national laws and practices which reflect varying ideological concepts and 
values (Apap and Carrera, 2004: 11). At EU level this means that there are 25 different 
views. In addition, EU level cooperation in border control issues requires a great deal of 
trust among the EU Member States which does not always exists (Monar, 2004b: 41). For 
, example, 
the exchange of information between Member States that includes sensitive 
personal data on immigrants or visa-issues needs to be stored and used properly, and 
there are different 'concepts among the Member States regarding which practices will 
provide an adequate level of protection. Among some Member States a perception exists 
that closer European integration brings the risk that corrupt practices from other Member 
States will become even more widespread (Apap and Carrera, 2004: 11). Moreover, when 
issues in the JHA field (heavily emphasizing immigration and preventing unwanted 
immigration, as explained later in this chapter) were brought to European level, not all 
national and sectoral interest were weighted equally in that policy-making process. 
Neither were all the actors deemed legitimate to set the agenda (Guiraudon, 2003: 266). 
This applies especially to the NPs - they have traditionally been left out of this EU level 
agenda-setting process (this will be empirically demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6). 
Regardless of the disparities in the context of a common EU immigration policy, 
common for all Member States in this policy field has been the dominance of elites both 
at national and at EU level when forming the EU policy agenda (Monar, 2003a; 
Guiraudon, 2001 and 2003; Huysmans, 2000 and 2006; Lahav, 2004b; Lavenex and 
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Wallace 2005). The consequence of this has been that the democratic and juridical 
control in this policy field is very weak. The main reason for this is tile culture of secrecy 
promoted by elites based on intergovernmental decisions-making models, which means 
that most citizens do not even know what has been agreed and by whom. Public debates 
on the different options for immigration and asylum policies do not take place in general, 
either by the public or by the NPs. This phenomenon has become more interesting to EU 
scholars recently because of the question of 'democi-atic deficit'. (This concept will be 
dealt with in chapter 4 in detail). Nevertheless, it seems that European leaders do not 
consider that this democratic deficit debate is specifically related to the field of JHA but 
only in general level to EU decision-making). ' However, the field of JHA is one of the 
main problem areas when considering transparency and accountability at EU level 
(Wallace and Lavenex, 2005; Monar 2002; Guiraudon, 2001 and 2003). This concern 
with the gap between citizens and elites steins from the creation of the EU as a 
predominantly elite affair. This has been one of the key stumbling blocks of EU 
legitimacy (Lahav, 2004b: 11). However, as chapter 4 will argue, the most effective way 
to increase legitimacy would be to engage NPs better in EU policy-making, including the 
field of JHA. 
Another challenge in attempts to close this gap between elites and citizens is the 
complicated decision-making procedures at EU level in the JHA field. These procedures 
on questions like immigration are not as straightforward as in agriculture or commercial 
policy fields that are now covered by the first pillar and that have clear decision-making 
rules based on EU Treaties. Although much of the JHA policy field has been recently 
'Europeanized' i. e., the decision-making rules are covered by the first pillar as explained 
later in this chapter much of it still remains based on intergovernmental cooperation 
(Ucarer, 2001: 295), where Member States are still the key players and decisions are 
made on the basis of unanimity and where democratic control is very weak. The main 
problem is that decision-making in the JHA field is a mix of different institutional 
procedures; regardless of the latest Treaty changes which moved many issues from the 
1 The information is to be found from the following web-page: 
_page/0 
19 (http: //%v%vw. europari. europa. eu/news/expert/infopress n -11254-277-10-40-902- 
20061002IPRI 1236-04-10-2006-2006-false/default-fi. htm2OO6). 
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2 
third pillar to the first pillar , the 
intergovernmental nature of this policy field is still 
remarkable and has a strong influence on policy outcomes (Ucarer, 2001: 295). Besides 
the conflicting views of Member States as explained above, there has been tension arnong 
the EU institutions as well. The European Commission, the EU Council and the European 
Parliament have had difficulties sharing competencies in this area (Moraes, 2003: 120). 
3.4. The Evolution of JHA - Hovv, the Immigration Became a Security Issue 
Since the mid-1980s, immigration issues have become a politicised issue through the 
question of asylum, or more precisely through the (con) fusion of immigration and 
asylum (Huysmans, 2000: 751). Before that, immigrants were primarily an extra 
workforce for the dornestic market for most Western European countries and their legal 
status was not relevant to domestic needs (Lahav, 2004a: 30). The shift from a permissive 
immigration policy to a contro I -oriented restrictive policy took place in the middle of 
1970s (Stetter, 2000: 85; Pellerin, 2005: 107). It did not radically change the 
understanding of immigration itself, but the main reasons for change were motivated by 
changes in the labour market and by a desire to protect the social and economic rights of 
the domestic workforce (Huysmans, 2000: 754). After that, political rhetoric increasingly 
linked migration to the destabilization of public o rder and emphasised the need to restrict 
population flows. However, by the 1990s, immigration policies, which had long been 
formulated behind closed doors and with little public attention, emerged as one of tile 
most politicised issues on all Western European agendas (Lavenex, 2001a: 853; Lahav, 
2004a: 3 1). The institutionalization of this restrictive development (and the beginning of 
Europeanization of migration policy) started in late 1970s and was based on loose 
intergovernmental cooperation (Stetter, 2000: 86). Typical of these cooperation forms 
were that they did not include the participation of National Parliaments, the EU 
institutions or civil society. 
2 The Treaty of Maastricht create the third pillar and the Treaty of Amsterdam removed the most important 
issues from the third pillar to the first pillar which means that the majority vote rule dominates and 
Commission has initiative right. Also the Treaty of Nice made further changes to the institutional 
framework. 
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3.4.1. The First Phase: Ad hoc Cooperation Outside of the EC/EU Framework 
Monar has argued that EU JHA policy-making significantly benefited from some of the 
European co-operation frameworks, which were established outside of the European 
treaties after the end of the Second World War, and which functioned as 'institutional 
laboi-aloiles' 3 forming tile bases and the core elements for what then became the EU 
acquis in field of JHA (Monar, 200] a: 12). The objectives for strengthening cooperation 
among Member States were both internal and external. The main internal driving force 
was the growing flow of immigrants and the main external source was the increased 
awareness of the links between terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking (Monar, 
2001 a: 14). An attempt to tackle external threats, such as terrorism, was the creation of ad 
hoc Group Trevi which was set tip in 1975 (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 460). This was a 
loose form of intergovernmental cooperation without any formal treaty provisions or 
permanent secretariat. Its main aim was to deal with issues of cross-border terrorism by 
encouraging closer co-operation among EC law enforcement authorities (Ucarer, 2001: 
296). Cooperation was conducted between civil servants and it did no. t result in any 
binding decisions. The most significant result of the Trevi Group was that it provided a 
framework for EC Members that they gradually applied further to tile other JHA 
questions (such as the fight against drug-trafficking). Moreover, the Trevi framework 
encouraged Member States to establish several other groups related to cross-border 
movement issues, reflecting the rise in activities which accompanied the single market 
programme (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 460). However, although the agendas covered 
by these intergovernmental groupings increased to a great extent, they continued to 
function outside of democratic or judicial control. The EU institutions and NPs did not 
participate in any of the groupings. 
3 Monar has explained the rapid development of JHA into a major field of EU policy-making with help of 
concepts of' institutional laboratories'. According to him these 'institutional laboratories' were the 
Council of Europe, the Trevi and Schengen. Typical of these 'institutional laboratories' were that they were 
outside of EC/EU and helped to pave the way for developing the EU legislation in a new policy field by 
offering a platform for new experiments in a new policy field (NIonar 200 1 a: 747-48). 
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The next and perhaps the most ambitious project of these early laboratory years was the 
Schengen agreement. 4 The main objective for this cooperation was the abolition of border 
controls between the signatory EC Member States. The main driving force behind 
Schengen cooperation was the Single Market idea and the Single European Act in 1986 
that officially created the 'fow- fi-eedoms'. 5 Parallel to the Trevi group, Schengen 
cooperation was also organized outside of the EU's institutional framework and it was 
led by elite from the Ministries of the Interior. Typical of this cooperation was that it was 
lacking the basic democratic requirements of accountability and transparency, meaning 
that NPs, EC institutions, or civil society were neither participating in the cooperation nor 
being informed of its outcomes (House- of Lords, 2006b: 8). Compared to previous 
attempts (such as Trevi), the Schengen agreement had a new, more detailed structure, 
which impinged on the police forces and customs authorities of the Member States and 
created a shared database 6 (Ucarer, 2001: 297). 
As an example of its effectiveness Schengen instituted a new system for determining state 
responsibilities in reviewing asylum claims in individual cases. In addition it established 
a common visa policy (including a uniform Schengen Visa) and formed cooperation in 
la%v enforcement matters (Monar, 2001 a: 13). Apart from these cases in which Schengell 
has shaped and facilitated decision-making on EU's JHA questions, it has also played a 
more general supporting role by providing a fruitful testing ground for specific 
techniques of negotiation (Monar, 2001a: 14). It advanced cooperation and exchange of 
information among Member States in a very structural way. The disadvantage was, :0 
however, that this work within Schengen was conducted away from the general public 
and their elected representatives (Ucarer, 2002: 298). Schengen also created guidelines 
4 The 1985 Schengen Agreement was a commitment by 5 EC Member States to remove their internal 
border controls (Germany, France, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium). The system is named afler 
the small town of Schengen in Luxemburg, which is close to both Germany and France. By tile end of 1998 
the Schengen system had built up a legal aquis of several hundred pages and except for two Member States, 
all EU Member States havejoined the agreements covered by Schengen cooperation. In 1999 most 
elements of the Schengen treaties were incorporated into EU Treaties and have become a base of EU aquis 
(Monar, 2002: 188). 
5 These 'four freedoms' were goods, services, capital and persons. 
6 In that database the Schengen Information System, (Iater SIS) important information is stored (such as 
criminal records and asylum applications) and national law enforcement authorities had access to that 
system (Ucarer, 2001: 988). 
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for future cooperation by strengthening the flexible, informal and secretive character of 
JHA, where the emphasis is on technical solutions which require special expertise by 
experts on security questions. This created a culture which is difficult to change and 
therefore the participation of NPs and individual Parliamentarians is difficult unless they 
have some particular expertise in these questions, which only few MPs have. 
ScheiVen cooperation proved that national preference formation did not precede 
interstate cooperation; rather the formulation of objectives and the pursuit of strategies 
were the product of socialising and learning at EU level among a small group of actors 
(Kostakopoulou, 2006: 23). A fresh example of cooperation based on exactly the same 
-format as Schengen cooperation is the Pi-flin Treaty 7, (Pi-flin Treaty covers a series of 
justice and home affairs issues including the exchanging of information between law 
enforcement agencies), which was originally signed by five EU Member States and 
where the aim is to incorporate the Convention into the legal framework of the EU 
(House of Lords, 2006b: 9). Similar to the practices of Scheiigen cooperation, there is no 
system of control by NPs and/or the EP on these new forms of intergovernmental 
cooperation that have been created in recent years in this policy field. 
3.4.2. The Second Phase: Maastricht and the Creation of the Third Pillar 
As the previous section clearly explained, cooperation in JHA issues was based on pure 
intergovernmental ism until the early 1990s. The main reasons for the gradual change 
were the secrecy that surrounded this cooperation, the lack of coordination by different 
intergovernmental groupings and the difficulties in agreeing binding measures. These led 
to increased calls for the establishment of formal linkages with tile Community process 
(Kostakopoulou. 2006: 9). The Maastricht Treaty changed the situation significantly: it 
introduced a single institutional framework for cooperation among Member States in this 
7 This Treaty was signed at PrUm, in Germany on May 2005 between internal Ministers of Germany, the 
UK, France, Italy, Spain and Poland joined in the Treaty in 2006. The ministers discuss almost every aspect 
of EU policy of JHA field at an 'informal level'. The Pi-flin Treaty set out the aim 'of incorporating the 
provisions of the Treaty into the legal framework ofthe EU' (House of House of Lords, 2006b: 8-9). 
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policy area by forming 'third pillar' decision-making in the EU (Monar, 2002: 196). 8 
Moreover, it meant a new and relatively coherent institutional home for various forms of 
cooperation that had previously been set up in an informal manner (such as Trevi and 
other informal ad. hoc groups). However, this new JHA pillar was still the product of a 
rather awkward inter-state compromise (Ucarer, 2002: 299). For instance, the participants 
in the third pillar were drawn from diverse national ministries, forces and agencies, all 
rooted in distinctive state traditions (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 462). The functions of 
these different actors from the Member States were visible in this policy field. Further, 
different national traditions (and geopolitical circumstances) were also evident in the 
non-congruence of national agencies combating financial fraud, smuggling, and border 
control (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 462). 9 Despite the fact that legal traditions, judicial 
training and even the concepts of crime were strongly embedded in each state structure 
and society, each professional grouping nevertheless shared a certain mutual respect on 
their different styles, which facilitated cooperation at the EU level. In addition, the civil 
servants of the interior ministries had already established well-ftinctioning practices for 
cooperation intergovernmental ly in the past and in that respect the Maastricht Treaty 
brought only a limited change. The same actors continued to work in 'third pillar' 
working groups with the same culture of secrecy as they had done earlier in different 
intergovernmental groupings outside of the EU's institutional framework. This was 
possible because the decision-making rules stayed strongly intergovernmental, the Zýl 
unanimity rule was the main decision-making form and supranational European 
institutions together with NPs were basically excluded from decision (and policy) making 
(Laven. ex and Wallace, 2005: 460). On a practical level this new third pillar set-up 
diverged significantly from standard EC decision-making and soon created frustration 
and disappointment among most of the actors involved. It also increased the feeling of 
'denioci-atic deficit' (Ucarer, 2002: 299). This is because the European Parliament (EP) 
8 The two other pillars are the 'first' pillar (commerce policy etc. ) and the 'second pillar'( foreign and 
security policy). The Maastricht Treaty identified nine areas of 'common interest' to be decided in the third 
pillar; asylum policy rules applicable to the crossing of the Union's external borders, immigration policy 
and the handling of third country nationals (TNCs), combating drug addiction and trafficking, tackling 
international fraud, juridical co-operation in civil and criminal matters, customs co-operation and police co- 
operation to combat and prevent terrorism and organized international crime (Ucarer, 2002: 299). 
9 For instance, from the UK participants were from Customs and Exercise, immigration services and 
Civilian Coastguards, as from Germany the participants came from border-control agency. 
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only had to be 'regularly informed' of JHA discussions and 'consulted' by the Presidency 
of the Council on the 'principal aspects of activities' (Kostakopoulou, 2006: 11). In 
practice the consultations usually took place afler the JHA meetings, by sending 
documents. The NPs were treated in a similar way without having a say in the decision- 
making process or policy preparation process. To sum tip, the Maastricht Treaty 
exemplified the strong tension between sovereignty and EU integration, the sensitivity of 
questions of social order and different national traditions of Member States. The Treaty 
demonstrated that the Member -States were not prepared to give up to the EU institutions 
their decision-making competence. 
3.4.3. The Third Phase; Amsterdam Treaty and JHA 
One of the main reasons for the reform of JHA cooperation that took place in tile 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 was the disappointment and criticisms that the Maastricht 
Treaty brought to this policy area. The 'third pillar' policy-making was criticised for 
being ineffective, lacking clearly defined objectives and for having decision-making 
structures that were far too complicated. Most of all, the absence of Parliamentary 
involvement and judicial supervision had increased the culture of secrecy in this policy 
field. The main suggestions for correcting these problems during the Amsterdam 
negotiation process included enhanced roles for the EU Commission, tile EP and for the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and a general elimination of the unanimity rule (Lallav 
and Messina, 2005: 852). This tirne, the Member States were ready to give more 
decision-making power to tile EU and as a consequence, a number of third pillar issues 
were brought into the first pillar for the first time. 10 Moreover, tile decision-making rules 
were also reformed; the unanimity rule was replaced in many cases but not in all 
(Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 464). 
10 Most important issues were immigration policy and asylum questions, external border controls (also the 
Schengen agreements were brought to the first pillar). Also thejudicial and police cooperation in civil 
matters were transformed into the First Pillar. However, all these provisions were to be into force afler the 
five years period by a unanimity decision from Council. Another precondition was that Council has to 
adopt measures regarding on asylum and illegal immigration and returning policy. 
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With this Treaty the concept of justice and home affairs was replaced by the discursive 
utterance bf 'creating an area of freedom, security and justice' (AFSJ) which became an 
objective of the EU (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 464). This was partly a result of 
growing feeling of insecurity among EU citize ns because of increased numbers of 
undocumented migration, asylum, organized crime, and drug trafficking. In order to 
address these concerns, the Reflection, a group preparing the Treaty changes for 
Amsterdam, i ntroduced a concept which led to the rationale for establishing the area of 
freedom, security and justice. It made a particular link between 'serving the citizens' 
interest' and the asserted 'demand on the part of the public for greater security' (Lavenex 
and Wallace, 2005: 464). 
At the institutional level the Amsterdam Treaty strengthened the EU Commission, the EP 
and the ECJ. The EU Commission gained a shared right of initiative in all areas. " The 
unanimity rule was to be required in the JHA Council following consultations with the 
EP, which was a new feature in the JHA field (Lahav and Messina, 2005: 854). Tile 
Treaty also increased the weight of the EP in another way; it introduced the co-decision 
procedure but only in the area of uniform visa rules and the procedures for issuing visas 
(Ucarer, 2003: 302). Moreover, the European Court received a mandate for the first time 
to interpret certain provisions in the JHA field that were transformed to the first pillar and 
to undertake preliminary rulings in policy areas failing within the first pillar on the 
request of Member States (Ucarer, 2003: 302). Finally, the NPs gained increased 
opportunities to participate in EU policy making (this will be explained in detail in 
chapter 4). However, the biggest surprise was that this Treaty reform incorporated the 
Schengen conventions and the acquis into the EU's institutional framework (Den Boer 
and Wallace, 2000: 513). This theme had not been part of the negotiations during the 
preparation of the Treaty. 
" However, this shared right for initiatives was to be replaced by exclusive right of initiative after a5 year 
time period, which took place on I. May 2004, but the Commission still had an obligation to consider any 
request by NIS for a legislative proposal, and the Treaty of Nice made some further changes so that in 
December 2004, co-decision and qualified majority voting was extended to all title IV measures, with the 
exception of legal migration. 
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Contrary to the airns of the Treaty revisions, the final outcomes of the Amsterdam Treaty 
were far from effective and transparent. Either the accountability was hugely increased or 
the decision-making procedures simplified. For instance, the integration of the Schengen 
acquis increased the complexity of the JHA institutional framework, because the UK and 
Ireland negotiated so called opt-outs from the Schengen legislation, which gave them the 
right to participate in the Schengen issues by choosing case by case (Monar, 2002: 194). 
in addition, the transitional period of five years led some observers to question whether 
the third pillar issues had really been shifted to the first pillar at all (Ucarer, 2003: 302 
and Boer and Wallace, 2000: 514-16). Clearly the EU Council remained as the key actor 
and the intergovernmental decision-making (and policy-making) nature of the policy 
continued to influence final outcomes. It can be argued that national sensitivities on 
sovereignty were the main driving force that encouraged a high degree of flexibility in 
this policy field. In addition, even though the Amsterdam Treaty established a special 
provision for closer cooperation among the Member States in the area of freedom, 
security and justice (Article 40, EU), these Treaty provisions did not prevent individual 
Member States from continuing their selective forms of intergovernmental cooperation 
outside the provisions of Treaties (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 466). 12 The only clear 
reform regarding the issues left in the third pillar was to develop a more intensive 
cooperation between police forces, customs and judicial authorities among the Member 
States and to give the Commission the shared right of initiative in this area. However, the 
aims did not increase democratic control of cooperation although the EP did gain the 
right to be consulted and the European Court of Justice was given the right to make 
preliminary rulings on certain issues, but only at the particular request of the Member 
States (Ucarer, 2003: 302, Ludford, 2004: 29-30). 
Lastly, the Treaty did not succeed in correcting the relatively large proportion of 
measures that had a non-binding legal nature. The JHA Council continued to produce 
recommendations and resolutions which were not legally binding (Ehrentraut, 2001: 25). 
12 An example of this is the creation of so called G5 (and from 2006 forwards G6 as the Poland was 
invited), an intergovernmental group bringing together five interior ministers from France, Italy, Spain, 
Germany and the UK. Among the issues on the table are cooperation to combat terrorism, illegal 
immigration, establishing a list of 'safe' countries of origin whose citizens would not be entitled to make 
refugee applications (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 466; House of Lords, 2006b: 2). 
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All these matters showed how difficult a task it was to 'communitarize' the JHA field. In 
addition, the participation of NPs was further complicated; this is because the NPs will be 
involved only when the Conventions (which have a non-binding legal nature) were to be 
. ratified at the national 
level and therefore they only have a say in the final version of the 
Convention, not in the preparation of it. 13 
3.5. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
As the section above clearly demonstrated, the Amsterdam Treaty was not a great success 
in the sense that it did not make JHA policy-making more coherent as the time- 
consuming procedures remained, together with ineffective structures as well as decision- 
making procedures that lack both transparency and democracy. Nevertheless, Amsterdam 
created high expectations in the new concept of 'the Area of Freedom (AFSJ), Security 
and Justice', which required more visible action from the EU institutions, including better 
democratic and judicial control (Monar, 2002: 19 1). The problem was how to tackle this 
issue at a practical level (i. e. how to implement the Amsterdam provisions). But before 
moving to implementation matters, the concept of AFSJ needs to be clarified. 
What does the objective of amended Article 2 of the EU Treaty mean by stating that one 
of the objectives of the Union is to 'maintain and develop the Union as an area of 
freedom, security and justice'; What is the balance between these concepts?; Is one more 
important than another, or are they all equal?; How do these goals fit into the special 
nature of JHA? A limited answer is to be found in Article 29 EU, which elaborates on 
this objective by stating that the aim is to provide citizens with a high level ol safety 
within an area of AFSJ by developing common action among the Member States in the 
field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing and 
combating racism and xenophobia (Article 29 EU). In addition, a supplementary 
interpretation is to be found from the EU Commission's action plan, which argues that 
'freedom loses much of its meaning if it cannot be enjoyed in a secure environment and 
with the full backing of a system of justice in which all Union citizens and residents can 
13 This information is based on interviewing the clerks of Finnish Parliament, March, 2003, in Helsinki 
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have confidence' (EU Commission, 1998a: 2). But Nvhy Nvas immigration linked to the 
security of EU cilizens? 
One explanation is given by Huysman who argues that the securitization of the internal 
, market 
is the key dynamic through which the European integration process is implicated 
in the securitization of immigration (Huysman 2006: 69). The logic of this kind of 
thinking is that increased free movement through abolishing border controls and 
facilitating transnational flows of goods, capital, services and people will challenge 
public order and law. According to Huysman, this link has been constructed so 
successfully both at EU level and at the national levels that it has obtained the status of 
common sense (Huysman, 2006: 69). Therefore, absolute free movement has to be 
tempered to secure a safe and lawful environment for the internal market (Huysman, 
2006: 87). This interpretation leads to a conclusion which is shared by many EU scholars, 
that security and freedom are simultaneously competitive and functional (Lavenex, 
2001a: 858; Kostakopoulou, 2006: 26; Huysman, 2006: 87). 
A ffirther explanation is that the concept of security necessitates measures designed to 
ensure that the citizens of Europe are free from risk of danger and fear. This means, 
however, that the understanding of 'security' has obtained an individual dimension 
(Kostakopoulou, 2006: 27). The implications are that in the Post-Amsterdam era, the 
term security has thus undergone an expansion: it migrated from defence and 
international security matters under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, to 
immigration-related matters (Lahav, 2004b; Huysman, 2006). Although the freedom of 
movement of people within the Union was, and still remains, a fundamental objective, 
however, in the field of JHA affairs, the concepts of security and justice make their 
essential contribution (Kostakopoulou, 2006: 28). This development has been facilitated 
by the Security paradigm, which has traditionally been prominent in the field of JHA; that 
is, the focus has been on free movement and 'compensatory measures to the internal 
market'. The consequence is that the promotion of security has widened further at the 
expense of freedom. On a practical level, the implications of implementing the objectives 
of AFSJ were that compensatory measures to 'free movement' at external frontiers were 
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extended, and these measures gave police and customs agencies an opportunity to craft a 
new role for themselves within an enlarged Europe, by identifying specific categories of 
security risks. This means that in the present political climate national Governments are 
focusing even more just on 'interior minister' notions of security. In practice this means 
that measures have been taken to weaken civil rights, such as by limiting the right to 
protest peaceftilly or by defining groups fighting oppression as 'terrorists' (Ludford, 
2004: 32). 
3.6. Tampere - towards European Immigration and Asylum Policy 
-On a practical level it was the Vienna European Council 14 in 1998 that first adopted the 
Action Plan on ho%v best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam in the 
AFSJ. However, it was a special JHA Council meeting in the Finnish town of Tampere 
1999 that brought this new concept into effect. That meeting can be considered as a 
turning point in the emergence of a European immigration and asylum policy (Monar, 
2002: 191). This is because the Member States agreed on several policy steps, 5 to be 
taken in this field and they also asked the EU Commission to keep track of and report on 
the progress made in all of the relevant dossiers (Ucarer, 2001: 303). The main steps 
were; creating partnerships with countries of origin, formulating a common European 
system on asylum, a fair treatment of third country nationals, and management of 
immigration flows (Tampere Conclusions, 1999). Although all Member States agreed 
that these steps were necessary, it has been difficult to achieve these aims (Givens and 
Luedtke, 2003: 29 1). 
One explanation for the difficulties has been the abovementioned conflict between 
freedom and security which continued to have a significant impact on the immigration 
14 Vienna European Council adopted the Action Plan on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and Justice, published in OJ C, 19,23.1.1999. 
15 Member States agreed on 'Tampere milestones' which were; commitment to human rights, basic 
institutions, rule of law, finishing the creation of a common market with freedom of movement, developing 
of common rules for dealing with racism and xenophobia, convergence ofjudicial systems, fostering 
transparency and democratic control, commitment to common asylum system (including specific rules to 
decide which state would deal with claims, common standards for reviewing claims and for reception of 
asylum seekers (Tampere Conclusions; 15.10.1999) 
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context. For instance, anything agreed on immigration and asylum at Tampere was 
subject to both the opt-outs of the UK and Ireland and a five year transition period where 
unanimity would remain (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 464). Also, it continued to be 
difficult to find a balance between the right to immigrate and the right to restrict 
immigration and asylum, because the interests were entirely on the latter aspect (Lahav 
and Messina, 2005: 871). This is because there is always a difficulty in striking a balance 
between the protection of human rights and civil liberties and public concerns about 
increases in immigration and crime rates (Peers, 2000: 227). Secondly, tile disagreement 
about what the common immigration policy should be, continued. One core element of 
the disagreement was, and still is, the question of labour immigration and what that 
should include and by whom the decisions should be made (Givens and Luedtke, 2003: 
291). It has been argued that the EU enlargement in 2004 gave incentives for more 
nationalist impulses among Member States and their Parliamentarians concerning labour 
immigration (Lahav and Messina, 2005: 871; Geddes, 2005: 797). For example, some 
Member States suffer from structural unemployment and because of that, they are 
reluctant to accept any attempt to increase the amount of labour immigration in their 
territory. Others see the increasing number of immigrants as a threat to national identity 
or public order. But common to all EU Member States is the way in which tile citizens 
were threatened by relating immigration to terrorism, drug dealing and international 
crime (Hayes and Bynyan, 2005: 75). This attitude was to a large extent formulated by 
the immigration elite and driven by popular press (Hayes and Bunyan, 2005: 75). 
Simultaneously, as the EU extended its policies outside of Europe, asylum seekers and 
immigrants faced less and less possible means of reaching the EU legitimately (Lavenex 
and Ucarer, 2003: 10; Geddes, 2005: 973; Bruycker 21.7.2006). This means that they 
have been forced into the hands of 'traffickers', providing a lucrative market for 
organized criminals, and this of course has increased the fear among EU citizens. 
When analysing the Tampere Conclusions, one observation can be made: it did not open 
up any new channels for migration, in particular, it did not create actual possibilities for 
legal immigration' (Tampere Conclusions, 1999). Rather, it highlighted cooperation 
among visa officers, the exchange of technical and personnel in border control issues, 
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building up the border control capacity in candidate countries and proceeding with 
readmission agreements with neighbouring countries (Tampere Conclusions, 1999). 
These all suggest that there was no shift from the negative restriction of immigration. 
Instead, the overall Conclusions emphasised the security and control mechanisms aimed 
at combating illegal immigration (Tampere Conclusions, 1999). The same paradigm 
continued to be significant in the JHA field. As an example of the continuous emphasis of 
security and control mechanisms was the European Council in Nice, which took place 
only fourteen months from Tampere. Nice Treaty revealed again the limitations of the 
endeavour to move beyond loose intergovernmental cooperation and highlighted the 
fundamental paradoxes intrinsic to the Europeanization of asylum and immigration 
policies; that is the tension between state sovereignty and supranational governance and 
the tension between internal security considerations and human rights issues (Lavenex, 
2001b: 852). This means that the difficulty in striking a balance between the protection of 
human rights and civil liberties and public concerns about increases in immigration and 
crime rates did not disappear but transferred from the national level to EU level. 
3.7. Extending Co-operation Outwards and the Recent Achievements in Field of the 
JHA 
As the previous section clearly illustrated the main aim in the field of JHA during the 
1990s was to remove barriers from the free movement of persons within the EU's 
territory. However, as the Tampere Conclusions indicated, the new century brought new 
goals; (1) the extension of EU's immigration and asylum policies outside the EU's 
territory, (2) an improvement in European police and law enforcement and (3) the 
combating of terrorism. Interestingly, they all were linked to the immigration and asylum 
questions, by creating tools to control the phenomenon before it reached the EU borders 
(Grabbe, 2006: 167). These abovementioned elements reflected clearly the changed 
balance in the field of JHA as explained in the previous chapter: that is, the promotion of 
security at the expense of freedom. 
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There were many overlapping reasons for this development. The first important driving 
force to promote the security element at the beginning of the new century was the fifth 
enlargement which took place in 2004, bringing in ten new Member States mostly from 
Central and Eastern Europe. Early enough, the old Member States had started to extend 
their immigration and asylum policies to their neighbours i. e., to transform the EU's 
securitised JHA policies outside of the EU (Grabbe, 2006: 155). The aim was to involve 
in growing numbers third countries in maintaining restrictive EU initiatives, such as 
controlling the entrance of immigrants, attempting to solidify EU border controls and 
demanding other countries to tighten their own border controls 16 (Ucarer, 2 002: 308). The 
second aim was to find new ways of combating organized crime by strengthening 
cooperation and increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement authorities among the 
Member States. New bodies were introduced: Europol (1999); OLAF (2001); Eurojust 
(2002); and European Public Prosecutor and the Euro border Control (the last two are not 
yet in force at the time of writing in 2007). 17 
However, the most important single factor that has institutionalized a mode of policy- 
making that allows the transfer of the security connotations of terrorism, drugs, traffic 
and money laundering to the area of immigration and asylum, was the events of II 
September 2001 in the USA. After that, such a transfer became extremely explicit, both 
in public discourse and in European legislative initiatives (Huysman, 2006: 71). In 
practice, these events made internal security matters one of the priorities of the EU's JHA 
field and these events also facilitated judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Apap and 
Carrera, 2004: 9). Since then, cooperation in criminal matters has been subject to less 
controversy than questions related to immigration and asylum, and a great deal of 
progress has been made. 18 Nevertheless, most of these matters have been agreed under 
16 The main reason for that was the special concern was the smuggling of human beings and drug- 
trafficking from these countries. 
17 The objectives of Europol are the following; to improve the effectiveness and cooperation of law 
enforcement authorities of Member States in combating and preventing drug trafficking, other serious 
forms of international organized crime and terrorism (Bryggeman, 2004: 156). The aim of Eurejust is to 
coordinate between national prosecution authorities in different Member States in cross-border criminal 
investigations. OLAF is a body that tries to fight against fraud and corruption and tries to protect the 
financial interests of the EU. 
18 The core legislative developments in this field are; Framework decisions on the European arrest warrant 
and on combating terrorism. Regulations (EC/2199/2001) concerning some import and export from 0 
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the third pillar, have had an intergovernmental nature and have had a general impact that 
extends far beyond combating terrorism (Apap and Carrera, 2004: 9). This means that the 
democratic control mechanisms have remained weak and not much has changed since the 
Trevi ad hoc cooperation in the ways in which these EU policies are prepared. 
To sum up, as these three new policy aims clearly demonstrated, the Union's 'area of 
freedom, security and justice' (AFSJ) has evolved substantially in the last few years and 
is more and more based on security related issues (Monar, 2004b: 129). As a 
consequence, the JHA dimension is now firmly identified as one of the Union's Priority 
policies (European Commission, 2004a: 4). Also, these new policy areas related to 
security issues have experienced a greater degree of development and convergence than 
others such as immigration and asylum issues. However, as this section has demonstrated 
the role of democratically chosen institutions has remained limited. 
3.7.1. Moderate Steps towards a Common Immigration Policy 
The previous section illustrated that the development of tile JHA field has been rapid, and 
different forms of cooperation among law enforcement officers have been established. 
However, the achievements in establishing a common immigration and asylum policy as 
stated in the Tampere Conclusions have been rather moderate. In response to the 
Tampere Conclusions, the EU Commission published a Communication in 2000,19 where 
it highlighted the fact that 'the zero immigration policies of the past 30 years are no 
longer appropriate' and the E0 will need to respond to increasing ageing, together with 
the slowing population growth in the Member States i. e., it suggested that the EU will 
need immigrants in the future to fill the gaps in labour markets. However, most Member 
States responded to this communication with a resistance to any drift towards Community 
involvement in areas beyond the scope of the EU Treaty, especially admission policy 
(House of Lords, 2006a: 30). The next step to improve this situation was taken in 2001, 
Afghanistan, (EC1342/2003) certain measures towards persons connected to bin Laden and al-Qaeda, and 
Taliban networks, Council regulation (EC/561/2003) about freezing funds and economic resources, Council 
regulation 2003/48/JHA combating terrorism. 
19 EU Commission, (2000c) COIM 757 final 
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partly in response to the Lisbon Strategy. 20 The EU Commission introduced in March 
2000 a Communication for a draft Directive. 21 This Directive laid down the basic 
conditions and rules of admission of migrants for employment purposes. 22 This attempt 
was not welcomed by Member States any more than the previous Communication. These 
measures failed to be successful simply because of the lack of support from the Member 
States. 23 This is because the Member States have a policy of keeping the EU out of 
admission policy and keeping the decision-making power on these issues at the national 
level (House of Lords, 2005c: 3 1). 24 
Further, the abovementioned sensitivity of this aspect of immigration policy i. e. legal 
immigration for the Member States was clearly visible in the Council Decision on 
December 2004, which stated that after the transitional five years period from the 
Amsterdam Treaty on policy areas covered by Ti tie IV of the Treaty (visas, asylum, 
immigration and other policies related to the free movement of persons) decisions should 
be made in the future by qualified majority voting (QMV). 25 However, the main 
exceptions to that rule were measures relating to legal migration, which will stay under 
the unanimity rule (House of Lords, 2005c: 3 1). The same tendency was carried further in 
the Constitutional Treaty, which stated that Member States will determine volumes of 
admission of third country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order 
to seek work (House of Lords, 2006a: 3 1). These decisions clearly showed that there has 
been no major improvement in the ways in which the Member States consider 
immigration: they cooperate only to restrict it not liberalize it. 
20 The central goal for the Lisbon Strategy adopted in March 2001 was for the EU to become 'the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world and where the labour market for 
immigrants and refugees represents a crucial component of the integration process'. In addition, the Lisbon 
Strategy first introduced the Open Method of Coordination, which was later in the same year used on 
immigration policy. 
21 EU Commission, (2001 d) COM 0386 final 
22 Admission means the rules that regulate the conditions in which immigrants are allowed to enter the EU 
area in order to work or just reside there. 
23 Professor Kess Groenendijk, giving evidence in the House of House of Lords, 15 June 2005 (the House 
of House of Lords, 2005, evidence, 46-47). 
24 The attitudes were also clearly stated in newspapers; See also: Ew-opean Voice, 'An Immigration 
strategy would make Europe fairer, richer, and stronger', Vol. 10, No. 3,29 January 2004; BBC News 'No 
EU say in economic migration, 5 January, 2005; Ein-opean Voice, 'Immigration - What's so wrong with 
asking the People', Vol. 11, No. 34,29 January 2005 
25 EU Council (Decision on 22.12.2004; 2004/927 EC, OJ L 396. 
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The next step in attempts to create common immigration policy were based on the so 
called Hague Programme from 2004.26 This programme was designed to build on the 
achievements of the previous five years under the Tampere programme, and to specify 
actions for the next five years. One example of changed priorities compared to the 
Tampere Conclusions was the explicit linkage of legal immigration to the fight against 
illegal immigration that the Hague programme brought. In addition, in this programme 
the 'management of immigration flows' the term which was first introduced in the 
Tampere Conclusions, was extended to have an 'external' dimension together with the 
proposals on border checks, biometrics and visa policies. However, the only actual 
achievement of Hague Programme regarding legal immigration was a policy plan, which 
again, was only a plan without any binding impact. The only binding decision that has 
concerned legal immigration since the Hague has been the achievement of the EU's long- 
term residential status for third country nationals. 27 To SLIM up, the extended cooperation 
in the field of JHA has included primarily restrictive measures and there have been few 
achievements regarding legal immigration. Therefore it can be argued that the 
improvements in the JHA policy have been driven by a 'securitising approach' which 
highlights internal security with a logic similar to that applied to external issues and 
where the role of elites is dominant instead of democratically chosen institutions. - 
3.7.2. Has the Democratic Control of JHA Field Improved? 
As argued in the beginning of this chapter a characteristic of JHA policy has been, since 
the early years, loose intergovernmental cooperation to the latest Treaty changes and the 
lack of democratic orjudicial control. As this chapter has demonstrated, there has been a 
major improvement in institutionalizing JHA cooperation within the EU institutional 
structures and in that way policy-making has become more transparent. Nevertheless, the 
achievements in democratic and judicial control have been moderate. Partly this is 
because the ftindamental structure of JHA decision-making has not changed and that is 
26 EU Commission (2005b) COM 184 final 
27 EU Council (2003a) Directive 2003/109/EC. 
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significantly due to the reluctance of Member States to give tip their decision-making 
power. The consequence is that the JHA sector still has a strong intergovernmental 
nature. For example, the JHA Council inherited from Trevi and from the Maastricht third 
pillar a heavily hierarchical structure of policy-making (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 
467). The JHA policy field is one of the few areas in the EU Council that has four 
depision-making layers and all these layers are dominated by experts from security issues 
28 (Monar, 2002: 197) . In addition, as the previous section showed, 
in this policy field 
there are more and more special agencies and bodies which are outside the main 
institutions, and which are designed to fulfil special tasks (Europol, Eurojust, Frontex) 
(Monar, 2002: 205). There are significant implications for democratic control in 
establishing these semi-autonomous bodies, because they are only weakly controlled by 
the Council of Ministers and . not 
directly by any democratically chosen institutions. 
Further, the main weakness in the control functions of the EP is that it has not been 
granted any power to amend or block legislation by the Council of Ministers - the EP 
only has the right to be consulted, except in measures concerning visas and judicial 
cooperation in civil law matters, for which the Treaty of Nice introduced the co-decision 
procedure (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 468). This means that the role of the EP has 
remained limited, although at a practical level it has intensified its engagement with tile 
JHA sector especially through its Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice 
and Home Affairs (LIBE). In addition, tile role of National Parliaments has also remained 
limited in this EU policy field. However, compared to the EP, the NPs do not have any 
direct Treaty base for their participation in EU policy-making; they do not have any right 
to be consulted or to be participants in co-decision-making as the EP does. Their only 
channel to influence the EU decision-making process is indirect, through their 
Governments. In addition, as will be explained in chapter 5, they can exercise 'direct' 
influence on the EU institutions but this is not the same as being participants in the 
decision-making. 
28 This means that agendas for JHA Councils are prepared by Coreper 11 which meets weekly, between 
Coreper and the working groups, the JHA structure has an additional intermediary level composed of 
special coordinating committees (national experts) and the lowest level is composed of working groups of 
specialists and operational bodies from national level. in addition, Ludford has argued that two-thirds of the 
ministers who meet at the EU Council meetings to discuss immigration and asylum issues are ministers 
from the Ministries of the Interior (Ludford, 2004: 30). 
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One main obstacle for improving the influence channels for NPs is the abovementioned 
very complicated EU decision-making process with four different layers, together with. 
the impact of serniautonomous agencies and different intergovernmental groupings, 
which is characteristic of the JHA decision-making. These elements also reduce to a great 
extent the real influence of Members of the Council of Ministers in this policy field who 
are accountab le to the NPs, because most of the policy-making takes place at the lower 
layers, where the experts are participating. Therefore, as argued by the existing literature 
(Lavenex and Wallace, 2005; Monar 2003c; Apap el al., 2004) a more effective way to 
increase the democratic control and transparency in this policy field is by strengthening 
the roles of the EP and the ECJ. These achievements were suggested in the Constitutional 
TreatY29 (which has not been ratified). Nevertheless, the recent tendency in this policy 
field indicates that the securitising approach is becoming an overriding policy goal which 
may refine the terms of the free movement of persons in Community Law. It is 
noteworthy that in the context of the EU's JHA policy, freedom has not been defined to 
include the protection of fundamental freedoms. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained how the field of the JHA has developed from loose 
intergovernmental cooperation to one of the most salient policy fields in the EU. It 
illustrated how policy-making in this policy field was outside the EU's legal framework 
until the 1990s without any democratic or juridical control and how the EU Treaty 
changes have one by one brought this policy field under the EU's legal framework. Tile 
terrorist attacks in September 2001 further accelerated the swift measures for enhanced 
security and control and since then, EU level "packages' that include anti-terrorist 
measures, cooperation among law enforcement agencies and border control experts have 
increased to a great extent and today these 'anti-terrorist' measures dominate the whole 
29 The Treaty suggested that NPs may participate in the evaluation mechanisms foreseen in Article 111-260 
and shall be involved in the political monitoring of Europol and the evaluations of Eurojust's activities. In 
addition, there will be improvements regarding to their access to information, in particular by receiving a 
wider range of non-legislative documents and it introduced a formal role for NPs in monitoring compliance 
of legislation with the principle of subsidiary. 
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field of JHA. This chapter began by arguing that in this policy field the participation of 
National Parliaments has traditionally been very limited. In this respect, this chapter did 
not find much evidence of change. Regardless of recent Treaty changes, which have 
highlighted the role of NPs as guardians of democratic control and legitimacy in EU 
policy-making, in practical terms this chapter suggests that the NPs are not participating 
effectively in this policy field and as a consequence of this, this policy field is still 
lacking democratic control. 
However, this chapter suggests that the main reason for the lack of NPs influence in JHA 
policy-i-naking at general level is in the present political climate where Member States are 
focusing even more on 'interior ministers' options of security' than ever before. In that 
kind of political climate it would be difficult to see how to add accountability and 
consultations with the NPs, which are methods to increase democratic control. Further, 
there are some rather traditional reasons which explain the low participation of the NPs in 
this policy field; First, in immigration and border control matters the Member States have 
always been reluctant to give up their decision-making power to EU institutions and 
therefore this policy field still is a mixture of intergovernmental and communitarized 
decision-making, which means that the participation of democratically elected 
institutions, such as the EP or the NPs is limited. At the EU level, the Council of 
Ministers (where individual Ministers are indirectly accountable to their NPs) is the key 
decision-making institution. However, linked with tile dominant 'security approach' in 
EU policy making in JHA field, there is a growing tendency to establish more semi- 
autonomous bodies (for example Frontex and Europol) and create different 
intergovernmental groupings to discuss immigration related matters such as the G6, in 
which most if (not all) decisions and policy preparations are made without any 
democratic control (Bryggeman, 2004; Hayes and Bunyan, 2005; House of Lords, 
2006b). Moreover, the immigration elite from Ministries of the Interior and from the 
Police have dominated policy preparation of these questions in each level at the expense 
of democratically chosen participants: The elites are participating at national and at EU 
level and at the intergovernmental levels, and the public at large still does not know much 
about what they are discussing and where, because the tendency has been to keep these 
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issues behind closed doors. The implications of the complicated decision-making 
procedures, together with the dominance of the immigration elites has led to the situation 
that the political guidance provided by NPs has been either completely missing or is very 
weak. This situation has not dramatically changed within the last ten years in this policy 
field as this chapter has demonstrated. 
An extra challenge for NPs has been how to decide what is meant by 'common 
immigration policy' because immigration related issues are not under one Ministry at the 
national level or under one DG at the EU level. Rather, as this chapter has demonstrated, 
the questions related to immigration (and to a lesser extent border control issues) touch 
many fields of society from employment to internal security questions which are valued 
differently among the different groups of actor in each society and country. This means 
that the politicians have not so far been able to establish 'a common immigration policy' 
for the EU which has left plenty of room for manoeuvre for immigration elites, who have 
highlighted the security aspects which is their area of expertise. The implication has been 
that the 'security' aspect has been recently embedded so effectively it) EU level thinking 
that today immigration is almost completely linked to 'illegal' issues such as international 
crime, smuggling and human trafficking. With this link to 'threat' the elites have been 
able to create more and more complicated methods and instruments to prevent the illegal 
aspects of immigration without any real involvement of the NPs. These instruments have 
far reaching implications which can potentially infringe not only the rights of immigrants 
but also the rights of EU citizens, and which eventually could jeopardize the democracy 
of the EU. This is the main reason why this chapter suggests that the involvement of NPs 
in EU policy-making in these matters is not adequate. 
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Chapter 4. National Parliaments in the EU Policy-Making Process 
Introduction 
This chapter will explain ho%v National Parliaments (NPs) have been involved in EU 
policy-making and how the EU has had an impact on NPs. Most of the existing literature 
considers National Parliaments as the main losers of European integration because in tile 
European legislation process, agenda-setting and decision-making powers are in the 
hands of members of the EU Council instead of in the hands of Parliaments. An 
additional argument that they are 'losers' in the European integration process comes from 
the fact that they do not have a Treaty base for their EU level participation. For these 
reasons, the NPs have been categorized as 'passive' rather than 'active' institutions in the 
EU policy process (Norton, 2001; Wessels et aL; 2003; Maurer 2003; Bengtson 2003; 
and Raunio 2001,2004; Kassim, 2005; Holzhacker, 2006). This chapter will ask what it 
means to be a 'passive' institution and what implications it has for the participation of 
NPs in EU policy-making. This chapter will argue, first, that the role of tile NPs has 
significantly increased in the EU policy process since the late 1980s beyond their natural 
task of influence i. e. installing a Government at the beginning of a term and powers of 
dissolution and law making powers) (Holzhacker, 2007: 14 1). Secondly, it will argue that 
the NPs have developed new methods of scrutiny, intensified mutual cooperation with 
other NPs and have created structures for networking and lobbying which all demonstrate 
Europeanization (Verg6s-Bausili and McLeod, 2006; Auel and Benz, 2005; Duina and 
Oliver, 2005). The main mechanisms through which the process of Europeanization in 
'downloading' sense has taken place have been learning and socialising'. The last part of 
this section will illustrate how the learning and socialising have taken place on a practical 
level. The aim is to demonstrate that the EU gave the first incentives for improving the 
involvement of NPs in EU policy-making, but after that further development has been 
based on the individual activities of the NPs. 
4.1. National Parliaments in the EU Policy-Making Process 
' The difference between Europeanization mechanisms is explained in details in chapters I and 2 
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The increased debate on the democratic legitimacy of the EU, which began with the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, brought National Parliaments (NPs) to the centre of 
European discussions for the first time (Norton, 1996: 8; Vergds-Balisili, 2002: 2). 
European leaders discovered that more citizen involvement and legitimacy was required 
for European integration to develop further as a political union and more importantly, that 
public support could no longer be taken for granted (Bengtson, 2003; Rizzuto, 2003; 
Maurer 2001; Raunio 2001; Wessels el. aL, 2003; and Pernice; 2001; Vos, 2003). This 
debate focused on the lack of democratic representation: the problem known as 
'denioci-atic deficit'. A canvass of the literature, however, suggests a different definition 
for that term, but common to all of the literature is the notion that the EU has failed to 
conform to a particular conception of democracy, which is an idealized rendering of 
Parliamentary democracy at the national level (Nugent, 1991; Norton, 1996; Banchoff., 
el. aL, 1999; Maurer, 2001; Wessels et. aL, 2003; Benz, 2004; Holzhacher, 2007). 
Nugent, for instance, suggests that 'the power of the European Council, the Council of 
Ministers, and the Commission, on the one hand, and the comparative weakness of the 
European Parliament (EP) on the other hand, does make a 'denioci-atic dqf1cit' in the 
European Community' (Nugent, 1991: 309). Further, Williams describes 'denloci-atic 
deficit' as a 'gap between the powers transferred to the Community level and the control 
of the elected Parliament over them' (Williams, 1991: 162). In most definitions the 
'democi-atic deficit' refers specifically to the weakness of the EP as the only directly 
elected EU institution, and even more specifically to the inability of the EP to hold 
European executives accountable to it in a manner comparable to tile way in which 
national Governments are held accountable to their own Parliaments. The main problem 
is that the main actors in the EU policy process, the Council of Ministers and the EU 
Commission are not directly accountable to European citizens (i. e. they are not 
democratically elected). In addition, as tile previous chapter argued, there are certain 
policy fields where EU policy-making is particularly lacking in democratic (or juridical) 
control, as in the case of JHA policy, where the EP has only very limited participation 
rights. As mentioned earlier, the NPs only participate indh-ec11j,, through their 
Governments (this will be explained in detail in chapter 5). Since the late 1990s however, 
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National Parliaments have increasingly come to be seen as a possible institutional 
solution to correct the problem of 'democi-alic dejticil' (Norton, 1996; Rizzuto, 2003). 
The main reason for the abovementioned argument is that NPs are central institutions in 
European systems of governance by providing the forum for interaction for different 
groups of individuals. They also link society with other democratic institutions - the 
executive, judiciary and state bureaucracy (Kopecky, 2003: 133). Parliaments are, 
perhaps, more than anything, symbols of representation: they are considered as key 
factors for democratic decision-making. In the EU's policy-making process, they are tile 
only channels for ordinary citizens to express their views and concerns regarding 
2 European policies (ECPRD, 2003: 13). The concerns of citizens should not be 
-underestimated because in each year the EU produces around 500 political decisions, 
directives and regulations which are important because they affect Member State politics 
and policies greatly (Auel, 2005: 304). In addition, NPs are important because they must 
accept these laws by ratifying EU acts before they become part of domestically binding 
law. However, as mentioned earlier, they do not have a Treaty base for their EU level 
participation, which means that their most important channel of influence is through their 
Government. 
Has the lack of a Treaty base created more challenges for the NPs to respond to the 
evolution of the EU than for other groups of actors in society, which also influence the 
EU indirectly? Interest groups, for instance, do not have a Treaty base for their 
participation at the national or EU level and they are still considered effective participants 
in EU policy-making (Ladrech, 2005: 318). This section will analyse what is meant by 
the statement that Parliaments are 'passive' institutions, where this understanding comes 
from and why it matters. Further, this section will examine whether the categorization 
'passive' versus 'active' has any explanatory power to explain how NPs are participating 
in the EU policy process in one particular policy field, that is, the JHA area. For 
instance, Bulmer and Lequesne have argued that European negotiations enable different 
2 ECPRD is European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (EPCRD) and its 
publication from 3.4.2003 "European Affah-s Committees: The Influence ofNalional Pai-lianzents oil 
Politics, an Ovei-view will be refer here as "ECPRD". 
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Governmental agencies, such as NPs, to maximize their power by inserting themselves 
into ftinctional networks at EU level (Bulmer and I-equesne, 2005: 283). This would be 
possible because the state institutions no longer have a monopoly in exercising political 
authority and therefore, the different levels of governance are open places for competition 
and contestation in which various actors can creatively pursue their goals (Bulmer and 
Lequesne, 2005: 283; Ladrech, 2005: 334). Interest groups can be named as one group 
that have been able to pursue various channels of influence at multiple levels (Ladrech, 
2005: 318) To support the ýbovernentioned view, Benz has also argued that the 
evolution of rnulti-level governance in the EU does not inevitably turn NPs into 
institutions without power (Benz, 2004: 896). Moreover, Duina and Oliver have argued 
that due to the EU's impact, the reach of the NPs has extended beyond the traditional 
remit of NPs (Duina and Oliver, 2005: 174). But have NPs taken advantage of the EU 
governance system, which is more and more characterized in the literature as a 'nuilli- 
levelpolicy- making' or 'multilevel -govei-nance system'. 
3 
To begin with the assumption that NPs are 'passive' institutions, it is worth mentioning 
that most authors have argued that although the NPs have adapted their structures and 
procedures to keep pace with the increasing scope of EU integration, it has not been 
enough in order to be effectively involved with EU policy-making (Norton, 1996; Maurer 
and Wessels, 2001; Raunio, 2001; Wessels et aL, 2003). On the other hand, this means 
that there are fewer legal constraints for the NPs to participate actively in the EU policy 
process. Nevertheless, concerns have been raised as to whether NPs are able to use all 
the new opportunities that the EU provides for them in participating in the EU policy 
process (Rizzuto, 2003; Benz 2004 and 2005). In addition, Benz suggested that the 
institutional reforms in the Member States have turned NPs into external veto players 4 in 
3 The Multi-level policy-making means that the policy-making and governance system in the European 
Union have become more complex than before as it includes the interaction of a large number of actors, 
both public and private, and the Nveight in its policy-making process is in early preparations. (Scharpf, 
1994,2000; Kohler-Koch, 1996,200 I; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005) 
4 Benz and Auel divide the veto power into two categories: internal and external. In the EU legislation 
process, the Council of Ministers hold the veto power against a policy proposed in the Council of Ministers, 
not Parliaments. However, NPs can indirectly veto the EU policy if they reject their Government's 
negotiation position or decision, and in that sense they are 'external veto players' (Auel and Benz, 2005: 
378) 
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EU policy, but this power should not be overestimated because members of NPs have no 
real interest in engaging in European policies (Benz, 2004: 885). In other words, he 
suggests that NPs have voluntarily chosen to be 'passive' rather than 'active' in the EU 
policy process. 
4.1.1. Being 'Passive' in the EU Policy Process 
The politics literature has different reasons for categorizing the NPs as 'passive'. The 
purpose of this chapter is not to 'chart' all the variations expressed in tile existing 
literature. Instead, it will show just a few examples of widely differing views, and will 
take a deeper look at Wessels et al's definition, because it names indicators which could 
be useful for this research as well. As an example, Auel describes National Parliaments 
'as being objects of a process of passive Europeanization' (Auel, 2005: 306). According 
to her study, for a long tirne Parliaments were just 'by-watchers' when something that 
was called 'Europeanization' for a variety of reasons simply happened to them (Auel, 
2005: 306). As explained in chapter 2, however, most of the existing literature describes 
Europeanization as an interactive process, where the impact is not static or mechanistic 
(136rzel, 2005; Radaelli, 2006). Nevertheless, this definition, where the NPs are 
considered as 'passive by-watchers' is largely shared in the existing literature. It 
highlights the earlier perspective of Europeanization studies, where tile emphasis is on 
'top-down' effects. The next section aims to explore from where this understanding 
derives. 
Wessels el aL, (2001 and 2003) used the categorization 'sti-ong' versus 'Iveak' in order to 
compare how groups of actors in the Member States have adapted their constitutional, 
institutional, procedural and administrative structures to the challenges of EU policy- 
making. They compared how NPs participate in EU affairs in 15 EU Member States in 
order to find out whether there exist so called 'besl pi-actices' among NPs and whether 
some NPs are more effective than others (Wessels el aL, 2003: 18). The typology 
csfrong' / 'weak' was created in order to compare evolution oil an EU level with that in 
national settings, because the political systern of the EU and the Member States is no 
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longer separate, as explained in chapter 2. However, there are certain difficulties with 
their typology; first, they do not explain clearly enough what makes. a Parliament 'strong' 
or 'weak, ' nor whether the typology applies to all policy-making or just to a particulal, 
policy issue, in a particular state. Secondly, they have many definitions (strong, weak, 
passive, active and multi-player) which are confusing. However, the most important 
implication from their study for this research is that they found that some NPs can 
effectively influence EU policy-making, even though they do not have a direct Treaty 
base for their participation. Those NPs who could get their views taken into consideration 
both at national and at EU-level were called 'sli-ong' adaptors. The other class, '11, eak' 
adaptors, were unable or unwilling to play a stronger game at either level. The 'stl-ong' 
adaptors had the following similar powers: the capacity to have certain veto power in the 
national decision-making process, the ability to make modifications and steer 
compromises through the course of the national policy process, were able to voice their 
opinions through reports and resolutions, and to reserve and use informal networking 
arenas forjoint consultation by using Parliamentary scrutiny (Maurer and Wessels, 2001: 
462). 
Those NPs that Wessels et aL, categorized as the most influential 'stl-ong' adaptors also 
had a better ability to participate in the policy process at EU level (because of that ability, 
Wessels' et aL, named them as 'multi-levelplayei-s' and continued to call them 'active' 
institutions). Compared to the 'iteak' adaptors, the 'sti-ong' adaptors had better access to 
EU information at a very early stage, a reliable and open relationship with their 
Governments and administrations, good capacities in their Parliaments (spe cial expertise) 
and most of all, constitutional support for Parliamentary participation (Wessels et aL, 
2003: 432). Therefore, the strong Parliaments do influence EU policy processes (Wessels 
et aL, 2003: 432). Moreover, they found evidence that these (strong) NPs do not simply 
follow their Governments in EU policy but instead try to prescribe their Governments' 
action (Wessels et aL, 2003: 432). According to Wessels et aL, those NPs that are able to 
exert influence at EU level (i. e., multi-levelplayei-s) such as the NPs in Denmark, Finland 
and the UK, have improved their access to information independently from their 
Governments. The following similarities were found among these 'Inulti-levelplayei-s': 
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first, they have intensified information exchange at many different levels; secondly, they 
actively participate in interparliamentary co-operation forums (sLIch as COSAC)5 and 
have created some other channels for informal cooperation with other NPs within the EU 
(Wessels el aL, 2003: 440); thirdly, they have created to some extent direct contacts Nvith 
European institutions such as the EP and the EU Commission. 
Nevertheless, Wessels et al., concluded that decision-making at the EU level continues to 
be primarily in the hands of the Governments. It is only their room for manoeuvre that 
has been restricted by the NPs and particularly by their European Affairs Committees 
(EACs) (Wessels et al., 2003: 441). NPs have created structures that enable them to 
participate effectively at EU level, but the incentive to participate varies greatly among 
the NPs. Compared to other societal institutions (such as Governments or interest groups) 
Wessels et al., call NPs 'passive' rather than 'active' institutions because decision- 
making continues to be in the hands of Governments, and Parliaments have only an 
indirect role in that process. This is the main reason why Wessels et al., categorize NPs 
as 'passive' institutions at the EU level. 
Although Wessels et aL, found great differences between 'sli-ong' adaptors and '11'eak' 
adaptors, ' a common feature of all NPs in EU Member States was that they have 
strengthened their formal role in the EU decision-making process, especially through 
European Affairs committees (EAC)6 (i. e. in(lh-ect influence), which, they arguejs due 
to the Europeanization of NPs. (Wessels et aL, 2003: 432). This, however, could also 
mean that the differences between 'sfi-ong' and 'weak' are misleading and there no longer 
exist great differences between National Parliaments regarding their influence on EU 
policy-making because of Europeanization effects. In addition, not only the 'stl-ong' 
adaptors but most of the NPs have further developed complementary instruments to 
participate in EU level policy-making by intensifying their indirect participation through 
Governments and by developing methods for direct influence, Such as keeping regular 
' COSAC will be explained in detail under the heading 4.3.2. 
6 The structure and the working methods of EACs will be explored later when analysing the individual 
Member States and their participation in EU affidrs. 
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contact with EU institutions (Verges and McLeod, 2006: 3). A recent example of this is 
that twenty NPs have sent their own representative to the EU. 7 
4.1.2.. More Reason Why National Par liaments are Categorized as 'Passive' 
The above section gave some ideas why NPs are considered 'passive' actors in the EU 
-policy process. Further, the 'passivity' of NPs is related to the problem of denioci-atic 
deficit of the EU which has three dimensions: (1) distance; (2) executive dominance; and 
(3) the lack of transparency. The first problem, refers to the fact that the NPs have lost a 
great amount of their traditional legislative powers to the EU. This means that there has 
been shift of competences from the national to the European level (Norton, 1996: 182; 
Wessels et aL, 2003: 43 1). This transfer has created a sense among citizens that decisions 
that affect their everyday lives are being taken by remote, unaccountable institutions over 
which they have no influence (Rizzuto, 2003: 97). This concern is not completely without 
evidence: as chapter 3 clearly demonstrated, the tendency in the EU's JHA field has been 
to keep most policy-making behind closed doors, led by a small group of elite i. e. away 
from the public eye. The main implication for removing legislation from the national 
sphere to the EU (which in geographical terms is often thousands of kilometres away) is 
that this loss of legislative power is a strong argument for categorizing NPs as the Vosel-s' 
of EU integration or as 'passive' institutions. This claim is strengthened by ihe argument 
expressed earlier that NPs have only an indirect role in the EU's policy process, that is 
they are able to exercise influence only thi-ough national Governments, not individually 
(Norton, 1996: 192). The influence thi-ough Government is mostly understood in the 
existing literature as monitoring Governments' actions after tile EU policy is decided at 
EU level (Raunio, 2001; Maurer, 2003). This function, however, is not considered an 
effective way for NPs to impose their views on EU policy formation in advance, 8 which 
is an important stage of forming a policy in the EU's governance. Moreover, the EU's 
decisional pro cesses disadvantage the NPs. For instance, qualified majority voting is 
7 (A full list of EU Member States who have sent their own representatives at tile EU can be found at 
w-ww. cosac. com). 
8 How influence is understood and used in this research is explained in chapter 1, and further empirical 
examples of how NPs exercise their influence are analysed in chapter 5. 
98 
particularly problematic, since it removes the requirement that policy outcomes receive 
the assent of the NPs (Kassim, 2005: 297). 
Because of the complex nature of EU policy formation, the traditional role for NPs (i. e., 
that of monitoring Governments' action post-hoc) is no longer considered an adequate 
tool for efficient participation (Maurer, 2001; Raunio, 2001; Holzhacker, 2006). As a 
consequence the literature has argued that it has deepened the 'democratic deficit 
problem' (Maurer, 2001; Pernice, 2001; Bentgson, 2003). 
The second reason why NPs are considered 'passive' is their dependency on 
Government. This is because EU policy-making and national preparations for EU level 
action are to a great extent in the hands of the Governments. As a consequence it depends 
-on the political circumstances affecting each NP and its Government whether and how 
well the NP is able to participate in the EU policy process and at which level. Tile 
Government's dominant position (i. e. its executive dominance), is further strengthened by 
its better ability to use information, knowledge and the powers of administration (Raunio 
and Hix, 2000: 153; Wessels et aL, 2003: 431; Kassim, 2005: 297). Parliaments do not 
generally have the same resources as Governments for participating in the EU policy 
process, or indeed the same expertise. This has particular importance in tile field of JHA, 
which is rapidly developing a policy field with decision-making rules that are more 
complicated than in other EU policy fields (Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 269). 
Therefore, the dominant position of the executive compared to Parliament has been used 
as another main argument for categorizing NPs as 'passive' rather than 'active' 
institutions in the EU's policy process. 
The third reason why NPs are regarded as 'passive' actors in EU policy-making that 
implies the EU's decision-making is suffering from the 'deinoc)-atic deficit' is the lack of 
ti-anspai-ency. As chapter 3 demonstrated, not only does decision-making in the EU's 
JHA field take place to a great extent behind closed doors, but the policy preparations are 
also almost entirely in the hands of experts who function completely behind closed doors. 
What follows is that the NPs are not always informed about these preparations at all 
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(Rizzuto, 2003; House of Lords, 2006b). These experts are usually civil servants from the 
EU Commission and from national ministries, experts and representatives from interest 
groups, but rarely national Parliamentarians. Also, the timing and volume of the elements 
involved in the policy/decision-making process make it difficult for the National 
Parliaments to be effectively involved (Kassim, 2005: 297). The consequence is that 
, 
decision-making remains largely in hands of experts, not only in the preparation, but also 
at the decision-making level in particular in the JHA policy field. Because of this, it could 
also be argued that this 'transparency' problem is not entirely about the dominance of 
Government but about the 'dominance q expeils', a typical feature of EU level policy- )f 
making (Wallace, 2005: 34). However, Ministers who formally take the decisions in the 
Council of Ministers (and who are accountable to the NPs) do not always know all the 
details about the issue concerned, because many details have been agreed at lower levels 
of policy-making. 
Therefore, the problem of distance, the Government's dominance and limited 
transparency are the main reasons for explaining wily NPs have been categorized as 
'passive' rather than as 'active' policy-makers in the EU policy process. However, this is 
only half of the story, as the latter part of this chapter will illustrate. There has in fact 
been a great amount of improvement since the Maastricht Treaty regarding the NPs' role 
at EU level, as the following sections will explain in detail. This has largely taken place 
because the NPs have demanded more say in the EU level decision-making process. For 
instance, their access to information has improved significantly in the last ten years in 
each of the NPs in the EU and the information gap between the Government and the NPs 
is no longer that substantial. Moreover, NPs have also begun to creat e information 
channels that are independent of their Governments. The main explanation for their 
improved role has been that the NPs throughout the EU have responded to the challenges 
of the EU's evolution by creating ne%v institutional structures in order to be better 
involved in the EU level policy-making process. 
4.2. Adaptation by National Parliaments to EU level Policy-Making 
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The process whereby the NPs have developed national participation structures has taken 
place incrementally and simultaneously with the evolution of the EU. This 'increment a) 
change' is one of the characteristics that Europeanization literature stresses. Typical for 
Europeanization is also that it is an interactive process which provides considerable 
opportunities for the creative usage of Europe (Radaelli, 2006: 59). For instance, it deals 
with how domestic change is processed; patterns of adaptation can be more complex than 
simple reactions to the 'EU' (Radaelli, 2006: 59). Comparative research on Parliamentary 
participation in the EU policy process has observed that the adaptation by NPs to 
European integration has been a three-stage process, during which they have become 
more involved in the governance of the EU (Norton, 1996: 8; Rizzuto, 2003: 103). In 
particular at the first stage, which took place from the beginning of the EC until the late 
. 
1970s, Parliaments in general showed little interest in being involved in EU affairs. In 
these early years of European integration, they were either left outside tile EU policy 
cycle or were only marginally involved (Wessels et aL, 2003: 43 1). Besides their low 
interest, there was no real need for Parliaments to be involved during that time because 
national interests were defended by the members of the Council of Ministers through 
their veto on most issues (Bengtson, 2003: 2). In addition, for decades, EC policy was 
considered to be part of 'external' affairs and as such, an indisputable prerogative of the 
6executive' - outside the legitimate claim for Parliamentary participation (Maurer, 2003: 
6). It can be argued that in this first stage the Europeanization of NPs was not very 
strong. 
At the second stage, which took place from the late 1980s to the 1990s, NPs gained more 
influence and became more active participants in the EU policy process for the following 
reasons: first, the European Community grew both in size and scope. The Single 
European Act (SEA 1986) resulted in a substantial amount of legislation which had to be 
passed and implemented by NPs (Bengtson, 2003: 2). Moreover, the SEA introduced 
qualified majority voting as a decision-making model in the Council of Ministers. This 
meant that national Governments Could no longer block decisions made by the Council of 
Ministers (Rizzuto, 2003: 104). But more importantly it was tile creation of the European 
Union (by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993) as the third stage, that changed the situation 
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significantly. Parallel to these developments, in the early 1990s, NPs noticed that they 
were losing their traditional access and influence to legislative process (Maurer, 2003: 
15). Secondly, as explained in the previous chapter, the Maastricht Treaty created two 
new pillars within the EU. Decision-making under both pillars was to take place at inter- 
Governmental level i. e., outside of the context of the Community, and the NPs were not 
involved in it- (Norton, 1996: 8) As a consequence of these changes and of growing 
awareness among NPs, they made various institutional reforms in order to improve their 
role in the EU's policy process by means of constitutional changes, specific laws, 
declarations, reports and by increasing the human resources of Parliaments (Wessels et 
al., 2003: 431). These reforms had three basic aims: to obtain more information, to 
handle this information more effectively and to improve participation methods. To sum 
up, at the second stage, European integration had a clear impact on the role of NPs in the 
EU process. However, as briefly mentioned earlier, this was one, but not the only reason 
for the increased role of NPs in EU policy-making. At the same time NPs had also begun 
to demand more of a say at EU level. 
The most significant improvement that was related to the third stage of adaptation among 
NPs and which could be named as the beginning of cross-national learning for the NPs 
was the establishment of a Committee of Ein-opean Affah-s (EAQ within each national 
Parliament (Norton, 1996: 8).. The first EAC was set up by the German Bundesi-al in 
1957 and the reason behind the establishment of the first Committee was to enable the 
Bundesi-at to better scrutinise the activities of the German Government in European 
affairs. (EPCRD, 2003: 10). As the European integration process developed over time, 
more EC member states followed the German example. As a consequence, the EAC is the 
most important institutional channel for NPs to participate in the EU policy process. This 
committee deals with most EU affairs, although the methods vary greatly between 
Member States (Maurer, 2001: 67). 9 How each of these Committees works in different 
EU Member States depends on their legal traditions, political structure and also on the 
relationship between the Government and Parliament. Nevertheless, the basic structure is 
9 The structure and functions of this EAC will be analysed detailed later in this chapter, when each NP is 
introduced. 
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similar among the NPs in EU Member States and the aim was to make sure that 
Parliament is involved in the EU decision-making process (Norton, 1996: 9-11). The 
creation of EACs has been considered the most important example of adaptation to EU 
integration that Parliaments have made so far (Norton, 1996; Wessels et al., 2003; 
Rizzutto, 2003). The next section will explain the reason why the NPs have developed 
similar methods for their influence even though they had different legal and political 
backgrounds, and why the EU Treaties did not specify explicitly how they should be 
participating in the EU policy process. The main argument is that they became deeply 
Europeanized and that largely took place though learning and socialising. 
4.3. The Participation of National Parliament at EU Level 
As explained earlier, until the 1990s, the NPs were left out of the EU policy process 
almost entirely and the NPs were considered mainly as 'objects of Europeanization' not 
as active participants in EU level developments (Auel, 2005: 306). One important reason 
for this was the lack of explicit reference in the EU Treaties to the role of the National 
Parliaments. Until the enactment of the Treaty of Nice in 2003, NPs did not have a 
specific role in the EC/EU Treaties; their role was only mentioned in separate 
declarations. 10 Even after the Treaty changes in Nice in 2003, their most important role 
in the EU's decision-making system was still to ratify Treaty changes and amendments 
and transpose EC directives into national law (Maurer and Wessels-, 2001: 429). 11 Besides 
Article 48 TEU, there are some other articles that identify the Member States and their 
National Parliaments as 'the mastei-s of the tieaties'. 12 These Treaty definitions are 
straightforward in emphasising the importance of NPs in that process but they do not say 
much about policy-making. Instead, they reflect the original approach of the EC's 
10 Declaration 13 and 14, Maastricht Treaty: their meaning is explained in the next section. 
According to the Treaty of European Union, any amendment to the treaties on which EU is based , shall 
only enter into force "after being ratified by all the Member States in accordance with their respective 
Constitutional requirements" (TEU, article 48). 
12 Also, this applies if a treaty change is required for the conclusion of an international agreement (article 
300.5 ECT ) and article 49 TEU stipulates that a European state's admission to the EU requires such 
ratification as well and eventually, according to TEU 42, the Member States must adopt a Council decision 
on police and judicial co-operation in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
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founding fathers, which was that the EC/EU Treaties are agreements between states 
(Maurer, 2003: 6). 
4.3.1. The Maastricht Treaty 
It was as late as 1993 that NPs gained a more precise role in the EU policy process (in the 
Treaty of Maastricht). The negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty took place 
during a period of public scepticism and disenchantment towards the European 
integration process, especially in Denmark, the UK and France, and this had an impact on 
the final outcome of that Treaty (Pryce, 1994: 11). For instance, the Danish Foreign 
Minister insisted during the Maastricht negotiations that the Community needed to get 
closer to citizens (Duff, 1994: 28). Therefore, three European Councils were devoted to 
reaching a workable definition of the subsidiarity principle, which was aimed at 
constraining in some systematic way the incremental growth of the activities of the EC in 
the first instance and only secondly to bring decision-making closer to citizens (Duff, 
1994: 27- 28). 13 As a consequence, the general atmosphere surrounding the Maastricht 
negotiation process had an effect which led some Parliaments (especially in Denmark, 
Germany and France) to take the first major steps towards increasing their role in the EU 
decision-making sphere (Duff, 1994: 27-28). However, at the EU level the first action to 
increase the role of NPs was based on the initiatives of the EP. Because of the activities 
of the EP, the National Parliaments were occasionally involved in Community level 
discussions bearing on the negotiations during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, but 
mainly they were 'by-watchers' in the negotiation process (Duff, 1994: 4 1). 
With the Maastricht Treaty, two new channels for NPs were created; the Treaty included 
txvo declarations related to the role of NPs. Since declarations have no force in laxv in the 
13 Tile principle of Subsidiarity is a traditional federalist concept. With the encouragement of the EC 
Commission and at the insistence mainly of the Germans, subsidiarity was written into the Treaty of 
Maastricht in the form of a basic guideline for future activity (Duff, 1994: 27). The Subsidiarity principle in 
relation to the Maastricht Treaty means that decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the people 
they mostly affect; however, the definition is ambivalent (Duff, 1994: 27). How this principle functions in 
practical level, see House of Lords, 2003b; EU Commission, 2005b; Convention of the future of Europe, 
2003d) 
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EU's legal system, they cannot be viewed as a 'legal base' for tile participation of NPs- In 
addition, it was primarily left to Member States to decide nationally, according to the ir 
Constitutions and Parliamentary traditions, how the NPs should participate in EU 
decision-making more effectively; the EU Treaties only gave guidelines. Nevertheless, 
most authors viewed this as a right step towards increasing the power of the NPs 
(Wessels el. aL, 2003: 30; Duina and Oliver, 2005: 174; Rizzuto; 2004: 896; Holzhacker, 
2007: 142). 
Declaration 13 was concerned with improving National Parliaments' effectiveness in 
scrutinising their Governments' EU-related decision-making. The second (i. e., 
Declaration 14) put emphasis on cooperation between National Parliaments in Member 
States and with the European Parliament. 14 Declaration 13 highlighted the importance of 
National Parliaments' access to information, and their need to receive EU documents 'ill 
good thne'. The main problem with this declaration was that it did not say anything about 
time limits or what would happen if the information was not delivered 'ill good fillie'. 
Despite these weaknesses, this declaration represented a political breakthrough in its 
recognition of National Parliaments' right to monitor the proceedings leading to EU 
legislation, although it was not legally binding (Maurer, 2001: 66). Based on these 
reasons, it can be argued that these two declarations offered a starting point for the 
Europeanization of the NPs. The main argument is that these two declarations established 
formal rules for the participation of NPs at EU level: (Declaration 13, by presenting 
guidelines for NPs to get better access to information and Declaration 14, by giving 
incentives to increase interaction among NPs and the EP). 
4.3.2. The Amsterdam Treaty 
As the previous section explained, the declarations in the Maastricht Treaty were not 
legally binding. Because of that there was still a need to improve the Parliaments' access 
to EU-related information, simply because there were differences among the 
14 Declaration 13: 'The Conference considers that it is important to encow-age involvement of NP's in the 
activities of the European Union... by exchange of infoi-mation... In this context the Governments of 
Member States will ensure that NPs receive Commission proposals for legislation in good finie' 
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Governments as to how much information they offered to their Parliaments (ECPRD, 
2003: 16). In addition, improving access to information became an important issue 
because of the difficulties in the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty. 15 Some 
Member States (such as Denmark, Germany and France) introduced new national 
provisions to enhance national Parliamentary scrutiny of their country's representative in 
the EU Council (Corbett, 1994: 217). 
Many suggestions regarding the institutional isation of NPs' role in tile EU were put 
forward during the negotiation process of Amsterdam, but ultimately, according to the 
Neunreither, the NPs were still 'awaiting fulfilment of the promise of closer participation 
in the EU' after the Amsterdam Treaty (Neunreither, 2000: 142). The NPs did riot 
participate in the negotiation process for either the Amsterdam Treaty or the Maastricht 
Treaty. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Amsterdam that entered into force in 1999 improved 
the role of NPs significantly. This Treaty introduced a Pi-olocol on the Y-ole of NPs (later 
16 PNP) , which followed the structure of the Maastricht 
Declarations (13 and 14) in the 
sense that it comprised two parts: the first dealt with information for National Parliaments 
and the second emphasised the role of the Conferences of the European Affairs 
Committees (COSAC). 17 COSAC had been established in 1989 and its purpose was to 
bring together delegations from the various National Parliaments' European Affairs 
Committees (EACs) and members ofthe EP. Its main aim was to offer a forum for open 
discussions among NPs; to function as an important platform for exchanging experiences 
and good practice between NPs, but it had no binding effects (ECPRD, 2003: 16) 
The first part of the Protocol (PNP) stated that 'All Commission consultation documents 
(green and white papers) and Communications shall be pi-omptlyfoi-ivai-cled to National 
Parliaments of the Member States'. It defined the type of information to be forwarded 
and it laid down a minimum 'six-iveek pei-iod' time frame for National Parliaments to 
15 The Maastricht Treaty was nearly rejected in referendum in France. In France and in Germany, 
constitutional amendments were made in order to control better (by both chambers in the Parliament) 
further transfer of powers to the European Union (Corbett, 1994: 218). 
16 Protocol is a part of the Treaty and compared to the Declaration it is legally binding. 
" The acronym COSAC comes from the French name for this body: 'Conf6rence des Organes Sp6ciais6s 
dans les Affaires Communautares'. 
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examine the documents from the submission of a proposal to 'the date when it is placed 
on a Council agenda for decision'. Compared to the declarations of the Maastricht Treaty, ZP 
these Protocols represented a major improvement because they included exact timetables. 
However, from a Parliamentary point of view, the Protocols still had certain weaknesses 
(ECPRD, 2003: 17). First, although the first Protocol indicated which documents were to 
be forwarded to the NPs within a specific time frame, it also stated that Wie Govei-nment 
of each Member State may ensuiv that its own National Parliament receives them as 
appi-opi-iate'. Therefore, it was still left open by whom the documents were to be 
forwarded and how the time frame was to be respected, which was already considered as 
the main problem in Maastricht Treaty (Maurer, 2001: 62). Secondly, as new policy 
fields, such as JHA and CFSP and EMU, were incorporated in to the EU's institutional 
structure, with a highly intergovernmental nature, these Treaty changes brought new 
problems: NPs had no decision-making powers in these fields and some Governments 
were not keen to have Parliaments involved in these sectors, as the British example 
showed. 18 Moreover, the capacities of the NPs in general to scrutinise these issues were 
completely dependent on the level of competence national Government gave to them 
(ECPRD, 2003: 16). For instance, both British Houses of Parliament complained that the 
complexity of the new decision-making procedures in these new pillafs caused difficulty 
in keeping track of business transacted to the Parliament under these pillars (Baines, 
2004: 70). 
The second part of the Protocol (PNP) that Amsterdam Treaty brought, considered the 
role of COSAC in European affairs by emphasising it as a forum for interparliamentary 
cooperation among National Parliaments. It had been noticed among EU leaders that 
there was an urgent need for more informal interaction among the NPs and that there 
were no common forum for that interaction ( Todoff, 2000: 2; Rizzuto, 2003: 104). 
However, the role of COSAC still remained informal and although it was given the 
opportunity to examine any legislative proposal or initiative in relation to 'the 
" The British Conservative Government was not willing to let Parliament participate in the EU policy- 
making process in Il and III pillar issues, and the House of Lords began by its own initiative to scrutinize 
issues related to these policy fields, as explained in more detail in chapter 5. Later, in 1997 when the 
Labour Government came to power, Parliament's scrutiny was extended to cover all EU policy fields. 
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establishment of an area of Freedom, Security and Justice which might have direct 
bearing on the rights and freedoms of individuals', its decisions remained non-binding 
(Neunreither, 2000: 142; ECPRD, 2003: 18). Even though it highlighted the informal 
role of COSAC, the PNP did provide COSAC with a legal character by stipulating that 
COSAC was able to make any contributions it deemed appropriate for tile attention of EU 
institutions, in the three specified areas: the legislative activities of the Union, notably in 
relation to the application of the principle of subsidiarity, in the area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (AFSJ) and questions relating to fundamental rights (Maurer, 2001: 63; 
House of Lords, 2003b: 2). 
In addition to the abovementioned Treaties, one cannot overlook the fact that 
developments in various forms of practical interparliamentary cooperation have also 
taken place at a great pace since the Maastricht Treaty (ECPRD, 2003: 18). For instance, 
bilateral and multilateral meetings are now organised between the EP and the NPs and the 
i-appoi-teurs from the EP are regularly invited to the NPs and their EACs and vice versa 
(Neunreither, 2005: 470). The joint meetings with representatives from all NPs are even 
more important, because participating members of NPs not only exchange information 
with MEPs, but also get to know the positions of the other Member States. As a result, 
the meetings have a more political character, which in turn has motivated members of EU 
institutions (such as the Commission) to participate (Neunreither, 2005: 470). 
These developments, which the Treaty of Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty first 
introduced ( i. e., the time guidelines for better access to information for the NPs expressed 
in Declaration 13 of Maastricht and Protocol 14 of the Amsterdam Treaty, which the 
other hand, constructed an informal supranational platform for actor for an exchange of 
views) demonstrate how the 'formal and informal rules and processes and 'ways of doing 
things' were first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and after a while 
were 'incorporated in the logic of national political structures. ' 
4.3.3. The Treaty of Nice and After 
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The previous sections have illustrated how the Europeanization of the NPs began with the 
Treaty of Maastricht and how their role has gradually increased in EU level policy- 
making. However, although their role has significantly improved, some weaknesses still 
remain; for instance NPs were lacking a Treaty base for their participation at EU level. 
Soon after the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force, it was largely recognized among the 
European leaders (such as Joschka Fischer, Gerhard Schr6der, Jacques Chirac and Josd 
Maria Aznar)19 that more improvements were necessary in order to make NPs real 
participants in the EU policy process, as they still had only an 'indirect' role in that 
process. For instance, there was a need to create instruments for rapid information 
exchange arriong the NPs in order to better influence the EU policy process (Maurer, 
2001: 63). 
'In addition, the method used so far to review the Treaties has been subject to severe 
criticism, mainly to the effect that the EU should be a matter for all citizens. This means 
that major changes in its developments should no longer be decided at Intergovernmental 
Conferences held behind closed doors and involving only tile leaders of Governments of 
Member States, as was the case in the Maastricht and Amsterdam negotiations (Fraga, 
2005: 490) In order to prepare the Treaty negotiations in as transparent and inclusive a 
way as possible, including members of NPs, the Nice Treaty stated that 'the role of 
National Parliaments in the European architecture is one of the piline mattei*s of 
consideration' (Treaty of Nice, declaration 23)20. It made an appeal for a pan-European 
discussion on how their role might be defined and as a consequence, the role of National 
Parliaments became one of the 'hot' topics for many European leaders in their public 
speeches. 21 At the practical level, however, the Nice Treaty (which came into force in 
2003) did not add any scrutiny provision for National Parliaments or improve their 
participation in any other way (House of Lords, 2002: 2). In fact, the Treaty of Nice 
amended the co-decision procedure which rather complicated the existing system because 
19 For the proposals presented by several politicians on the role of NPs see M. V. Agostini, 'The Role of 
National Parliaments in the Future EU' in the InternationalSpectator, No. 36, Vol. 4 (2001), pp. 29-41. 20 See the documents of Convention of Europe that deal with these questions: CONV 67/1/02; 355102; 
378/03; 579/03. 
21 The President of the EU Commission, in 2001, Prodi, gave a famous speech on March 20,2001 in the 
EU Parliament regarding the role of National Parliaments in EU decision-making. 
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now the final texts after the (co-decision) procedure differ, often considerably, from the 
original versions, which means that the participation of the NPs was made more difficult 
than earlier. 22 The Laeken Summit that took place in December 2001 tackled these issues 
once again and at that meeting it was decided to convene the Convention on the Future of 
Europe to formulate definitive proposals for the NPs to participate in the EU policy 
process (ERPD, 2003: 19). It was decided that the Convention should address precise 
questions Pif the role of NPs: such as should the NPs be represented in a new institution, 
alongside the Council of Ministers and the EP; should they have a role in areas of 
European action in which the EP has no competence and they should focus on tile 
division of competence between the EU and Member States, for example through 
preliminary checking of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity (Rizzuto, 2003: 92- 
93; Fraga, 2005: 491). 
The Convention started its work in March 2002 and in numerical terms at least, 
Parliamentarians dominated the composition of the Convention (Rizzuto, 2003: 92). Out 
of a total of 66 members, the NPs had 33 members at the Convention (Convention of 
Europe, 2002b: 2). 23 There were various working groups that considered the role of 
National Parliaments and different proposals on how to improve their role. The 
Convention ended its work and the improvements were codified in the Constitutional 
Treaty 24 which at the time of writing has not been ratified and which was rejected by the 
referendums in France and in the Netherlands in 2005. The most important aspect of that 
Treaty was that it would for the first time have given NPs a dil-ect role in the EU's 
legislative process. It provided that, if a third of National Parliaments or their chambers 
presented a reasoned opinion objecting to an EU legislative proposal on the grounds that 
it did not comply with the principle of subsidiarity 25 , the Commission, (or other 
institution) would have to reconsider its proposal (House of Lords, 2005: 14). This 
22 This information is based on interviewing the clerks of the ESC of House of Commons, and House of 
Lords, in London, January 2006. 
23 EU/CONV/67/02). 
24 'Me full text of the Treaty can be found: http: //europa. eu. int/constitution/print 
- 
en. htm 
25 Subsidiarity principle means that the EU should act only if the objectives of a proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can better be achieved by the Community. It was first 
mentioned at the Maastricht Treaty, but the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 gave further emphasis to the 
principle by including it in Article 2 of the TEU (Lords, 2005: 9). 
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change would have increased, at least at some level, the opportunities of the NPs to have 
direct participations rights in the EU decision-making. 
Conclusion: 
This chapter has analysed why the NPs are considered as 'passive' rather than 'active' 
institutions in the EU policy process. The main arguments expressed by the existing 
literature for the limited participation of the NPs in the EU policy process have been the 
lack of an explicit Treaty base in EU decision-making, the dominance of the 
Government, together with its better access to information and the lack of transparency in 
the policy-making process at EU level. The aim of this chapter was to show that there 
have been major improvements in attempts to increase the role of the NPs in the EU 
policy-making process since the mid 1990s, although the main aim, to have a Treaty base 
for the participation of NPs in the EU policy process, is still missing. Nevertheless, this 
chapter has demonstrated that the claim that NPs do not have enough information to 
participate effectively in the policy-making process is no longer valid (Rizzuto, 2004; 
Duina and Oliver, 2005). On the contrary, as chapter 5 will further demonstrate, with 
evidence, members of National Parliaments in the four countries chosen for this 
comparison consider that their access to information is adequate. 
In addition, this chapter has illustrated that there are a great number of new channels 
created at EU level to provide more information for the NPs and new cooperation forms 
have been established for their common action. This chapter has shown how the EU gave 
the first incentives for improving the involvement of NPs in EU policy-making, but after 
that further development has been based on the individual activity of tile NPs. Therefore, 
highlighting access to information as the main dividing character to categorize the NPs as 
either 'passive' or 'active' institutions (as most of existing literature reviewed in this 
chapter has Suggested), is no longer helpful in analysing further whether NPs are able to 
'upload' national preferences to EU level and what role they have in 'downloading' EU 
policies at the national level. More challenging today for the NPs is how to handle all the 
information they receive and whether they are actually able to participate at the levels 
where the decisions are made. 
Thus, being involved in the levels where the decisions are made is a challenge which 
could have greater implications for the role of the NPs in tile EU Policy process in tile 
future. The growing tendency (in particular in the field of JHA) is to create informal 
intergovernmental groupings where important EU issues are discussed only among a 
certain number of EU Member States (as explained in chapter 3) and where the EU 
institutions and the NPs are excluded from these discussions. This chapter found 
evidence that the main purpose of recent Treaty changes has been to increase the political 
control of NPs in protecting the rights of individuals and their fundamental rights at EU 
level. i. e., to increase the democratic control of the NPs over the EU level decision- 
making in particular in the areas of Freedom, Justice, and Security. This goal has been set 
in several levels (Laeken Declaration and in Constitutional Treaty). One way to increase 
this control of the NPs over EU policy-making was to give COSAC a right to address to 
EU institutions any contributions which it deems appropriate on the legislative activities 
of the EU, notably in relation to the application of the principle of subsidiarity, the area of 
Freedom, Justice and Security as well as questions regarding fundamental rights 
(EPCRD, 2003: 18). However, these improved tools given to the COSAC or NPs at EU 
level do not solve the main problem at the practical level, which is that many topics 
related to the area of Freedom, Justice and Security are discussed to a growing extent in 
intergovernmental meetings by (some) Governments of Member States. Further, these 
discussions cover almost every aspect of EU policy of interest to the participants and in 
many cases they have reached firm conclusions on the action which should be taken and 
the timetable for it (House of Lords, 2006: 5). This means that many important EU 
policy preparations are moving to intergovernmental levels, where the EU rules do not 
apply, and the danger is that the NPs are not involved in that kind of policy-making at all. 
This is tile most difficult challenge for the role of NPs in EU policy making in the future. 
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Chapter 5. National Parliaments and their 'Uploading' Influence on EU 
Policy Process 
Introduction 
The previous chapter (4) suggested that the EU gave the first incentives for improving the 
involvement of National Parliaments in EU policy-making, but' after th at further 
developments have been based on the individual activity of the NPs. Further, it 
suggested that learning and socialising have been important mechanisms of 
Europeanization through which the NPs have developed their participation methods. This 
chapter examines whether, and if so, ho%v National Parliaments have used their 
opportunities to 'upload' national preferences to the EU level., It will first look at the 
institutional structures of the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia which provide the 'to ols, 
for influencing the EU policy process. After that it will examine whether and if so, how 
uploading has taken place in two policy areas: immigration and border control. Based on 
the Europeanization literature, this thesis understands Europeanization as a 'two-way 
process' and because of that understanding, uploading is understood here as a process of 
influencing, which concerns the construction of EU level policy. As this chapter will later 
explain, the NPs have two options for exerting their influence; either indii-ect or diiect. 
This chapter will argue that National Parliaments have created institutional opportunities 
to influence effectively the EU policy process, but the interesting question is the extent to 
which the NPs use these opportunities. 
This chapter will first explain 'influence' and what is meant by 'agenda-setting'. After 
that it will compare the methods which the NPs in the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia 
have developed to influence the EU policy process and will introduce the channels they 
use for their influence. The use of influence will be empirically examined by comparing 
'I am aware of the difficulties of considering National Parliaments as unitary actors; there are in most 
Parliaments many different national parties, which all have their own preferences. The role of NPs (at the 
national level) is to choose among those different views. However, based on the existing literature, so far, 
regarding the EU's immigration policies, the party differences have not been represented to a great extent 
and this is the main reason why this research makes the assumption that NPs are capable of producing a 
unitary preference (Holzhacker, 2005; Neunreither, 2005: Benz, 2004; Raunio, 2005) 
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how these four Parliaments responded to tile Green Paper on Economic Migration, which 
was produced by the EU Commission in January 2005. This Green Paper 2 has been 
chosen first, because its preparation offered an excellent opportunity for different 
stakeholders to influence the EU legislative process at an early stage; and second, 
because the replies given by different stakeholders reflected the direction of ftiture 
legislation in the given policy field. As chapter 3 demonstrated, the EU still lacks a 
common immigration policy, which means that Member States can decide which 
direction this policy field will take, and it was assumed that this will be important for 
NPs. In order to analyse the 'uploading' dimension, this chapter will examine 
Parliamentary debates in the four NPs chosen for this research. In addition, the interview 
material (see the appendixes) will also be used for this purpose. 
This chapter will argue that the four Parliaments under consideration have created very 
similar institutional structures for influencing the EU policy process, which suggests that 
this has happened through the process of Europeanization. Secondly, it will argue that the 
four Parliaments have similar aims for developing the EU's common immigration policy 
(they all prefer controlling entrance rather than establishing liberal immigration policies 
towards third country nationals). This second notion also suggests that this has happened 
through the process of Europeanization. 
5.1. Definition of Influence 
As explained in chapter 1, this research understands Europeanization broadly, as a 'two- 
way' process where the 'uploading' dimension refers to 'influence' i. e. that which forms 
policy at EU level and 'downloading' that which adapts EU outcomes at the domestic 
level. (the 'downloading' dimension is analysed in chapter 6). However, as explained in 
2 Further, this particular Green Paper, (Green Paper on an EUApproach to Managing Migralion. 
COM(2004) 811 final) was chosen for the comparison because it was assumed that it will be highly 
interesting for National Parliaments, because controlling legal entry of immigrants goes to the heart of state 
sovereignty and because labour issues touch many important aspects of each society, and therefore they are 
politically interesting questions. In addition, it was difficult to find a Green Paper where all the four ' 
National Parliaments had similar influence opportunities and this Green Paper on economic migration did 
offer that opportunity. 
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chapter 1, there are overlapping elements when analysing the effects of Europeanization 
and sometimes it is not possible to separate influence and impact. When analysing 
Parliaments and their opportunities to influence, the existing literature usually defines tile 
exercise of power by the legislative branch as the control, influence, or monitoring of 
Government decision making (Holzhacker, 2007: 143; Saalfeld, 2005: 349). These three 
terms refer to various degrees of influence that a Parliament may have on Government 
-(Holzhacker, 2007: 143). However, tile main difficulty in the study of legislative 
behaviour is identifying Parliamentary influence; it might not always be observable and it 
might include elements such as anticipated reactions (Saalfeld, 2005: 347). 
In this research this traditional division of influence is not considered as adequate as it 
refers mainly to the national level whereas this research is concerned also with the EU 
level. The traditional definition, which refers only to indii-ect influence (i. e., through 
Governments) does not include the other dimension of influence: that is, National 
Parliaments can also dii-ectly influence EU institutions. For these reason, this research 
follows Dahl's definition of influence: 'a relation among actors such that the wants, 
desires, preferences or intentions of one or more actors affect the actions, or 
predispositions to act, of one or more other actors' (Dahl, 1999: 32). According to this 
definition, influence may either be 'manifest' in which the actors (in this research 
. 
National Parliaments) act to achieve a given outcome, or 'implicit' in which the actors 
are successful in achieving a given outcome without taking any obvious action because a 
Government may act in anticipation of reactions from the Parliament (Dahl, 1999: 32). 
5.2. Agenda-Setting Influence 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, there are different ways for the Parliaments to make 
use of their agenda setting influence, that is to have a say over what questions are dealt 
with at the EU level. They can exercise their influence (indii-ectly) through their 
Governments or (dii-ectly) by influencing EU institutions Such as the European 
Parliament or EU Commission. However, the option of exercising influence through the 
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EP has so far not been used to a great extent. 3 The first option, exercising influence 
indii-ectly (through Government) takes place mainly through European Affairs 
Committees (EA C)4 . Here the main question is whether the Parliament is able to 
influence the Government's bargaining position in the Council of Ministers before and 
during the negotiations; whether it is able to change it i. e., influencing agenda setting; 
and thirdly, whether the Government is able to influence the final EU outcome. The 
second option, influencing dii-ectly the EU Commission, is more difficult to measure, 
because there might be many overlapping reasons why the EU Commission's original 
proposal changes during the negotiation process. However, it must be noted that even 
using 'dii-ect' channels, the outcomes are often indirect and difficuit to measure because 
interaction at the EU level occurs within multiple arenas (as explained in chapter 2). This 
means that tile EU system provides multiple and iterative opportunities for each actor to 
exercise its voice or voices in shaping EU policies. 
At the national level, the Government usually controls the agenda, that is, formulates 
policy proposals on which Parliament decides; and there are hardly any other parties 
involved in that agenda setting (Auel and Benz, 2005: 375). But this traditional 
relationship between legislature and executive (i. e. Parliament and Government) at the 
national level has been challenged in the multi-level politics of the EU. At the EU level 
the most important 'agenda' setter today is the EU Commission which has the sole right 
of initiative in most policy fields in the EU, although formally the Council of Ministers is 
the institution that sets the agenda and the NPs are represented there through their 
Governments. What follows is that the national Government often reacts to what the EU 
3 This is perhaps because the role of the EP has remained limited. Even in those issues failing under the 
first pillar the EP has not been granted any powers to amend or block legislation by the EU Council 
(Lavenex and Wallace, 2005: 469). The EP mainly has a consultative role. However, the EPs role has 
increased with the latest Treaty changes, as the Treaty of Nice introduced the co-decisi6n procedure which 
applies partly to questions related to immigration: visa andjuridical cooperation in civil law matters. 
Despite its limited legislative powers, the EP and particularly through its Committee on Citizen's Freedom 
and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) has intensified its engagement with JHA (Lavenex and 
Wallace, 2005: 469). An example of its indirect influence is that the president of LIBE has regularly been 
invited to attend part of the informal meetings of the IHA ministers. 
4 The European Affairs Committees in all four Parliaments differ in somewhat in their names and functions, 
which this chapter aims to introduce, but the main purpose is not to highlight the differences between them, 
but to identify their similarities. 
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Commission introduces. Neither the Parliament nor the Government have direct influence 
over the setting of the European agenda in this process (Auel and Benz, 2005: 378). 
Turning now to the national level the existing literature argues that the Parliament's 
agenda-setting power is weak in the UK (Auel and Benz, 2005: 380; Holzilacker, 2005: 
439). This is mainly because the UK essentially has a two party-system and (normally) 
large-majority Governments, and agenda control is monopolised by the Government. 
This means that Government does not need Parliament's support for setting or changing 
the agenda because it already has a majority behind it. The Finnish Parliamentary system 
is based on a consensus democracy which has a long tradition going back to World War 
11. Typical for this kind of system is the plurality of parties needed to form majority 
coalitions; when the Government is formed with variety of parties, they often have a 
large majority in the Parliament (Raunio, 2007 forthcoming). In Finland, tile Government 
controls the Parliamentary agenda in cooperation with different party groups of 
Parliament (Auel and Benz, 2005: 376). This means that Parliament's power of agenda 
setting is stronger than is the case in the UK. 
In Poland Governments are often formed by different party coalitions, but not normally 
from major coalitions, as has been a characteristic of some of the (older) EU states 
(Antoszewski, 2001: 80). So far, the traditional competition between a strong united left 
and a strong, although more fragmented right, has been missing in Poland (Antoszewski, 
2001: 80). Another characteristic feature of Polish coalitions has been that parties with 
radically different views of Poland's relationship with the EU have formed Governments 
together. 5 In addition, conditionality has played a major role at the Polish pre-accession 
5 The latest Government (formed late 2005) is a minority Government (Law and Justice Party) supported 
by the League of Polish Families and Self defence on the basis of so called 'Stability Pact'. This is a kind 
of political agreement based on a list of laws to be adopted based on an agreement between these three 
political groups, but this is not a coalition in its normal meaning, because it is not based on a majority. This 
is a typical example of the coalition fonnation in Poland, where the difference between right and left is not 
clear compared to 'older' EU Member States. This new Polish coalition is also described as 'euro sceptic' 
and 'populist' regarding its European policy (The Financial Times, 2006). According to interviews, the 
Government does not represent well the Polish majority which is pro-European. As an example of the 
Government's 'euro-scepk and populist' attitude towards EU policy at the EU level, is the Polish 
Government's attempts to use methods of confrontation instead of compromise and persuasion in the name 
of fighting for Poland's national interests (this information is based on interviews with Polish 
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stage, which has led to tile creation of a strong core executive in terms of EU policy 
making (Lazowski, 2007 forthcoming; Cichocki, 2003; Zubek, 2005). What follows is 
that agenda setting power remains mainly in the hands of tile Government. In Estonia, 
Governments are normally built on various coalitions similar to Western Europe (i. e. 
either based on a majority or minority). The 2004 coalition Government has been built 
with three rather right-located par-ties. When Estonia joined the EU, amendments were 
added to the legal framework in order to ensure that the Parliament could participate in 
the EU legislative process effectively. 6 Despite these amendments, the Government still 
has a strong position in setting the EU agenda in Estonia. 
To sum up, there is little difference to be observed when comparing the agenda setting 
opportunities in the four countries under consideration. The Governments are the main 
agenda-setters in each of these four countrjies and the length of EU membership hardly 
matters in this respect. 
5.3. Institutional Opportunities for Parliaments to Exercise their Influence EU 
Policy 
As chapter 4 explained, the National Parliaments have established similar mechanisms 
for participating in the EU policy process more effectively. The most imporiant way for 
National Parliaments to exercise their influence is through European Affairs Committees, 
which all EU Member States have created in their Parliaments (EPCRD, 2003: 10). The 
First EAC was set up in 1957 by the German Bundesi-al. The other Member States 
followed that example one by one so as to better scrutinise the activities of their 
Governments at the EU level. As mentioned in chapter 4, from the point of view of the 
NPs, one of the most important changes in the European integration process was the 
implementation of the internal market (SEA 1986) which together with the creation of the 
Parliamentarians (Sejni) and with high/middle level civil servants of the Polish Parliament and with 
high/middle level civil servants from the Ministry of the Interior in November 2005 and in April 2006, in 
Warsaw. 
6 Riigiko-u Rules of Procedure Act from March 2004. This information is based on interviews with 
middle/high level civil servants from the Estonian Parliament and with interviews with Estonian MPs in 
Tallinn, April 2006. 
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European Union brought the qualified majority voting as decision-making rule to the 
Council of Ministers (Holzhacker, 2007: 142). This change greatly reduced the NPs' 
ability to exercise influence indii-ectly through their Governments at the EU level, 
because their Governments could be overruled by qualified majority (ECPRD, 2003: 11). 
As a consequence of this change, the NPs increased their engagement with EU policy- 
making either by setting up new EACs or strengthening the existing ones. This section 
will introduce the functions and roles of European Affairs Committees (EAC) and 
Special Committees in the four Parliaments. 
Before explaining how these Committees function in each of the four Parliaments it is 
important to mention the legal framework which structures their participation. In case of 
the UK which does not have a written Constitution the scrutiny procedures of Parliament 
are determined by combination of national 'Constitutional, political and practical factors' 
(Bulmer and Burch, 2003: 8). The main impact of not having a written Constitution, 
which would define Parliament's role in the EU decision making, and the long British 
traditions of having a strong parliamentary control over the executive, is that tile UK has 
taken more pragmatic approach to developing structures of Parliamentary participation in 
EU policy process than most of the other EU Member States. This means that the 
Parliaments participation is based on need rather than on grand principles in the UK 
whereas many other EU Member States have explicitly included Parliament's role in EU 
affairs in their legal framework. For the UK, the main aim has always been to maintain 
UK's Constitutional tradition. This also means that tile 'nature' of parliamentary scrutiny 
is not solely linked to a specific EU policy but to sovereignty of Parliament as such 
(Norton, 1996: 103; Carter, 2001: 397). Nevertheless, both Houses in the UK Parliament 
have established effective participation procedures as the following sections will explain. 
Different from the UK, the legal framework has had more impact on the participation of 
the Finnish Parliament. In Finland the Parliament's participation in the EU policy making 
is defined in the Constitutional level (section 96 of the Finnish Constitution)7 . 
The main 
7 The Finnish Constitution can be found in English: 
htt wfiwww. I in I ex. fi; -fi; -'] A ifkaan nok set! I 999.,, eni 999073 l. pdf 
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aim was to guarantee that the Parliament will have a real influence over the EU affairs 
after the EU membership transferred traditional legislation powers from Parliament to the 
EU (Raunio, 2001: 291). Having a reference in Constitutional level implies clearly the 
importance given to the Parliament in EU policy process in Finland. In similar vein, in 
Poland and Estonian, their parliamentary participation in EU affairs is defined in legal 
contexts although not at the Constitutional level as in Finland. However, in all these three 
countries these laws were greatly amended when they joined in the EU. The main 
purpose was to guarantee Parliaments' effective involvement in EU affairs. 9 To SUM Lip, 
all these four Parliaments have clear legal references (either based on the Constitutional 
practise or law) that offers them effective opportunities to participate in the EU policy 
process. 
5.3.1. European Affairs Committees 
In the UK, the main scrutiny Committee in the House of Commons is the European 
Scrutiny Committee (ES, C). It has 16 members (Norton, 1996: 96-102). The House of 
Commons also has three European Standing Committees covering different subject 
areas. 10 The main difference between the Scrutiny and Standing Committees is that 
debates are open to the public in the latter. In addi tion, the Standing Committees are open 
for any member of the House to attend and to speak at, unlike the Scrutiny Committee 
88 In Estonia Rfigikogit Rules of Procedure Act § 152 regulates the scrutiny process within the Parliament 
(all the legal documents related to the Parliament's role can be found: 
fit ti gil koau. co"? rep id=450377 
lin case of Poland, the standing Orders ofSejin, July 1992, and the Act of II March on Cooperation of the 
Council of Ministers with the Sejnz and Senate in matters related with the membership of the Republic of 
Poland in the EU. (An English version of Act is available in 8 Yearbook of Polish European Studies 
(2004). htt tit) i be. ch/l aw/i cl/p 100000 htm 
9 In Estonia Riigikogit Rules of Procedure Act regulates the scrutiny process within the Parliament and in 
case of Poland, the standing Orders of Sejni and Senate regulates the participation of the two chambers in 
EU policy making. In addition, the Parliament has adopted an Act on Co-operation between the Council of 
Ministers and the Parliament in EU matters (An English version of Act is available in 8 Yearbook of Polish 
European Studies (2004). 
10 Committee A considers documents referred to it by the ESC on agriculture and fisheries, Committee B 
considers documents on social security and home affairs, and Committee C considers trade policy and 
industry. They have 13 permanent members but all MP's may attend and non-permanent members may 
move amendments (A short guide for Members of Parliaments by the staff of the ESC, 2001: 8 and 19-20). 
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which has 16 members and which meets in private. The main role of the Scrutiny 
Committee is to sift EU documents on behalf of the House, identifying those of political 
or legal importance and deciding which should be debated. " The Standing Committee is 
tile place debates take place. 
The House of Lords has a similar structure to the Commons and the Select Committee on 
the European Union with 20 members counts as one of its most prestigious Committees. 
It attracts the most prominent members of the Lords, different from the Commons, where 
the ESC is not considered as one of the most important Committees (Carter, 2001: 405). 
Both Houses have a number of sub-Committees and they can also use the floor for 
plenary debates (Walters and Rogers, 2004: 359-360). These debates often are politically 
important. However, debates on European affairs on the flow-, in both Houses, are a 
rather rare event due to the Government's firm control over the Parliamentary process 
(Auel and Benz, 2005: 38 1). 12 This means that the motions, which are the basic 
documents for the debates, need to be put down by the Government; they cannot be put 
down by the Committee. 13 
There are certain differences in the scrutiny systems in each House. The Commons is 
recognized as a 'talk' Parliament rather than a 'woi-k' Parliament (Armstrong and 
Bulmer, 2003: 400). This means that the Commons ESC reports quickly, often within a 
week of receiving the document, and reviews a wide range of documents (almost 500 a 
year). The Lords Committee reports on a smaller number of documents (about 20 a year) 
11 This information is based on interviewing prominent MPs (members of ESC) and clerks of the ESC in 
London, 15 March, 2006. 
12 According to interviewees, British Parliamentarians (in the Commons) generally have an adequate 
position to influence the EU policy process, but this ability is not always used to its full extent - an 
example of that is the low interest among the Parliamentarians for Standing Committee debates in general. 
These debates could serve as an excellent opportunity for gaining added information because the minister 
responsible for the matter is present and Parliamentarians could use the available 30 minutes by questioning 
him/her effectively about the Governments' position. So far, in EU matters this opportunity is less used 
than in 'more national matters'. " In the House of Lords, on the other hand, the members are more keen to 
use the opportunities to discuss with members of Government. This information in based on an interview in 
Brussels, May, 2005 with the representative of the UK's House of Commons in the European Union and 
with the clerk of the Common's ESC in January, 2006 in London 
13 This information in based on an interview in Brussels, May, 2005 with the representative of the UK's 
House of Commons in the European Union and with the clerk of the Common's ESC in January, 2006 in 
London. 
121 
in greater detail and in longer enquiries (Rogers and Walters, 2004: 357). The great 
advantage of these different working methods is that the systems in the two Houses are 
complementary rather than competing (Carter, 2001; Armstrong and Bulmer, 2003: 400). 
To sum up, the EAC provides an effective toof for both Houses to be involved in EU 
level policy making. 
The Finnish European Affairs Committee is called the Grand Committee (GQ. 14 A 
special feature of it is that the chair is frequently given to an opposition party member, 
which guarantees to a certain extent that the opposition will be engaged in Finnish EU 
policy making. The rationale behind the Finnish system is that Parliament has a real 
influence only when it participates in the policy formation from the very slart of the EU 
decision making process (Raunio, 2007 forthcoming). In practice, this means that the 
Parliament can start its deliberations as soon as the EU Commission considers proposals 
or puts forward its proposals. However, Parliament usually waits until the Government 
presents its initial position. This means that the policy issue has already been dealt with at 
several expert levels, both at the national and at the EU-Ievel before Parliament's 
involvement begins (Raunio, 2007, forthcoming). 
The Finnish Grand Committee (GC) consists of 25 members and 13 substitute members 
and the duties and responsibilities of the Committees are defined in the Finnish 
Constitution. 15 The basic principle is that the Special Committees, not only the GC, are 
systematically involved in EU matters. 16 In practice, each specialized committee follows 
EU affairs in their own field and the Grand Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee 
14 The role of the Finnish EAC is close to the Danish one (which was the model for the Finnish EAC when 
it was created). The way the Danish EAC functions is often in the literature described as 'Mini- 
Parliamentarism' (Laursen, 2005: 424). This description applies too to the Finnish Grand Committee, 
although compared to Denmark, in Finland the Governments are normally formed with majority coaliti-ons 
(and in Denmark the Governments often are based on minority coalitions). In the Finnish case the 'Mini- 
Parliamentarism' means, however, that parties tend to send their more influential members to the Grand 
Committee and because of that the Government needs to listen to the members of the GC in order to 
survive politically in the case of difficulties. 
15 Besides the GC, the Foreign Affairs Committee is the other important committee responsible for EU 
affairs in the Finnish Parliament. The former handles so called first and third pillar issues, the latter second 
pillar issues. 
16 Information based on interviewing clerks of the Grand Committee and Special Committees in Helsinki, 
March 2003. 
122 
can create sub-committees in order to have more expertise. 17 The Special Committees 
usually have more technical expertise (i. e. Parliamentarians with knowledge of the 
Committee's special subject) than the more 'gen6ralist' Grand Committee. 18 The Special 
Committees scrutinize EU legislative proposals and take evidence as they decide (thus 
choose who and from which institutions will be invited to give evidence). 19 These 
Committees prepare their opinions in the light of information about the Government's 
tentative position (Raunio, 2001: 183). After studying the issue, the Special Committees 
give their opinion to the GC which then expresses the view of the Finnish Parliament. 
These documents are available to the public. To sum up, the Finnish approach of having 
both Grand Committee and Special Committees involved in the EU policy process is 
considered as an effective way to involve entire Parliament in EU policy making. 
The Polish EU Affairs Committee (EAC) in the lower House (Sejm) consists of 41 
members and is based on the principle of proportionality (Polish Constitution, article 
148e of the Sejm Rules of Procedure). Similar to the UK, the second Chamber of the 
Polish Parliament, (Senate) has its own Committee dealing with European affairs, but is 
different from the UK, the Polish Senate has not gained the same importance as the 
House of Lords has in the UK. Main explanation is that the Senate has not been given the 
same power as the lower House (Polish Constitution, article 95). On the other hand, the 
Senate's role has been established to represent territorial interests (Kopecky, 2003: 136). 
As such, cooperation between the Government and the Sejm is wider than with the 
Senate. 201 t is the opinion of the, 5ejj)i (EAQ which will form the basis of the Parliament's 
position (Polish Constitution, article 148). A typical feature of the Polish Parliament, 
which is similar to the other Eastern European democracies, is the relatively frequent 
changes in the Parliament's composition (Kopecky, 2003: 141). After elections in 
October 2005, only 7 of the previous members of the EAC were chosen again for the 
17 This information is based on interviewing the Chair of Grand Committee, in Helsinki, December 2005 
18 Information based on interviewing clerks of the Special Committee responsible for JHA affairs in 
Finnish Parliament, Helsinki, March 2003. 




same Committee. 21 The main reason for the limited number of experienced 
Parliamentarians is that the EAC has not attracted the most experienced or influential 
members of the Polish Parliament because EU affairs are not considered that interesting 
in the Parliament. 22 
The structure of the EAC is that the committee presidium chooses from its members' two 
'co-i-epoj-lei-s' who will then decide which issues need further discussion in the 
Committee. Other issues will be adopted without debate (Szalay, 2005: 74). However, 
this system., which emphasises individual skills instead of strengthening the Committee as 
an institution, reduces the possibilities for the Committee to develop in a more 
predictable direction 'and increase its respect. The involvement of other Special 
Committees is not required although the EAC may seek their opinions (Szalay, 2005: 74). 
The opinion of the EAC should constitute, in principle, the foundations of the 
Government's position at the EU level. 23 So far, the main focus of the Polish Parliament 
has been on implementing existing EU legislation and consequently, there have been few 
debates on EU policy-making (Lazowski, 2007 forthcoming). This means that the 
possibilities for the Polish Parliament to test its power to call the Government to account 
. 
24 for its action at the EU level have been rare One main problem with the efficiency of 
the Parliamentary mechanism is the limited expertise and understanding of EU-related 
matters by the members of Parliament (Lazowski, 2007 forthcoming). The structure of 
Polish Parliament provides effective tools for participating in the EU policy process 
effectively, but so far, that opportunity has not been fully used. 
In Estonia the European Affairs Committee is the main organ responsible for EU 
affairs. 25 It has 15 members and II special Committees each preparing EU issues in 
accordance with their special expertise, similar to the Finnish structure. The EAC has 
21 This information is based on interviews with middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament and 
from the Ministry of the Interior and discussions with MPs (sejl? l) in Warsaw on November 2005. 
22 This information is based on interviews with middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament and 
from the Ministry of the Interior and discussions with MPs (sejm) in Warsaw on November 2005. 23 
p. 2). 
24 This information is based on interviews with middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament and 
from the Ministry of tile Interior and MPs (sejm) in Warsaw, November 2005. 
25 ( http:.,., www. riigikogu. q ). 
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attracted prestigious Parliamentarians to serve in the Committee, similar to the Finnish 
experienýe. Double membership makes the Committee unique: members of the EAC are 
at the same time members of other Specialised Committees (Szalay, 2005: 41). The 
advantage of this double system (which is also in use in Finland) is that EU issues are 
widely distributed within the Parliament and in this way, more Parliamentarians are 
involved in the EU affairs. 26 The main role of the Estonian EAC is to monitor the impact 
of EU initiatives and the Government's policy towards the EU. The Committee also 
forms, with the help of the Special Committees, the opinion of Parliament on EU draft 
legislation. In addition, it supervises the activities of the Government in pursuing the 
policies of the EU (Riigikogu rules of Procedure, article 1(3)). 
The Government has to submit EU information to the Parliament when, according to the 
Constitution, legislation requires Parliament's involvement. In practice, this means that 
before the Council of Minister's meeting takes place in Brussels, the Government sends 
its position to the Parliament, and the relevant Minister can appear in Parliament to 
explain the positions and to have a discussion with MPs. These discussions normally take 
place in the EAC. The same procedure applies after Council meeting has taken place. 
Alternatively, the Minister can send written information from the meeting to the 
Committee. 27 
Parallel to the Polish experience, so far, the Estonian Parliament has been implementing 
existing EU legislation to a great extent, which means that the weight in Parliamentary 
participation has been on 'downloading' dimension. However, because of the Soviet past, 
the concept of sovereignty has played an important role in Estonia. This means that the 
Constitution and sovereignty are protected by numerous references in the Constitution. 
26 Besides the European Affairs Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee is the other important 
committee responsible for EU affairs in the Estonian Parliament. The former hand! es all the other issues 
except of the common foreign and security policy which is prepared by the latter. (Riigikogu rules of 
Procedure, amended act, article 1). Also, similar division of shared competences between two Committees 
is in use in Finland. This information is based on interviews with high and middle level civil servants 
working in the Secretary of Eli affairs and in the Estonian Parliament, in July 2003 and in March 2006 in 
Tallinn. 
2' This information is based on interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and with interviews with Estonian MPs April 2006 in Tallinn. 
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Therefore the Estonian Constitution could be regarded more of a legal than a political 
document (Albi, 2005: 25). This however, could have implications for EU relations. 
Interviews indicate that the legislative functions which were lost by the Parliament and 
shifted to the EU level, due to Estonia's accession to the EU, are carefully monitored in 
the Parliament in a growing extent. 28 If the Parliament considers that the Government is 
acting inadequately at the EU level, the Parliament does have the legal means to make the 
Government respect its views. 
Similar to the UK, Finland and Poland, Estonia's institutional structure provides effective 
participation opportunities for the Parliament in the EU policy process, but so far, there is 
limited experience how the Parliament has been involved in the EU policy making. As 
this section illustrated the four Parliaments under consideration have established similar 
structures which offer adequate opportunities for participating in the EU policy process. 
However, they all have different political backgrounds and traditions, but nevertheless 
they have chosen to establish similar systems for participating in the EU policy process. ZD 
This observation suggests that learning and socialising as mechanisms of Europeanization 
have had an impact on the ways how these structures have been established. ' As 
mentioned in section above, when Finland was preparing its EU membership, the 
participation methods from other EU Member States were carefully studied and the best 
parts were copied to the Finnish structure. Estonians followed to a great extent the 
Finnish examples when they were establishing their Parliamentary participation methods. 
5.3.2. Scrutiny of EU Affairs 
The previous section illustrated that the main channel for NPs to exercising their indirect 
influence are the EACs and the structures of these Committees have many similarities 
among the four Parliaments. Before analysing how the NPs use their (Iii-ect influence, 
which these structures provide, however, it must be jaken into consideration that there is 
no common definition of scrutiny, which will have an impact on how influence is 
2' This information is based on interviewing prominent MPs in Estonian Parliament, in April 2006 in 
Tallinn. (The full list of names and dates are in attached in appendixes 1-5) 
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understood in each NP. The definition of 'sciwtinyl in the UK has developed over the 
years and today includes a number of functions, such as debating, policy documents, 
publishing detailed reports and placing EU issues and information in the public domain 
(Carter, 2001: 402). British participation in the EU policy process is based on the 
'sci-ittiny of documents' (Rogers and Walters, 2004: 357). The information which the UK 
Parliament receives from the Government regarding EU issues is not selected in advance, 
which means that a large amount of time in Parliament is spent in selecting the important 
issues. In the UK, the scrutiny system is accompanied by a scrutiny reserve which 
determines that Ministers should not agree to EU proposals in the EU Council until 
Parliamentary scrutiny has been completed (Baines, 2004: 64). However, the scrutiny 
reserve is not statutory; though in general, the reserves established by both Houses are 
respected by the Government (Rogers and Walters, 2004: 360). 
Different from the UK, Finland Estonia and Poland have chosen a scrutiny system that 
combines a document-based system with the pon, ei- to mandate the Government. 
Mandating means that the Parliament authorises the Government to act at the EU level. 
However, the mandating processes and the nature of the mandates differ in each of the 
three countries. Common for all three Parliaments, however, is-that the mandate is only 
politically binding. 
In Finland and Estonia the information which the Parliaments receive from their 
Governments is selected for scrutiny according to established criteria. According to 
Finnish system, the Government provides information to the Parliament when-the 
substance of the EU issue falls within the Parliament's competence, as defined in the 
Constitution (Article 96)29. (Tiilikainen, 2003: 156). This first category are called 'U' 
matters, referring to the obligatory character of Parliamentary approval (these are for 
instance EU Commission proposals for Regulations and Directives) (Tiilikainen, 2003: 
156). The other category are called 'E' matters, which relate to the Parliament's right to 
29 The Full text of the Finnish Constitution can be found in English: Http: Hw%vw. om. fi/21910. htm 
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30 
receive information (Constitution, Article 97) and these are normally more informal . 
These 'E' matters can for instance, be related to the pre-initial phase of Community 
legislation such as the Green and White papers of EU Commission or EU Commission 
Communications. They may also include horizontal programme that might have essential 
effects on the content of future EU legislation (Tiilikainen, 2003: 157). 
In the case of Finland, the 'mandating' process begins very early in the decision-making 
process. The mandate is given before the Council working group begins to examine a 
proposal (COSAC, 2005a: 13). 31 In practice the mandate means that the Finnish 
Government is obliged to present a negotiating position, either in written form or orally, 
to the GC on the draft legislation discussed by the Council. The binding effect has a 
political meaning in that the Government may deviate from the mandate under certain 
circumstances, but in such cases, the Government has to explain its behaviour to the 
Parliament as soon as possible. 
Parallel to the Finnish system, Estonia has established a system that combines a 
document based form with a power to mandate the Government. The mandate is 
politically binding (COSAC, 2005b: 13). Similar to the Finnish case, the selection of 
documents is based on whether the legislative act requires legislative changes and/or has 
substantial economic or social impact (Szalay, 2005: 39). In both countries, Governments 
can always use their own initiative or the Parliament can request that they are sent other 
important EU documents. As in Finland, the Estonian Government should follow the 
opinion given by the Parliament and if it differs from it, it must justify its behaviour to 
the Parliament at the earliest opportunity (Riigikogu rules of Procedure, article b 
30 The"division of business into 'U' and 'E'-matters is theoretical because whether or not something falls 
within the Parliaments traditional competence does not necessarily define how central the issue will be in 
the future. According to the Finnish experience, there are some very important and far-reaching E-matters 
and some quite marginal U-matters (Report ofthe Committee to assess EU scrutiny procedures, 2005: 9)30. 
Despite that, the current division is regarded as a useful from the point of the Parliament's view, because it 
ensures that all the information is first examined by the Government in terms of whether Parliament should 
30 be involved. 
31 The COSAC Secretariat has prepared a third bi-annual Report that was published in May 2005 regarding 
'the Developments in Eni-opean Union Pi-ocedin-es and Pi-actices Relevant to Pai-lianzentaty Sci-miny' 
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152(5 )32 . However, there arc no legal sanctions if the Governments do not respect the 
opinion given by these two Parliaments. 
Similar to. the Finnish and Estonian cases, Poland has also established a system 
combining a document-based form with a power to mandate the Government (COSAC, 
2005a: 13). In the Polish system, similar to the British model, the Government does not 
make, any selection of EU information for the Parliament. This means that in practice, tile 
Polish structure relies heavily on the capacities of individual Parliamentarians to choose 
which questions are important and which need further debate in the Parliament. 33 The 
opinion taken by Polish EAC of the Sejm should, according to the Polish system, then 
form the basis of the Government's position (Szalay, 200.5: 73) However, the opinion is 
not unconditional and the Government may, to a certain extent, depart from it. But if 
does, it has to justify its behaviour to the Parliament afterwards. So far, the main 
emphasis in Polish Parliament has been in implementing existing EU legislation and 
therefore, there have been rather few debates in the Parliament on EU policy-making, in 
particular in the field of immigration (Zubek, 2005: 594). 34 This means that the 
opportunities for the Polish Parliament to test its power of holding the Government to 
account for its action at the EU level have been rare. 35 
It can be concluded that in the case of the UK and Poland, scrutiny is understood in. a 
more restricted way than in Finland and Estonia. An example of this is the practice that 
allows British and Polish Parliaments to select for themselves the information they 
consider to be important instead of having a system where Governments do that, as is the 
32 
ý9 Full participation of Estonian Parliament can be found: www. riiQikoQu. ec. " lang. en (under the topic EU 
and participation) 
33 This information is based on interviews with middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament and 
from members of Parliament (sejm) in Warsaw in November 2005. 
34 The same kind of information was received from the interviews with middle level civil servants from the 
Polish Parliament and from the Ministry of the Interior and from MPs of Parliament (sejm) in Warsaw in 
November 2005 and again in April 2006 (see the full list of interviews in appendix 3). 
35 This information is based on interviews with middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament and 
from the Ministry of the Interior and MPs (sejm) in Warsaw, November 2005. 
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case in the Finnish and Estonian Parliaments. 36 The differences in scrutiny systems might 
have implications to the effectiveness of their uploading opportunities. For instance, the 
interviews in Poland and in the House of Commons indicate that the Parliaments use too 
much timeýin selecting information that is relevant instead of influencing the context of 
that information. 37 
5.3.3. Timing and Access to Information 
As chapter 4 demonstrated, one of the key clernents in determining the categorization of 
the Parliament as a 'passive' rather than 'active' institution compared to the Government 
is its access to information and timing. That is, whether the information is received at the 
right time and whether it is accurate. The British Government has to submit information 
to both Houses within 10 working days of receiving it. The Polish Government must also 
submit information to both Houses in the Parliament within 14 days of receiving it. 38 In 
Finland and Estonia, where the Government selects in advance the information sent to the 
Parliament, the time frames have a different meaning. Nevertheless, the information 
received by each Parliament is very similar. The information consists of the factual and 
legal background to an EU document, including the ministerial responsibility, the initial 
position of the Government, its financial effects and key difficulties (Baines, 2004: 78-79; 
Tiilikainen, 2003: 156; Polish Parliament (2004), Rules of Procedure, article 148e; 
Estonian Parliament. (2004), Rules of Procedure, article 152). This means, however, that 
the four Parliaments receive very similar information from their Governments, although 
they have established different structures for selecting the material which needs to be 
delivered to the Parliaments. 
However, the main difficulties for each of the four Parliaments in influencing the EU 
policy process are related to the procedures used rather than the timing. This applies in 
36 However, in Finland Constitution defines clearly the selection criteria, which means that the Government 
cannot decide independently about the informati 
f 
on it submits to the Parliament. Similar rules apply also to 
Estonian Parliament. 
37 This information is based on interviews with middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament and 
from the Ministry of the Interior and MPs (sejmý in Warsaw, November 2005 and April 2006, and 
interviewing the clerks of British House of Commons, in London, in January and March 2006. 
38 The Polish Rules of Procedures are found from: (htip:. -Vlibr. scim. Lýov. pl.. -"oicle/itidex. l)lip, p. 2). 
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particular to the field of JHA: the interviews support the arguments expressed by the 
literature that the complexity of the third pillar procedures and the lack of documentary 
basis, which applies particularly to the lengthy confidential negotiation process, are 
considered as the main challenges for effective influence in each of the Parliaments 
(Drewry et aL, 2004: 211-13). Another problem that has arisen since the enlargement of 
the EU in 2004, is the growing tendency among the five biggest EU Member States 
(including Poland from the beginning of 2006) to have regular informal meetings, at the 
intergovernmental level. These meetings are aimed at exchanging views on all aspects of 
the policy issues in the field of JHA in an 'informal atmosphere'. 39 The main problem is 
that 'intergovernmental greupings' of this type lack the basic democratic requirements of 
accountability and transparency (Statewatch, 2006: 2). The consequence of groupings 
like these is, that they undermine democratic society and reduce democratic control in EU 
policy making (see chapter 4). 
When considering the main difficulties which the National Parliaments in tile four 
countries have faced, the interview data suggests that there were more difficulties related 
to a lack of knowledge and expertise among Parliamentarians in Poland and Estonia than 
in the UK and Finland . 
40 During the pre EU-era members of the Polish Parliament often 
complained of receiving inadequate information from the Government as well as having 
limited access to technical expertise and specialist knowledge in order to understand tile 
implications of legislation (Grabbe, 2001: 1017). Being a full member of the EU, the 
problems are somewhat similar, although access to information has become better 
because it is defined in a legal context (Zubek, 2005: 616). However, the technical 
facilities for internal information distribution are still largely inadequate in the Polish 
Parliament. 41 Overall, the existing structure highlights the Government's role in the EU 
39 'Fresh examples' are the so called 'G6' meetings, among the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and 
Poland which originated in 2003 out of discussions between former (UK) Home Secretary and French 
Interior Minister. The ministers discuss almost every aspect of EU policy in the field of Justice and Home 
Affairs (Lords, 2006: 5). The emphasis is on informal ac hoc meetings, and inevitably their conclusions a 
have major impact on the future direction of that policy (Lords, 2006b: 6). 
40 This information is based on interviews with middle range level servants from the Polish Parliament and 
from the Ministry of the Interior, November 2005 and April 2006, in Warsaw. 
4' This information is based on interviews with middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament and 
from the Ministry of the Interior, November 2005 in Warsaw. 
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policy process of setting the Parliamentary agenda for EU matters. However, the 
inexperience of recent Governments (chosen in 2005 and changed -again in 2006) has 
shifted more power from politicians to civil servants in the Foreign Ministry and to the 
tte, 42 President's office. This does not necessarily change the Parliament's role for the be 'r. 
In Estonia the distribution of documents is considered adequate in general, but the other 
problems, (i. e. 'the difficulty with procedures such as knowing at which policy layer the 
issue is being dealt with and when in particular in JHA issues) were similar to the Finnish 
43 and British experience. Similar to the experiences of the three other Parliaments, the 
number of EU Commission proposals has sometimes been considered too demanding by 
the Parliamentarians. Some MPs complained about the difficulty of dealing with the 
information in such a short timeframe. 44 Besides that, the Estonian Parliament has a small 
number of clerks and secretaries, and their main duty is to prepare the EAC meetings. 
Therefore, if individual MPs need any further information apart from that which they 
have received from the Government, they have to search for it personally, which is time 
consuming. Similar to the experiences in older member states, most of the MPs are more 
interested in national issues rather than in EU affairs. This means that they often make a 
45 sharp distinction between domestic and EU matters . 
To sum up: the empirical material indicates that there were many similarities in the ways 
that the NPs in each of the four Parliaments receive information and what that 
information consists although they have certain differences with their structures. 
However, i-eceiving infoi-mation according to the rules set was not considered as the main 
problem for participating effectively in the EU policy process, but the time to study the 
issues and prepare opinions, were found more problematic, in particular in Polish and 
42 This information is based on interviews with high level civil servants in tile Polish Foreign Ministry, in 
the Prime Minister's Office, with civil servants from the President's office and discussions with the Finnish 
Ambassador in Warsaw, in Warsaw, April 2006. 
43 This information is based on interviews with clerks of the Estonian EAC and interviews with prominent 
MPs (who are also members of the EAQ, April 2006 in Tallinn. 
44 This information is based on interviews with prominent ýarliamcntarians in the Estonian Parliament,. in 
Tallinn April 2006. 
45 This information is based on interviewing prominent Parliamentarians in tile Estonian Parliament in 
Tallinn, April 2006. 
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Estonian Parliaments. 46 In addition, the extensive amount of substance together with 
complicated decision-making procedures in tile JHA field, with a limited timeframe to 
consider EU proposals, were regarded as the main challenges for exercising influence 
effective in each of the NPs. 
5.3.4. Public Access to the Scrutiny Processes of National Parliaments 
An important aspect of the scrutiny process within NPs is the openness of the process, 
that is, what are the channels available for people and organisations outside of the NPs to 
follow the progress of scrutiny and to evaluate how Parliamentarians are keeping their 
promises. Regarding public access, there are certain differences among the four 
Parliaments. 
In order to influence the content of EU legislation, a typical strategy for the House of 
Commons in the UK is to monitor Government's policies and discuss them in public. 
This means that the House of Commons uses indii-ect ways of exercising influence in 
policy- making (Benz, 2004: 888). This strategy of keeping the public informed on 
legislative processes at the European level and making the Government respect 
Parliament's view (i. e. follow the rules), has turned out to be an effective way for the 
House of Commons to scrutinize the Government and indii-ectly influence the 
47 Government's policy on EU affairs. The Finnish Parliament, on the other hand, does not 
normally discuss EU matters in public, although it is legally possible. Unlike in the 
British system, both tile GC- and the Special Committees meet in private and take all 
evidence in private. The argument for this practice is that information received in 
Committee meetings may include the negotiating positions of other member states or 
other confidential information. 48 This means, however, that political differences, if there 
46 This information is based on interviews with members of the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
EU, the Sub Committee F (home Affairs), February, 2006 in London. 
4' This information is based on interviews with the representative of the House of Commons in the 
European Union in Brussels in May 2005 and with the clerk of Common's ESC in London, January 2006. 
48 Knowing the negotiation positions from other Member States is considered as an important tool for the 
Finnish Parliament to build a realistic view of the issues at EU level and adjust the national priorities to it. 
This information is based on interviewing the clerks of Grand Committee and Special Committee in 
Helsinki, March 2003 
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are any, are solved behind closed doors and there is no public pressure for individual Nips 
to defend their views in front of tile public. In addition, the absence of an audience 
facilitates consensus building as MPs are more free to compromise. Consequently this 
practice can reduce the transparency of democratic processes (Benz, 2004: 896). 
According to the Finnish experience, this kind of criticism has so far not been expressed 
in Finland. 49 
In Poland, the EAC meetings are, in principle, open to the public (although they could be 
held in private if necessary), but they have not attracted much public interest. 50. In 
addition, the minutes of meetings are open to the public. Estonia on the other hand, has 
chosen a similar system to the one used in Finland. This means that the EAC or Special 
Committee meetings are not in the 'public domain', although the minutes that reflect the 
sittings are public. These contain the list of participants, the agenda and the Committee's 
resolutions and sometimes summarise the position of the Committee (Riigikogu Rules of 
Procedure Act). So far, EU affairs have not attracted a large public interest (including 
media and press) particularly with regard to EU immigration policy. 51 To conclude the 
evidence found in the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia suggests that the ways in which 
the public has insight into the activities of their Parliaments is found adequate. 
5.3.5. Direct Influence 
The sections above have analysed the ways in which the four Parliaments call exercise 
their opportunities for indii-ect influence. This section will look at the channels for dii-ect 
influence and how these channels are used. It is important to analyse channels for dil-ect 
influence because these could offer a counterbalancing way for Parliaments to 
compensate for the limited power which they have in setting the Parliamentary agenda 
49 This information is based on interviewing a representative of the Finnish Parliament to the EU in 
Brussels, by phone, February, 2006. 
5() This information is based on interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament 
and on interviews with researchers in the Polish Foreign Affairs Institute, in Warsaw, November 2005 and 
in April 2006 
" This information is based on interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and on interviews with Estonian NIPs in Tallinn, April 2006. 
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(as explained in section 1). This section argues that in general Parliaments, other than the 
House of Lords, have been less ambitious in developing direct influencing methods. 
Both the House of Commons and the Finnish Parliament have informal meetings twice a 
year with the members from the European Parliament (MEPs) from their country. 52 
Besides that, EACs visit the 
I 
Presidency country shortly before it takes up the EU 
presidency and they take part in the activities of the COSAC. In addition the Committees 
in both Parliaments visit other EU institutions on an irregular basis. For instance the 
Commons visit the EU Commission once a year and meet, when possible, the British 
Commissioner on their trip to Brussels. 53 
Nevertheless, the House of Commons has been criticised for tile small number of 
members having informal contacts with European institutions or members of other 
national Parliaments (Auel and Benz, 2005: 383). This limited interest in being more 
involved in EU affairs can be explained, perhaps, by the fact that formal procedures (i. e. 
indirect influence through Government) are considered adequate in by Commons. On the 
other hand, and against the argument that the members of Commons have not shown 
much of an interest in EU affairs, is tile example of a growing number of contacts with 
the EU institutions and individual MPs. Evidence for that -is the number of informal 
contacts which have increased significantly in recent years between the members of 
House of Commons and EU institutions, such as the EP (Neunreither, 2005: 472). An 
example of this growing interest is that each member of the Commons is entitled to travel 
twice a year to the seat of the EU institutions, and it is estimated that 200-300 members 
use this opportunity yearly (Neunreither, 2005: 472). This suggests, however, that 
52 However, the Finnish MEPs are invited to attend the Grand Committee meetings collectively only for a 
particular agenda point which is named 'conversations with MEPs'. During that agenda point the MEPs are 
allowed to speak but they are not able to participate in the meeting further or express their views on any 
other agenda point. MEPs (Finnish or of other nationalities) may be invited to address the GC on a specific 
topic that is before the GC. This means that they are treated in the same way as any other experts who are 
invited to the Parliament for giving evidence on certain issue. (This information is based on interviews with 
the clerk of GC in March 2006 in Helsinki, on inter-views with members of the Grand Committee 
(Parliamentarians) on their trip to Warsaw in April 2006 and with Finnish MPs in May-July, 2006 in 
Helsinki). 
53 This information is based on interviews with the members of Commons EAC and their clerk, in March, 
2006 in London. Additional information has been found from a shoi-t guicle to Afenibei-s of Parliqnient ky 
the staff ofthe ESC, Published by House of Commons, June 2005. 
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Parliamentary engagement in EU affairs goes far beyond the EU specialists in the House 
of Commons. It could be assumed that these visits also create other informal contacts 
among the Parliamentarians and therefore, the informal channels will substantially add to 
the knowledge and expertise of the British MPs. The problem is how to measure the 
potential influence that these contacts might bring. 
However, in both Parliaments (Finland and in the UK's House of Commons) cooperation 
at party level is more intensive among individual MPs through their party connections 
and, also towards the EP, but the frequency of these meetings is in the hands of each 
member and depends on their personal interests. This means that the institution itself, the 
EAC, is not involved in that kind of cooperation. The situation is very similar in 
Estonia. 54 
The House or Lords uses informal channels (i. e. dii-ect influence) to the EU institutions 
and other societal actors55 in a more systematic way than the Commons or the Finnish 
Parliament. The Lords regularly take evidence from Governments, EC institutions, 
academics, a large range of different NGOs and from many other experts, drawing on a 
wide range of interests from within the national and European level (House of Lords 
2000: 2). Lords have regular contacts with the EP and with MEPs. 56 These regular 
contacts suggest that The Lords have a number of different ways of getting information 
independently from the UK Government in order to complement the information they 
receive from the Government. 57 One main explanation for the more effective way of 
using opportunities for influence in the House of Lords compared to the House of 
54 This information is based on interviewing prominent MPs in the Estonian Parliament, inTallinn, April 
2006. 
55 The connections of the Commons to civil society will be examined in chapter 6. 
-'6 This information is based on interviews in London, February, 2006, with members of the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the EU, the Sub Committee F (home Affairs). 
57 For instance, the information received from civil society organisations, such as Statewatch, often gives 
the reason for the Lords to begin an inquiry on a certain issue, as was the case in their 40 th Report on 
Session 2005-06 ' Behind Closed Doors: the meeting of the G6 Interior Ministers at Heiligendamm. In 
addition, according to the interviews, the Reports of the Lords do not attract the British media much and the 
influence of these Reports on the (Euro-sceptic) public opinion is rather limited but they are highly 
respected by the UK Government and th ey often raise a useful debate with the Government's 
representatives. This information is based on interviews in London, February, 2006, with members of the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, the Sub Committee F (home Affairs) and their clerk (see the 
appendix I for full names and dates). 
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Commons is the different structure of the Houses. This means that most members of the 
Lords have been chosen to the Parliament different from Members of Commons and 
because of that there is not similar party discipline among Lords as is among the 
CommonS). 58 
Another important source of information independent of tile Government is civil 
society. 59 The connections of Finnish Parliament with representatives of civil society or 
NGOs have been rather limited in the field of immigration policy. 60 The main 
connections so far, have been organized by individual Parliamentarians or a groups of 
Parliamentarians. 61 The Finnish Parliament takes evidqnce from representatives of civil 
society and some NGOs only to a limiied extent in the field of immigration. 62 
The Polish and Estonian Parliaments have also established tools similar to tile UK and 
Finland for direct influence in the EU. 63 However, in the case of Members of the EP, tile 
Polish and Estonian Parliaments have been more enthusiastic; both Parliaments invite 
their MEPs to each EAC meeting. Polish MEPs have often used this opportunity to 
participate in the EAC meetings, although they are not allowed to vote there; but in 
Estonia, MEPs have rarely used the opportunity to attend EAC meetings. 64 In both 
countries this practice was created because it was considered that the MEN do have 
useful expertise for national MPs to draw upon and on the other hand, this structure offers 
58 This information is based on interviews in London, February, 2006, with members of the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the EU, the Sub Committee F (home Affairs) and their clerk. 
59 The connections with civil society will be analysed in more detail in chapter 6. 
6() It could be also asked what kind of impact civil society has on policy making in Finland, i. e. how well 
civil society organisations are to be assumed to have an expert or lobbyist role. However, the role of 
Finnish civil society or its impact on the long-term policy making in Finland could have been a topic for an 
further research, but was beyond of the purposes of this research. 
6' This information is based on interviews with the clerk of GC in March 2006 in Helsinki, on interviews 
with members of the Grand Committee (Parliamentarians) in their trip to Warsaw in April 2006 and with 
Finnish MPs in May-July, 2006, in Helsinki. - 
62 This information is based on interviews with the clerk of the GC in March 2006 in Helsinki, on 
interviews with members of the Grand Committee (Parliamentarians) in their trip to Warsaw in April 2006 
and with a Finnish MP in May, 2006, in Helsinki. 
6' This information is based on interviews with middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament in 
April 2006, in Warsaw and with the Polish Parliamentary representitive to the EU by phone, in May, 2006. 
6' This information is based on Riigikogu Rules of Procedure Act from March ý 2004 and to the interviews 
with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian Parliament and interviews with prominent Estonian 
MPs in Tallinn, April 2006. 
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a suitable method for Estonian and Polish Parliaments to bring their national interests to 
65 
the EU level . 
Different from older member states, the Polish and Estonian Parliaments, as with the 
other new EU member states, have found cooperation in COSAC very USefUl. 66 
Moreover, they have developed other bi-and multilateral meetings with other 'like- 
minded' Parliaments from the new EU Member States. 67 The aim of these meetings has 
been to share their experiences and to discuss possible means of cooperation. 
The Polish and Estonian Parliaments have established only to a limited extent 
information channels for direct influence at the national level. The role of civil society is 
underdeveloped in both countries and a consequence of this is that the NGOs do not have 
any particular role in inputting information to the Parliaments or contacting individual 
Parliamentarian S. 68 In addition, parties in Poland have had little opportunity to form 
stable relations with the electorate (Kobecky; 2003: 140; Rose-Ackerman, 2005: 129). 
However, this could also be related to their Communist past, and different state traditions 
of these two EU Member States. 
It can be argued based on the evidence found from interviews that tile Finnish, Polish and 
Estonian Parliaments have underestimated the information channels provided by national 
civil society organisations, which could offer well structured information to 
Parliamentarians. This would be one way to develop information channels which are 
independent of Government. The UK, in particular the Lords, and to a certain extent, the 
65 According to interviews, many of the Polish and Estonian Members of the EP (MEPs) (for time of 
writing of this research 2004-2007) were persons with prestigious EU carrier at the national level and 
therefore it can be assumed that personal relations influenced when these procedures were created where 
their knowledge is structurally used. This information is based on interviewing the clerk of the Finnish GC 
in March 2006 in Helsinki and the clerk of Estonian EAC and prominent Estonian MPs in Tallinn, April 
2006. 
66 This information is based on the interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and interviews with prominent Estonian MPs in Tallinn, April 2006. In addition, similar 
information has been submitted to COSAC; see: www. cosac. com 
67 These joint meetings include cooperation such as 5+1 (Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia, Czech 
Republic and Cyprus) and 1+3 'group' Poland together with Baltic states (COSAC, 2006b: 13) 
6' This information is based on interviews with middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament and 
on interviews with high range civil servants from Prime Minister's Office, in April 2006, in Warsaw and 
with the Polish representative to EU in Brussels, by plione in May, 2006. 
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House of Commons, have used this opportunity. 69 In the case of other direct information 
channels, the Parliaments, except the House of Lords, are fairly passive. They are highly 
dependent on the information provided by their Governments. In this respect, there is not 
much difference to be observed between these four Parliaments. 
5.3.6. The Opportunities for Parliaments to Exercise Influence - Europeanized? 
This chapter so far has illustrated that the most important way to influence the EU policy 
process for all the four Parliaments in this study is through their EACs (i. e. inclh-ectly). It 
has shown that they all have institutional structures which offer adequate opportunities 
for influencing EU policy making and these structures have many similarities. As this 
section explained, regardless of the differences with their political systems or 
Parliamentary traditions, all these Parliaments have chosen to establish similar structures 
which also function in a similar ways. This observation suggests that this is due to the 
process of Europeanization. In order to exp lain why they have created systems alike, this 
result indicates that the main mechanisms have been learning and socialising. 
For example, when Finland was preparing its Parliamentary participation structures' for 
the EU membership, the examples of other Parliaments participating in EU affairs were 
carefully studied . 
70 After comparisons, Finland chose to follow to a large extent the 
Danish model, which was considered the most effective for the Finnish Parliament for 
many reasons, but most importantly because it gave enough say to the Parliament. In 
addition, the Danish model seemed the best fit for the Finnish political and Parliamentary 
traditions. This Finnish example suggests that the learning and socialising have certain 
limitations as main mechanisms of Europeanization. Further, the Finnish example 
suggests that these mechanisms of Europeanization function well as long as they 'fit' 
smoothly into the Parliamentary traditions and the political environment. Similar learning 
and socialising effects took place when Poland and Estonia were establishing their 
69 How civil societies are providing input for the House of Commons, is examined in chapter 6. 
70 This information is based on interviewing clerks of the Grand Committee and Special Committee in 
Helsinki, March 2003 and on interviewing the Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's Office, in 
Helsinki, April 2003. 
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structures for Parliamentary participation in EU policy-making before joining the EU. 71 
They also looked at examples from the other EU Member States. In the case of Estonia, 
the Finnish Parliamentary participation system was followed to a great extent. 72 
In addition, however, the Parliaments in the accession countries extended this informal 
learning environment by creating other informal platforms among themselves and created 
-a system where their MEPs have connected to the work of the NPs. In other words, these 
examples suggest that they were not only studying the examples of existing EU members 
but also learning from each other. The Polish and Estonian examples suggest that the 
learning environment was extended outside the EU's institutional structures. An incentive 
for this learning process for new Member States was given by the EU through its 
financial aid and technical assistance (Grabbe, 2006: 58-59). The learning process, not 
only in new Member States but generally, was further facilitated by the easy access to 
information, as data about best practice was made increasingly available across national 
frontiers (Duina and Oliver, 2005: 177). In addition, as chapter 4 showed, the NPs were 
continuously developing instruments of interaction and influence vis-A-vis EU 
institutions, notably, methods and instruments similar to networking and lobbying 
(Verges and McLeod, 2006: 3). A recent example of this new organisational innovation is 
the appointment of permanent liaison officers as outposts of Parliamentary chambers in 
Brussels. At present, twenty NPs have one or more full-time delegates in Brussels 
(Verges and McLeod, 2006: 6). The UK has three persons (two from the Commons and 
one from the Lords); Finland, Poland and Estonia each have one person. 73 The main 
function of the liaison officers is to assist their respective Parliamentary EU Committees 
as being the 'eyes and ears' of the EU Committees. 
This tells us that the NPs have adapted to the challenges of EU level decision making but 
still, compared to the Governments, they all seem to be rather 'passive' institutions. This 
is partly because they have limited opportunities to change the Parliamentary agenda, 
71 This information is based on interviewing the clerk of the Estonian EAC in Tallinn, April 2006 and on 
interviewing the clerk of the Polish Parliament (sejnz) in Warsaw, November 2005. 
72 This information is based on interviewing the clerk of the Estonian EAC in Tallinn, April 2006 
73 This information is based on interviewing the Finnish, Polish, British and Estonian liaison officers to the 
EU, in June 2005 in Brussels. 
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which is considered an important tool for real influence, though not the only one. In that 
sense, there is not much difference to be found between old /new EU member states. 
Except for the House of Lords, all the four Parliaments under consideration have been 
rather 'passive' in developing channels of influencing independently (direct influence) 
from their Governments. These independent channels would be the most significant tool 
for NPs to balance their power against their Governments. The following section, which 
reviews how t he NPs have exercised their opportunities to 'upload' their preferences to 
the EU policy process supports this argument. 
The empirical evidence suggests that to a limited extent the Polish and Estonian 
Parliaments have been better than the older ones at developing channels for indii-ect 
influence. An example of this is the more intensive cooperation with the EP and the 
MEPs in the Polish and the Estonian Parliament. These connections are important, as tile 
EP has recently gained more decision making power after recent Treaty changes. The 
connections with the EP offer an excellent channel for Parliaments to increase their direct 
influence, a matter which has perhaps been noticed in new member states better than in 
the older ones. One explanation can be that their institutional structures are new'and 
recently established and therefore more open for new ideas and practices than the older 
ones. 
5.4. Influen6e at a Practical Level 
This section will analyse how National Parliaments in the UK, Finland, Poland and 
Estonia are exercising their opportunities to influence the EU policy process at a practical 
level by comparing how they responded to a particular Green Paper published by the EU 
Commission on economic migration. This particular Green Paper was chosen, because it 
offers an excellent opportunity to exercise both dii-ect and inclit-ect influence. In addition, 
it goes to the 'heart' of problems in establishing immigration policy for tile EU. After the 
comparison, this section will examine how the EU's immigration policy and border 
control issues have been dealt with in these NPs. The aim is to analyse whether the four 
NPS Linder consideration have succeeded in changing their Governments' views on these 
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issues and whether the NPs have succeeded in 'uploading' any of their interests to the EU 
level. However, in the case of border control, it is more difficult to make exact 
comparisons, because the UK has opted out or all Schengen acquis, and this legislation 
forms the basis for border control cooperation at the EU level. Further, despite Poland 
and Estonia having adopted all of the existing Schengen acquis, they are still not allowed 
to participate in the Schengen system. Therefore, the following section will look more 
broadly at the border control debates that have taken place in the four NPs under 
consideration and will pay particular attention 74 to the establishment of the EU's external 
border control agency (FRONTEX). 75 
This section will argue that there has been a great deal of Europeanization in the British, 
Finnish, Polish and Estonian Parliaments regarding immigration issues: first, when. tile 
policy i. s understood as controlling or restricting immigrants and asylum-seekers from 
entering the EU area, attitudes are very similar in each of the four EU member states and 
their Parliaments. Second, when understanding common immigration policy in a lai-gei- 
context, that is, as including certain mininnun civil Hghtsfoi- innnigi-ants, they are less 
Europeanized. This argument is in line with the existing literature (see chapter 3) which 
has demonstrated that security concerns are dominating the field of tile EU's JHA 
(Huysmans, 2006) and tile Parliaments have adapted that understanding. The third 
argument is that although Poland and Estonia have only been members of the EU a short 
time, they are deeply Europeanized when it comes to their attitudes regarding 
immigration and border control issues. 
5.4.1. Managing Economic Migration 
74 This research assumes that the creation of this Agency had special meaning for each of the four member 
states: the agency is located in Warsaw and the head of this agency is Finnish. In addition, Tallinn (Estonia) 
was one of the locations proposed for this agency and lastly, the UK has unsuccessfully tried to opt-in to 
this EU cooperation. Based on these reasons, this section will look at how this has been dealt with in each 
of the four NPs. 
75 FRONTEX is a European Agency for the management of the operational cooperation at the external 
borders between Member States. The agency evaluates, approves and coordinates proposals forjoint 
operations, proposes these and makes its technical equipment available to Member States forjoint 
operations at the external borders. The headquarters is located in Warsaw, and the agency started work at 
the end of 2005. (EU Commission, 2004b, Regulation 6226/04). 
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The Green Paper Managing Economic Migration, 76 published by the EU Commission in 
January 2005, has been chosen for the comparison for three reasons; first, it touches on 
sensitive questions, such as the harmonisation of the entry to the EU to work from 
outside. Second, the debates concerning immigration in the NPs are very often linked to a 
broader context which highlights security elements (such as combating international 
crime, smuggling, trafficking and drugs), instead of to humanitarian elements (such as 
protecting asylum-seekers). 77 Third, national reactions to Green Papers offer an excellent 
opportunity to influence EU policy at an early stage. This is because the primary aim of 
publishing a Green Paper is to call for reactions from institutions and actors both at the 
EU and national level (EU Commission, 2004c: 12). 78 It is important that different 
stakeholders express their views because after the comprehensive consultation process is 
completed, the EU Commission will present policy plans based on these consultations. 
This section will argue that the NPs do not exercise this influence opportunity to a great 
extent. 
This Green Paper is based on the Hague Programme, adopted by the European Council in 
2004, which set out an EU work programme for the years 2005-10 in the field of 
immigration. This included a request to formulate a policy plan on legal immigration, 
including issues such as admission procedures. (As explained in chapter 3, the EU still 
does not have a common immigration policy which would give direction for economic 
migration in the EU). Despite the common reluctance among the Member States to 
develop this particular policy (see chapter 3), the EU is clearly committed to a common 
immigration policy as stated in the EU Council conclusions at Tampere in 1999. The 
Green Paper suggested that the EU needed to review its immigration policies in the 
longer term, particularly in light of an ageing population and demographic de cline. In 
addition a common policy was considered necessary in order to end the exploitation of 
76 EU Commission, (2004c) Given Papei-: An Appi-oach to managing econonfic inigi-ation (COM 2004) 811 
final 
, published 
in January 2005. 
77 See the chapter 3, where the existing tendency in EU's immigration policy issues is eýplained and where 
the difference between security based elements and humanity based elements is analysed. 
" Commission of European Communities (2004c) Given Pape)- on an EU app)-oach to managing economic 
migi-ation, COM (2004) 811 final, I I. January, 2005. 
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(illegal) workers. 79 As the comparisons below will illustrate, the responses to this Green 
Paper have clearly reflected the national preferences of the Member States. In addition, 
this section will examine what kind of role, if any, the national Parliaments in the UK, 
Finland, Estonia and Poland have in influencing the EU's common policy on economic 
migration. 
The UK 
The Green Paper on economic migration was debated in both Houses of Parliament in the 
UK with great interest. The Commons debate was based on the Government's response to 
the EU Commission, which is the normal procedure in the UK. 80 In order to examine 
whether the Parliament (the Commons) succeeded in adding anything to the 
Government's position, the Government's reply will be considered briefly here. Tile 
Government's response highlighted its reluctance to harmonize immigration-related 
issues. The reply clearly stated that the British opt-in policy is to choose not to 
pai-ticipate in measures that would undermine the UK's border controls. In addition, the 
reply emphasised the fact that it is very important for the UK to maintain tile highest 
authority for border control issues at the national level. It is worth mentioning here that 
the Green Paper on Economic Migration only asked for opinions on minimum 
harmonization for entry and minimum protection for economic immigrants coming from 
outside the EU; its aim was not to consider border control policies. 
The debates in the Standing Committee (Commons) concentrated on security elements 
(i. e. preventing illegal immigrants entering the EU /the UK). Some MPs were interested 
in getting accurate statistics of illegal workers and illegal immigrants staying in the UK 
and few of them shared the Government's view which was that the Green Paper should 
only have considered migration within the EU (i. e. including the new Member States) 
79 EU Commission, 2004c Given Papei- on an EU appi-oach to managing economic migi-ation, COM 
(2004) 811 final, I LJanuary, 2005. 
'0 EU Commission, 2004c Given Papei- on an EU appi-oach to managing economic inigi-ation, COM 
(2004) 811 final, I I. January, 2005%vas debated at the House of Commons Standing Committee on 12 
December 2005 and the full text of the British responsq the EU Commission is found on 
http: NvNvNv. publ icat ions. Parl iament. uk/pa/cm2005O6/smstand/euro/stO5l2l2/512]2sO. 
144 
instead-of outside the EU. 81 Only one MP questioned the Government's previous success 
in combating illegal immigration without participating in the EU based system (i. e. in 
Schengen cooperation). Many concerns were raised about the opportunity for migrants to 
use the British social benefit system and the potentially increasing crime figures as a 
82 result of developing a common immigration policy at the EU level. The debates showed 
that the Parliamentarians were not interested in discussing the suggestion presented in tile 
Green Paper which concerned developing minimum common standards in order to 
protect economic immigrants at the EU level. 
After the debate, the Government's response to the EU Commission was accepted by the 
House of Commons without any added or distinctive statements from tile Parliament. 
This debate, however, clearly highlighted the fact that both parties, the Government and 
the House of Commons, shared a relatively similar approach to attempts to create a 
common EU policy on immigration and asylum issues. Immigration is considered as a 
national question, which is strongly related to the sovereignty of the state. It could be 
argued that this debate in the Common's Standing Committee did not produce any added 
value to the Government's view on economic immigration or challenged the vie%v taken 
by Government. Further, Parliament showed no interest in influencing the Government's 
agenda setting- power. 
Conversely, the House of Lords found the Green Paper highly significant and they 
decided to have a large scale enquiry on it. This was published in November 2005.83 The 
Lords concluded in their Report that most regulations on economic migration, including 
the control of admission and admission procedures, should remain at member state level 
(House of Lords, 2005c: 45). The report stated that there is no need for a common 
a' EU Commission, 2004c Green Papei- on an EU appi-oach to managing economic migration, COM 
(2004) 811 final, I I. January, 2005 was debated at the House of Commons Standing Committee on 12 
December 2005 and the full text of the British response the EU Commission is found on 
http: wNv,, v. pubiications. Parliament. uk/pa/ciii2O0506/smstand/euro/stO51212/51212sO. 
82 EU Commission, 2004c Gi-een Popei- on an EU approach to managing ecollonlic Inigi-ation. COM 
(2004) 811 final, I I. January, 2005. Also, the full text of debates in the House of Lords is also found from: 
hitp: w%v%v. publications. Parliament. uk t 
83 House of Lords (2005c), European Union Committee's, 14"' Report of Session 2005-2006 Economic 
migration to the EU, report with evidence, published 16 November 2005. 
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amnesty on illegal immigration but the EU should set certain common standards to 
protect the rights of legal migrant workers (House of Lords, 2005c: 45). The Lords 
concluded that member states were best placed to work out, whether or not they needed 
economic migration. In this sense, Lords Report did not differ significantly from the view 
taken by the B ritish Government (and accepted by the House of Commons). However, 
the Lords did use their report as tool to express a view different from that of the British 
Government, which is to participate selectively in EU immigration and asylum policy by 
bringing their view to the EU level (House of Lords, 2005c: 32). Moreover, the evidence 
suggests that the Report clearly had a national aim. One important aim was to try to 
convince the British Government to change its views. 84 The empirical evidence suggests 
that different from the Commons, the Lords challenged the Government's agenda setting 
power and tried to change the policy taken by the Government by using both direct and 
indirect methods. 
Finland 
The Green Paper on economic migration was analysed in the Finnish Parliament in the 
Special Committee responsible for JHA affairs by considering the information received 
from the EU Commission and from the Finnish Government. In addition, the Special 
Committee took evidence from the Trade Unions, from civil servants (from different 
ministries) and from one NGO representative. This is a typical practice in Finland: the 
evidence is taken mostly from civil servants and other experts working closely with the 
Government. Because the Finnish Special and Grand Committee meetings are not held in 
public and the minutes of the meetings, which are published, only include the names of 
MPs who asked a question in the Committee meeting, there is limited information 
available about the actual debates in the Committees, unless they are published by 
individual Parliamentarians, which happens rather rarely. The discussion on the Green 
Paper in the Finnish Parliament highlighted the need to maintain existing structures in the Z-1 
84 Article (63)3 of the EC Treaty provides for the Community to adopt measures on 'conditions of entry and 
residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence 
permits' Article (69) and a Protocol to th ,e 
EC Treaty provide that the UK is not to be pound by measures 
adopted under article 63 unless it opts into them. 
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employment market and retain responsibility for them within the hands of each individual 
member state. However, the Parliament supported efforts to create a genei-al framework 
at the EU level for regulating economic migration as long as it did not create more 
bureaucracy or restrict tile national employment market. The Parliament also argued that 
encouraging controlled legal migration would be the best way to prevent illegal 
immigration. After the discussion in the Special Committee, the Parliament agreed with 
the opinion expressed by the Finnish Government and did not deliver any separate 
yesponse to the Commission regarding the Green Paper. It could therefore, be concluded, 
that the debate in the Finnish Parliament was moderate, fact based and did not provide 
any new or contradictory views compared to the Government's view. Similar to the 
British Commons, the Finnish Parliament did not challenge the Government's agenda- 
setting power by providing any further information or by requiring Government to 
change any of its views. 
Estonia 
This Green Paper was discussed in the Estonian Parliament in its EAC. Similar to the 
Finnish EAC meetings, the Estonian EAC meets in private. 85 According to interviews 86 
and minutes of the meeting, the Estonian Parliament discussed this topic based on the 
Government's position, but there was no comment on the debate within the minutes of 
the meeting. The Estonian response to the EU Commission reflected well the preferences 
of Estonia, which were, in this case, shared by the Parliament and the Government. So 
far, and this argument has also been clearly supported by the interview data, national 
party differences in Estonia are not reflected in the EU policy on immigration and asylum 
issues. 87 
85 This information is based on interviewing the clerks of the Estonian EAC, in Tallinn, April, 2006. 
86 This information is based on interviews with Estonian MPs (the chair of the Committee and three other 
members who had been present at the meeting), and with the clerks of the EAC, and with the high/ middle 
level civil servants who have provided the information for the Parliament, in Tallinn, April 2006. (Full list 
of interviews with names and dates is provided in the Appendix 4). 
87 This information is based on interviews with Estonian MPs (the chair of the Committee and three other 
members who have been present at the meeting), and with the clerks of the EAC, -and with the high/ middle 
level civil servants who have provided the information for the Parliament, in Tallinn, April 2006. 
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According to the Estonian Government's response, Estonia supported the idea that* the 
EU as a whole should draw up a more concrete policy plan and create a legislative 
framework that included immigration and questions associated with demographic ageing. 
Estonia preferred a horizontal approach, which would cover conditions of entry to 
member states territory for all third country nationals, but only for ently not 1-esi(lence. 
This implies that the Estonian Government also used this Green Paper as a tool for 
bringing some of its most important national concerns to the EU level as the following 
examples will show. The Government's response supported the 'community preference' 
principle of filling gaps in the labour market. In addition, the response highlighted the 
need to lift the temporary restrictions from the free movement of persons within tile EU, 88 
although this issue was not asked in the Green Paper. However, this question is highly 
important for Estonia because it is one of the new EU member states which are still 
suffering from the restrictions established by some of the older EU member states 
conc erning the free movement of persons within the EU. Another example of using. the 
response on economic migration as a tool to bring its national preferences (which are not 
directly related to the Green Paper) at the EU level, was Estonia's statement against 
granting any rights at the EU level to third country nationals (i. e. migrants from outside 
the EU). Instead, it suggested that all decisions regarding tile rights of third country 
nationals (except entrance criteria) should be left to each member state to determine. 89 
This reveals the domestic problem, which is the large Russian speaking population in 
Estonia. However, this domestic issue is not related to migration from outside the EU. To 
sum up, the Government's response was approved without any changes by tile Parliament 
and sent to the EU Commission as the Estonian position. As with Finland, the 
Government's agenda-setting power was not questioned. 
Poland 
88 In particular Germany and Austria demanded long transitional restrictions on the free movement of 
persons within the Union as the 10 new EU Member States joined in 2004. The UK, Ireland and Sweden 
did not have any restrictions. Finland lifted its restrictions on I May 2006. 
'9 All contributions on the Green Paper on the Economic migration can be f9und: 
http: //ec. europa. eLl/COMM/justice_home/ne%vs/consulting_ptiblic/emn/ 
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In Poland the Green Paper was not discussed in the Parliament at all. The Government 
replied on behalf of Poland to the EU Commission. 90 Although the Green Paper was not 
discussed in Parliament, the Government's reply presented the opinions expressed by the 
Polish MPs during the interviews. The reply highlighted the fact, that for the time being, 
Poland has no active immigration policy and therefore, the topic does not raise debates in 
Parliament. 91 Despite the fact that immigration is not an issue in Poland right now, 
Poland also used the opportunity to bring some of its national interests to the EU level 
with the help of the Green Paper. However, similar to Estonian case, some of these points 
were not addressed in the Green Paper. Again as in the Estonian, case, the Polish response 
reiterated the need to liberalize immigration policy towards third country nationals but 
only after restrictions placed on the new member states on access to the EU's labour 
market had been lifted. The Polish response concluded that full introduction of the 
principle of free movement for new member state nationals is a priority for Poland. 
Further, this access to the EU labour market should also be granted to immigrants who 
are already integrated in the member states before thinking about migration outside from 
the EU. 92 
5.4.2. Agenda- setting Influence and Parliaments 
When comparing responses from the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia to * the 
abovementioned Green Paper, certain similarities can be found. Each of the foul- states 
used their opportunities to bring their national interests to the EU level Nvith the help of 
the Green Paper. Estonia and Poland did this most obviously by commenting on the 
existing restrictions for the free movement of persons, which certain 'old' member states 
90 The observation in text are based on comparing this response from the Polish Government to the Green 
Paper and the information received during two separate interview trips to Poland concerning Polish 
immigration issues. The first interviews in Poland took place in October/November 2005 and the second 
interview trip in April 2006 (see chapter I where these trips are explained and the Appendix 3, wheie the 
full list of interviews is provided). 
91 This information is based on interviews with high and middle level civil servants in the Polish Ministry 
of the Interior, the middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament, and discussion with Polish MPs, 
October / November 2005 and interviews with a member of Polish Institute for the International Affairs, 
and with high level civil servants from the PM's chancellery, with a high level civil servant from the 
President's office and with several EU-experienced MPs from the Sejnz and Senate, in Warsaw, April 2006. 
92 See the full reply from the Polish Government: 
http: //Nvw%v. ec. eut-opa. eu/comm/J*ustice_home/news/Consulting_public 
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had put in place for new member states. However, the Green Paper was concerned with 
migration frorn outside. the EU and not ivithin it. With its response, Estonia also brought 
to the EU level its national minority concerns. The response from the UK Government 
reiterated its existing 'opt-in' policy which gives it the possibility to participate in EU 
proposals that best suit British national needs. This was not the question addressed in the 
Green Paper. On the other hand, the Report produced by the Lords and presented at the 
EU level, was clearly aimed at influencing the national Government. The Lords hoped 
that pressure coming from the EU would then defect back to the national level and make 
the Government change its policy. The Finnish reply was fairly moderate and a good 
representation of Finnish EU policy, which has been considered 'predictable, realistic 
and pro-European'. 93 
When considering the i-ole of Pai-liaments in these responses, one conclusion can be 
observed. Parliaments had very a moderate, if any, in forming the responses to the Green 
Paper (as was the case in Poland). They did not produce any additional input to their 
Governments' positions: instead (except the House of Lords) they all agreed to accept the 
replies produced by their Governments although there is no legal restriction which would 
demand Parliaments to do so. However, another interpretation of the results can be that 
there were hardly any differences between the four NPs and their Governments 
concerning the EU's immigration policy. This applies, in particular, to the question of 
economic migration. All the answers implied a preference for security based policies, 
which restricts rather than liberalizes migration. It could then be argued that Parliaments 
did not find it useful to use their limited resources challenging the agenda-setting power 
of Governments in this particular case. This observation suggests that as long as the 
Governments are 'protecting' their views at the EU level, the Parliaments are satisfied 
with their limited role in forming the EU's immigration policy. But it is interesting to ask, 
why all these four Parliaments (except the House of Lords) share so well the attitudes 
with their Governments. 
93 Information is based on interviewing clerks of the Grand Committee and Special Committees in Helsinki, 
March 2003 and April 2006. 
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As explained earlier in this section, after the consultation process ended (i. e. the 
responses to the Green Paper had been delivered and analysed by the EU Commission) 
the EU Commission made some legislative proposals on the topic concerned. In this case, 
the EU Commission decided on December 2005 to introduce a policy plan on legal 
migration 94 . This meant that the programme did not contain any 
legislative or operational 
proposals, but a 'road map' listing the actions and legislative initiatives that the EU 
Commission i ntended to take in pursuit of the consistent development of EU legal 
migration policy is listed (EU Commission, 2005a: 2). It could be argued, that this 'next 
move' by the EU Commission reflected concerns raised in the four responses which were 
analysed above, although it is too early to say what exactly their role in that process was. 
(It is likely that similar views were presented by many other EU actors). Nevertheless, 
this example of the Green Paper on Economic Migration illustrates well that the 
consultation process does provide an excellent opportunity for stakeholders to 'upload' 
their preferences at the EU level. On the other hand, this comparison clearly showed that 
the NPs in the UK (except the Lords), Finland, Poland and Estonia did not try to 'upload' 
any national preferences to the EU level in this case. 
5.5. Immigration Debates in the Parliaments 
This section will analyse further whether the Parliaments have used their opportunities to 
'upload' any preferences to the EU policy process in some othei- cases in this policy field 
than was the case with the Green Paper, and if so, what those cases were. Secondly, this 
section will examine whether there are any similarities between the topics which have 
been discussed in each of the four Parliaments and if there were, what they were and why 
they were discussed. 
5.5.1. Immigration Debates in the UK Parliament 
94 EU Commission, (2005a) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on a Policy Plan on Legal Afigi-ation. COM (2005) 669 final. 
I 
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From January 2005 to the end of May 20069" the Commons debated- immigration related 
issues 8 times in the European Standing Committee. The debates included topics such as 
immigration, asylum and exchange of information in questions which are related to 
immigration and combating illegal immigration and on terrorism. 96 In the previous year 
(2004) the Commons debated questions II times, but most of these debates concerned the 
National Asylum and Immigration B ill. 97 However, the frequency of Standing Committee 
debates is not the only tool to measure whether the issue is important or not. When 
questions are considered important, the Commons can also issue Reports and ask for 
written information from their Ministers. 98 
When looking at the minutes of the Standing Committee meetings, one common 
denominator is to be found, that is, the main interest has been on EU proposals relating to 
preventing illegal immigration or other controlling measures. 99 The debates often 
concerned different ways of intensifying cooperation on asylum policies at the EU level, 
proposals related to the exchange of information between the EU Member States' law 
enforcement officers or access to common databases. 100 The most important questions for 
the British MPs were the exact costs of possible EU level participation and the expected 
advantages if the UK did opt-in to any of the proposals'. Besides these issues, some 
Parliamentarians expressed their concerns about whether sorne Southern and Eastern EU 
member states would be able to maintain their frontier controls. 101 This would have 
95 This section will oDly consider the Standing Committee debates in the House of Commons, because as 
explained earlier in this chapter, the main channel for the House of Lords to scrutinize the Government is to 
conduct sophisticated reports. 
96 This list of debates in the Commons Standing Committees is based on the information found from the 
hit p: /. -`www. PubI ications. Parl iament. uk/pa/cni/ciii euro. htm and from the information received from the 
clerks of the Commons ESC and from the clerk of Lords ESC, May 2006. Further, BBC has also quoted 
the Debates in Commons Standing Committee on economic migration: http: //news. bbe. co. uk/go/pr/fr/- 
2/hi/uk_news/politics74440406. stm, and comments on this debate can also be found from: EIRO -Online: 
http: %v%v%v. eiro. eufofound. ie/2006/01/feature/euO6Ol205fhtml. In addition, these debates are referred in 
European Voice, Vol. 12, No. 9 in March 2006. 
97 Look at the previous footnote (i. e. 82). 
9' This information is based on interviewing the clerk of the Commons ESC, in June, 2006 through emails. 
99 This list of debates in the Commons Standing Committees is based on the information found from the 
hit p: /., `www. PubI ications. Parl iament. Lik/pa/cni/cmeuro. htm 
'00 The full debates of the Commons Standing Committee are to be found: http: // 
%v-, vw. r)ublications. Parliament. uk/pa/cm/cmeuro/htm 
101 Similar information was also found from European Voice, 'An EU of all creeds, colours, and 
prejudices', Vol. 12, No. 9,9 March 2006 
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indirect implications for the UK as most illegal'immigrants arriving in the UK have 
entered from another EU country (House of Lords, 2005a: 8). Interestingly, none of the 
Parliamentarians, as such questioned the British opt-out policy on the EU's immigration 
and asylum policies. 102 
The minutes of the Standing Committee meetings showed that MPs were most concerned 
about those EU -proposals which would have required sharing databases with other EU 
partners. Their main concern was primarily related to the fear that these databases might 
contain some information about Bi-ifish nationals, which most MPs did not wish to be 
given to other EU member states unless it was known how the information would be used 
and by whom. Another concern was how to ensure that the shared information did not 
cause problems with other EU based databases and how these different databases would 
relate to the Schengen information system. Some MPs also expressed doubts about how 
security of the data: who would have access to the databases and how long the data would 
be held there. A few MPs also questioned whether access to common EU databases 
would offer value for money for the UK. 
Both Houses found the EU proposal on creating a European Agency for the management 
of operational cooperation at the external borders (FRONTEX) of the EU highly 
interesting. The Commons produced four reports on it and the Lords carried out one large 
enquiry including tile submission of a large amount of oral and written evidence. 103 The 
reason why both Houses looked at the issue was the decision taken by the British 
Go*vernment to 'opt-in' to this EU proposal. The main concern for both Houses was 
whether tile Agency would exchange personal information on individuals with member 
states and whether there would be a link between the Agency's information exchange and 
the Schengen information systems (House of Lords, 2003a: 68). In other words, the main 
concern was again how to guarantee effective data protection standards, particularly if 
these involved risk assessment, profiling and intelligence sharing (House of Lords, 
102 See the footnote 73.1- 
103 House of Commons, 2003; 11 th, Report, 2003-2004 para 4 and 13 th, Report 2003-2004, para 9, the 
House of Lords (2003a) 29 th Report (2002-03). 
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2003a: 20). This issue was not debated at the Standing Committee in either House 
because the information given by the Government was considered sufficient. After 
receiving further information from the Government, both Houses accepted the 
Government's decision to opt-in to this EU proposal. 104 However, The Lords emphasised 
again that the British 'opt-out- policy' from the Schengen acquis had led to difficulty at 
the EU level and they had encouraged the Government to consider the possibility of 
'adopting the common manual on checks at the external border' (House of Lords, 2003a: 
23). This demonstrated again the attempt of the Lords to change the Government's policy 
by using EU level influence. However, the Commons did not try to challenge the 
Government's position in this case. This is perhaps because the EU proposal was again 
aimed at strengthening EU border control, which has been a clear priority for the 
Commons as well. However, what happened in this case was that the UK's participation 
in FRONTEX was denied by other EU member states because the UK is not member of 
Schengen and the other EU member states considered that this proposal was related to the 
core questions of the Schengen acquis. 105 This is an example of how measures relating to 
immigration and asylum have overlapping elements with the Schengen acquis but 
because the UK is holding its rights for partial participation in these issues, it -can 
effectively be excluded from measures in which it would be in its interest to 
participate. 106 
Based on immigration-related debates in the House of Commons, the following 
conclusions can be made. Firstly, regardless of the issue, the British premise was that it is 
up to the UK to choose whether to participate in any particular EU initiative, and this 
premise was not challenged by the Parliament. Secondly, the debates illustrated the main 
concern among the MPs, that is, doubts about the Government's ability to influence other 
EU partners in a way that guarantees the protection of privacy at the EU level when 
104 House of Commons, 2004; 13 th Report, 2003-04: 69, the House of Lords, (2000) and House of Lords, 
(2003a) 29 th Report, 2002-03). 
105 The first one was on External Border Management Agency (FRONTEX) and the second on a measures 
related to the inclusion of biometric identifiers in travel documents. 
106 This information is based on interviews with members of the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
EU, the Sub Committee F (home Affairs) and their clerk, in London, February, 2006 and on their, 29 th 
Report, 2002-03: 5). 
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sharing databases. The MPs'07 were not concerned about the rights of immigi-ants and 
asylinn-seekei-s, as such, but about individuals in the UK if the information gathered for 
one purpose was used for another purpose and then passed to another EU state. 
These debates raised serious concerns about the abilities of other EU member states to 
ensure that shared data would be used as agreed at the EU level. 108 This finding suggests 
that it matters that the British political and legal institutions are outside of the continental 
mainstream. In addition, these debates illustrated that many MPs felt that the British 
island position could guarantee frontier control, but at the same time MPs did express 
doubts about whether other EU member states could control their land borders and large 
water frontiers. 109 Lastly, the debates indicated that British MPs were interested in 
participating in EU immigration and border control issues only when these were aimed at 
restricting migration flows to the UK. In addition, the evidence from these debates 
supports the argument expressed in the existing literature, that is, that most MPs still 
make a sharp distinction between national and EU affairs in particular with such issues as 
immigration and border control (Drewry and Giddings, 2004: 7). These debates further 
supported the argument expressed earlier in this section that the British Parliament has 
not fully used its opportunities to upload any of its preferences to the EU level. For 
instance, the House of Commons clearly indicated that they were worried about data 
protection in each of the EU proposals examined here, but it did not stipulate that the 
Government should have required stricter measures during the EU negotiations. 
5.5.2. Immigration Debates in the Finnish Parliament 
107 , Although recognising that shared databases can be powerful tools in the fight against crime and illegal 
immigration, we are concerned at the Government's increasing use of large-scale computer databases, 
many of which hold information on innocent law-abiding people' stated by MP Mr. McNulty, House of the 
Commons, in the European Standing Committee, 5.12.2005. 
103 For instance, the EU data-protection proposal and the many other initiatives which are combating 
against international crime and illegal immigration are based on assuming some homogeneity between 
Member States; however, there are huge differences in the integrity of the judicial systems of certain 
Member States and the sort of use or misuse which might be made for their own data records (Lords, 
2006a: 25). 
109 Similar information was received by interviewing 4 British MPs who are also members of European 
Scrutiny Committee, in London, in March 2006. (the full list of interviews and date is provided in the 
Appendix 1) 
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Similar to the experiences of British Parliamentarians, Finnish MPs consider immigration 
and border control issues important at a general level. ' 10 However, it is difficult to find 
empirical evidence to support that claim. 111 From 2004 to end of May 2006,1 12 the 
Finnish Parliament considered immigration and border control issues altogether 84 times. 
The statistics clearly show the weight attached to the security dimension. However, this is 
more a consequence of the EU's immigration agenda, which is dominated by security 
elements (as explained in chapter 3), than a preference of the Parliament. This is because 
the Finnish Parliament practice is to follow the EU agenda on its debates. 
Normal practice in the Finnish Parliament is that debates and discussions are based on the 
Government's proposal and discussions are held at Special Committees. Usually the 
Parliament approves the Government's proposal, adding only a few remarks, if any. This, 
however, does not necessarily mean that the MPs have not discussed the items. On tile 
contrary, based on the interview data, the debates behind closed doors are sometimes 
very critical. Ministers have to defend their views strongly even to their own party 
colleagues (who are not in the Government). What follows is that Ministers usually tend 
to come to the Parliament well prepared and take seriously the critique expressed by 
Parliament, which is normally known by the Minister earlier, through party 
connections. 113 
"0 This argument is based on interviewing Parliamentarians; when asking whether the immigration issues 
are politically important, the Parliamentarians in both countries answered, that immigration issues are very 
important, however, this attitude is not observable from the action they have taken at the Parliaments. 
"1 In addition, direct comparisons are difficult to make because the Finnish Parliamentary system differs 
significantly from the British model. This is because all the Parliamentary committee meetings are held Z, behind closed doors. Therefore it is difficult to track individual debates among Parliamentarians, especially 
since EU matters are rarely debated on the floor of the Finnish Parliament. 
This means that the only method is to compare the E (U)-letters which Government has provided for 
Parliaments to the reports of the Special Committees (or Grand Committee issue). However, full reports are 
not always prepared, often there is only a minute to be found. According to the interviews, Parliamentarians 
pose sometimes strict questions to the ministers, even from the same parties and having meetings behind 
closed doors without the media, the conversations are regarded as useful method for Parliament to 
influence the Government's policy (Raunio, 2007 forthcoming). 
112 In year 2004 the statistics showed that Special committee considered 33 JHA related EU questions, in 
year 2005,31 and end of year 2006,20. 
113 This information is based on interviewing prominent MPs who are also members of the Grand 
Committee between 2003 and 2006, in Helsinki. (Full list of interviews and dates is provided in Appendix 
2) 
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The empirical material showed that there were two immigration and border control- 
related cases where the Parliament clearly tried to influence the initial position taken by 
Government. 1 14 The first case concerned an EU framework decision on the retention of 
data processed and stored, in connection with the provisions of public electronic 
communication services. 115 (The same decision was also debated in the UK House of 
Commons). This framework decision was aimed at providing data for the purposes of 
investigating, detecting and prosecuting serious crimes including terrorism. 
Consequently, the Parliament advised the Government not to approve this EU proposal at 
this stage at the EU level because this decision would have included sensitive information 
(such as who called whom and when, and telephone and internet subscriber information); 
but it did not say clearly how to make sure that this information was to be appropriately 
stored. Questions included in this proposal are defined at the constitutional level in 
Finland and the way in which they were suggested in this draft EU proposal were clearly 
against the Finnish Constitution. Further, parallel to the debates in the UK Parliament 
(the section above) the Finnish MPs were concerned that this decision would have an 
impact on the privacy rights of Finns, not the rights of immigrants or asylum-seekers. 
In this case, the findings suggest that the Finnish Parliament exercised successfully its 
influence opportunities to EU policy- making indii-ectly through the Government. This is 
because later that year, in 2005, the EU Commission issued a new (this time) draft 
directive, which took into consideration most of the concerns expressed by the Finnish 
Parliament earlier that year, and concerns expressed by the Finnish Government at the 
EU level. ' 16 However, as the minutes of the UK's Common ESC meetings showed, 
similar concerns were expressed by tile House of Commons although this particular 
114 This framework decision is considered here, although it is not purely an immigration (or border control) 
question because it illustrates well the fact that many immigration related issues have far reaching 
implications, and today terrorism is underpinned to the immigration issues to a great extent as explained in 
chapter 3 
115 Directive 2006/xx/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the retention of data proceeded 
in connection with the provision of public electronic communication services and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC. 
116 This information is based on minutes of the Finnish Parliament, HaVL 19/2005 vp U/42/2004 vp, PeVL 
35/2004 and to PeVL 3/2006 vp and on information received by interviewing a prominent Finnish MP in 
May, 2006. The information (in Finnish) from minutes can be found: 
http: //%v%vNv. eduskunta/fi/faktatmp/ulatmpý/pevl-3_2006. lltni 
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question was not debated in the Standing Committee but dealt with in writing. 117 It can 
also be assumed that other EU Member States had similar views. 
The second example where the Finnish Parliament tried to change the Government's 
initial position was the Government's initiative for joining tile Pruirn Treaty. ' Is This is a 
Treaty which was signed at the intergovernmental level by 7EU states in 2005, similar to 
the Schengeii cooperation in the early 1990s, where any EU member state could join the 
agreement later but could not make any changes to the rules. The PrOm Treaty 119 contains 
provisions which aim to incorporate that Treaty into European law in the future. 120 The 
main concern by the Parliament was that the PrOm Treaty could have jeopardised 
negotiations already taking place within the EU institutions on the same issues. Further, 
the Parliament raised concerns over accountability and transparency in this kind of 
intergovernmental grouping. 121 However, in this case the Parliament did not succeed in 
changing the view taken by the Finnish Government. This was partly because, the 
structure of Finnish coalition Governments guarantees that the Government normally has 
a majority in Parliament when it presents its proposals. 
Apart from these two exceptions, there have been only a few other occasions where EU 
level immigration issues have provoked any discussion in Parliament, and they have 
usually been linked to national issues, such as to the changes in national immigration and 
117 The Select Committee on European Scrutiny (in the House of Commons) made a scrutiny reserve on 
this issue on 14.12.2004 in order to receive more information from Government in written form (i. e. this 
issue was not debated at the Standing Committee. The letter sent by the ESC included similar concerns as 
the Finnish Select Committee found re,, arding this issue. The letter and the reply from the British 
Government to House of Commons can be found from: littp: // 
wxvw. publications. Parliament. uk/pa/cn12OO5O6/emselect/cmeuteg/34-xv/3423. htm 
118 The Treaty of PrOm was signed on 27 May 2005 in town PrUm in Germany between Gen-nany, Spain, 
France, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Belgium and Austria (Italy and Finland have since said they want tojoin 
too). The Treaty covers a series of JHA issues including the 'exchange of information' (in effect, the 
'principle of availability' (Statewatch, news, 5. September, 2006). Full text of the PrOm Treaty is available: 
http: Nv-, v%v. statewatch. org/news/2006/sep/05eLi-g6. htm. 
119 It could be questioned whether the PrOm Treaty is part of EU affairs, because it has been made outside 
of EU structures, but the Finnish Parliament has taken a view that this Treaty is part of EU affairs, because 
the aim of PrUm Treaty is that it will be incorporated later to the EU's institutional structures. 
120 The Prijm Treaty is available: http: %v-, vw. statewatch. org/news/2006/sep/05cu-g6. htni 
12 1 The Prilm Treaty has been considered in the Finnish Special Committees responsible for JHA issues: 
(HaVL 22/2006 vp -E 97/2005 vp. The information (in Finnish) can be found: 
http: ww%v. edLiskunta. fi/hallintovaliokunnan mietinn6t. 
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asylum law. 122 EU level immigration issues raised some debate in Parliament just before 
the 2004 enlargement. This was because at that tirne most of the older EU states (Finland 
included) restricted the free movement of persons from the new EU member states to 
their labour markets. In the Finnish Parliament, the main 'input' for these debates came 
from the Trade Unions and interest organisations in the field of labour. However, other 
than Trade Unions, other connections between Parliament and civil society or interest 
groups are not very well developed in the Finnish immigration field .1 
23 Nevertheless, this 
example showed again, that the input from NGOs and interest groups could be an 
important supplementary information source for Parliamentarians. 
Although the Finnish Parliament has shown an interest in border control issues, the 
establishment of a European external border control agency (FRONTEX) was not 
debated in the Finnish Parliament, because it was primarily viewed as an administrative 
arrangement that did not by itself create new EU powers beyond those following from tile 
Treaties. 124 Therefore, the issue was primarily prepared at the Governmental level in 
Finland and Parliament was informed about it along with other issues, but it did not raise 
the same level of interest as in the UK. 125 For instance, when the location of this agency 
was discussed at the EU level, the national preparation was left to Governmental actors. 
To conclude, these debates in the Finnish Parliament support the earlier argument that 
the Parliament has not used a much of its opportunities to 'upload' its preferences to the 
EU level. Similar to the debates in the UK Parliament (Commons) there was very little 
difference to be observed between the Government and Parliament concerning. the 
immigration and border control policies at the EU level. 126 However, this does not mean 
122 This information is based on interviewing some members of Finnish Grand Committee (MPs) in their 
visit in Warsaw, April 2006. 
123 This information is based on interviewing some members of Finnish Grand Committee (MPs) in their 
visit in Warsaw and the clerk of GC, in April 2006, in Warsaw. 
124 This information is based on interviewing some members of Finnish Grand Committee (MPs) in their 
visit in Warsaw and the clerk of GC, in April 2006, in Warsaw. 
125 This information is based on interviewing high level civil servant from the Ministry of the Interior, and 
the clerk of the Grand Committee, in Helsinki, August 2006. 
126 This information is based on interviewing the clerks of the Select Committee responsible for JHA 
affairs and with middle/ higher level civil servants from the Ministry of the Interior, in Helsinki, March- 
April, 2003. 
159 
that all Finnish EU policy goals are entirely shared by all MPs or that tile Parliament as 
such is a coherent actor. More than that, the findings suggest that tile potential disputes 
are resolved by the Government (i. e. between the governing party groups) before it 
presents its initial position to the Parliament and then the opposition has limited 
opportunities to influence the Government. In addition, when Parliament has used its 
opportunities to influence EU policy, the questions have concerned pl-otecting national 
civil rights, suc h as privacy or transparency and accountability, similar to the case of the 
UK. In addition, only a limited number of MPs are deeply committed to EU affairs in 
general and more particularly to immigration and border control questions (Raunio, 2007, 
forthcoming). What follows, is that most MPs do not try to influence the EU policy 
process, because it is time consuming and the EU legislation is increasingly technical in 
nature. Moreover, it is difficult to estimate the possible consequences of initiatives in tile 
future. 127 Logically most Parliamentarians are interested in being re-elected and so far, 
European issues have not been decisive issues in national elections in Finland (Raunio, 
2007 forthcoming). Lastly, for some MPs, it is difficult to distinguish between EU and 
national issues and to know what their role could be in the process of formulating EU 
policy. 128 This all suggest that the Governmental actors (elite) has plenty of room for 
action. 
5.5.3. Immigration Debates in Polish Parliament 
The literature has suggested that the emphasis in Polish Parliament has been on 
'downloading' EU laws, policies and practices with only limited opportunities for 
'uploading' country-specific preferences and priorities as 'a policy-maker' (Goetz: 2605: 
255; Holzhacker, 2007: 149; lankova and Katzenstein, 2004: 326). This claim is 
supported by looking at the minutes of Parliamentary meetings. Since Poland joined the 
EU (i. e. from 2004) the minutes of the EAC meetings have shown that there have been 
127 This information based on interviewing the clerks of the Special Committees responsible for JHA in 
Helsinki, and with middle/higher level civil servants from the Ministry of the Interior, in Helsinki, March- 
April, 2003 and with two prominent Finnish MPs in Helsinki, March - May 2003 and with the Chair of tile 
Grand Committee in December 2005, in Helsinki. 
128 Information based on interviewing the clerks of the Special Committees responsible for JHA in the 
Finnish Parliament, in Helsinki, in March 2003 
160 
fewer than ten different EU proposals from the immigration field (Directives/ Council 
proposals / Framework decisions) considered in the EAC Committee, which according to 
the Polish structure, is the main actor in Parliament in EU affairs. 129 The statistics showed 
that the EAC has looked at the following issues (from May 2004 to May 2006): mutual 
information exchange in the areas of immigration and asylum; tile status of refugees; the 
action plan against the smuggling of migrants; combating cross border crime; combating 
international crime; the Schengen acquis; and the exchange of information between EU 
member state law enforcement authorities. The minutes of the EAC meetings (which in 
principle record all the individual questions and comments expressed by MPs and the 
replies from ministers) showed that there were no major debates in the EAC on any 
immigration or border control related issues. 130 In addition, the Parliament did not add or 
demand any changes to the Government's position on any of tile cases it chose for its 
consideration. Interestingly, the issues which the Polish EAC in the (Sq/111) chose for its 
approval were very much the same as considered in the British and Finnish Parliaments, 
although the Parliamentary structures for choosing issues for further consideration are 
different in these countries. 131 In the Polish case, the EAC does not purely follow the. EU 
agenda but instead, chooses for itself topics which need more detailed consideration. This 
implies, perhaps, the strong impact of the Polish Governmental (immigration) elite in the 
Parliament. This means that the EU agenda dominates at the national level even though 
the structure of the EAC is not based on following the EU's JHA agenda (as is tile case in 
Finland and Estonia). (The role of the immigration elite is analysed in detail in chapter 6). 
129 The minutes of the Polish (Sejin) EAC meetings can be found: 
littp:.,,;, Iorka. seiiii. L, ov. T)I/Bitiletvn. nsf.., "kskr5? 01ienFortn&SUl--l. The interpretation of these minutes has been 
checked with the clerk of the Polish EAC (sejjn). 
130 The minutes of the Polish (Sejin) EAC meetings can be found: 
littp:! 'i*orka. seiiii. i-, ov. p]! Bitiletyn. nsf. -'-k-skr5? OpciiForiii&SUE. The interpretation of these minutes has been 
checked with the clerk of the Polish EAC (sejnj). 
"' According to interviews (most EU related discussion were conducted in the Committee for Foreign 
Affairs and some in the Internal Affairs Committee which shows, according to the interviewee that Polish 
Parliamentarians still make sharp distinction between domestic affairs and EU affairs (latter being 
international affairs). In addition, some discussions have taken place in the Senate (no minutes of meetings 
available), overall Senate has shown a little more interest on EU affairs than Sejm, although it has not full 
competences to participate in all the EU related matters according to Polish Law. This information is based 
on interviewing a researcher in Centre of Migration Research, in Bristol, in October, 2006 
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Border control policy is considered more important than other issues in the immigration 
field, such as developing legal immigration policy. 132 The main objective for the 
Government, which the Parliament so far has shared, has been to take all necessary 
measures to prove to the other EU member states that Poland has the capacity to protect 
its borders. This would then lead to Poland joining Schengen coopei-ation. 133 However, 
having strong borders fits well with the Polish national identity; borders define territory 
over which a state exercises sovereignty and they are an integral part of its identity. ' 34 In 
addition, history (and in particular the memories of the Second World War) is said to be 
more relevant in Poland than in some other EU member states which have reconciled 
with the past (Zaborowski, 2004). 135 Based on all the above mentioned reasons, it could 
have been expected that the establishment of the external border control agency 
(FRONTEX) would have raised lively debates in tile Polish Parliament, especially as 
Poland (at the Governmental level) lobbied hard to bring the agency to Warsaw. 136 
However, the minutes of the EAC meetings showed no debates on this issue either. ' 37 A 
possible explanation for the lack of Parliamentary involvement in this issue could be that 
it was primarily prepared at the Governmental level and the Parliament still feels, (based 
on its previous role from the accession period), that there is a sharp distinction between 
Governmental and Parliamentary issues. 138 
132 This information is based on interviews in the Polish Parliament (Sejni) with EU-experienced 
Parliamentarians, and with middle/ high level civil servant in the Parliament (sejni), high level civil 
servants from the PM's chancellery, and with a high level civil servant from the President's off ice, in April, 
2006 in Warsaw. The interviews were the only way to gain this information because the minutes of the 
EAC meetings showed no debates among Parliamentarians. 
13' This information is based on interviews in the Polish Parliament (Sejnz) with EU-experienced 
Parliamentarians, and with high level civil servants from the PIM's chancellery, with a high level civil 
servant from the President's office and with the Head of Frontex, in April 2006 in Warsaw. 
134 This information is based on interviews with a member of the Polish Institute for International Affairs, 
with high level civil servants from the PM's chancellery, with a high level civil servant from the 
President's office and with EU-experienced Nips (members of the EAQ, in Warsaw, April 2006 
135 The minutes of the Polish (Sejin) EAC meetings can be found: 
httl2:.! I'orka. scini. L, ov. pl.. -'Bitiletvii. nsfikski-5? OpeilForiii&, SLIE. The interpretation of these minutes has been 
checked with the clerk of the Polish EAC (sejni). 
136 This information is based on interviewing high level civil servants in Ministry of Interior, in Helsinki, 
August 2006 and middle and high level civil servants in Ministry of Interior, in Tallinn, in April, 2006. 
13' FRONTEX is European Agency for management of operational cooperation at the external borders of 
the Member States of the EU. It was created 2005 to coordinate and cooperate in protecting the borders of 
the EU. 
138 This information is based on interviews with high and middle level civil servants in the Polish Ministry 
of the Interior, the middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament, and discussion with prominent 
Polish MPs, October/ November 2005and 2006. 
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Apart from the abovementioned questions, which the EAC has considered without 
discussion, only a few immigration-related questions have been debated in the Polish 
Parliament -since EU membership according to the interview data. 139The first that 
attracted great interest among MPs was the decision of the 'old member states' to restrict 
the free movement of persons from new member states. Another issue, which was 
strongly debated, only shortly before joining the EU, was the introduction of the EU's 
common visa policy. This regime required visas from the countries neighbouring Poland, 
for instance from Ukraine and Belarus (this topic is analysed in chapter 6). 1 40 The third 
issue, raising some discussion in the Parliament, was the growing number of Polish 
citizenship applications, soon after Poland joined the EU. Tile applications were made by 
persons with Polish roots and who had left the country earlier. ' 41 
Although the Polish Parliament has considered in its EAC most of the proposals 
considered by the UK and Finnish Parliaments, there were. no discussions in the 
Committee about the implications of these EU proposals for Poland., 42 One possible 
explanation is the fact that not all the debates are included in the minutes of meetings due 
to the documentation system still being under construction in the Polish Parliament. 
Nevertheless, the interview data also confirmed an absence of discussion about the 
implications of the proposals. The Polish MPs were not concerned about data protection 
issues in immigration and border policies as was the case in the UK and partly in Finland. 
139 This information is based on interviews with high and middle level civil servants in the Polish Ministry 
of the Interior, the middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament, and discussion with prominent 
Polish MPs, October / November 2005and interviews with a member of the Polish Institute for 
International Affairs, with high level civil servants from the PM's chancellery, with a high level civil 
servant from the President's off ice and with EU-experienced MPs (members of the EAQ, in Warsaw, April 
2006. 
140 This information is based on interviews with EU experienced (members of the EAC) MPs; in Warsaw, in 
November 2005 and April 2006. Also, similar information was gained from forum which is interested in 
migration in Poland: http: //xv%vNv. wsisw. natolin. edu. pi 
141 Most of these applications came from outside of Europe, mainly from Israel. However, this topic was 
considered primarily as a 'Government problem' in the Parliament. 
142 This information is based on interviews with high and middle level civil servants in the Polish Ministry 
of the Interior, the middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament, and discussion with prominent 
Polish MP, October / November 2005 and interviews with a member of the Polish Institute for 
International Affairs, with high level civil servants from the PM's chancellery, with a high level civil 
servant from the President's office and with EU-experienced MPs (members of the EAQ, in Warsaw, April 
2006. 
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Neither did the Polish Parliamentarians discuss the transparency or accountability issues 
related to the decision-making models in immigration and border control policies. 
The lack of interest in using opportunities to upload any preferences at tile EU level in 
immigration policy in the Polish Parliament could partly be explained by Poland's high 
unemployment rate and its history as an emigration country. 143 (This will be analysed in 
chapter 6). However, these reasons do not explain the lack of interest in border control 
issues. This lac k of interest in exercising influence in the EU's immigration and border 
control policies does, however, raise a more general question which is, whether the Polish 
Parliament is better engaged with EU policy making in other EU policy fields, which 
perhaps, are nationally considered more important than immigration and border control 
issues. In fact, the existing literature has argued that the Polish Parliament is suffering 
from limited expertise and understanding of EU-related matters in general, which could 
perhaps better explain the lack of interest among the MPs in this area too (Lazrowski, 
2007, forthcoming; Holzhacker, 2007: 149; Gormy el aL, 2007 forthcoming). 
5.5.4. Immigration Debates in Estonian Parliament 
Similar to the Polish experience, since membership of the EU (Le from May 2004), the 
Estonian Parliament has had a limited number of debates on immigration issues. 
According to the minutes of the Estonian EAC meetings, the Committee discussed 
immigration and border control-related EU-proposals (communications, regulations and 
decisions) II times between May 2004 to May 2006). 144 Similar to the Finnish cases 
these topics have been brought for Parliamentary discussion in the context of the JHA or 
143 According to the statistics (2006), only in the UK, there are 350.000 registered Polish workers today 
(The Sunday Times, 2006): However, that relatively large number of Polish workers that have left Poland 
for a better future, affects the Polish labour market too, although it has not been considered as an EU 
immigration related problem and it has hardly been a topic of any Parliamentary debates. (This information 
is based on interviews with EU-experienced MPs (Sejin) , 
in Warsaw, in April 2006. 
144 This information is based on interviews with the clerks of the EAC and high and middle level civil 
servants from the Ministry of the Interior, in Tallinn, April 2006. The minutes of the EAC meetings can be 
found (in Estonian): http: //web. riiaikoizu. ee/enis/plsqI/protocols. form 
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the GAERC Council meetings, rather than as its own issues. 145 In addition, similar to the 
experiences of the three other NI's chosen for this research, these EU proposals brought 
for discussion have mostly been concerned with restrictive measures such as controlling 
migration flows, returning illegal immigrants and intensifying border control. 
Parallel to the Polish experiences being a full mernber of the Schengen structure is an 
important goal for Estonia, although it has not dominated the Parliamentary agenda. 146 
This could perhaps be explained by the fact that among the other EU partners there is not 
that much doubt about Estonia's capacity to control its borders because it is a small 
eastern EU country, and not a neighbouring country of any of the older EU Member 
States, as is the case with Poland. 147 
When looking at Schengen-related issues, which the EAC has considered, the emphasis 
was on procedures (i. e. when Estonia can join Schengen). However, most MPs found it 
politically more important to debate the Border Treaty it, ith Russia, 148 in the Committee 
and in this context some MPs, who did not like the draft Treaty as proposed, expressed 
their hopes that the EU would press Russia to make certain changes to the Treaty. 149 
This is because the relationship with Russia is a highly important national issue for 
Estonia. This led to an observation that differentiates Estonia from Poland, that is, tile 
EAC debates have often touched on the Russian speaking minority issue, which is a 
sensitive domestic rather than EU immigration matter. However, this minority issue has 
implications for immigration policies. It relates to citizenship questions, labour market 
access and the rights and duties of third country nationals. (These connections are 
145 This information is based on interviews with the clerks of the EAC in Tallinn, April 2006. The minutes 
of the EAC meetings can be found (in Estonian): littp: Hweb. ri igi ko gu. ee/em s/p I sq I/p rotocol s. form 
146 This information is based on interviews with the clerks of the EAC and high and middle level civil 
servants from the Ministry of the Interior, in Tallinn, April 2006. 
147 An other reason to explain the reason why this question has not been as important as in Poland could be 
trust: Estonia has been rated as the least corrupt post-communist country, and according to a study by 
Transparency International from 2000 -2005, Estonia was significantly less corrupt than a number of older 147 EU member states (http:.. -"/'ývww. wni.. ec.,, *'eiie., "etiro. f'kat-' 314/8.19.1itinl). This could indicate that Estonia's 
border control is also functioning according to EU standards. 
14' According to the interviews in the Estonian Parliament (MPs and clerks of the EAC), Estonia and Russia 
have some unsolved border issues which have been on the negotiation table for several years, in Tallinn, 
A01 2006. 
" This information is based on interviews with the clerks of the EAC and high and middle level civil 
servants from the Ministry of the Interior, and with prominent MPs in Tallinn, April 2006. 
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explained in chapter 6). It can be argued that this minority issue has increased the interest 
among the MPs in EU legislation on immigration related issues. This means that 
Parliamentarians have learnt how far EU legislation can lead in certain cases (as the 
example of third country nationals in chapter 6 Nvill show). This is an important 
observation because similar to the Polish experience, the common EU immigration policy 
has not been considered an important issue so far in Estonia. ' 50 
The establishment of the European Agency for the management of operational 
cooperation at the external borders (FRONTEX) was primarily dealt with at the 
Governmental level as was also the case in Finland and Poland. 15 1 The EAC considered it 
once, as part of a JHA Council meeting agenda point. 152 The FRONTEX issue raised a 
few questions, such as what the functions of the Agency were, by whom would the 
external border be controlled and where the Agency would be located. ' 53 However, 
questions were not raised about personal information exchange among the Member 
States, which was the main concern in the UK. Further, the Parliament did not add or 
required any change to the Government's position in this case. 
To conclude, the lack of interest in EU immigration issues can be clearly observed from 
Estonian Parliamentary debates. Similar to the Polish case, the same EU proposals that 
raised a high/middle level concern in the British and Finnish Parliaments did not raise 
any debate in the Estonian Parliament. The empirical evidence suggests that the Estonian 
Parliament has not exercised its opportunities to upload many of its interests in this policy 
field. Further the findings suggest, similar to the Polish experience, that there has not 
been so far particular national interests in immigration-related issues that needed to be 
brought to the EU level. This is because Estonia has also adopted a very restrictive policy 
towards the entry of immigrants and asylurn-seekers, very similar to many older EU 
150 This information is based on interviews with the clerks of the EAC and high and middle level civil 
servants from the Ministry of the Interior, and with prominent MPS from the EAC in Tallinn, April 2006 
15 1 This information is based on interviews with the clerks of the EAC and high and middle level civil 
servants from the Ministry of the Interior, in Tallinn, April 2006. The minute of this EAC meeting can be 
found ( in Estonian) http: //web. riii! ikouu. ee/ems/saros-bin/mgetdoc? itemid=051020001&1ogin=r)ro 
152 See the previous footnote above. 
153 See the previous footnote above. 
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member states. 154 Apart from the large Russian speaking minority (which is often 
psychologically related to the immigration issue in Estonia), Estonia has not received 
many applications from asylum-seekers or immigrants wishing to come to Estonia. In 
addition, Estonia is still a relatively poor EU state, which also impacts on attracting 
immigrants. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at how the NPs in the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia have 
sought to influence the EU policy process, first by examining to what extent Parliaments 
have institutional opportunities to influence EU policy making and second, as how they 
have made use of these opportunities, It argued that the institutional structures for 
Parliaments in the four countries under consideration offer opportunities for influencing 
effectively the EU policy process. However, the evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that the NPs have used these opportunities only to a limited extent in 
immigration and border control issues. A concrete example of this 'limited' interest of 
national Parliaments in influencing the EU policy process, was their reactions towards the 
EU's Green Paper on Economic Migration: none of the four Parliaments under 
consideration (except the House of Lords in the UK) exercised their opportunities for 
dii-ect influence (i. e. providing their own reply to the EU Commission) or indil-ect 
influence (i. e. to add some input to the opinion prepared by their Governments). Further, 
this chapter found more evidence that the four NPs were reasonably satisfied with their 
limited agenda-setting power by looking at whether the NPs have been more active in 
uploading their preferences to any other immigration or border control questions. Again, 
apart from the House of Lords, this chapter observed that the questions considered by tile 
-NPs in the immigration field were relatively similar in the UK, Finland, Poland and 
Estonia. In this sense, there was not much difference to be found between 'older' and 
'newer' EU member states. Apart from the House of Lords, the NPs did not challenge the 
Governments' positions in this policy field. 
154 This information is based on interviews with the clerks of the EAC and high and middle level civil 
servants from the Ministry of the Interior, and with prominent MPS from the EAC in Tallinn, April 2006. 
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However, when examining the context of these above mentioned debates in tile four NPs, 
the emphasis was different in the UK and in Finland compared to Poland and Estonia: in 
particular the UK Parliament (both Houses) was concerned about how the privacy of 
member state individuals was to be guaranteed when considering further cooperation in 
immigration and border control matters at the EU level. The Finnish Parliaments had 
similar concerns but it was also concerned about the transparency and accountability of 
immigration and border control cooperation that takes place at the intergovernmental 
level. These debates were not found to have taken place in the Polish or Estonian 
Parliaments. The evidence represented in this chapter suggest that tile process of 
Europeanization has had a great impact on the ways in which the four NPs have 
established their ways to participate in the EU policy process. 
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Chapter 6. National Parliaments and their 'downloading' Role in the 
EU Policy Process in Field of JHA 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to look at the 'downloading' dimension of 
Europeanization in immigration related issues' in the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia. 
This chapter will examine the in-ipact of the EU on these four Member States and more 
specifically, the impact of European immigration policy on the domestic institutions, 
practices, policies and policy structures, and how that process took place and what role, if 
any, the National Parliaments (NPs) have had in that process. 
This chapter will first argue that the EU's 'downloading' dimension is not always easy to 
be separated from the 'uploading' dimension, in particular in the cases where the NPs 
have had a rather modest role in fon-ning EU policy, as chapter 5 demonstrated. In 
addition, the 'downloading' effect has not always been straightforward. Often the NPs 
have downloaded policies not particularly thinking that they were 'EU policies'. Insome 
other cases national resistance to 'downloading' certain EU policies can be a result of 
other reasons than the EU resistance, such as historical or geopolitical realities. The 
second argument for this chapter is that the EU's rapidly growing JHA agenda has 
influenced Poland and Estonia2 more than the UK or Finland, but the role taken by 
Parliaments is limited in each of the countries chosen for this comparison. 
1 The purpose of this thesis was analyse immigration questions, but soon it became clear that for 
interviewees tile questions 'immigration' and 'asylum' are the same. In addition, lot's of literature deals 
with the immigration questions together with the asylum issues. Based oil these reason, this research does 
consider 'immigration and asylum policy' together. 
2 The timeframe for examining the 'downloading' effect of immigration policies (i. e. tile changes in the 
immigration and asylum field) is longer than the actual EU membership in the cases of Finland, Poland and 
Estonia for several reasons. As explained in chapter 3, the EU's JHA policy field was first created by the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993 but by that time only the UK, from the countries chosen for this comparative 
study, was a member of tile EU. As this chapter will demonstrate, however, EU influence did not stop with 
existing members but reached the surrounding states as well. In addition, in 1993 Finland was already 
negotiating its accession to tile EU and became a member in 1995. Poland and Estonia made their EU 
applications a few years later, but they clearly had expressed their wish to be members of tile EU as soon 
the Communist regimes fell. In order to be considered as a potential candidate they started to make 
significant changes to their national structures to fulfil the EU membership criteria. For these reasons the 
'downloading' of EU policies started in Poland and Eýtorlia long before their actual membership began. 
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6.1. Identification of the 'Downloading' Dimension 
'Downloading' is understood here as the impact of the EU on Member States and their 
domestic institutions, practices and policies and how European policies are incorporated 
into national policy structures (136rzel, 2005: 63; Radaelli, 2006: 59). This means. that the 
EU's impact will be looked at from the perspective that stresses the hierarchical 
relationship between the EU and its Member States by emphasising the top-down 
dynamics (Dyson and Goetz: 2003: 15). With this approach, Europeanization is usually 
linked to coercive pressures, but as argued in chapter 2, the nature of this relationship 
itself is changing because new forins of policy-making and governance have emerged in 
the EU context (Dyson and Goetz: 2003: 15). These new forms, such as the 'open- 
method of coordination' have provided opportunities for learning and socialising arriong 
the Member States. These new forins of EU policy-inaking are supplementing traditional 
instruments, those with more coercive character. This is particularly true in the field of 
JHA, where policy plans without legally binding effects are common as the example of 
the Green Paper on Economic Migration in chapter 5 showed. 
At the practical level, 'downloading' means that once policies are negotiated and agreed 
at EU level, they have to be made legitimate within the Member States (Wallace, 2005: 
33). There are various ways how that happens but this is the main link between NPs and 
'downloading' perspective of Europeanization. However, before EU policies become 
binding they need to be absorbed into the 'normal' procedure and mindsets of domestic 
policy-making, which needs more than just ratification of a Treaty or implementing a 
Directive (Wallace, 2005: 33). At this stage, there could be a significant variation among 
the Member States as to how 'downloading' occurs and to what extent different political 
actors participate in that process at the national level and how smoothly the processes 
develop. This chapter aims to look at these processes in the UK, Finland, Poland and 
Estonia in the immigration field. 
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6.2. The UK and the 'Downloading' Dimension 
The existing Europeanization literature (chapter 2) has suggested that historical reasons 
forjoining the EU are important when analysing ho%v 'downloading' has taken place in 
the particular EU state and the role which Parliament has played in this process. 3 Forthe 
UK the reasons for applying for membership of the EC in 1961 were both economic and 
political (Armstrong and Bulmer, 2001: 389). The decision, which took the UK into tile 
EC in 1973, was passed by only a narrow majority and, since then, the UK's relations 
with tile EC and EU have been a matter of political controversy (Armstrong and Bulmer, 
2003: 389; Rogers and Walters, 2004: 35 1; Budge et aL, 2001: 86; Miers, 2004: 12). This 
controversial approach is still visible when looking at how the UK has responded to the 
rapid changes that have taken place in the EU's immigration and asylum policy. As an 
example, the UK has succeeded in maintaining its own policy regarding border control 
whereas other EU Member States have gone in a different direction by lifting their 
internal borders and intensifying their mutual cooperation. This section will argue that the 
EU's immigration and asylum policy have been adopted at a national level only when 
they have fitted with British national interests; and, secondly, when they have demanded 
only small changes to national laws. Parliament has had a limited role in that process, 
mainly because EU immigration is considered a highly technical issue which does not 
interest the public at large. In addition, the preparation of the EU's immigration policies 
has been dominated by the Governmental elite. Nevertheless, although being resistant to 
EU developments in general, this section will show that some elements of British 
immigration and asylum policy are Europeanized. 
6.2.1. History and Geopolitical Location 
When considering geographical position, the biggest difference compared to the other EU 
Member States is that the UK is an island. The UK has constantly used this to argue for 
its own policy regarding border control and immigration issues (Allen, 2005: 138). 
3 For instance Bulmer and Burch (see 2.5.2. ) investigated the factors that influenced the adaptation in the 
UK and in Germany and they argued that for Germany, the adaptation has been easier because it was one of 
the founding members of the EC. 
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Another difference, contrary to the other three countries chosen for this comparison, is 
that the UK has a long tradition of being a country of immigration. ' There has long been a 
regular flow of (economic) migrants to the UK which accelerated in the second half of 
the 20th century, mainly from Commonwealth countries (House of Lords, 2005c: 21). 
This practice created a British tradition of welcoming immigrant workers frorn outside 
the EU. Although the UK has moved away from this '1960s liberal and permissive 
immigration policy' in a more restrictive direction similar to other EU Member States, 
the free movement of ivoi-kei-s is not considered a great threat to the UK, contrary to most 
of the other EU Member States. An example of this different approach was tile British 
decision not to restrict the free movement of workers from new EU Member States after 
4 the 2004 enlargement. This decision raised some debate in the British Parliament before 
the 2004 enlargement took place, but it was fairly mild (Huysmans, 2006: 7). 5 This, 
however, does not mean that the UK is applying a liberal immigration policy. It means 
only that British policy is slightly less restrictive than the policies in many other EU 
, Member States regarding economic labow- immigration. 
Despite the long tradition of immigration, the British economy was performing better 
than most of its EU partners (at the time of this research 2003-2007), which means that 
the country needed a substantial labour force. In addition, the UK, at the national level, 
has developed laws and norms that regulate immigration effectively. Equally, therefore 
the UK has not been much disposed to the introduction of the common EU's immigration 
and asylum policy; especially, as British national legislation goes further than some of the 
EU proposals. An example of this is EU's proposal for economic migration (see chapter 
5) (House of Lords, 2005c: 35-38). This EU proposal includes certain issues that are 
already regulated at national level in the UK. To sum up: the British national immigration 
4 Besides the UK, only Ireland and Sweden did not restrict the access of workers from eight new EU 
Member States to their labour markets (except Malta and Cyprus)as the last enlargement (2004) took place. 
Especially in France and Germany the public was considering the Eastern enlargement as a great treat 
regarding the free movement of persons. (Huysmans, 2006: 6). 
5 The Sunday Times, 14 May 2006 had an extensive analysis of immigra 
, 
nt workers and their positive 
influence on the British economy. Nevertheless, with the 2007 enlargement; the UK Government has 
announced that it will provide workers from Bulgaria and Romania with gradual access to the United 
Kingdom's labour market p9st-Accession. In order to do so, the Government will bring forward secondary 
legislation that will place restrictions on nationals of those countries (15.11.2006) 
littp: //,, vNvNv. workingintlieuk. gov. uk/NN, orking in the-uk/enihomepage/news/announcements/2. htmI 
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practices and experiences are well developed from a national point of view and therefore 
the need to adjust to EU level policies has been rather limited. 
6.2.2 The UK's Special Legal Position Regarding the EU's Immigration and Asylum 
Although the UK has been reluctant to adopt EU developments in the field of 
immigration and asylum policy since the 1990s, British domestic policy on immigration 
and asylum has increasingly been shaped by EU developments (Drewry et al., 2004; 
Ryan, 2004). A dramatic increase in the numbers of asylum seekers in the early 1990s 
could be a major cau SC. 6 At that time it was believed in the UK that participating in the 
EU action would lead to a reduction in the level of asylum applications in the UK (Ryan, 
2004: 447). In addition, the creation at the same time of the single European market 
required the removal of internal barriers, including barriers for tile free movement of 
persons (Drewry et al., 2004: 204). Although the UK was not participating in Schengen 
cooperation, the decisions by other EU Member States to lift their internal border controls 
had indirect implications for the UK too, as will be explained later in this section. The 
main consequence of these overlapping events was that the UK could not effectively 
control its immigration and asylum policy without intensifying its participation at EU 
level. This meant that the strongest driving force for the UK's participation at EU level 
has been the desire to make other EU Member States follow British national policies 
rather than develop a common EU policy based on common EU ideas and values. The 
main actors in this policy have been the Governmental elite. Before analysing the reasons 
for this, the partial British participation in the EU's immigration and asylum field has to 
be explained. 
In this policy field the UK has negotiated two major exemptions with regard to EU 
legislation. Together with Ireland, it has a special position regarding both border control 
6 The EU faced an increased number of immigrants and asylum seekers not only from Eastern and Central 
Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain but, at the same time from developing countries; (Somalia, Sri 
Lanka, Iraq and Afýghanistan) (UNHCR, 2004: 4). In absolute terms, the UK had more asylum applications 
than any other EU state in the each of the years 2000-2002, and in 2002 was fourth of the 15 EU in 
applications by population (U`NHCR, 2004: 4-5). 
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(the Schengen Agreement) and the adoption of measures on immigration and asylum, by 
virtue of the two protocols to the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). The first enables the UK 
to retain border controls at frontiers with other Member States (House of Lords, 2005c: 
3 1). 7 The second protocol relates to the adoption of measures covered by Title IV of the 
EC Treaty (including visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free 
movement of persons). These two exceptions (later called 'opt-outs') made it possible for 
the UK to participate only partly with EU measures in immigration and border control 
questions. The main otýjective for British policy has been to retain freedom of national 
action; to retain control of over its borders and over whom it admits to the country 
(House of Lords, 2005c; Drewry el aL, 2004; Ryan, 2004). This, however, reiterates the 
point that immigration policy is understood as a domestic issue, and that decision-making 
should stay at the national level, as the debates in chapter 5 demonstrated. Further, this 
section will illustrate that this partial 'downloading' policy has not been challenged by 
the House of Commons, but has been, a number of times in the House of Lords. 8 
6.2.3. The Role of Parliament in the EU's Immigration and Asylum Policy 
The two 'opt-outs' have given the UK an opportunity to choose in which proposals to 
participate. In practice, this has meant that the UK has been able to avoid 'downloading' 
most of those EU measures that would have caused resistance in Parliament (or which 
were not consistent with British domestic legislation) simply by not participating in those 
EU issues. Therefore, the main discussions and debates in the Parliament have taken 
place when considering whelhei- to pai-ficipale in any EU measure, and in this sense the 
7 According to this protocol the UK may take part in some or all. the arrangements under the Schengen 
acquis after a unanimous vote in the EU Council (Drewry el aL, 2004: 207). This however, means that 
Schengen countries have no duty to accept the UK's participation, the case of FRONTEX being an example 
this (chapter 5) (The House of Lords, 2005c: 3 1). 
" This information is based on interviews with the clerk of the European Scrutiny Committee in the House 
of Commons and with the clerk of Lords Select Committee on the EU, the Sub Committee F (home 
Affairs) in London, January 2006 and these information was supplemented through e-mail correspondence 
during the spring/summer2006 and b analysing the debates in the House of Commons Standing 0y Committee 2002-2006. These debates are to be found: 
http//: www. ptiblications. Parliament. uk/p, Vldl99900/ldhansrd/pdvn/i.... 
and by looking at House of Lords (2005c), 14'h, Report of Session 2005-2006, HL paper 58 and House of 
Lords, (2006a) 32nd Report of Session 2005-2006, HL, paper 166. 
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House of Commons has so far not challenged Government's policy not to 'opt-in'. 9 This 
is because most Parliamentarians prefer not to give the impression that they are pro- 
European, as they know their constituents tend to be anti-Brussels. 10 The Directive on tile 
admission -and residence of third country nationals (2003/109/EC) is an excellent 
example of the British practice not to participate in EU level action. " The UK has 
consistently used its 'opt-out' policy in this important area of EU-level action since the 
coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (House of Lords, 2005c: 3 1; Ryan, 2004: 
440). From this practice one could expect that British domestic policy in this question 
differs greatly from other EU Member States; however, that is not the case. On the 
contrary, British family reunification law goes further than the EU directive's 
requirements. 12 But the main objective for this policy has been again that in the UK, 
family reunification is regarded as a matter of domestic law rather that part of EU 
PoliCY. 13 In addition, this practice demonstrated the UK's reluctance to create legal rights 
of admission for third country nationals who are residents in other EU Member States 
(Ryan, 2004: 440). The debates in the House of Commons showed that MPs share the 
same attitudes as the Governmental elite in these questions. 14 These abovementioned 
examples of British decisions not to participate in EU proposals showed that there have 
9 This information is based on interviews with the clerk of the European Scrutiny Committee in the House 
of Commons and with the clerk of Lords Select Committee on the EU, the Sub Committee F (home 
Affairs) in London, January 2006 and this information has been suppleme , nted 
through e-mail 
correspondence during the spring/summer 2006 and b analysing the debates in the House of Commons y 
Standing Committee 2002-2006. These debates are to be found: 
httpH: wNvw. publications. Parliament. uk/pa/ldl 99900/ldhansrd/pdvn/I.... 
10 This information is based on interviews with the clerk of the European Scrutiny Committee in the 
House of Commons and with the clerk of Lords Select Committee on the EU, the Sub Committee F (home 
Affairs) in London, January 2006 and the information has been supplemented through e-mail 
correspondence during the spring/summer 2006 and analysing the debates in the House of Commons 
Standing Committee 2002-2006. These debates are to be found 
http//: www. publications. Parliament. uk/pa/ldl 99900/ldhansrd/pdvn/i... 
11 EU Council (2003a) Directive 2003/109 concerning the status of third country nationals who are long- 
term residents. OJ L 16 2004. 
12 EU Council (2003b) Council directive on the Right of Family Reunification, OJ 2003 L 251/12 
compared to para 177 Immigration Rules (Nvww. homeoffice. gov. uk. 
13 This information is based on interviews with members of the Commons EAC (MPs) and the clerk of the 
European Affairs Committee in the House of Commons, in March, 2006 in London. In addition, the 
information is based by analysing debates from the House of Common's Standing Committees 2002-2006: 
littp//: %v%vw. publications. Parliament. uk/pa/ldI 99900/ldhansrd/pdvn/I.... 
14 This information is based on interviews with members of the Commons EAC (MPs) and the clerk of the 
European Affairs Committee in the House of Commons, in March, 2006 in London. In addition, the 
argument is based on examining debates in the House of Common's Standing Committees 2002-2006 
which are to be found: http//: NvNvNv. publications. Parliament. uk/pa/ldl99900/ldhansrd/pdvn/l.... 
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been no major changes regarding British 'opt-out policy' (which was negotiated by the 
Conservative Government led by Major) under Labour (Blair's) Governments since 
1997. This is a strong indication of the fact that political party differences are not 
significant when considering British participation in the EU immigration field. 
An additional advantage of the British 'opt-in/out'. policy has been that the Government 
can 'test' the level of possible resistance at national level before deciding whether to 'opt- 
in' to certain EU policies and therefore the effects of 'downloading' a certain EU 
measure are well known beforehand and possibly debated in Parliament. It can be argued 
that, with this practice, the role of the British Parliament in 'downloading' EU policies 
does not differ much from its role in uploading national preferences at the EU level 
(chapter 5). The Parliamentary debates between years 2003-2006 in the House of 
Commons clearly illustrated that in the House of Commons the incorporation of EU 
policies into domestic process rests, to a great extent, in the hands of the Governmental 
elite and MPs (in the Commons) are not keen to challenge that practice. 
On the other hand, the House of Lords (its European Union Committee and its Sub- 
Committees) has been effective in provoking debates on the EU's immigration issues at 
the domestic level, for instance, by questioning whether the UK's policies on these issues 
are adequate or appropriate for the 2 I't century or how to better coordinate UK policies 
with those across the EU (Drewry et aL, 2004: 211). The Lords have constantly criticised 
British policy, stating that tile UK's influence in shaping EU policy is reduced by the fact 
that it does not participate enough in the policy (House of Lords, 2005a; 2006a). It can be 
concluded that tile activities of the H. puse of Lords in the EU's immigration field 
guarantees, to a certain extent, that the UK Parliament, as a whole, is aware of EU 
impacts when deciding whether to 'opt-in' to any EU measures. 
6.2.4. The EU Measures in which the UK has Participated 
As mentioned earlier, ' the UK is not covered by the EU (Schengen) rules. Nevertheless, 
the UK has been considerably affected by Schengen policy, simply because of the greater 
possibility for those who wish to enter the UK irregularly to reach Channel ports, as they 
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already are in the Schengen area (Ryan, 2004: 433). The practical implication of this is 
that the UK has developed reciprocal frontier control agreements with France and 
Belgium. 15 In addition, the UK 'opted in' to a number of the EU's operational measures 
aimed at reducing irregular migration across the external EU border and to legislation 
aimed at strengthening immigration control and enforcement throughout tile 
EU/Schengen area. ' 6 Common feature for all of these measures has been to achieve a 
more i-estrictive i-egime in other EU Member States; the main aim being to reduce the 
likelihood of onward irregular migration to the UK. In most cases, the UK has 
participated in measures which did not demand major (or any) change to the national law. 
An EU Directive, such as of the status of third country nationals who are long term 
residents (2003/109), which would have demanded significant changes to the domestic 
legislation, the UK decided not to participate in. Parliament has supported participating in 
those measures that are aimed at restricting illegal entry but debates in the House of 
Commons did not demonstrate real demands from MPs to know exactly what British 
Ministers were doing on its behalf at the EU level. 17 One explanation for this lack of 
interest is expressed by the British Refugee Council, that is, that many of the UK's 
asylum and immigration-related measures are subject to minimal scrutiny and 
accountability. ' 8 This is because they are partly implemented outside state territory, or 
'privatised' by being delegated to airlines and ot . her carriers. 19 This also indicates that 
MPs do not always have the most current information about the UK's position in 
negotiations at EU level. Therefore this means that they are less influential. 
As this section has demonstrated, Parliament has supported the Government to a great 
extent in its EU policies in this policy field . 
20 This does not however, mean that the 
15 (http: i'. I%vww. iiid. lioincoffice. ý,, ov. tjk, iiidý'ený-honief I aws-pol icy/Consul tat i on-document s. -'Cl osed- 
consu I tat ions. NI ai ncontent. 0085.111 eA ni i)---j U xt-Vroces-S-re, 101`0 
16 
such as developin ,g visa and residence permits, 
developing criminal penalties for those who intentionally 
assist third country nationals to enter or transit illegally across EU territory and to measures regulating 
trafficking in human beings (Ryan, 2004: 440). 
17 See the debates in the House of Common's Standing Committees 2002-2006: 
httpH: wxv%v. publications. Parlianient. uk/pa/lýl 99900/ldhansrd/pdvn/I.... 
18 Double (2004) has expressed strong criticism about the general possibilities of the member of the House 
of Commons to scrutiny implementation of EU legislation (Double, 2004: 8 1). 
19 Qittp: //wwNY. re Fu geecounci 1. ore., "ut,, "pol i cy/respoiises., "2006.. -*etiasvI u ni pol i cv. 11 tin. ) 
20 This information is based on interviews with the clerk of the European Scrutiny Committee in the House 
of Commons and with the clerk of Lords Select Committee on the EU, the Sub Committee F (home 
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Parliament did not have the instruments to make the Government change its policies. For 
instance, Parliament could have delayed the national 'downloading' process, by 
protesting against the Government's legislative act although this has, particularly in the 
field of immigration, never happened so far. 21 Further, in the case of a major EU 
instrument which needs primary legislation (e. g. the 1995 Data Protection Directive 
which needed the Data Protection Act 1998), there. is ample opportunity for the tabling of 
amendments, which if carried, could in theory, prevent full implementation of EU 
legislation (Double, 2004: 81). In practice, however, at the end of the process the 
Government has to vote down such amendments, since otherwise it would be in breach of 
its EU obligations, and ultimately subject to proceedings in the ECJ if the EU feels the 
directive has not been fully implemented. 22 To sum up, Parliament has not used either its 
political or legal instruments to make the Government change its EU policy in this policy 
field. 
6.2.5. Public Opinion and the Immigration Debates in the UK 
This section will analyse how much public opinion matters when Parliament considers 
whether to participate in EU measures in this policy field. 23 This is an important question 
Afthirs) in London, January 2006 and the infon-Dation has been supplemented through e-mail 
correspondence during the spring/summer 2006 and by analysing the debates in the House of Commons 
Standing Committee 2002-2006. These debates are to be found: 
httpH: %v%v%v. publications. Parliament. uk/pa/ldi 99900/ldhansrd. /pdvn/I.... 
21 In the UK implementing directives occasionally needs primary legislation, but is nearly always done by 
Orders under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. These Orders can be subject to 
affirmative resolution (i. e. need prior approval of both Houses of Parliament) or negative resolution (the 
Order automatically enters into force, but members of either House can try to have them voted down within 
40 days, which is called 'praying against' the Order, or Regulations, or other statutory instrument). The 
choice between an affirmative or negative instrument is the minister's. That should not be a reason for Z, delay (This information is based on interviewing the clerk of Lord's ESC, in March, 2006, in London and 
the infon-nation has been supplemented by email correspondence in July-October 2006. 
22 This information is based on interviews with the clerk of the European Scrutiny Committee in the House 
of Commons and with the clerk of Lords Select Committee on the EU, the Sub Committee F (home 
Affairs) in London, January 2006 and information data has been supplemented several times through e- 
mail correspondence during the spring/summer/ 2006 and by analysing the debates in the House of 
Commons Standing Committee 2002-2006. These debates are to be found: 
http//: %vww. publications. Parliament. uk/pa/ldl 99900/ldhansrd/pdvn/l.... 
23 This aspect could have been examined in chapter 5 as well, but in British case, the differences between 
'up-loading' and 'down-loading' perspectives are less visible due to its partial participation in EU's 
immigration field. Because of that, the role of NGO's and elite will be investigated here, especially because 
these two groups have more meaning in case of the other three countries chosen for this comparison as this 
chapter will later show 
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because immigration is a highly significant issue in British politics and it can be assumed 
that it will have implications for the 'downloading' process. However, opinions are 
24 divided on public opinion' influence in the UK in this policy field. For instance, the 
existing literature has suggested that public opinion is not the decisive factor in carrying 
the Ein-opean pi-oject on immigration field because the value of mass attitudes is in their 
capacity to be politicized by elites who can then translate them to the political agenda 
(Lahav, 2004b: 1158). But does the sarne apply to national immigi-ation policy? Several 
surveys of the British public found that immigration/asylum was considered a more 
important problern than the economy, education, drugs or Europe. 25 Moreover, more than 
half of Britons think that 'there are too many immigrants coming to the country and that 
Government's policies on immigration and asylum were not tough enough . 926 The data 
gathered in this research (see chapter 5 too) suggests that the British Parliament has not 
acted according to the skepticism and hostility expressed by the British public in surveys, 
either at the national level or at the EU level. The main explanation is that the general 
restrictionist policy stance of British Government(s) makes it less necessary for the 
Parliament to advocate such a position. However, this does not apply to the House of 
Lords, as it has constantly pushed a more pro-European and less restrictionist approach 
than the Government. 27 
The role of British immigration NGOs is also interesting, but ambivalent. 28 The interview 
data gathered for this research suggests that the NGOs in the immigration field are not an 
important source of information for members of the Commons. For instance, MPs in the 
Commons or their clerks did not mention NGOs as an important source of input 
24 ori. coni. /pol Is.. '2001"mi gyrat ion. shtmD. 
25 (Nvww. vouLYov. conV 30 th August - I" September 2006; www. in ori. conv`pol I s.,, `2006! 'st068l3. sht 1111) and 
26 (Ensor and Shah, 2005: 4; www. yougoy. com. "200630"' August -I" September 2006). 
27 The House of Lords, 2005c: 3 1; the House of Lords, 2006a: 11-12. On the other hand, it is easier for the 
House of Lords to demand policies which do not please public opinion, because the Lords do not have to 
consider about their re-election or party discipline. Therefore, they have more freedom to express their own 
ideas. 
2' Existing literature has argued that NGO activity has an important role to play in narrowing the gap 
between European citizens and EU elites since it potentially links civil society and sources of public 
engagement to decisions by policy elites (Ladrech, 2005: 318; Gray and Statham, 2005: 878). 
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information during interviews. 29 When they take evidence for their Parliamentary 
enquiries (see chapter 5), they normally invite civil servants and Ministers and very 
seldom representatives of NGOs in immigration. 30 In a similar way, the Refugee Council 
has complained that they have not been able effectively to participate in EU policy 
discussions. 31 Tile abovementioned, however, does not apply to The Lords, who consider 
the input from NGOs as very important. 32 The NGOs (especially Statewatch) draw The 
Lords' attention to matters which they think need looking at (which for example led 
directly to the Lord's report on the Heiligendamm meeting). 33 In addition, The Lords 
routinely send the NGOs calls for written evidence to which many of them reply, and 
many NGOs are regularly invited to give oral evidence. 34 According to the interviews, 
this input coming from NGOs in the immigration field is considered as valuable and 
sometimes very influential. 35 On the other hand, the immigration field is a difficult target 
for lobbying because it is a Government dominated field (Gray and Statham, 2005: 879). 
What follows is that the main target for the British immigration lobby is the Government 
29 This information is based on interviews with the clerk of the European Scrutiny Committee in the House 
of Commons and with the clerk of the Lords Select Committee on the EU, the Sub Committee F (home 
Affairs) in London, January 2006 and this information has been supplemented several times through e- 
mail correspondence during the spring/summer 2006 and by analysing the debates in the House of 
Commons Standing Committee 2002-2006. These debates are to be found: 
bttpH: %vNviv. publications. Parliament. uk/pa/ldi 99900/ldhansrd/pdvnfl.... 
30 This information is based on interviewing British prominent MPs in the House of Commons (who are 
also members of the EAC) in March, 2006 in London and their clerks. This information is supplemented 
with email correspondence with the clerks of Lords ESC (June-October, 2006). Information that supports 
these finding is found also from Gray and Statham, 2004). 
31 (lLttL)-. -*"/www. refiugeecouncii. org/uk/policy/repsonses/2006/euasylunipolicy. htm. ) 
32 This information is based on interviews with the clerk of the House of Lords (ESC) and with prominent 
members of the Lords ESC F-subcommittee in March 2006, in London. This information has been 
supplemented with email correspondence with tile clerks of ESC (June-October, 2006) 
33 House of Lords (2006b) criticiscd in their 4V' Report of Session 2005-06 'Behind Closed Doors: the 
meeting of the G6 Interior Ministers at Heiligendammm the lack of transparency surrounding the meetings. 
It highlighted that these meetings of the six most powerful EU Member States (the UK, Germany, France, 
Italy, Spain and Poland) at which ministers decide how they want to take forward EU policy on justice and 
home affairs are kept regularly. The report concluded that Parliament as well as public and other EU 
Member States, has a right to be told in detail what has been decided. However, this Report has gained 
some positive development: as the next meeting took place in the end of October in the UK, the Home 
Office published on webb a report on this meeting (littp: H%v-, vw. homeoffice. gov. uk/about-us/news/g6- 
results) 
34 This information is based on interviews with the clerk of the House of Lords (ESC) and with prominent 
members of the Lords ESC F-subcommittee in March 2006, in London. This information has been 
supplemented with email correspondence with the clerks of ESC (June-October, 2006) 
35 This information is based on interviews with the clerk of the House of Lords (ESC) and with prominent 
members of tile Lords ESC F-subcommittee in March 2006, in London. This information has been 
supplemented with email correspondence with the clerks of ESC (June-October, 2006) 
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instead of Parliament. Interview material supports this view, stating that British MPs are 
seldom contacted by the immigration lobby regarding EU policy issues. 36 Moreover, 
based on the interview data, most MPs consider immigration an especially national 
issue. 37 To sum up, though public opinion in the UK is eurosceptic and negative 
regarding EU's immigration policy, this attitude has not, to a great extent influenced 
Parliament's views. 
Another explanation for the limited role of Parliament in participating in EU policy 
making is that the immigration field in the UK is elite-led and highly institutionalized 
(Statham and Geddes, 2006: 248). The immigration elite dominate in the field and they 
-have considerable autonomy in their actions over immigration policy. It has also been 
argued that the immigration elite are insulated from populist hostility (Luedtke, 2005: 
85). On the other hand, the British immigration elite are not very pro-European as is tile 
case in some other EU Member States. 38 This means that the gap between elite and public 
opinion is perhaps not as great in the UK. The UK has consistently taken part at EU level 
in measures aimed at strengthening immigration control or proposal laying down of rules 
concerning the entry of asylum-seekers (Ryan, 2004: 453). These aims are not at odds 
with public opinion in the UK, though public opinion has been requesting more 
restrictive measures. 39 In addition, the British 'opt-outs' provide, to a great extent, 
opportunities first to look at how the EU proposal is developing at the EU level and to 
wait for reactions of the domestic public before deciding whether to participate in it or 
not. In this sense, it may be right to argue that public opinion matters to a certain extent: 
it sets down the norms, or the 'rules of the game' by which elites must structure their 
discourse (Lahav, 2004b: 1158). 
16 This information is based on interviewing British prominent NIPs in the House of Commons (who are 0 
also members of EAC) in March, in London. Similar information is found also from Gray and Statham, 
2004 
. 37 fhý is information is based on interviews in London, February, 2006, with members of Lords Select 
Committee on the EU, the Sub Committee F (home Affairs) and with the clerk of the European Scrutiny 
Committee in the House of Commons and with prominent MPs of ESC in the House of Commons in 
March 2006. Also same kind of conclusions has been expressed by existing literature (Ryan, 2004; 
Statham and Geddes, 2006) 
38 The followin 
*g sections will explain 
how the elite is very pro European in Finland, Poland and Estonia. 
39 (http:.,, '., "wývw., iloi-i. coni., polls.,, "2003. -"init-, ralioii. stitmI and littp:.! iw%v%v. mori. coiTi! "polls/2006 30"' August - I" 
September; littp: i., wNvw. ic-, ir. orQ. uk; ")Ii(i=5024). 
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Another interesting, but ambivalent question is to what extent party politics matter for EU 
immigration policies. It has been argued that during the period of Conservative power 
-(1990-1997) Governmental actors held a decisively more restrictionist position than 
during Labour Governments (1997-2004) (Statham and Geddes, 2006: 254). This might 
be true at national level, but when comparing the British action at EU level, there have 
not been major changes in the UK's approach even after the change of Government in 
1997. The British 'opt-outs' were negotiated during the Conservative Government, but 
they were accepted by the Labour Government. In addition, recent surveys support that 
argument by stating that over 50% of respondents do not think that any of the political 
parties have 'good policies on asylum and immigration 1). 40 Another argument which 
suggests that party differences are not decisive in the UK when considering its 
immigration policies at the EU level, is that the UK has only opted in to EU measures 
which fit British domestic needs and in this sense party differences are not significant. 
To sum up: the evidence suggest that the House of Commons has shared the same 
concern as the Government regarding irregular immigration and 'rooting out' abuse in the 
UK's immigration system. 41 British policy-making in this field has been contextualized 
against security needs. The 'downloading' of IEU policies has not created significant 
resistance in the UK Parliament because EU legislation in the immigration field is only 
partly binding on the UK and therefore the UK has been able to choose inmost cases in 
which EU activities to participate.. In this sense, this section suggests that British 
immigration or border control issues have not been changed to a great extent due the EU, 
but they have been influenced by the EU. Parliament has not played a significant role 
either by trying to delay the 'downloading' of EU policies or by channelling public 
opinion in these matters. The leading role has been in the hands of the immigration elite. 
40 lpsos MORI political survey asked on September 2003, September 2004, April 2005 and Auoust 2006 0 'which party had best policies on asylum and immigration'. They surveys stated that 2003 49% present said 
none, 2004,52% said none, on 2005 (election year) 6% said none, and 27% said 'don't now' and 2006 52% 
said none. Among the parties the Conservatives had small lead (12%, 7%, 18%, 5%). 
(littp: 4, -'Ný. -v%. w. mori. coin.! 'polls.. -'-1003! jiiieration. slitinI 1 
41 This information is based on debates in the House of Commons on immigration and border control issues 
between 2003-2006 (littpH: xv-%v%v. publ i cat ions. Parl i ament. uk/pa/i dI 99900/ldhansrd/p d vn/I.... ) and on 
literature: Ensor and Shah, 2005: 2) 
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The main driving force for the UK in participating in the EU's immigration and asylum 
policy has been a desire to make other EU Member States restrict their policies in order 
that the flow of (illegal) immigration would be prevented more effectively before 
reaching the UK. This last observation demonstrates how difficult it is at the practical 
level to separate 'uploading' and 'downloading' dimensions, although as demonstrated in 
chapter 5 the UK Parliament has not been actively 'uploading' its preferences to tile EU 
level. 
6.3, Finland and the 'Downloading' Dimension 
In Finland, EU membership was considered both in economic and geopolitical terms 
(Egeberg, 2005: 190). At the time of application for EU membership in 1992, there 
existed a strong consensus in society that EU membership would benefit Finland. 
Contrary to the UK, all the major political elites, including party and interest 
organizations were in favour of EU membership (Tiilikainen, 2003: 150; Egeberg, 2005: 
203). It is assumed that the strong support for EU membership facilitated the 
'downloading' aspects of EU regulations, norms and practices in general. In addition, 
Finland did not have any major difficulties in adoptingthe EU's securitized immigration 
and asylum policy because Finland has not attracted immigrants or asylum-seekers to a 
great extent. The limited number of immigrants means that the debate on immigration has 
not been politically salient issue so far. 42 
6.3.1. Historical Background - Country of Emigration 
Finland was a fairly closed society until the 1990s with a small number of foreign 
residents and undeveloped immigration infrastructures. This background has implications 
for the development of its immigration policy. Different from the UK, Finland has a long 
42 This information is based on interviewing prominent MPs in the Finnish Parliament ( August-October 
2006 in Helsinki and in MPs (members of The Grand Committee in their trip to Warsaw (in April 2006) 
and high level civil servants in the Ministry of the Interior, in August 2006 in Helsinki. 
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-tradition of emigration. 43 It was only at the start of the I 990s that Finland started to 
attract immigrants due to refugee problems at the European and global levels at that time 
(UNHCR, 2004; 4). However, compared to many other European countries, especially to 
the UK, the number of immigrants was still low in Finland, partly because of the strict 
Government policies but also because of the peripheral location of Finland; Finland is out 
of tile main immigration routes (Salmenhaara, 2003: 1) 
Since the beginning of the 1990s the public debate on immigration has focused mainly on 
some more or less populist issues such as the abuse of the welfare benefit system by 
asylum-seekers (ECRI, 200): 17). The Parliament did not play an active role in these 
public debates. Most of the debates on EU immigration issues in Parliament in the late 
1990s were related to other, more national issues such as labOUr matters, as explained in 
chapter 5.44 Further, until the late 1990s both the Finnish immigration elite and the 
Parliament had a fairly restricted view on EU cooperation in border control and 
immigration issues in general: Finland did not support EU suggestions of 'burden 
sharing' in immigration/asylum questions nor did it support 'joint operations' in border 
control questions at the EU level. However, as explained later in this section, this 
restrictive attitude among the immigration elite and Parliament changed in the late 
1990S. 45 The lack of political interest and the small number of immigrants partly explains 
why there has been no resistance to the adoption of the EU's immigration and asylum 
policy, which is characterized by a securitizing approach in Finland. The other part of 
explanation is that it has been less dernanding to download the policies from the EU than 
to develop a national strategy based on Finnish needs, in particular as Finnish 
43 The major migration streams went mainly to the North America in early 1930's and to Sweden since the 
World War 11 (Koivukangas, 2003: 3). The main reasons for emigration were the over-supply of domestic 
labour and lo%v living standards (Salmenhaara, 2005: 1). 
4-1 This information is based on interviewing MPs (who are also members of the Grand Committee) on their 
trip to Warsaw, in April 2006. 
45 This information is based an interviewing a prominent MP in March 2003 and October 2006, in Helsinki 
and on interviewing MPs (who are also members of the Grand Committee) on their trip to Warsaw, in April 
2006. 
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immigration and asylum laws were restrictive even before entering the EU. This means 
46 
that there were no major changes after becoming members of the EU . 
6.3.2. Pro-, European Policy - The Role of the Immigration Elite 
The role of the Governmental elite is strong in forming Finnish EU policy ill immigration 
. 
matters, but d ifferent from the UK, the Finn ish immigration elite are pro-European. At 
the practical level most EU policy making is made in the absence of public debate. This 
is not purely a Finnish issue but a general trend in the JHA policy field (see chapter 3). 
In the Finnish case, however, it matters more because (as explained in chapter 4 and 5), 
the EU Affairs Committee in the Parliament debates and makes decisions behind closed 
doors, which makes it even more challenging for the public to follow Finnish policy 
making in this field. Further, this secrecy also strengthens the role of the elite. Tile role of 
NGOs or civil society has traditionally been relatively limited and particularly in this 
policy field. 47 This is partly because the Finnish Parliament has not, so far, actively 
developed channels for a regular dialogue with NGOs in the immigration field. 48 The 
links to NGOs have been considered as the responsibility of the Government, which has 
more regular contact with NGOs in general. However, this will not increase their input in 
to the Parliament (Raunio, 2007: forthcoming). As the empirical examples in chapter 5 
showed, the input from the NGO sector to the Finnish Parliament is not effectively 
utilised in the immigration field. 49 However, the interview material suggests that there are 
some differences between the parties in how they value dialogue with the civil society 
and NGOs. For example, the Green Party has developed more cooperation with NGOs in 
the immigration field than the other parties. Further, the Special Committees which are 
46 This information is based on interviews with high level civil servant from the Ministry of the Interior, 
August 2006, with prominent NIPs in April-August 2006 and with the clerk of Grand Committee, in April- 
August, 2006, in Helsinki. 
47 This information is based on interviews with prominent MPs in April-August 2006 and with the clerk of 
the Grand Committee, in April-August, 2006, in Helsinki. 
48 This information is based on interviews with high level civil servant from Finnish Ministry of the 
Interior, August 2006, with prominent MPs in April-August 2006 and with the clerk of the Grand 
Committee, in April-August, ý2006, in Helsinki. 
49 This information is based on interviews with prominent NIPs in April-August 2006, and interviews with 
high level civil servants from the Ministry of the Interior in August 2006 and with the clerks of the Grand 0 
Committee, March 2003 and in April-August, 2006, in Helsinki. 
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chaired by the Green Party are taking evidence and integrating the immigration NGOs in 
their Parliamentary work . 
50 This also applies to some Parliamentarians from other parties 
who have previously been elected to the EP and who have learned to use the NGOs and 
civil society as a valuable information source. 5 1 Nevertheless, at the general level the 
input to the Finnish Parliament from the NGO sector on immigration questions is still 
limited and is concentrated on personal contacts between MPs and representatives of 
NGOS. 52 
The Finnish immigration elite are divided into two different 'elite' groups with partly 
different EU 'agendas'. On the one hand, the business and economic organisations are in 
favour of increasing labour immigration into Finland to secure national competitiveness 
and the supply of labour in the. future (Conference of Finnish Industries, 2006: 1-2). The 
Ministry of Labour, which is responsible for labour immigration supports this more 
liberal view driven by the Finnish economic lobby. On the other hand, the Ministry of the 
Interior, which is the other Ministry responsible for these questions 53 represents the other 
EU elite, by driving a strict, security-based policy, where the main weight is on 
preventing illegal immigration and securitizing borders. The Parliament has taken a 
passive role between these two elites. 
The main driving force for both elites, in their European politics, has been the 
compatibility of Finnish policies with EU policies in this field. For example, the new 
Finnish immigration policy programme (from the Ministry of Labour), which was 
presented to the Parliament in June 2006, shows that the main driving force behind this 
50 This information is based on interviewing Finnish MPs between in March, 2003, between April-October 
2006 in Warsaw (as the Grand Committee was in its trip in Warsaw) and in Helsinki in August-October. In 
addition, 2 MPs submitted email answers to the interview questions, October. /November 2005 (see the 
a pendix for the questions asked). 
5 
PThis 
information is based on interviews with prominent MPs in April-August 2006, two of them being 
previously Finnish MEPs in the EP and interviews with the clerk of the Grand Committee, in April-August, 
2006, in Helsinki. 
52 According to interviews, the NGOs in this policy field have brought to MPs knowledge practical 
problems in individual cases that exist in implementing EU policies at the national level. An example is 
treatment of asylum-seekers at the local levels, which has not always done according the laws and 
international Conventions. 
53 The Finnish Foreign Ministry is partly involved with these questions as well. 
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policy programme was the EU. 54 It states that 'national immigration policy cannot be 
planned strictly from the national point of view; instead, it must fit the international 
context. 'The main context today for Finland is the European Union'. 55 This approach 
differs greatly from the British starting point, which emphasized the national point of 
view. An example of Parliaments' low level of interest in participating in the EU policy 
process in Finland (either by uploading or 'downloading'), is that this programme did not 
actually produce any discussion in the Parliament. It was approved without any changes 
or recommendations at the Special Committee. 56 
Another example of the Finnish pro-European elite's approach (although different from 
the previous one) is the behaviour of the Ministry of the Interior, which has had a 
stronger role than the Ministry of the Labour in forming Finnish EU policy. The 
emphasis has been on security elements, which are compatible with the EUs JHA 
priorities. 57 A recent example of its pro-European agenda (the securitized approach) was 
the aims expressed for the Finnish EU Presidency (2006) programme, which highlighted 
the fight against illegal immigration and human trafficking, the enhancement of 
cooperation and exchange of information among law enforcement authorities, and the 
improvement of cooperation between tile EU and Russia. A further objective was to 
develop the EUs external border controls. 58 They did not say much about developing 
greater opportunities for labour immigrants or protecting asylum-seekers, as these have 
. not traditionally 
been interesting issues for the Ministry of the Interior. In fact, neither of 
these abovementioned issues has been amongst the ones where the EU achievements 
have been the greatest (see chapter 3) and in this respect the Finnish approach made no 
exception. 
The change in Finnish EU immigration policy from passive to euro- enthusiastic among 
the elite took place in the late 1990s, in parallel with the changes at the EU level as the 
54 %vww. iiiol. fi. iitilkiistit/iiiiiiiip-ration policy programme 2005: 1. 
55 w%vw. inol. fi/julkaisut., "itniniý,, ratioii policy ýrogramme 2005: 7. 
56 The immigration programme produced by the Ministry of the Labour, was debated at the Special 
Committee responsible for immigration questions on May 2006: HaVL 19/2006 vp-MINS 1/2006 vp. 
These documents are (in Finnish) published: http: //,. vww. edtisktjilta. fi., "Iausunnot ja mietinn6t 
57 wwwAnterminju'EU presidenc ., 58 wwwJntermin. fl: 'FIJ presidency. 
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JHA field became one of the most politically salient (Grabbe, 2006). At that time Finland 
held its first EU Presidency (1999). The border control question was an issue where 
Finland was more advanced than other EU partners; and further, this issue was highly 
important because the EU was preparing its eastern enlargement. The culmination of 
change of thinking in the EU's immigration questions in Finland can be traced to the 
Tampere JHA Council in September 1999.59 Since then Finland has actively participated 
in different forms of cooperation in border control issues and against illegal immigration. 
In this respect, the Parliament also revised its restrictive view of enhanced cooperation in 
questions of the EU's external borders, and since the late 1990s, it has approved the 
Government's enthusiastic view driven strongly by the Ministry of the Interior. 60 Except 
for a few individual MPs and one particular Special Committee, which is chaired for the 
time being by an opposition party member, there have hardly been any critical views 
expressed by MPs towards the Finnish Government. 6' Nevertheless, it can be argued that 
the elite from the Ministry of the Interior have clearly dominated this policy field by 
concentrating on security issues, which is also the current trend at the EU level. The 
Parliament has incrementally adopted this change in 'the ways of doing things'. 
However, this division amongst elites has not undermined the national adaptation process 
because both elites are Pro-European. Further, Parliament has not tried to play an 
independent role in this process. For instance, t lie Finnish Alien Act was prepared by 
'keeping an eye on' the preparation of EU directives. The Act was subsequently approved 
59 This information is based on interviewing prominent MPs (who are members of the Grand Committee, 
and who have been loncy members of the Finnish Parliament and also with the clerk of the Grand 
Committee between April 2006 and October 2006. This information is supplemented by looking at the 
issues which the Finnish Parliament has considered between 1998- 2006. The change of emphasis can be 
also seen from the number of the documents. (the statistics are to be found in Finnish: w-, %, -w. cduskunta. fi. -' 
tilastot 
-59 This information is based on interviewing prominent MPs (who are members of the Grand Committee, 
and members of the Special Committees responsible for these issues in May- October 2006. 
60 This information is based on interviewing prominent MPs (who are members of the Grand Committee, 
and members of the Special Committees responsible for these issues in May- October 2006) in Helsinki. 
61 Only the Law Committee has recently criticised in its reports the dominance of the Ministry of the 
Interior in the ways in which it has prepared the EU policy in immigration related issues. For instance, the 
committee criticised Finland's accession to the PrUm Treaty which was done without infon-ning the 
Parliament of this Treaty. This information is based on interviewing prominent MPs (who are members of 
the Grand Committee, and members of the Special Committees responsible for these issues in May- 
October 2006 in Helsinki /in phone/ in emails (see the appendix of interview list for full information). The 
critical view of Law Committee can be also seen from its report on Prflm Treaty: LaVL 4/2006 vp- E- 
97/2005vp and from HaVI 23/2004 vp. These documents are to be found (in Finnish) from: 
http: //w%v-, v. eduskunta. fi/ lausunnotja mictinn6t. 
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by Parliament. 6 '-' This Act from 2004 raised only limited discussions among MPs. The 
discussions focused mainly on how to accelerate the procedures for removing non- 
detained asylum seekers and how to identify the categorizations for countries which are 
considered-as 'safe'. Only one MP criticized the way the Ministry of the Interior had 
prepared this particular Act by complaining that there was not enough time given for 
Parliament to study all the issues. That kind of critique (to the Ministry of the Interior) 
has been expressed only occasionally in the Parliament. 63 As explained in chapter 5, the 
Finnish system, which keeps all the EU preparations in Parliament behind closed doors, 
effectively limits the possibilities for analysing these debates. This means that critical 
views, if existing among MPs, are not channeled to the public. 
The way that Finnish national policy adopts EU policies in advaiwe means that most of 
the national legislation is already compatible with EU requirements before it is 
i mplemented. For instance, when Directive 2003/109/EY (which concerns the status of 
EU third country nationals, who are long-term residents) was to be nationally 
implemented, the Finnish Alien Act was already compatible with this. As the previous 
section demonstrated, the UK did not participate in this directive because it would have 
meant that the UK had to change their national law to be compatible with this directive. 
Examples like this may lead to the conclusion that the Finnish Parliament (using indirecl 
influence) has succeeded in 'uploading' its national interests to the EU level because, in 
'downloading' EU policies, it has not faced many difficulties. However, a more accurate 
interpretation is that the Finnish Parliament has effectively 'downloaded' EU policies 
based on the Governments' proposals without necessarily thinking of them as 'EU- 
policies'. This is because these policies have been embedded well in advance within 
Finnish thinking through the elite. In addition, the limited number of immigrants has 
facilitated the implementation of EU policies into domestic law. 
62 This information is based on interviews with high level civil servant in the Ministry of the Interior, in 
March 2003 and in August 2006, in Helsinki. 
63 The Alien Act was debated at the Special Committee responsible for immigration questions on April 
2004: HaVM 4/2004 vp -HE28/2003 vp. HE 151/2003 vp. Three MPs fell opposite views to the Report of 
Special Committee these documents are (in Finnish) published: littp: H NVWW. CCIL[SkLinta. fi.: Iatistiiiiio. t ja 
mietinnot F 
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This means that EU membership has clearly increased the opportunities for influence of 
64 
the Governmental elite to the EU policy making in the immigration field . In practical 
terms, Finland also benefited from the common immigration and asylum policy of the EU 
because of its peripheral location. For instance, because of the Dublin Convention, 65 
Finland receives fewer asylum-seekers than some other EU members. 66 The consequence 
is that Finland has faced far fewer problems with asylum-seekers than for example Spain 
and Greece. Because of the low political salience of immigration questions in Finland, 
there has not been a need for a wide public debate on this issue. As long as immigration 
is not a politically interesting question, Parliamentarians are not interested in participating 
more effectively in such policy formation which gives plenty of room for maneuver for 
the elite. 
As this section has illustrated Parliament has taken a passive role in 'downloading' EU 
policies at the national level . 
671t can be observed from Parliamentary reports and opinions 
in this policy field that Parliament has only acivised the Ministries to ensure the laws and 
implementation practices in this policy field should be more consistent than the existing 
practices. This could be interpreted as a slight criticism of the Government's 
effectiveness in 'downloading' EU policies in this policy field. More than that, it leads to 
the main problem in Finnish immigration (and asylum policy) and that is the lack of a 
coordination body in managing the cross-sectoral implementation of immigration and 
64 This change in the influence opportunities among the elite can be observed by reviewing the strategies of 
both Ministries responsible for immigration policy as explained earlier in this section: 
(www. mol. f-i.. "itilkaisut, 'immiaration policy programme 2005 ; w%vxv. intei-niiii. fi. ijulkaistit/Tlie Strategy for 
developing immigrati n administration and law, 2006 ). In addition, similar information was given by 
interviews with high level civil servant in the Finnish Ministry of the Interior, August 2006, in Helsinki 
65 This is because the asylum-seekers that arrive Finland have normally already made earlier an application 
in another EU Member State, which according to the Dublin Convention, are then responsible for 
processing their applications. The Dublin Convention is EU Convention that describes the responsibilities 
regarding the asylum-seekers among the EU countries. This Convention allows Finland to return these 
asylum-seekers to the other EU Member States, instead of integrating them in the Finnish society. This 
information is based on interviews with the high level civil servant in the Ministry of the Interior, in August 
2006, in Helsinki 
66 This information is based on interviews with the high level civil servant in the Nfinistry of the Interior, in 
August 2006, in Helsinki 
67 This information is based on interviews with prominent MI's in April-August 2006 and with the clerk of 
the Grand Committee, in April-Augusý, 2006, in Helsinki. 
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asylum policy at the everyday basis. 68 This problem, on the other hand, suggests that 
Parliament has not been giving decisive advice on what Finnish national immigration 
policy should be and how to change existing practices. 69 What follows, is that although 
the 'downloading' of EU policies in Parliament in legal terms has been effective, the 
'downloading' at the practical level has been less effective (Salmenhaara, 2005: 7; 
Council of Refugee, 2006: 10). These problems at local level show first; that there is a 
significant gap between the elite-driven 'pro-European' project with the 'eurosceptic' 
public opinion; 70 and second, that the Parliament is not effectively participated in the EU 
policy process in immigration field either at the EU or at tile national level. Both levels 
are dominated by the Governmental elite. 
6.3.3. Public Opinion and Problems at Practical Level 
There exists a great gap between Finnish public opinion and elite opinion regarding the 
EU in general in Finland (EU Commission, 2004d). This is particularly true in the case of 
immigration policy. The existing immigration literature has argued that negative public 
opinion is not factored into elite decision-making or institutional developments (Lahav, 
2004a: 700). This argument does indeed apply to Finland. For instance, according to the 
latest Eurobarometer survey, the Finns support the EU almost as little as the Britons 
(Finns 48% ; Britons 3 8%). 7 1 This IoNv level of support for the EU is by no means seen in 
the Finnish EU policy, which continues to be rather euro enthusiastic. For instance, the 
Minister of the Interior in his speech to the EP in September 2006 did not mention at all 
the question of public support when analYsing the difficulties in establishing a common 
immigration policy for the EU. The only time lie mentioned citizens was when he said 
6s As one Finnish MP put it 'it would be the most desirable to seek the input of all parties working in the 
field of the immigration and asylum when legislation is prepared on such issues'. This information is based 
on interviewing a prominent Finnish MP, in May, 2006, Helsinki. 
69 From this report HE/22/2003, one can see that the Parliament has not demanded actively Government to 
develop a national immigration strategy in order to correct the existing problems at everyday level 
(www. eduskunta. fi/ HE 22/2003 vp, HE 28/2003 vp, 15/2003 - EV 37/2004 vp (these documents are only 
found in Finnish/Swedish) 
70 EU Commission, (2004d) Eurobarometer 62/2004 
71 EU Commission, (2004d), Eurobarometer 62/ 2004; %vww. eva. fi/07.03.2006. 
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'they expected the EU to do more in combating terrorism and organized crime'. 72 The 
same kind of attitude was found from the speech of the Prime Minister Vanhanen when 
fie introduced the Finnish Presidency aims to the EP in July 2006. Although different 
from the Minister of the Interior, the Prime Minister mentioned in general -that EU 
citizens need to know more about tile matters that have been discussed in the EU. 
However, when lie talked about the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), he too 
emphasized the. need for a more effective common approach in combating the different 
kinds of security risk. He did not mention that in the AFJS, the public does not know 
much about what has 6eefi discussed at the EU level, or where the ideas come from and 
how they affect the lives of the EU citizens. 73 This indicates the generally accepted view 
that, in this policy field, the public does not need to be told details of what has been 
decided at the EU level because decisions have been made between states i. e. 
intergovernmental ly. 74 
However, 'not knowing' is not the main reason why Finnish public is anti-immigrant. As 
in the UK, the main reason for the Finnish public hostility against the EU's immigration 
policy is their belief that there are 'too many immigrants' and 'that the Government is not 
stopping abuses of the asylurn system effectively'. This is regardless of the fact that in 
Finland the percentage of foreign citizens is amongst the lowest in Europe. 75 In order to 
understand why Finnish public opinion is so 'anti-immigrant', one must take into 
consideration two facts: firstly, that immigration is a fairly new issue in Finnish society 
-and secondly, that immigration started in Finland at the same time as Finland was facing 
a deep recession which caused high unemployment (some 19% in 1990) (Salmenhaara, 
2005: 7). These overlapping events had the following implications: a sudden inflow of a 
(relatively) high number of immigrants created a feeling of insecurity among Finns 
72 The contribution of Mr. Rajam5ki, the Minister of the Interior to thejoint debate on Freedom, Security 
and Justice/Immigration in Strasbourg, in the European Parliament, 27.9.2006 
(http: //xvxvw. interminibulletin. nsf/PFS/32ABC705EBFD2 ... 
) 
73 See the speech of the Primer Minister Vanhanen in the European Parliament, July 5,2006 
http: //wxv-%v. vn. fi/ajankolitaista/puheet/puhe/fi. jsp? oid=l 63079 
74 See also the Essay from Tony Bynyan ' While Europe sleeps' in Statewatch News online, 7 November 
2006 (http: // www. statewatch. org) 
7 -5 This inflormation is based on Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries: UNHCR, 2004: 4-5 
http: //'%vNvNv. unhci-. orLý. statistics 
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because they were afraid that immigrants would threaten the social welfare system, which 
was already reaching its limits because of the high unemployment rate. This fear was 
further developed by the role of Finnish media. 
In addition, although there are no extreme-right parties in Finland, some politicians at the 
local level used xenophobic and racist discourse in the early 1990s and gained some 
support among, the electorate (ECRI, 2001: 42). Despite the fact that the economic 
situation has long been better in Finland than the average in the EU, the public debate 
still largely focuses on issues such as controlling immigration, tightening measures in the 
field of asylum and refugee legislation regarding access to welfare benefits because of 
these overlapping events in the early 1990s (Salmenhaara, 2005; ECRI; 2001; Refugee 
Council, 2006). 76 What follows is that immigration is still linked to unemployment in the 
minds of many Finns (Salmenhaara, 2005: 7). However, in fact, the Finnish economy has 
shown (in 2003-2006) a great need for more labour immigration, both skilled and 
unskilled, and it is forecast that there will be problems in attracting labour to move to 
Finland (Confederation of Finnish Industries, 2006: 1-2. ), but this kind of thinking has 
not effectively been channelled to the p ublic. 
Contrary to attitudes at tile elite level, when it. comes to implementation tile Finnish 
authorities, including the police and border guards, have not always followed EU policies 
as they are described in law (ECRI, 2001: 42-44). For instance, 'the safe country of origin 
concept' has not always been followed adequately when considering asylum-applications 
(ECRI, 2001: 42-44; Refugee Council, 2006: 10). This practice has led to 'group 
decisions' on asylum applications rather than individual decisions, based on the specific 
circumstances and experiences of each asylum seeker (Refugee Council, 2006: 8). These 
examples indicate that the extensive gap between elite-level policy-makers and the 
implementing authorities is ever growing, the latter representing to a greater extent 
general public opinion. Although the Parliament has not been active in forming 
76 For instance the Finnish Alien Act was debated at the Special Committee responsible for immigration 
questions on April 2004: HaVM 4/2004 vp -HE28/2003 vp. HE 151/2003 - EV 37/2004 vp. Three NIPs 
left opposite views to the Report of Special Committee thcse documents are (in Finnish) published: http: // 
-, x, ýww. eduskunt, t. fillatisLintiotja mietinn6t. 
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immigration policy either at the EU or national levels, it reflects more the elite attitude 
than the public attitude. 77 This means that the Finnish Eurosceptic public's attitudes have 
not been transferred to the Finnish Parliament; nor has the Finnish Parliament tried to 
transfer that attitude to the EU level by using its indii-ect influence (chapter 5). These 
findings suggest that initiatives taken at the elite level are not always filtered down to the 
local level to be implemented in practice. Further, these deeply rooted views amongst the 
Finnish public on immigration and asylum issues indicate that generally accepted 'ways 
of doing things' (i. e. the informal practices, beliefs and attitudes, see chapter 2) are only 
Europeanized at the 'elite' level in Finland. 
It can be concluded that Finnish immigration policy is strongly elite-led and the elite are 
strongly pro-European, mainly operating behind closed doors, which is rather a common 
feature for the immigration field at the EU level too. The Finnish Parliament has 
'downloaded' smoothly and effectively the EU's immigration legislation. National 
policies have been developed in the EU context to such an extent that they have not 
always been identified as 'EU policies'. The data suggests that a process of socialisation 
and learning as mechanisms of Europeanization among the Finnish immigration elite 
started years before Finland entered the EU and national adaptation was further facilitated 
by the fact that immigration was not politically very salient issue in Finland because of 
the limited number of immigrants. Therefore most MPs do not find this topic particularly 
interesting. This means that Parliament has not tried to restrict the dominance of the 
immigration elite nor has it channelled the Finnish Public's 'anti -i mrn igrati on' attitude in 
the immigration policy making at either the national or EU level. The data suggests that 
Finnish Parliament has shared to a great extent the attitudes of the immigration elite. 
Further, it is correct to argue that EU membership did not bring any major changes to 
Finnish immigration and asylum policy. However, this was not because Finland (or tile 
Finnish Parliament) successfully 'uploaded' its national priorities in to the EU policy 
77 This information is based on examining tile following Parliamentary documents (in Finnish) HE 28/2003 
vp, 15/2003 - EV 37/2004 vp. For instance the Finnish Alien Act was debated at the Special Committee 
responsible for immigration questions on April 2004: HaVNI 4/2004 vp -HE28/2003 vp. HE 151/2003 - 
EV 37/2004 vp. These documents are (in Finnish) are published: littp: // xvývw. edtiskLinta. ii.. Iatistiiiiiot ja 
mietinn6t. 
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process in order to reduce the 'downloading' costs. 78 The main reason why Finland has 
downloaded so effectively EU immigration policies is that it was left in the hands of the 
elite, because it has so far not being a politically interesting issue. 
6.4. The 'Downloading' Dimension in Poland 
While the UK has been fairly resistant to the EU's impact in the immigration field and 
Finland has downloaded smoothly and effectively the EU legislation, the situation in 
Poland has been somewhat different. The literature has argued that the EU has exported 
its border policies, including immigration policy, to Poland (and other new Member 
States in Central and Eastern Europe) largely through the con(lilional element that played 
a significant role in the accession process (Sadurski, 2004; Grabbe, 2003 and 2006; 
Goetz, 2005; Schimmelfennig el al., 2005a). This means that all JHA legislation, which 
was directly related to security issues such as border control matters was not sub ect to j 
any transitional periods and it had to be implemented before joining the EU (Gorny el al., 
2007: forthcoming). The literature has suggested that the 'Europeanization' of Poland's 
asylum and immigration policy was an important part of the EU's accession strategy 
because the political sensitivity of these issues among the most powerful 'old' Member 
States created a fear that illegal immigrants and international crime would 'flood' tile 
existing EU area through Poland unless Poland could effectively protect its borders 
(Grabbe, 2006: 167). 
Therefore, it was essential that Poland, with its long borders with non EU Member States, 
followed the same policy as the majority of older Member States. This strategy 
highlighted the importance of security elements, including effective border control and 
restricting illegal immigrants crossing the Polish borders to the EU area. For instance, 
the Annual Reports of the EU Commission on Poland's progress in implementing the EU 
acquhv supports the vie%v that this strategy was a success in Poland (EU Commission, 
2002a: 51; 2003a: 62). However, this section will argue that there were other crucial 
" This information is based on interviews with high level civil servant in the Finnish Ministry of the 
Interior, in August 2006 and with a prominent NIP and with the clerk of the Grand Committee, in August 
2006, in Helsinki. 
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elements apart from the EU's conditionality requirement, which further facilitated the 
adaptation of the EU's immigration and asylum policy in Poland. Firstly, Poland had 
relatively limited immigration policies prior to 1989 (Grabbe, 2002: 92 Gorny et A, 2007 
forthcoming). This is because under communist rule, Poland, (among the other CEE 
countries), did not have immigration policy as such, as the focus 1vas on preventing 
emigration by Polish inhabitants. Secondly, there was little pressure from third country 
nationals trying to enter Poland in significant numbers (ECRI, 2004: 17). Thirdly, after 
the Word War 11, there were no major minority groups living in Poland, 79 which also 
facilitated the process of 'downloading' the EU's immigration policies. The implication 
was that the social environment in Poland was favourable to the adaptation of for EU 
immigration policy. 
6.4.1. The Export of the EUIs JHA Policies to Poland 
The EU accession process provided perhaps the most direct incentive for legislative 
changes in recent years in Poland (Kowalski, 2004: 322; Gorny et aL, 2007 forthcoming). 
On immigration issues this process, with the exception of introducing the EU's common 
visa policy to Poland (explained later in this section), was considered in Poland as a 
rather technical and technocratic exercise which hardly raised any 'strong feelings' in 
Polish society (Iglicka, 2004a: 1). Evidence of this was the lack of Parliamentary debates 
(and other public debates) on the subject during the accession process (Sadurski, 2004: 
384). However, this could partly be explained by the fact that Parliament was not 
involved in the accession negotiations as such and its main duty was to pass the EU 
legislation. Because of the technocratic nature of EU implementation, the Ministry of the 
Interior developed a dominant position during the accession process and this dominance 
has prevailed since EU membership began (Weinar, 2006: 11; Iglicka, 2004b: 8). 
Another reason for this is that immigration was not considered politically salient at the 
80 national level. In addition, it was considered within the Polish Parliament that 
79 http: /iwww. mi gpol grou p. com 
so This information is based on interviews with middle range civil servants from tile Polish Parliament and 
from the Ministry of the Interior and discussions with prominent NIPs (sejm), who are also members of the 
EAC (Sejm) in Warsaw on November 2005 and in April 2006 and on interviews with high level civil 
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questioning any specific issues of EU i-elated legislation would only mean a delay in 
Poland's membership of the EU (Kowalski, 2004: 323). The only policy area that raised 
debate in the Parliament and disagreement about EU harmonization requirements was the 
necessity to implement the EU's common visa policy. (This will be analysed later in this 
chapter). It was observed that throughout the Parliamentary procedures, the prospective 
obligations of EU membership were acknowledged and EU's security needs as a whole, 
were found to be consistent with those of the Polish State (Iglicka et. al., 2005: 4). 
6.4.2. Creating Restrictive Immigration and Asylum Policy - The Role of the Elite 
It is interesting to ask why Poland decided not to pursue a liberal policy towards 
immigration and asylum issues after the collapse of Communism in 1989 given that it 
-was a country with established traditions of producing refugeeS. 81 It has been argued that 
the lack of tradition and experience in the field of immigration policy in the Polish state is 
one main reason that helped it to accept the ELJ's immigration policy (i. e. which is rather 
restrictive), but this cannot alone explain the choice of having a restrictive policy 
(Weinar, 2003; Iglicka et al, 2005). The literature has suggested that the main factors that 
helped introduce the restrictive EU policy to Poland were the dominant role of the elite in 
the immigration field, who have fast adopted the EU's security based approach through 
learning and socialising together with the lack of public debates, and the limited civil 
society participation (Iglicka et al, 2005; Gorny et aL, 2007 forthcoming). In addition, in 
the post-communist context, the state played a prominent role in the management of day- 
to-day politics which has further hindered the development of interest organizations 
(Pdrez-Sol6rzano Borragdn, 2005: 9; Zubek, 2005: 613). Interest organizations can be 
important sources of information for Parliaments because they can offer informal views 
-different 
from those of the Government. On the other hand, the influence of international 
organizations such as the European Council and LJNCHR among the EU, was significant 
in Poland when Polish asylum laws were establisheý, i. e. before the EU's security based 
servants in the Polish Foreign Ministry, in the Prime Minister's Office, and with civil servants from the 
President's office and discussion with the Finnish Ambassor in Poland in Warsaw, April 2006. 
"' In historical and political context people have been fleeing persecution from Poland for instance to the 
UK and other Western countries ( Home Office Research Study 259,2003: 86) 
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approach became one of the major criteria for EU membership (Weinar, 2006: 3; Gorny et 
aL, 2007: 4 forthcoming). 
Similar to the Finnish experiences the main institutional actors Participating in the 
interaction with the EU representatives in the immigration field from the Polish side were 
civil servants from the Ministry of the Interior and the Polish Border Guards (Iglicka, 
2004b: 1). This meant that EU preparation in this policy field was in the hands of a small 
group of elites, and because of their activity, the socialisation and policy learning process 
started years before the EU membership negotiations themselves began. 82 These experts 
participated at the transnational level together with other experts from the EU Member 
States and learnt from them (Weinar, 2003: 2). The Polish elite quickly adopted the 
security-based immigration policy derived from other EU Member States and brought 
these strategies into the Polish forums, especially to Parliament to gain acceptance for the 
new policies (Weinar, 2003: 17). Because immigration was not a politically salient issue 
at the national level, the environment for adaptation was favourable and gave the elite 
freedom to act. Parliamentarians were not interested in participating in this policy field 
and therefore they did not restrict the elite in forming the policy. In addition, tile national 
adaptation process was further facilitated by the EU providing financial instruments such 
as PHARE 83 and twinning projects (Weinar, 2003: 12; Grabbe, 2003: 95). These 
instruments further highlighted the expert nature of immigration policy which did not 
leave much room for Parliamentary input. 
Parallel to the British and Finnish experiences, the massive refugee flows that took place 
in Europe in the early 1990s had the impact of establishing a restrictive immigration 
policy in Poland. This is because many of the asylum-seekers trying to enter Germany, 
the UK or Sweden were travelling through Poland. As part of the EU's requirements in 
82 This information is based on interviews with the middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament 
and from the Ministry of the Interior and discussions with prominent MPs (sejm) who are also members of 
the EAC in the Sejm, in Warsaw on November 2005 and April 2006. 
83 As a associate State, Poland received funding from EU to cover the costs of adjustment of the admission 
procedures to European standards - i. e. to meet the requirements of the restrictive border control systems. 
In that process 'Twinning' is aimed at helping Poland to adapt its -administrative and democratic institutions 
to comply with the requirements by learning from Member State experiences. It includes the secondment of 
officials from EU Member States to work in*Polish ministries and other institutions. 
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the JHA field, Poland had signed readmission 84 agreements with other EU Member States 
(EU Commission, 2002: 58). The consequence for Poland as with other CEEs of these 
massive refugee flows, was that they received a new important mission from the EU to 
become so called 'Bitffei-zones' for migration i. e. keeping the dangerous exterior at a 
distance from the safe European interior (Grabbe, 2006: 184). These refugee flows also 
had significant financial implications for Poland, which helped adapting EU's security- 
based immigration and asylum policy (Grabbe, 2006: 184). Huysmans has argued that, 
though not directly spoken of as a threat, asylum and immigration can be rendered as a 
security question by being institutionally and discursively integrated in a policy 
framework that emphasises policing and defence (Huysmans, 2006: 4). This is exactly 
what happened in Poland; the threat linked to immigration and asylum issues was quickly 
constructed in society. It was further facilitated by the fact that Polish immigration and 
asylum laws were strictly linked to overall EU developments (Kowalski, 2004: 322). 
Consequently, there was hardly any criticisms expressed in Poland when EU standards 
which conflicted with international la%v standards were implemented. The latter normally 
apply a more humanitarian approach than the EU approach. 
6.4.3. Lack of Political Interests in Immigration Issues 
The ongoing process of transforming the security-based EU approach in Polish 
immigration and asylum law was helped by two factors. Firstly, Poland has a long 
tradition of being a country of emigration; and secondly, it was suffering from a high 
85 unemployment rate (2003-2006). What follows is that Poland does not have any 
experience of being a country attracting immigrants and integrating them into society; 
and secondly, the high unemployment rate has created social, economic and political 
problems which are reflected in Polish attitudes towards immigration and asylum-seekers 
"' The Readmission agreement means that when asylum-seekers or illegal immigrants who are travelling 
through Poland to some other EU countries were caught, they were returned back to Poland (Weinar, 2006: 
3). 
85 This information is based on interviews with the middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament 
and from the Ministry of the Interior and on discussions with prominent MPs (sejin) who are also members 
of the Polish (sej1n) EAC in Warsaw on November 2005 and April 2006 and on interviews with the high 
level civil servants in the Polish Foreign Minisfry, in the Prime Minister's Office, and with civil servants 
from the President's office and discussion with the Finnish Ambassor in Warsaw, in Warsaw, April 2006. 
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(Bem, 2004: 474). These factors further helped to build up a restrictive, rather than a 
liberal immigration policy. In addition there were very few 'foreigners' 86 in Poland, as 
Poland is nationally fairly homogeneous (ECRI, 2004: 17). Since EU membership the 
number of legal immigrants in Poland is still very smal 1.87 In addition, legal immigrants 
normally integrate into society both in economic and cultural terms and therefore, this 
process does not attract any particular attention from the Parliament. Similar to the West 
European experience, refugees are the most prominent group of foreigners in the public 
and political discourse although their numbers are very small (Bem, 2004: 474). 
However, the Polish refugee structure is still underdeveloped and the financial support 
given to the refugees is often not enough to meet their needs (Bem, 2004: 474). 
Therefore, these issues are more often linked to the difficult economic situation of 
Poland, where even native Poles encounter serious problems in everyday life and 
-according to interview data, this was an important reason why MPs were not debating 
immigration in the Parliament; there were more important issues both at the national and 
EU levels. 88 To sum up, there were many overlapping elements such as the strong 
influence of the supranational level actors, weak or absent opposing views at the national 
level and the refu ce flows which resulted in Poland adopting the Western security- 9 
based approach towards immigration and asylum policy. 
6.4.4. The History and Geopolitical Location 
Another reason why Polish attitudes towards EU immigration policies 'fitted' so 
smoothly with the EU approach and why the Parliament hardly expressed any opposing 
views (expect on the visa policy) is the historical perspective. Poland's European policy 
86 The main 'fbreign' groups are citizens from Ukraine (%vww. migPolgrouj). coni). However, they are 
considered 'shuttle migrants' coming and going according to their visa validity period (maximum of 90 
days), which means that they are not considered as targets for immigration or asylum policy measures 
(Iglicka et al., 2005: 12). 
87 (www. rnigpolgroup. corn; ECRI, 2004: 17). 
88 This information is based on interviews with the middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament 
and from the Ministry of the Interior and discussions with prominent MPs (sejin) who are also members of 
the Polish EAC in Warsaw on November 2005 and April 2006 and on interviews with Polish civil servants 
and Parliamentarians, in November 2005 and in April 2005 in Warsaw and on interviews with the high 
level civil servants in the Polish Foreign Ministry, in the Prime Minister's Office, and with civil servants 
from the PrQdent's office and discussion with tile Finnish Ambassor in Warsaw, in Warsaw, April 2006 
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has been strongly influenced by two historical factors; first, it is a former communist 
country which is still going through a process of democratic consolidation. 
" Sovereignty 
also plays an important role in this legacy and in Poland sovereignty is deeply linked to 
the protection of its borders. 9() Second, Poland has long borders with countries that are far 
from EU accession, and the drastic and traumatic shifts in the location of its borders over 
the last century has left a complex legacy of sensitive issues (Zaborowski, 2004: 33-35; 
Iglicka, 2004b: 2; Cordell, 2000: 5). Because of these issues, Poland has a rather 
complicated history with its neighbouring countries, particularly with Russia and 
Germany. 91 
Poland suffered greatly from World War II, and as a consequence lost half of its territorýy 
in the east to the Soviet Union. This was compensated for by taking over part of Prussia 
and other eastern territories of pre-war Germany (Zaborowski, 2004: 28). This resulted 
in a large wave of expulsion and migration; millions of Poles who fled from the east 
replaced millions of Germans who were expelled from their homes (Zaborowski, 2004: 
28). All this created the so called 'western frontier issue' which dominated relations 
between Poland and Germany until its resolution in 1991. For Poles, Germany was 
considered a constant threat to its existence until the beginning of the 1990s. 92 As a 
consequence of this history, geopolitical location has been an important factor in Polish 
European policy since the collapse of the Communism regime. Tile EU's security based 
immigration and asylum policy approach fitted well with that discourse and perhaps 
reduced, to a certain extent, Polish fears as EU border policies went to the heart of 
89 Only 15% of Polish people think that democracy works well (Kolarska-Bobinska, 2003: 93). Also, the 
trust on Polish institutions is very low; in 2003 only 12% of population trusted on the Polish Parliament 
(Kolarska-Bobinska, 2003: 93). On the other hand, the trust on European institutions, such as the EU 
Commission and the European Parliament are very high compared to any other EU Member States 
(Kolarska-Bobinska, 2003: 93). 
ý0 This information is based on interviews with the middle/high level civil servants from the Polish 
Parliament (sejm) and from the Ministry of the Interior and discussions with prominent MPs (sejnVSenate) 
who are also members of the EAC in Warsaw on November 2005 and April 2006. 
91 One Polish interviewee described this 'history is perhaps more present in Poland than in many other EU 
Member States' and this has an impact on how Poland behaves in the EU context, because Poland is still 
suffering from insecurity and it has feeling that it should gain some compensation from Europe' Similar 
viJws were expressed during interviews by prominent MPs (sejinlSenate) who are also members of the 
EAC in Warsaw on November 2005 and April 2006 and on interviews with high level civil servants in the 
Polish Foreign Ministry, in the Prime Minister's Office, with civil servants from the President's office. 
92 See the footnote above. 
201 
Poland's newly found sovereignty (Huysmans, 2006: 17: Lavah, 2004b: 1172; Grabbe, 
2006: 150). 
Despite its history, Poland has had no major problems accepting considerable financial 
and technical assistance from the EU and from Germany to upgrade its border 
infrastructures (Zaborowski, 2004: 37; Zubek, 2005: 594). Germany provided a major aid 
programme to increase Poland's border policing and there has been close cooperation 
between German and Polish border guards, including joint operations and training 
(Grabbe, 2002: 99). It can be argued that Polish immigration policy is not only influenced 
by the EU and the international community but to a great extent by Germany (Grabbe, 
2006: 21-25). 
One explanation for this contradictory attitude of Poland towards Germany is Poland's 
close relations with Ukraine in economic, political and historical terms. Polish politicians 
have consistently presented their country as an advocate for Ukraine's EU accession 
(Grabbe, 2006: 167). This, however, would not have been possible if Poland had not been 
accepted into the EU and that would not have occurred without strong support frorn 
Germany. In order to fulfil the EU's accession criteria, Poland needed Germany's 
support, especially in building its border control structure and adopting the EU's 
immigration and asylum laws. As Kowalski has argued, it is hardly possibly to answer 
the question of what Polish immigration and asylum laws would be like without the 
influence of EU standards (Kowalski, 2004: 322). 
6.4.5. The Special Relationship with Ukraine 
Poland has borders with Ukraine of 526 km. For historical reasons these areas are 
POPLIlated by large Polish minorities. 93 Cross-border trade plays an important role for 
Poland and Ukraine, and it was considered as one of the main benefits arising from the 
93 This information is based on interviews with prominent Polish MPs in the Polish Parliament 
(sejinlSenate), in November 2005 and April 2006, in Warsaw. 
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Communist collapse. 94 In this respect EU membership created a major change in Poland's 
visa-free policy towards Ukraine and other former Soviet countries. During tile Polish EU 
negotiations, Poland opted for the gradual introduction of a visa requirement prior to the 
date of accession, but the EU made it clear that any bilateral agreement, which was 
incompatible with membership obligations, was not possible. These membership 
obligations reflected a significant difference in the manner in which the EU and its 
members states on the one hand, and Poland on the other, viewed the question of visa-- 
free travelling (Iglicka, el al., 2005: 6; Grabbe, 2006: 167). The Polish side highlighted in 
particular the socio-economic benefits of cross-border trade (Batt, 2003: 13). 95 In 
addition, the fact that there is a large Polish minority living in Ukraine and the fact that 
half of today's Ukrainian territory belonged to Poland before WWII were also important 
considerations. Aside from these reasons, it can also be argued, from the geographical 
point of view, that it is important for Poland to have an independent country between her 
and Russia. As one interviewee put it; 'Poland's fate is tied up with the situation in 
Ukraine. 96 
6.4.6 The Reactions of Parliament to the EU's Visa Policy 
The introduction of the EU's visa policy created for the first time during Poland's 
accession period, extensive debates both in the press and in Parliament (Grabbe, 2003; 
Weinar 2003; Iglicka et al., 2005; Lazowski, forthcoming 2007). Parliament criticized the 
Government for the hasty and uncoordinated introduction of the new requirements 
without implementing a proper information campaign targeting cross-border traders 
(Iglicka, et al., 2005: 6). This was the first time that Polish MPs realised that not all EU 
94 For example, between 1990 and 1997, the number of people crossing Poland's eastern border rose almost 
threefold, from II million to 30 million a year, turning Poland into one of the world's most frequently 
visited countries (Batt, 2003: 12). Not surprisingly, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe regard their 
new right to travel freely as the most significant achievement of 1989-90 revolutions (Batt, 2003: 12). 
95 It has been estimated that 240.000 people earn their living from the bazaar trade across the Polish- 
Ukrainian border, about three-quarters of whorn have no other source of income ( Kataryna et aL, 2002 
cited Batt, 2003: 12-14). In addition, the volume of cross-border 'open-air market' trade was important to 
Poland too, especially after the Russian financial crisis in 1998 had had depressing effects to the Polish 
economy 
96 This information is based on interviews with prominent MPs in the Polish Parliament (sejin), who was 
also members of the EAC (Sejm) in Warsaw on November 2005. 
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legislation in the field of immigration was purely technical in nature. On the contrary, the 
changes in the procedures for travellers. frorn Ukraine, Belarus and Russia travelling in to 
Polish territory had serious, large scale effects. While there were issues from an 
economic and historical perspective, the introduction of the EU's visa policy also had 
serious political effects on Polish foreign relations. Polish politicians had promised 
Ukraine that it would not introduce visas for Ukrainians after joining the EU (Grabbe, 
2006: 167). 
For these reasons the introduction of the EU's common visa policy created strong 
resistance in the Polish Parliament (at the national level the only supporters of this policy 
were the elite in the Ministry of the Interior. Even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
against this 'top-down' adaptation of EU policies). However, as the Polish authorities 
eventually realized there would be no exemption from the EU's common visa policy, it 
had to find a solution that fitted with Polish national traditions and was politically 
acceptable at the national level. Consequently, visas were issued without cost for the 
Ukrainians. 97 As this example illustrated, different to any of the other changes in Poland 
as a result of the EU immigration policies, the visa question was a political issue and 
extremely unpopular among the public. 98 It also demonstrated that Parliament had tools 
to influence EU policy when necessary; it was n ot able to avoid implementation of the 
EU's common visa policy, because it is part of the binding acquis, but it was able to 
change national practices in a more favourable direction. However, it must be noted that 
the Parliament was not alone on this issue; the Polish Press and the Foreign Ministry too 
were against the view expressed by the leading immigration elite from the Ministry of the 
Interior. 99 
9' This information is based on interviewing the high level civil servants from the Ministry of the Interior 
and from the Prime Minister's Office, in November 2005 and in April 2006 in Warsaw. 
9' This information is based on interviewing prominent MPs in the Polish Parliament (Sejin) in November 
2005 and in April 2006, in Warsaw. See also the article from A. Wienar'the Polish expei-iences of visa 
policy in the context Ofsecuritization'(http: 11 www. libertysecurity. org) 
99 This information is based on interviewing prominent NIPs in Polish Parliament (Sejin) in November 
2005 and in April 2006, in Warsaw. See also the article from A. Wienar'thc Polish experiences of visa 
policy in the context ofseciu-ilization(hapW www. libertysecurity. org). 
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This national solution (i. e. granting visas free of charge for Ukrainians) together with tile 
Polish 'user-friendly visa policy"00 created a nationally acceptable solution that clearly 
followed the Polish tradition of giving consideration to the 'human dimension of the 
border crossing'. In addition, this example demonstrated that in this case the Polish elite 
were divided. This is because the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was expressing a more 
liberal view, based on a good neighbour policy and general diplomacy while on the other 
side the Ministry of the Interior was expressing the strict EU security-based approach 
(Grabbe, 2005: 130). In this particular case, the Parliament was actively participating in 
finding a politically acceptable solution. This example demonstrated that the adaptation 
of this EU policy inainly took place in a coercive manner, which means that the 
socialising and learning mechanisms of Europeanization had certain limitations; they 
only function as mecilanisms of Europeanization as long as there is no or only low 
national resistance. This example also illustrated that in the Polish case, there were 
limited opportunities for the domestic actors to 'upload' national preferences to the EU 
level in order to reduce the adaptation costs when 'downloading' policy outcomes at the 
national level. 
in more general terms, however, this chapter did not find much evidence that the Polish 
Parliament has been active in 'downloading' EU policies except on the visa-issue, which 
was difficult because Poland was not a member of the EU at that time. Further, as chapter 
5 clearly demonstrated, the Parliament has not shown a great interest of 'uploading' its 
interests at the EU level aflei- becoming a member of the EU. The main explanation for 
the lack of interest in the Parliament during the pre-accession was the very tight 
timeframe for the national implementation of EU legislation. This meant that Parliament 
had to pass a significant amount of legislation without much opportunity to discuss these 
issues or consider national implications. This requirement made Parliament act as a 'law 
creation machine' (Lazowski, 2007, forthcoming). Parliament has continued its pre- 
accession practice to a great extent, by treating the EU's immigration policies largely as 
100 Polish visa regime offers 23 types of various visas, and such a diversification gives a wide range of 
options for the consulates to run user-friendly visa policy: for instance there are many categories that are 
free from charges in Belarus and Russia (such as children, students, scholars, academics participating in 
international or interregional exchange programs), individuals visiting ill family members or enterina or 
attending to funeral (Weinar, 2006: 6-8). 
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technical questions without any major political discussion. Immigration was not 
politically interesting before EU membership and the situation has not changed. 1011n 
addition, Parliament is still heavily involved in 'downloading' existing EU and Schengen 
legislation and has not really had any experienced discussion of EU policies (Lazowski, 
2007 forthcoming). Apart from implementing the EU's common visa policy, there has 
not been a great deal of resistance within Parliament to adaptation of the EU's 
immigrationregime. 
These findings from Poland leads us to question the relevance of the traditional 
understanding of 'uploading' and 'downloading' dimensions in analYsing how domestic 
change has taken place (i. e. the process of Europeanization). The examples above 
illustrated that the Polish Parliament has not taken an active role in 'downloading' EU 
policies into national law except in one case. As chapter 5 demonstrated, Parliament did 
not 'upload' any of its preferences to the EU level. These empirical findings suggests that 
-the main weakness in the traditional understanding of the 'uploading' and 'downloading' 
perspective is that it assumes that national priorities need to be first 'uploaded' to the EU 
level in order to facilitate the 'downloading' at the national level (i. e. lower the 
adaptational costs). However, as the Polish example showed, Poland had no possibilities 
to upload any of its national interests to the EU level because in order to become a EU 
Member State it had to implement the existing acquis as it was and the negotiation 
options were minimal. This also left very little room for manoeuvre for the Parliament 
when 'downloading' EU legislation. In addition, the passive role of the Parliament was 
incorporated into the domestic structures during the pre-accession time, a situation 
difficult to change once EU membership had been achieved. 
This does not mean, however that the situation cannot change: as Lazowski has argued, 
and chapter 5 showed, the Polish Parliament can influence EU policy making (Lazowski, 
. 2007 
forthcoming). This means that the legal framework offers adequate tools for 
'01 This information is based on interviews with the middle level civil servants from the Polish Parliament 
and from the Ministry of the Interior and discussions with prominent MPs (sejin) who are also members of 
the EAC in Warsaw on November 2005 and April 2006 and on interviews with the high level civil servants 
in The Polish Foreign Ministry, in the Prime Minister's Office, with civil servants from the President's 
office and discussion with the Finnish Ambassor in Warsaw, in Warsaw, April 2006. 
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influence when participation is considered politically important enough. An example of 
this power is Parliament's recent demand to have the Polish milk quotas at the EU level 
increased 102 (Lazowski, 2007fortlicoming). But so far, immigration has not been 
considered as an important EU policy issue and therefore the Parliament has not tested its 
opportunity to influence this policy field. To conclude, the Polish Parliament has not 
questioned the Government's leading role in the EU policy process to any extent when 
'downloading' EU policies and as such, has not tried to act as a counterbalanced actor to 
the immigration elite. 
6.5. The 'Downloading' Dimension in Estonia 
Similar to the Polish case, the EU had a large influence on the immigration policies 
adopted in Estonia through the conditional element (Grabbe, 2003; Goetz; 2005; 
Sadurski; 2004). Comparable to the experiences of the Polish Parliament, the Estonian 
Parliament too had a limited role in forming the EU policy during tile pre-accession era. 
At the theoretical level, Estonia's starting point regarding its adaptation to EU policies 
should not have been very different from the Polish case: both were previously 
Communist states without experience of immigration policy, as this term is understood in 
its usual meaning (i. e. immigrants come freely to a certain country for mainly economic 
reasons). 103 Analogous to the Polish case, Estonia also chose to have rather restrictive 
immigration and asylum policy, but for different reasons than Poland. However, at tile 
practical level, the starting point was completely different: Estonia along with the other 
two Baltic States (Latvia and Lithuania), were the only accession states that derived from 
the Soviet Union and in several respects, this experience reflected in their attitudes 
towards EU adaptation. The Soviet experience strongly affected Estonia's adaptation to 
the EU's immigration and asylum policy as will be explained is this section. Different 
from the Polish case, however, more domestic resistance was observed in Estonia when 
102 Polish Sejnz made a resolution in January 2006 on the EU's common agriculture policy. The Sejnz called 
upon the Polish Government immediately to open negotiations with the EU Commission for an increase of 
milk quatas for Poland. It was argued that the milk quatas not used by other Member States should be 
allocated to Poland and CAP subsides should be paid accordingly (Lazowski, 2007 forthcomin ) 9 
103 This information is based on interviews with prominent MPs (members of the EAC) in the Estonian 
Parliament and with discussions with high and middle level civil servants in the Ministry of the Interior in 
Tallinn, in April 2006 and in July 2006. 
207 
analysing how the 'downloading' took place. This is mainly because the Estonian 
definition of immigration is in some respects different from the definition used for 
instances, in Poland. Because of this, the issue (as it relates to the Russian speaking 
minority) was also politically interesting and therefore, raised some discussion among 
Parliamentarians. 
6.5.1. Geopolitical Realities and the Burden of History 
The main difference between Poland and Estonia is that in Estonia immigration policy is 
strongly linked to a sensitive state sovereignty issue and, to more specifically, the large 
Russian speaking population. In order to understand the link between immigration policy 
and sovereignty one has only to look back to Estonia's specific historical and 
constitutional legacies (Day and Shaw, 2003: 214). 104 This is because after Estonia's 
incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940, drastic changes in the ethnic composition of 
Estonia took place. Soviet-era 'migration' effects had a significant influence both in 
demographic and in ethnic terms; At the same time as ethnic Baltic State residents were 
forced to migrate from their homes to other parts of the Soviet territory, incentives were 
given to ethnic Russians to migrate to the Baltic States (Gelazi. s, 2004: 226). 1 05 The result 
was that over 10000 ethnic Estonians vanished from the census data between 1934 and 
1959 (Gelazis, 2004: 226). 106 These changes created a great deal of fear towards the large 
Russian population among Estonians and it influenced how the question of sovereignty 
was understood. In Estonia, sovereignty is linked to the ethnically defined nation-state 
and national self-determination (Albi, 2005: 123). In this context the large minority group 
104 Before World War II Estonian population was comprised of Estonians, Germans, Russians and Swedish 
(http: /. `www. meis. ee). 
105 In 1940 when the German troops were leaving Estonia, the Soviet Un 
* 
ion executed estimated 2000 
Estonians, and deported 18.000-19.000 more to labour camps or exile in the Soviet Union. Further, in 1944 
Soviet Union deported from 'liberated' areas of the Baltic States around 60.000 people. Most at risk were 
those who had served in the German or Finnish armed forces, although no-one who had lived through the 
Nazi occupation was above suspicious (Smith, 2002: 37). The Soviet terror became worse: in 1949 during a 
one single month approximately 60.000 people were deported from Estonia (Smith, 2002: 37). Total 
population losses for one year (1941) have been estimated at 54.000-60.000, almost 6% of the total 
population. 
'06 Approximately 1/3 of the today's population (32,1 %) of Estonia is of non-Estonian origin, the was 
majority of whom do not speak Estonian (http:.. -'. `xvww. meis. ec). In 1934 88% of population was ethic 
Estonians, in 2000 67,9% (http: //www. meis. ce). 
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is considered as a threat to the Estonian language and culture which are deeply rooted in 
the nation's identitY (Smith, 2002: 67-68). 
Tile Estonian concept of sovereignty explains why Estonia established such a strict 
citizenship law and why this is linked to the question of immigration (Raik, 2004: 583; 
Smith 2002: 67; Day and Shaw, 2003: 214). In addition, Estonian statehood is essentially 
based on the c oncept of legal continuity between the independent inter-war state and the 
state that arose out of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Day and Shaw, 2003: 216-217). 
The consequence is that Estonia grants citizenship automatically only to pre-war citizens 
and their descendants, based on its pre-war citizenship legislation (Gelazis, 2004: 226). 107 
In practice this policy has meant that after regaining its independency, a large number of 
-Soviet-era people (and their children) were considered as aliens (i. e. 
immigrants) and 
were subject to a process of naturalisation if wishing to gain Estonian citizenship. 108 This 
process of naturalisation has been widely criticised by international organisations because 
it has been considered too demanding (EU Commission, 1998c; ECRI, 2005). As a 
consequence, the number of natUralizations has been limited and there is a large Russian 
speaking minority living in Estonia, many of whom are completely without any 
citizenship (i. e. stateless persons). In the Estonian context they are considered as 
'immigrants'. To sum up, the issue of sovereignty linked to citizenship has wider 
implications which have EU level impacts as well, as the next section will show. This 
issue raised concerns among the EU Member States throughout the whole EU accession 
process (EU Commission, 1997-2002; Smith, 2002; Mikkel and Pridliam, 2004; 
Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004; Gelazis 2004). 
6.5.2. European Influence: the Impact of Conditionality 
The existing literature has argued, similar to the Polish experience, that the EU was the 
most influential external actor in Estonia, with the principle of conditionality playing an 
'0' The same information was received from interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the 
Estonian Parliament and from the Ministry of the Interior in Tallinn, April 2006. 
'0' The prerequisite for Estonian Citizenship included knowledge of the constitution, history and foremost 
passing a language examination (Estonian Citizenship Act 1995: article 6) (see also Pettai, 2003). 
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important role (Albi, 2005; Dimitrova and Pridliam, 2004; Grabbe, 2003 and 2006; 
Mikkel and Pridliam, 2004; Raik, 2004; Watson, 2000). In addition, tile EU's decision to 
start accession negotiations with Estonia (among the other Baltic States) was not as clear 
as was the case with Poland. The main reason for the EU's hesitation was the complexity 
of the Baltic States' historical legacy and their geopolitical location, together with the 
large Russian speaking minority (Mikkel and Pridham, 2004: 717). Secondly, compared 
to Poland, Estonia does not share any borders with the older Member States. This means 
that the security risk for the 'old EU' was not as evident in the case of Estonia as it was 
considered in the case of Poland regarding the potential flows of illegal immigrants and 
international crime in to the EU territory. Therefore, there was not the same incentive for 
the EU to interfere in Estonia's border control structures as was the case with Poland. 
Similar to the Polish case, however, the most important facilitating factor for adopting the 
EU's security-based immigration and asylum policy was the strong influence of 
supranational actors operating in that particular policy field. 109Paral let to the Polish 
experience, the Estonian elite quickly adopted the security-based immigration policy 
derived from the other EU Member States and brought these strategies to the Estonian 
Parliament to gain acceptance for the new policy. In Estonia too the EU facilitated this 
adaptation process by providing financial and technical help through programmes such as 
PHARE110 and twinning projects (Grabbe, 2003: 95). In addition, the EU Commission 
annual regular reports had an important impact on the adaptation of EU legislation, in 
particular in the field of immigration policies. "' This is because the questions relating to 
immigration were such nationally sensitive issues that none of the political parties were 
able to set any national programme on these issues. Therefore, tile annual EU reports, 
which highlighted the need for Estonia to develop a friendly neighbourhood policy with 
109 This information is based on interviews with the high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and from the Ministry of the Interior in Tallinn, April 2006 
110 As a associate State, Estonia received funding from EU to cover the costs of adjustment of the 
admission procedures to European standards - i. e. to meet the, requirements of the restrictive border control 
systems. In that process 'Twinning' is aimed at helping Estonia to adapt its administrative and democratic 
institutions to comply with the requirements by learning from Member State experiences. It includes the 
secondment of officials from EU Member States to work in the Estonian ministries and other institutions. 
III This information is based on interviews with the middle/ high level civil servants in the Ministry of the 
Interior in Estonia, in April 2006, in Tallinn. 
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Russia and the need for better treatment of national minorities, Nvere politically more 
acceptable than if these suggestions had come from any national actors (EU Commission, 
1999 and 2000; Day and Shaw, 2003). In particular, the latter requirement was a difficult 
task for Estonia, not only because of a strong national resistance towards the Russian 
speaking minority, but also because there was a lack of consensus at the EU level about 
what exactly minority protection should include. ' 12 In addition, with Estonia being an 
example, the EU did apply differentiated pressure across applicants regarding this matter 
depending on whether the minority protection was regarded as problematic and relevant 
to the EU's security interests (Schimmelfennig el. A, 2005b: 32). In the case of Estonia, 
the minority issue was considered as highly important because Russia brought its 
concerns to the EU's knowledge and made a small diplomatic issue of it (Pridham and 
Mikkel, 2004: 721; Day and Shaw, 2003: 217). Thi's is why some EU Member States 
hesitated to complete negotiations with Estonia. " 3 This is also the main reason why the 
'EU Commission put strong pressure on Estonia to develop its minority policies according 
I to the accession aqcztis. How this pressure impacted on Estonia can be seen from the 
Commission's, annual reports regarding Estonia's progress in adopting EU legislation 
(Commission, 1998c; 1999b; 2000b; 2001c; 2002b). The influence of these annual 
reports will be examined in the next section. 
6.5.3. The Minority Issue and National Resistance 
The annual reports of the EU Commission on Estonia's progress fulfilling the accession 
criteria provide a useful tool in examining how the 'downloading' process in EU 
immigration policies took place in Estonia. Thus far, there had been no national strategy 
for immigration policy, which rneans that the EU approach did not face any competitive 
112 The existing literature has argued that in tile accession acquis, the minority criterion remained ill- 
defined, failing to develop a clear and common standard for all the applicant states (Schwellnus, 2005: 56, 
Grabbe, 2006: 28). EU has neither developed a minority standard within the internal acquis 
communattlaire. In the absence of EU rules in questions of minority protection, the EU has mainly referred 
to standards developed by other European organizations, mainly to the Council of Europe and OSCE 
(Schwellnus, 2005: 56) 
"3 This information is based on interviews with high level Finnish civil servants who were participating at 
the last round of the EU's enlargement negotiations, in Helsinki, in Nlarch-April, 2003. 
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suggestion. This made the environment for learning favourable. 114 The early EU 
Commission annual reports (1997b and 1998c) made explicit and constant references to 
the protection of minorities but also called Estonia to improve its handling of issues 
involving refugees and asylum-seekers in general (EU Commission, 1997b: 59; 1998c: 
26). From these reports two observations can be made: first, the EU played a central role 
in the process of establishing a immigration policy for Estonia; and second, the emphasis 
of these reports changed over time because the EUs JHA policy goals changed (see 
chapter 3). The 1998 report noted that Estonia had made significant efforts with 
immigration, border control and asylum issues (EU Commission, 1998c: 38). However, 
this report still highlighted the intpoi-Imice of humatz fights as part of a successful 
implementation in the field of immigration by stating that there was still considerable 
work to be carried out, especially with the minority issue and with implementing 
measures in the asylum field (EU Commission, 1998c: 36). 
However, the new tendency in the EU's JHA policy was to be observed from the report 
from 2000 onwards as the emphasis was given to visa-policy, border-control issues and 
combating. international crime (i. e. restrictive measures instead of human rights based 
views). The report noted that Estonia had made good progress with visa-policy, border 
control issues and with immigration policies, although Estonia lies off international 
migration routes and is not for the time a major country of destination or transit for 
immigrants. Nevertheless, it stated that the capacity for implementing measures 
controlling immigration should be considerably increased (EU Commission, 2000b: 76). 
This report no longer highlighted the human rights aspect as most important criteria in the 
field of immigration and asylum, and the minority issue was hardly mentioned (EU 
Commission, 2000b: 11). The 2001 report stated that Estonia had made remarkable 
progress on visa-policy; and it was positive regarding Estonia's progress With Schellgell 
action plan, with external management and retention of personal data (EU Commission 
2001b: 43). In the field of immigration, this report noted that Estonia had completed the 
alignment of its legislation, including the most restrictive measures such as legislation on 
114 This information is based on interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and from the Ministry of the Interior in Tallinn, April 2006 
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carriers' liability and the creation of an office responsible for visas and illegal 
immigration (EU Commission 2001b: 43). In addition, 2001 report noted that Estonia 
had signed readmission agreements with 33 countries, but had not concluded those with 
Russia, Belarus or the Ukraine (EU Commission report, 2001b: 47). This report also 
noted that further efforts had been made regarding human rights issue in general and with 
the minority issues in particular. However, that was the only time the human rights aspect 
was mentioned in this report, which was rather controversial given the ECRI report from 
the same year criticised Estonia for the considerable problems with tile asylum issues and 
the issues concerning the protection of minorities (ECRI, 2001: 19-20). 
As these EU Commission reports illustrated Estonia had easily and without national 
resistance adopted the main elements of the EU's restrictive immigration and asylum 
-policy goals which were mainly inspired by European influences. The continuing 
problem of minority protection strictly represented the Estonian national interest, and 
even with this issue some progress was made. However, the formal adaptation of rules 
that were not truly supported by the public (or even by some parts of elite) seemed to 
have been a more difficult task for Estonia. The Russian speakers were considered a 
threat and therefore, there was a great deal of resistance treating them the same as ethnic 
Estonians. These questions also found their place on the developing Estonian 
immigration agenda. ' 15 As explained earlier in this section, the reports of the EU 
Commission, and the ECRI reports functioned as instruments that forced Estonia to adapt 
to EU immigration and asylum policy which were not supported by the public. This 
pressure from the EU was particularly visible during the first years of Estonia's 
independence because immigration and minority issues were highly sensitive political 
issues at that time. It would have been very unlikely for then to reach any political 
, consensus on these questions 
domestically without external pressure. ' 16 In addition, 
during the first years of the EU negotiations the plans and responses that Estonia 
presented to the EU sometimes amounted to no more than declarations and promises and 
115 This information is basedron interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and prominent INIPs (who are also members of the EAC) in Tallinn, July 2003 and April 2006. 
116 This information is based on interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and from the Ministry of the Interior in Tallinn, April 2006. 
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the gap between promises and actual achievement grew (Raik, 2004: 584; Day and Shaw, 
2003: 215). This caused particular problems at the practical, everyday level as the 
learning process was not entirely completed or embedded into national structures. 
6.5.4 An Elite Project 
Similar to the experiences in Poland and to a lesser extent in Finland, EU integration 
carried (and still carries) a strong image as an elite project in Estonia which gives very 
little room for democratically chosen stakeholders to influence this policy field (Raik, 
2004: 586). 1 17 This is the main explanation why such a gap exists between the official 
promises and practical implementing measures. The dominance of the elite resulted from 
the asymmetrical structure of the EU negotiation process. As mentioned earlier in the 
case of Poland, the accession negotiation did not offer candidate countries any real 
opportunities to negotiate, Parliaments hardly had any say in the in that process (Albi and 
Laffranque, 2004,100; Cichocki, 2003: 3). Also in Estonia, immigration is a highly elite- 
led policy field. At the practical level the preparation of these policies was concentrated 
in the hands of a few top civil servants from the Ministry of the Interior during pre- 
accession (Raik, 2004: 587). The situation to some degree continued after the accession 
because the EU's immigration policy is not considered an important issue among 
Parliamentarians. 118 Another difficulty was the lack of dialogue on immigration issues 
with lobbyists and civil society groups. This meant that there was no input from that 
sector to Parliamentarians. ' 19 On the other hand, the limited role of civil society can be 
explained by the fact that the state tends to be perceived as an entity clearly separate from 
civil society, a trend also reflected in the very weak social underpinning of the party 
system (Norgaard and Winding, 2005: 8). 
1" See also the statement expressed in Estonian Human Development Report, 2002: 110 
118 This information is based on interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and from the Ministry of the Interior in Tallinn, April 2006. 
119 This information is based on interviewing high/middle level civil servants from the Ministry of the 
Interior in Estonia and prominent MPs (also members of the EAC) and the clerks of tile Estonian 
Parliament, in April, 2006, in Tallinn. 
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Some authors have argued that political elites in post-communist states have, in many 
cases, adopted minority policies in line with European norms simply because there was 
no other choice if they wished to enter key Western and international organizations 
(Tesser, 2003: 488). However, in the Estonian case, there is a question as to whether the 
elite's formal acceptance of such norms actually changed domestic practices and whether 
the public accepted these rules that were transformed directly from the EU. To support 
the abovemen tioned scepticism Raik has argued that in Estonia, the gap between words 
and deeds was a typical feature of communist rule (Raik, 2003: 585). In practice this 
meant that under the Soviet rule the norm among Estonians was to comply, while at the 
same time maintaining a more or less latently critical outlook (Raik, 2003: 585). Based 
on these reasons, it can be asked whether the same practice has been adopted concerning 
those EU policies that contradict national preferences such as the treatment of a national 
minority. 
As shown by the EU reports analysed earlier in this section, the supranational level actors 
were the main driving force behind Estonia adopting the EU's security based policy in 
the immigration field. 120 In practice, the contacts among civil servants were particularly 
intensive with Finland and Sweden (Pridham and Mikkel, 2004: 719). Finland offered to 
help build border control infrastructures, and operational cooperation between those 
countries' police and border control officers developed fast in the early 1990s. 121 
However, as this cooperation took place behind closed doors there is hardly any publicly 
available information to show lio%v much of tile EU's security-based immigration policy 
was transformed through these bilateral contacts. This is a particularly interesting 
question because in the early 1990s neither Finland nor Sweden was a member of the EU. 
Another factor that helped the small elite group to gain a dominant position in the 
immigration field in Estonia was the lack of political interest. 122 This is demonstrated by 
120 This argument was also expressed by the interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the 
Estonian Parliament and from the Ministry of the Interior in Tallinn, April 2006 
12 1 This information is based on inteýviews in high level/ middle level civil servants from the Finnish 
Ministry of the Interior in March 2003 and in August 2006, in Helsinki. 
122 This information is based on interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and with interviews with Estonian MPs in Tallinn, April 2006 
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the fact that immigration issues (apart from the Russian speaking minority issue) have not 
yet been the subject to any major political debate. 123 In addition, political control over the 
work of the civil servants - not only by Parliament but also by Government - was weak 
during the accession period and this created opportunities for civil servants to form the 
-policy fairly independently (Raik, 2004; AM and Laffranque, 2004). Moreover, much of 
the legislation in the immigration and border control field was and still is very technical 
and demanded specific expertise that most politicians did not have. 124 In such a small 
state like Estonia, it was hard to find the human and financial resources necessary to 
formulate EU policy (Raik, 2004: 588). 
Lastly, apart from the Russian speaking minority issue, which Estonians considered as 
the most important immigration question, there have been only a very modest number of 
immigration or asylum applications in Estonia (ECRI, 2005: 19). 1 25 This means that a 
number of immigrants 126 did not create pressure to develop restrictive immigration and 
asylum policy. To sum up, similar to the Finnish and Polish experience, immigration and 
asylum policy have not been regarded as politically salient (apart from as a minority 
issue) in Estonia. This has left a plenty of room for manoeuvre for the elite to dominate 
this policy field. As a consequence, Estonia has created very restrictive immigration and 
asylum policy, where everyday practices have not always respected international human 
rights standards fully (ECRI, 2001; 17; ECRI 2005: 19). This practice is very much in 
line with the Finnish and Polish experience and follows the security-based approach of 
123 This information is based on interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and from the Ministry of the Interior and the same information has been received from 
interviews with Estonian MPs in Tallinn, April 2006. 
124 This infon-nation is based on interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and with interviews with Estonian MPs in Tallinn, April 2006. 
125 This information is based on the statistics of Citizenship and Migration Board of Estonia: 
http: //w%v%v. mig. ce/eng/asylum/asylum/ and on the Council of Europe (its third report on Estonia, adopted 
in June 2005. According this report, only 104 asylum claims have been made in Estonia since 1997, only 4 
people have been granted refugee status and 9 have received 'subsidiary protection in 2003'. In 2004,14 - 
people applied for asylum in Estonia and there was that time 7 pending asylum applications. ECRI was 
further informed that between 2003 and 2604, no one was granted asylum in Estonia and the last time 
anyone was granted refugee status was in 2001 (http: Nv%vw. coe. int /CRI(2006)1 Third report on Estonia. 
See also Estonian Human Rights Development Report, 2002; 114 for similar information. 
126 In addition, there are currently only a small number of immigrants living in Estonia. Partly this is a 
consequence of the fact that an iflimigration quota, which is set yearly at around 0.05% of the permanent 
population is very small. 
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the EU, which emphasises a restrictive rather than a human rights approach and where 
the key actors have been from the elite. The only exception in Estonia is the Russian 
speaking minority issue, which is a production of Estonian history and of geopolitical 
realities. As the next section will show, this issue was not only problematic during the 
negotiation process, but continued to be difficult even after Estonia became a member of 
the EU. 
6.5.5. Third Country Nationals 
At a practical level the most difficult task in 'downloading' EU policies in Estonia was 
related to one particular Council Directive (2003/109 EC) 127 which concerns the status of 
third country nationals who are long-term residents (Van Elsuwege, 2004: 53). The main 
aim of this Directive was to make third-country nationals who legally reside in the EU, 
more equal with the citizens of the EU. It includes issues such as social rights, equal 
treatment in the labour market, as well as other rights relating to education, social 
security and tax benefits. Most importantly, the Directive offers third-country nationals 
who hold long-term residency permits, and their families, a right to move freely to a 
certain degree in to other EU Member States. These are political and social rights that 
Estonia has only offered to third-country nationals through a naturalisation process. As 
earlier sections of this chapter showed, the UK did not 'opt-in' to this Directive because it 
would have required changes to its national law; and for Finland and Poland 
'downloading' this particular Directive did not cause problems at the national level, 
because the number of third country nationals who would have benefited from this 
Directive in these two states was limited. 
Not surprisingly, during the review of the draft legislation in the Estonian Parliament this 
particular Directive raised lively debate amongst MPs. It Nvas considered as unfair, 
because the Directive had been made before Estonia joined the EU. 128 For instance, some 
127 EU Council (2003a) Directive 2003/1.09 EC, concerning the status of third- country nationals who are 
long term residents published in OJ 204 L 16/44. 
i 
12' This information is based on interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and with interviews with Estonian MPs in Tallinn, April 2006. 
217 
Parliamentarians were disappointed that this Directive regarded Turks that had freely 
chosen to live and work in Germany in the same way as retired Russian military persons 
living in Estonia, because they were both considered as 'third country residents'. ' 29 Some 
MPs complained that the EU did not take into consideration any national difference or 
historical legacies which were completely different in the case of Estonia from other 
Member States; The Russians did not 'emigrate' to Estonia whereas Germany and France 
positively attracted immigrants to their countries during the 1960s and 1970S., 30 In 
addition, some Parliamentarians questioned whether any national 'integration conditions' 
(i. e. the language requirements) could still be applied in this Directive at tile 
implementation level. The idea of integration requirements is centred on the premise that 
foreigners who are long-term residents of Estonia, should be able to communicate in 
Estonian. 131 
The Directive 2003/109 did not say anything about integration or language requirements. 
The integration of foreigners into Estonian society by demanding a language test was a 
politically important question. The Parliamentary debates demonstrated again how 
important this question is for MPs because it touched on the core questions of 
sovereignty. Therefore, it was a domestically difficult task to implement this Directive in 
a way that it would have taken the national parti cularities into consideration without at 
the same time being contradictory to EU requirements. However, these concerns were to 
a certain extent shared between the immigration elite in Estonia and the Parliament, but 
the elite understood that the Directive was part of EU legislation and there was no real 
possibility of avoiding its implementation. 132 Based on interview data there were hardly 
any differences between the opposition parties and Government (i. e. elite) regarding this 
Directive. 133 Eventually, Estonia succeeded in finding a solution that served as a 
129 This information is based on interviews Estonian MPs in Tallinn, April 2006 
130 This information is based on interviews Estonian MPs'in Tallinn, April 2006 
... This information is based on interviews with high7middle level civil servants from the Ministry of the 
Interior and similar information was found from the web-pages of the Ministry of the Interior regarding the 
Council Directive 2003/1009/EC ( http//: %v%v-, v. Sisemin. gov. ee). 
132 This information is based on interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and with interviews with Estonian MPs in Tallinn, April 2006. 
133 This information is based on interviews with high/middle level civil servants from the Estonian 
Parliament and with inter-views with Estonian MPs in Tallinn, April 2006. 
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compromise for both national and EU requirements. People who are applying for long- 
term residential status before I June 2007 are not required to pass the language test. The 
language requirements will apply only after that date. With this condition, tile language 
requirement will affect the so called 'new immigrants' arriving later into Estonia. This 
has meant that a large proportion of the Russian speaking minority can now apply for 
long-term residency status without passing the language test. This is possible because 
Estonia decided to apply tile Directive to both third-country nationals and to persons with 
undetermined (i. e. stateless) citizenship who fulfil the requirements specified in the 
Directive. 134 The 'downloading' process for this particular Directive showed that 
Parliament did participate in this process by demanding conditions, which fitted with 
national traditions. 
This Directive helped to solve the problem of stateless persons in Estonia to a certain 
extent (Van Elsuweg, 2004: 54). 135 On the one hand it can be argued that it put an end to 
Estonia's resistance to harmonising EU immigration and asylum legislation in a way that 
was expressed in the accession acquis. On the other hand, this example demonstrated the 
limitations of learning and socialising as the main 'mechanisms of Europeanization'. 
These mechanisms functioned effectively in an environment without national resistance 
or with only a low resistance. The Estonian exam pie showed that the institutional side of 
immigration policy-making, especially concerning generally accepted 'ways of doing 
things', seems rather resistant to Europeanization. 
To conclude, the 'downloading' of the EU's immigration and asylum policy took place 
smoothly, to a great extent, through learning and socialising in Estonia. At the national 
level the immigration elite were in a dominant position in facilitating this process and 
Parliament had a limited role in this process. 136 The only strong resistance in 
'downloading' EU policy in this policy field was the treatment of the Russian speaking 
134 See the further information of this Directive: httn: //w%výv. sisemin. uov. ee. 
135 The problem of stateless people is not a small one in Estonia: according to latest report from ECRI, 
Estonia still has over 139.000 stateless persons in the country (ECRI, 2005: 32). 
136 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have argued that rule adaptation cover a broad range of issues and 
structures and are both formal and informal. They can comprise rules for regulation and distribution in 
specific policy areas, rules of political, administrative, and judicial process, and rules for the setups and 
competences of state and sub-state organizations (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005a: 7) 
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minority, which in Estonia was considered as the core question of immigration policy. In 
this case also Parliament expressed its views strongly alongside the elite, which had tried 
to delay 'downloading' this issue in a way that tile EU had required since the beginning 
of the EU, negotiations. Nevertheless, the Directive was successfully downloaded 
regardless of the strong national residence, which showed again the limitations of the 
uploading and 'downloading' perspectives in analysing Europeanization process. At the 
time this Directive was negotiated at the EU level Estonia was not a member of the EU 
and therefore it did not even have a theoretical opportunity to 'upload' its national 
preferences in order to reduce adaptation costs. In general the role of Parliament in 
'downloading' the EU's immigration and asylum policy has been rather limited; it has 
mainly acted as a 'law approving machine' which was also the case in uploading EU 
policies (see chapter 5). However, as the Parliamentary debates regarding Directive 
2003/109 showed, Parliament has become more cautious about EU legislation when it 
strongly resonates with national interests. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to look at the 'downloading' dimension of 
Europeanization in immigration related issues in the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia. 
This chapter examined how European policies have been incorporated into the domestic 
institutions, practices, policies and policy structures and how that process took place and 
what role, if any, the National Parliaments (NPs) had in that process. The following 
observations can be made. First, the circumstances in which the countries chose to join 
the EC/EU had to a certain extent influenced how they downloaded the EU's immigration 
and border control policies. For the UK, joining the EC was mostly an economic issue. 
The main objective of the UK's participation in EU level immigration policies has been 
the desire to make other EU Member States follow the British domestic policies rather 
than change its own legislation in line with the EU legislation. Nevertheless, this chapter 
argued that British immigration and asylum policy have changed to a certain extent due 
to the EU because other EU Member States have intensified their cooperation in this 
policy field and this has had indirect implications for the UK. 
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For Finland, Poland and Estonia EU membership was also a political question, which 
facilitated, to a certain extent, the adaptation process of the EU immigration policies. In 
the case offinland, national immigration policies have long been prepared with regard to 
the EU context, and adaptation has not caused any strong national resistance. In Poland 
and Estonia the impact of the EU has been strong; first, because of the conditional 
element when joining the EU; and second because of the lack of their own national 
immigration policies due to their Communist past. The EU has been the main external 
driving force, and this chapter observed that many changes have taken place to a great 
extent through learning and socialising. 
History and the geopolitical location in Europe have implications for how immigration is 
understood and how the policy itself is defined. The UK has a long tradition of 
welcoming (labour) immigrants with developed national policies, whereas Finland has 
only recently begun to attract a small number of immigrants, without any traditions of 
integrating them in to society. In Finland, immigrants are usually connected to 
humanitarian protection which means that they have not been considered so far a source 
of economic growth as is the case in the UK. In the case of Poland and Estonia, 
immigration is still more related to the circumst ances existing after the Second World 
(WWII) War. Because of the changes in regimes and borders after WWII, both countries 
faced large forced immigration flows which have impacted on how they define 
immigration today and how they have downloaded the EU policies in immigration field. 
However, common to all four countries has been the low level of interest among the 
Parliamentarians participating in the EU level policy formation. 
The implementation of Directive 2003/109 which concerned the status of third country 
nationals demonstrated the difficulties underpinning the concept of a 'common' EU 
immigration policy. The UK decide not to 'opt-in' to this directive because the UK saw 
this issue as a national concern. In Finland and Poland implementation of this Directive 
did not cause any particular problerns because in these countries there is a fairly limited 
number of persons who would benefit from this Directive. However, in Estonia, this 
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Directive faced serious national resistance because its main beneficiary was the Russian 
speaking minority. 
Nevertheless, this chapter found some similarities between these four countries. A 
common characteristic in all four Member States is the dominant role of the 
Governmental elite, mainly civil servants from the Ministry of the Interior. This means 
that to a great extent, EU policy making is in the hands of a small group of elite which 
operates at both levels (i. e. national and EU level). This is tile main explanation as to why 
the socialisation and policy learning process has produced similar attitudes in the four 
countries under consideration. These elites are deeply Europeanized. This strong elite 
influence has been further facilitated by weak or absent opposition views at tile national 
level, particularly in Poland, Estonia and to a lesser extent in case of Finland. In the case 
of the UK, the elite channelled more critical views expressed by the public than was the 
case in Finland and Estonia, which have almost as eurosceptic a public as the UK. In the 
Finnish case, the difference is most obvious: the elite is highly 'pro-European' and the 
public is fairly 'euro-sceptic' but this gap between the Finnish elite and public opinion is 
not to be observed when analysing Finnish effectiveness in 'downloading' EU policies. 
But the role of National Parliaments in 'downloading' EU policies in this policy field has 
been weak. This chapter observed that the NPs in these four EU Member States have 
shared the same concerns as their Governments regarding irregular immigration and the 
rooting out of abuse in the immigration system. But besides that, their role has been very 
limited. This is mainly because in each of the four EU Member States, policy-making on 
immigration issues has been contextualized against security needs and this view has been 
shared both by the Parliaments (to a lesser extent also in UK the House of Lords) and 
Governments. In Poland and Estonia, the Parliaments have considered immigration issues 
as rather technical issues, and not politically interesting, with two exceptions (common 
visa-policy in Poland and the Directive of 'third country nationals' in Estonia). In these 
cases both Parliaments protested against the EU policy and tried to delay the 
'downloading' process. Although tile issues were different, the main objective was the 
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same; EU policies went to the heart of their newly found sovereignty and the Parliaments 
reacted. 
This chapter observed that in Finland, Poland and Estonia immigration policy has so far 
not been a significant political issue because of the low numbers of immigrants living in 
these countries, together with the lack of traditions in this policy field and because the 
immigrants have not been considered as a source of economic growth. On the other 
hand, in the UK the issue has been regarded as a highly significant political issue, but still 
the role taken by Parliament does not differ greatly from the Finnish, Polish or Estonian 
examples. The main explanation is that the British Government is already driving a 
policy that reflects the needs of the Parliament. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusions of the Participation of the National Parliaments 
in the EU's policy process in the JHA Field 
Introduction 
This research has examined tile factors that affect the Europeanization of National 
Parliaments (NPs) in the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia in the EU's policy process in 
the specific field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). It has analysed their participation in 
the EU's pol icy oil internal security, and more specifically, on 'immigration- related' 
issues. This research had two aims; first, to analyse whether National Parliaments in these 
four countries have been able to 'upload' their national interests to the EU level and if so, 
how successfully. A second dimension of this research was to examine how these EU 
level policy outcomes were 'downloaded' at the national level and what role the NPs 
have in that process. 
The role of National Parliaments (NPs) is important because the citizens of the Member 
States are represented at EU level through their National Parliaments and because they 
transform EU legislation into national law. Further, in order to increase the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU, improving the participation of the NPs in EU policy-making 
(including JHA policy) has been considered to be the best way to promote that goal. 
However, attempts to increase citizens' involvement and democratic control in EU 
policy-making seems to have disappeared from the aims of the EU at least in the field of 
JHA since the terrorist attacks of I Ith September 2001. The recent trend in this policy 
sector has been to create internal security strategies with a logic similar to that applied to 
external security issues (Pellerin, 2004; Laveneux and Wallace, 2005; House of Lords, 
2006b), which put the political goals of 'increasing democratic control of tile NPs in EU 
policy-making' and 'bringing the EU closer to the citizens' under threat. This is because 
much of that cooperation in field of JHA (such as G6 meetings) takes place in the levels 
which are lacking democratic control as explained in this thesis. Therefore, it is important 
to look at the factors that affect the participation of National Parliaments in tile EU policy 
process in particular in the field of JHA. 
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This chapter draws together the conclusions of this comparative Study. The first chapter 
of this research presented the research question and introduced the research rationale and 
strategy. After that, the focus was on st udies that draw on the concept of Europeanization; 
how this concept has been used for explaining a wide variety of effects in the national 
scene with a direct EU source or indirect EU influence and whether this concept could 
offer a tool for explaining the factors that affect the participation of NPs in the EU policy 
process. Then the thesis explained the institutional structures which provide tools for the 
NPs to participate in the EU policy process and analysed how these structures have 
developed parallel to EU evolution and tried to explain why the NPs have established 
structures alike. The next aim was to introduce the link between NPs and JHA and 
explain why it is important for NPs to participate effectively in the EU policy process in 
that particular policy field. Chapter 5 and 6 examined empirically the participation of NPs 
in two dimensions; first, what the structures were which the four NPs have established to 
participate in the EU policy process and after that, whether they were able to use these 
structures to 'upload' (bring) their preferences to the EU level policy-making (chapter 5); 
and secondly, hoNv EU level outcomes were 'downloaded' (chapter 6) to the national 
level in each Member State and what role the NPs had in that. This understanding of 
Europeanization derives from the existing literature, which has made a distinction 
between the 'up' and 'downloading' perspectives (136rzel, 2005; Goertz, 2005). 
The structure of this concluding chapter is as follows: Section (1) explains the main 
observations in this research, Section (11) links the findings back to the hypotheses 
addressed in the first chapter in order to find out whether the variables have any 
explanatory power as potential factors affecting the Europeanization of NPs. The factors 
that this thesis hypothesized as important were: (1) legal traditions, (2) the administrative Z: l 
resources available for the NPs (3) the socio-economic level of each Member State and 
(4) geopolitical location. Lastly, Section (111) explains other interesting findings of this 
thesis and it suggests that these can be used for generating ftirther hypotheses for ftiture 
research in this policy field. 
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The main observations in this research can be summarized as follows: (1) the four NPs all 
have institutional structures which offer adequate opportunities for participating in EU 
policy-making and these structures have many similarities. This observation suggests that 
this is due to the process of Europeanization; (2) The main mechanisms through which 
Europeanization has applied to the NPs have been learning and socialising; (3) NPs are 
not using their opportunities to participate in EU's immigration and border control 
policies as effectively as they could; (4) The NPs have very similar views regarding 
context of what the EU's common immigration policy should be, which this research 
suggests, is due to the European ization; (5) Separating 'uploading' and 'downloading' 
perspectives of Europeanization did not explain the participation of NPs in the EU policy 
process in this policy field as much as assumed. Each of the observation and finding will 
be analysed individually in this concluding chapter. 
Section I 
7.1. Main Observations 
7.1.1. Similar Institutional Structures. for Participating in the EU Policy Process 
This thesis observed that the National Parliaments of the UK, Finland, Poland and 
Estonia have all institutional structures whi ch offer adequate opportunities for 
participating in EU policy-making and that these structures have many similarities. This 
thesis suggests that this is due to the process of Europeanization. Further, this result 
indicates that the main mechanisms through which Europeanization has influenced the 
National Parliaments in this respect have been learning and socialising. As the examples 
iti chapters 4 and 5 illustrated, the NPs in these four countries have responded to the 
challenges of EU policy-making by creating new institutional structures parallel to tile 
EU Treaty changes. The empirical examples illustrated that these new participation 
structures of the NPs consist of the formal rules, such as functions of European Affairs 
Committees (EAC), but also of informal processes, Such as keeping contacts with 
members of the EP and other NPs and of procedures, which are imitated from other EU 
actors, such as from interest organisations. 
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This research observed that the most important way that all four Parliaments participate 
in the EU policy process is through their EACs (i. e. hidii-ectly). The comparison showed 
that the duties and functions of these Committees have many similarities but more 
importantly, that these structures offer adequate opportunities for participating in EU 
policy-making for all four NPs. The research observed that the four National Parliaments 
have developed their national participation structures incrementally and simultaneously 
with the evolution of the EU. This 'incremental process of change' is one of the 
characteristics that the Europeanization literature stresses (Radaelli, 2006; Bulmer and 
Burch, 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). As explained in chapter 1, the concept of 
Europeanization can be defined as an interactive process where rules and procedures are 
constructed and defined in the EU policy process and then incorporated into the logic of 
domestic discourse, identities and political structures (Radaelli, 2006). 
When analysing how the institutional roles of NPs developed parallel with EU evolution, 
this thesis suggests that the process of Europeanization influenced their roles in the 
following way: first, the EU Treaties offered formal rules, such as Declaration 13 of the 
Maastricht Treaty which presented guidelines to allow NPs better access to information. 
However it was left to each Member States to decide domestically whether they do that 
and how. After a short while these guidelines were institutionalized in the national 
structures of the NPs and this research observed that these national arrangements have 
many similarities although Declarations do'not have any legally binding effect. This 
research suggests that this development was strongly influenced by the cross-national 
learning, as the empirical examples showed in chapter 5. Another example, one where the 
first incentive also came from the EU, but which was further developed by the NPs 
themselves, was to increase mutual interaction among NPs by strengthening the 
'Conferences of European Affairs Committees' (COSAC) (Protocol 14 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty). This Protocol constructed an informal supranational platform for members of 
NPs to exchange their views and gave them an opportunity for cross-national learning. 
HoNVever, the incentives from the EU were not the only reasons for increasing the role of 
NPs in EU policy-making; the NPs had also begun to demand more say at the EU level in 
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order to compensate for the loss of legislative powers which had been transferred to a 
great extent to the EU level with earlier Treaty changes (such as SEA). ' 
An example of intensified cooperation among the NPs, which is based on the activities of 
NPS, is the great number of various forms of practical interparliamentary cooperation, 
which they have established outside of EU structures. Bilateral and multilateral meetings 
are now organized between NPs and the European Parliament (EP) regularly, meetings 
are held between various EACs, as well as between more specialised standing 
committees and between political groups (ECPRD: 2003; Holzhacker, 2007; EU 
Commission 2005f). The evidence suggests that these informal forums of among 
Parliaments give opportunities for cross-national learning and socialising. For instance 
when analysing the methods and topics dealt with in these various forms of cooperation, 
the evidence indicate that the NPs have copied many practices used by the EU 
Commission, interests groups and networks. This observation suggests that cross-national 
learning has taken place and has had certain influence not only to the procedures but to a 
certain extent to political cultures in the NPs as well. This means that the NPs have not 
only learned from each other but also from other institutions dealing with EU policy- 
making. For instance some NPs have established smaller groups among themselves to 
follow up certain immigration issues such as de velopment of the Schengen legislation 
(VISEGRAD countries, see chapter 5) and these groups have many similarities with the 
working groups of the Council of Minister's. To sum up, these new forms of intensified 
cooperation between Parliaments indicate that the 'formal and informal' cooperation 
forms were first defined at the EU level and later incorporated to a great extent in 
domestic structures and practices, and cross-national learning was an important 
mechanism through which this Europeanization process took place. This observation is in 
line with the Europeanization literature. The next section will further elaborate the cross- 
national learning. 
7.1.2. Learning and Socialising 
1 The Single European Act was aimed at completing the process of creating an internal market, and with 
that Treaty change, (as explained in chapters 3 and 4) EU institutions gained much more decision-making 
power at the cost of NPs. 
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As explained in Chapter 1, this research was investigating the mechanism of 
Europeanization which could best explain the participation of National Parliaments in the 
EU policy-process in the JHA field. It observed that the main mechanism were learning 
and socialising, although it observed that there were also some 'top-down' 
Europeanization in particular in the case of Poland and Estonia. 
This thesis observed some Practical examples of the cross-national learning and 
socialising that could have characterised the Europeanization of NPs. The first case is 
linked to the processes where domestic participation models for the NPs were created: the 
interview material demonstrated that when Finland was preparing its Parliamentary 
participation structures for EU membership, the examples of other Parliaments in the EU 
Member States were carefully studied and the advantages and disadvantages were 
compared. An example of cross-national learning is that after comparisons, the Finns 
chose to follow to a large extent, the Danish model, which was considered most effective 
for the Finnish Parliament. In addition, the Danish model seemed to fit best with Finnish 
political and Parliamentary traditions. 
Similar learning and socialising effects took place when Poland and Estonia were 
establishing their structures for Parliamentary participation in EU policy-making. They 
too looked at the examples from other EU Member States and were studying their 
systems. In the case of Estonia, as result of cross-national learning process the Finnish 
Parliamentary participation system was followed to a great extent (see chapter 5). In 
addition, however, the Parliaments in the accession countries (2004 enlargement)2 were 
not only studying the examples of existing EU members but also learning from each other 
and from EU institutions. In that context the NPs followed in new Member States many 
practices used by EU institutions especially related in information-sharing and policy- 
making networks partly because the EU offering both financial and practical help for 
2 There are regular bi-and multilateral meetings, which are held with other 'like-minded' Parliaments. In 
the case of Estonia for instance, meetings are held with other Baltic states + Poland and in these meetings 
they discuss Schengen-related issues. Another example is '5+1' group. These cooperation forms were listed 
and briefly discussed in chapter 5 (under the section 'direct influence') 
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establish certain civil society networks in new Member States (and in their NPs). All 
these examples indicate that they had extended the learning environment by creating 
other informal platforms for mutual learning and socialising. Originally these informal 
forums for cooperation were created to help preparations for EU membership. However, 
after being accepted into the EU, the NI's found these forms of cooperation still valuable 
and they were institutionalized into their national structures. These examples also support 
the earlier argument of this section that the EU first provided an incentive for establishing 
these informal cooperation forms which were further developed by the participants 
themselves (in this case accession states). 
In the UK, however, learning did not play a major role when it joined the European 
Community (EC) in the 1970s. The main reason for this is that at that time the EC was 
very different organization and much smaller from what it was when Finland, Poland and 
Estoniajoined. In addition, at that time Parliaments were left out of the EC's decision and 
policy-making, and the decisions were made unanimously, which meant that Member 
States could protect their national preferences much more easily than later in the EU. 
Nevertheless, learning and socialising apply on the UK Parliament too. As chapter 5 
illustrated, both Houses in the UK have developed their Parliamentary participation 
methods parallel with EU developments and parallel with other EU Member States and 
the structures have many similarities. 
Further, this thesis observed that the Parliaments are not only learning from each other 
but also to a certain extent they are imitating examples of other actors operating at the EU 
level, such as interest organisations and lobbies, by creating informal platforms in 
different compositions. The main objective is to intensify their opportunities to 
participate in EU policy-making more effectively and to compensate for the loss of 
traditional legislative powers to EU institutions (see chapter 4). In addition, this research 
suggests that these practices demonstrate a change in beliefs and in 'ways of doing 
things' among the NPs: they have created methods which are similar to networking and 
lobbying, which is likely to be a consequence of learning. An example of an innovation 
similar to networking and lobbying is that each of the four NPs has appointed a 
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permanent liaison officer in the EP. This also indicates of the change in political cultures 
among the Parliaments which is could be due to the cross-national learning process. Tile 
main function of these liaison officer is to assist her/his EACs at the national level by 
gathering EU information directly from the EU and offering a vital channel for informal 
communication between the NPs and EU institutions. The formula used by these liaison 
offices is very similar to the interest organisations and networks and fairly far away from 
-the traditional functions of the NPs. This means that the NPs have learned ways to 
intensify their dii-ect information channels similarly to the ways in which interest 
organisations operate. 
In addition, this research observed that all four NPs have intensified their cooperation 
with tile EP, mostly through their MEPs. In this respect Poland and Estonia are tile most 
advanced because they have established a system which invites their MEN to participate 
in every EAC meeting at the national level. The main objective has been to use the 
expertise of the Polish/Estonian MEN in a more structured way and to create a direct 
channel to bring their national priorities to the EU level, which is similar to the strategies 
used by interest organisations. 
Another observation supporting cross-national learning and socialising as important 
mechanisms of Europeanization of NPs is the ways in which the behaviour of the Chair 
of the EAC influences the use of dii-ect influence channels in the Parliament and how 
importantly the role of that Committee is considered among Parliamentarians. Based on 
interview material from Finland and Estonia, research data indicates that if the Chair of 
the EAC is actively developing his/her personal contacts and using (fil-ect influence 
channels in EU policy-making, it sets an example for the next Chair of the EAC in how to 
use direct contacts actively. The next Chair is then likely to follow the previous example, 
which will soon lead to an institutionalization of that kind of behaviour. However, in the 
case of Estonia, where the EAC has been functioning only for a short time period, it is 
too early to say whether this pattern of institutionalization will take place. Nevertheless, 
there are some similarities between Finland and Estonia which give reason to expect a 
certain amount of institutionalization. For instance, this research found evidence that in 
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both Parliaments being a Chair of the EAC is a highly regarded task among MPs. The 
members of the EAC are mostly experienced MPs Nvith a good knowledge of the EU, 
with language skills, and many of them have experience of being a minister in the 
Government. In both countries the present Chairs of the EAC are previous Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs. 
Part of this applies to the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC) in tile House of Lords. For 
example, the ESC is also a highly regarded body among the Members of the Lords and 
being chosen as chair of the ESC is a highly competitive process. The members of the 
ESC are often persons with extensive EU experience. The interview data suggests that tile 
Members of the Lords are effectively using personal contacts from their previous 
positions in their work in -the Committee. However, it must be kept in mind that (as 
explained in chapter 5), nomination to the House of Lords differs greatly from the other 
NPs and it can be asked how democratic the House of Lords is at all. In addition, their 
working methods are different and they are free from the party discipline which puts 
them in a different position to 'normal' MPs who have to be elected to the Parliament 
every four years or so. 
On the other hand, the interview data indicated that exercising dil-ect influence is not 
considered an important way for the Commons to participate in the EU policy process as 
it is in the case of the House of Lords. For example, the Chair of the ESC in the 
Commons only mentioned those rather formal connections between the EP and the UK 
Parliament (twice a year joint meetings with MEPs and the Lords and irregular meetings 
with British Commissioners when possible). The only occasion where informal contacts 
were pointed out was party connections; British MPs have regular contacts with their 
European counterparts. These contacts might be important on a personal level, but they 
do not bring much information to the Committees. In addition, none of the other 
Members of the Commons ESC emphasised direct personal contacts at the EU level as a 
valuable information source for direct influence. 
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In case of Poland (the seim), the EAC is not regarded as paticularly interesting 
Committee and because of that, MPs are not particularly keen to serve on it. The present 
Chair of the EAC has so far not taken a very active role in the Polish Sijm. 3 However, the 
previous chair of the Polish EAC was more EU experienced and had therefore succeeded 
in increasing the role of the EAC in general in the Polish EU policy process, where the 
elite are in general in a dominant position in EU policy preparation at the national level. 
The main reas on is that the Polish Governments have been relatively weak and they have 
stayed in power only for a short time, which has increased the power of elites. Several 
changes in the composition of the Government in a short time period have further 
weakened the functions of the EAC. As this example of Poland showed, it is too early to 
make any firm suggestions about the role of Chair of the EAC in analysing the use of 
direct influence in Poland. However, these observations from examples of the behaviour 
of the Chair of the EAC and the reputation of the EAC indicate that learning and 
socialising as a mechanism of Europeanization have had some impact in Finland, Estonia 
and the House of Lords. 
7.1.3. Participation Opportunities in Immigration and Border Control Matters 
The third main observation of this thesis is that the four NPs (except the House of Lords) 
are not using their opportunities to participate in the EU's immigration and border control 
policies as effectively as they could. This argument is drawn from comparing 
Parliamentary debates, minutes of Committee meetings, and conducting interviews 
among the Parliamentarians (MPs) and civil servants in two EU policy areas; 
immigration and border control. 
When analysing how National Parliaments can participate at the practical level in the EU 
policy process, this research divided the Parliamentary influence into two categories: 
indii-ect or dii-ect Influence. 4 The empirical findings suggest that the institutional 
3 Members of Senate were not interviewed for this purpose, because the role of the Senate is different (see 
chapter 4). In addition, the Senate has qnly limited role in EU's immigration questions. 
4 When exercising influence thi-ough the Government, which is the traditional and most common way, it 
depends heavily on the Parliamentary structure whether or not the Parliament has real possibilities to 
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structures of Parliaments in tile four countries offer them opportunities to participate 
effectively by exercising both ways of influence .5 An example of 
how the four NPs 
participated in the EU policy process was a comparison of their responses to the Green 
Paper on Economic Migration (chapter 5). The Green Paper was chosen because the 
responses offer an effective way for different stakeholders to use their influence over the 
direction of future EU policies. In addition, responding to Green Papers provides NPs 
with a way of exercising both c1ii-ect and in(ffi-ect influence. 
The comparisons demonstrated that none of the four Parliaments under consideration, 
except the House of Lords in the UK, used their opportunities to exercise dii-ect influence 
by providing own respond to the EU Commission. They did not exercise either their 
influence indii-ect1j, by requiring changes to the opinion prepared by their Governments. 
This indicates that the NPs had a very moderate, if any role at all, in forming national 
responses to this Green Paper (as was the case in Poland). This observation raises several 
questions (which will be discussed further in the next section): first, were the four 
Parliaments satisfied with their limited influence in forming EU immigration policy? 
Why did they not use their channels for dii-ect influence? Was economic migration an 
irrelevant question for them? 
In order to find out whether the lack of interest among the NPs was only related to this 
particular Green Paper, or whether it indicated a more general tendency among the NPs, 
the immigration-related debates in the four Parliaments were examined between May 
2004 and June 2006.6 The comparisons showed that similar questions were dealt with in 
each of the four NPs. The four NPs were mainly considering issues that were restrictive, 
change the Parliamentary agenda, (As explained in chapter 5 the Government non-nally sets the 
Parliamentary agenda). And this practice normally gives the Government a dominant position as analysed 
in chapter 5. 
5 The main dil-ect channels named in this research (explained in chapter 5) are regular contacts with the EU 
institutions, in particular with the EP, which has legislative powers, and with the EU Commission, which 
prepares EU legislation. In addition, the direct influence channels also include a regular dialogue with civil 
society, interest groups and NGOs at the national level. 
6 Because in Finland almost all EU-related debates are held behind closed doors (either in the Grand 
Committee or in Special Committees), the minutes of the EAC meetings in Finland were analysed in order 
to compare the debates. Also, the minutes of meetings in Poland and Estonia to2ether with supplementary 
interview material were used in order to compensate for the lack of recorded debates in these NPs. 
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but more importantly, (except with the case of the House of Lords) the NPs were mostly 
satisfied with the information given by their Governments and they tried not to provide 
any new or controversial information to be delivered to the EU policy process by using 
indirect or direct channels for influence. In Poland and Estonia, the discussions in 
Parliament were very limited, and in most cases, there was no record of debates on these 
topics at all. 
The evidence suggests that with border control issues the tendency was the same, if not 
even less enthusiastic. In addition, this research faced some difficulties in finding 
comparable cases in border control issues. This is because the UK has chosen not to 
participate in Schengen structures and because Poland and Estonia are not accepted as 
participants in Schengen structures. This means that only Finland from these four 
countries is a full participant in this cooperation. 7 'Based on the abovementioned 
difficulties to find comparable cases, the thesis looked at only one case: the establishment 
of the external border control agency, FRONTEX (chapter 5). This example, however, 
suggested first, that border control issues were dealt with to a great extent at the 
Governmental level in Finland, Poland and Estonia, and secondly, it suggested that the 
role of elites was significant in these three EU Member States. This is because the 
comparison showed that there was only very limited discussion about this topic in the 
Finnish and Estonian Parliaments. In Poland this issue was not discussed in the 
Parliament at all, which is rather interesting, because the headquarters of FRONTEX was 
eventually established in Warsaw. These observations raise the question whether the 
issue was not politically relevant in these three countries. In the UK, on the other hand, it 
was considered politically relevant and as evidence of that, both Houses had extensive 
inquiries and discussions on this topic (see chapter 5). 
The following observations clearly have their limits because there were so few 
comparable cases relating to tile topic of border control and immigration. First, the lack 
of discussions in the Finnish, Estonian and Polish Parliaments Suggests that the elite 
7 Schengen cooperation is important because it forms tile cornerstone of the EU's border control policy and 
has implications for tile EU's immigration and asylum-policy as Nvell. 
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dominates this policy field not only at the EU level but also at the national level; and 
secondly, considering the FRONTEX question, the NPs have accepted the creation of 
new serniautonomous institutions with operational powers at the EU level, which 
undeniably 'will decrease the democratic control of these institutions. 8 In the case of tile 
UK, however, the participation of Parliament in the FRONTEX case indicates that border 
control issues are considered politically more interesting in tile UK than in the other three 
NPs., Its geopolitical (island) position has some explanatory value in the UK's case, at 
least at an ernotional level. This is because the UK does not have a land border with any 
other country (except Ireland) as the three other Countries do; and the island position 
gives it a sense of isolation. 
7.1.4. Similar Preferences for a Common Immigration Policy 
The evidence revealed certain similarities among the four NPs; first, the questions 
considered by the NPs in the immigration field were relatively similar in the UK, Finland, 
Poland and Estonia, although the way that these matters were dealt with in the NPs 
differed greatly (i. e. whether these questions raised debates in the NPs or not). This was 
also a surprising observation because the systems for choosing the topics which are 
considered in each Parliament are different9. Secondly, most Parliaments (except tile 
House of Lords) supported restrictive immigration policies instead of liberal ones. Tile 
comparison demonstrated that tile NPs (again except the House of Lords) were mainly 
considering issues that were restrictive: (i. e. aimed at controlling immigration or 
preventing illegal immigrants from entering the EU area, by intensifying the cooperation 
among the law enforcement officers). These were the issues that raised the most debates 
in each of the four Parliaments. 
(i) The same EU Proposal - Different Emphasis 
This is because semiautonomous institutions are usually controlled only by the EU Council, if at all. 
As chapter 5 demonstrated, tile Finnish and Estonian Parliaments are following the EU agenda in their 
Parliamentary Committee work and the selection of material dealt in the Parliaments is based on the 
Government's initiative. But in the case of the UK and Poland, the Committees themselves choose which 
topic they bring for the Parliaments' consideration. 
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The comparisons showed that the same EU proposal had different emphasis depending on 
which NPs considered it. The UK Parliament (both Houses) in particular were concerned 
with the privacy of Member State individuals in immigration and border control matters 
at the EU level and in particular when intensifying cooperation between law enforcement 
officers in different EU Member States. Tile Finnish Parliaments had similar concerns as 
the UK Parliament. In addition, Parliaments in the UK and Finland were also concerned 
about the transparency and accountability of immigration and border control cooperation 
-at 
the EU level. This concern became real after the terrorist attacks in September 2001. 
As explained in chapter 3, these attacks brought internal security issues to the centre of 
EU policy-making and immigration and asylum issues became linked to a great extent to 
the internal security threat. As a consequence, a growing amount of cooperation in this 
policy field started to take place at the intergovernmental level without any democratic 
control. The Lords, in particular, raised concerns related to these cooperation forms, 
which also awoke debates in the House of Commons. Similar concerns, but only to a 
limited extent, were expressed in the Finnish Parliament. 
Another observation which was common for the UK and the Finnish Parliaments was that 
debates on cooperation between law enforcement officers were not purely EU 
immigration issues for most MPs. On the contrary, the debates illustrated that many other 
concerns expressed by the MPs in these two countries were hardly related to these 
particular EU proposals at all. This observation indicates that immigration is a large 
phenomenon which is difficult to deal with; it has large-scale implications for many 
different fields of society, but the main concern among MPs was a feeling of threat - that 
immigrants would exploit welfare benefits, that an increase of immigrants would multiply 
the criminality or that extending EU cooperation among the laNv enforcement officers at 
the EU level would lead to an exploitation of data protection of ordinary citizens who are 
mainly native Britons and Finns. In other words, these debates were hardly related to the 
EU's immigration policies as such but reflected the fear which has been successfully 
included at EU level action when considering immigration questions and now the same 
kind of thinking is found from the national levels. 
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However, similar kinds of concerns related to the data protection or to the protection of 
civil liberty rights were not found in the debates in Polish or Estonian Parliaments. The 
main interest among the MPs in Poland and Estonia were the procedures: what tile EU 
proposals were about and who participates in them. These were tile questions asked of 
FRONTEX when it was dealt with in the Estonian Parliament. The lack of real discussion 
about the context of the EU proposals in the immigration policy field indicates the 
following: first, MPs in Poland and Estonia are not adequately informed about EU 
proposals; or secondly, that the protection of civil rights (and democratic control of EU 
policies) are not considered as important as they are among MPs in the UK and Finland 
because of the Communist past. Or lastly, many MPs in Estonia and Poland do not 
understand how much te clinical information is exchanged between EU Member States 
already and what the implications of these measures are for the civil rights of EU citizens. 
This is because most of the EU legislation was never discussed at all in the NPs in 
Estonia and Poland when it was 'downloaded' to the national law with a very strict time 
frame. To sum up, the evidence suggests that the security-based thinking model which 
was first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process has been incorporated in the 
logic of national rules, procedures and 'ways of doing things' in each of the four 
Parliaments, and this finding illustrates a high level of Europeanization. 
(H) Party Differences - Immigration is a National Issue 
What does all this tell us? First, the research data revealed a puzzle: interview material 
shows that most Parliamentarians in each of the four NPs consider participating in the EU 
policy process in immigration questions as an important goal, but when examining how 
the participation has taken place in practice, the evidence suggests that the four 
Parliaments (except in the case of the House of Lords) are neither trying to 'bring' any of 
their preferences to the EU level (different from their Governments) or 'importing' any 
EU outcomes from EU level to national level. This observation leads to an interpretation 
of the outcome that there are hardly any differences between the four NPs and their 
Governments concerning the preferences of EU's immigration policy. In addition, this 
indicates that the differences between political parties are insignificant: they all want to 
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restrict immigration at the EU level. This applies in particular to the question of 
economic migration; the answers from NPs demonstrated that preference was given to 
security-based policies, which restrict rather than liberalize immigration. In addition, 
economic migration was considered as a question that should be left to the Member 
States. In Finland and Estonia, for instance, the differences between Ministries are greater 
than the differences between political parties when considering the EU's immigration 
policy. In Po land, immigration is not politically interesting at all. In the UK, on the 
contrary, immigration is a salient political issue, and one could expect that party 
differences are significant. The differences can be great at the national level; the UK has 
a national immigration policy, unlike the other three EU Member States, but this research 
did not find any real differences among the parties regarding their attitudes towards EU's 
immigration policy that would have had an impacCon the EU's immigration policies. A 
great part of that can be explained by the British opt-out policy, which allows the UK in 
most cases to choose whether to 'opt-in' the EU policy that best suits its national 
preferences, as explained in chapter 6. 
The main answer to the abovementioned puzzle is the fact that immigration is considered 
as a national issue and it is strongly linked to the question of sovereignty i. e. to the 
question of belonging (Drewry et aL, 2004; Lahav, 2004a). Interview data showed that 
most MPs are not keen to have more EU involvement in this policy field in any of the 
four NPs, even' though this issue is not politically interesting in Estonia and Poland. 
Further, the evidence suggests that many Parliamentarians are suspicious about the 
capacities of othei- EU Member States to control their borders and prevent illegal 
immigrants entering the EU area. Estonian and Finnish MPs mentioned the Southern EU 
Member States as the main concern and the British MPs raised concern about tile 
capacities of Eastern Europe. This all implies that even though EU cooperation is 
considered necessary for controlling immigration at the EU level, it is still regarded as a 
national issue, which is the main obstacle for establishing a common immigration policy 
for the EU. 
7.1.5. The Useftilness of 'Uploading' and 'Downloading' Perspectives 
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As the comparisons above demonstrated, National Parliaments have effectively 
implemented EU policies based on their Governments' proposals without always 
necessarily thinking of them as 'EU policies'. In addition, the evidence suggests that they 
have not actively tried to 'upload' their preferenceslo to the EU level either indii-ectly or 
dii-ectly. This observation leads to the main weakness of the traditional understanding of 
'uploading' and 'downloading' perspectives. It assumes that national priorities need to be 
first 'uploaded' or exported to the EU level in order to be easier 'downloaded' nationally. 
The main motivation according to this understanding is that 'the more European policy 
fits the domestic context, the lower the cost of adaptation in the implementation process 
is' (Bbrzel, 2005). An additional advantage of 'uploading' issues to the EU level is that it 
may enable Member States to address problems at the EU level which pre-occupy them 
but cannot be effectively dealt with at the domestic level any 1pore (Bbrzel, 2002 and 
2005). But what if there exists no clear cut line where European policies end and national 
policies begin? As this research has observed, each of the four NPs have effectively 
'downloaded' EU policies based on their Governments' proposals without always 
necessarily thinking of them as 'EU policies'. 
Another reason to question the usefulness of separating 'downloading' and 'uploading' 
dimensions in this particular policy field is that the process of Europeanization of the 
EU's immigration policies continues at the national level. The policy goals are largely 
produced by the small elite, which functions both at national and EU levels. As well as 
'uploading' national preferences to the EU level, the 'downloading' process of these EU 
outcomes also rests in the hands of immigration elites, who though formally working 
under the Government, are in fact fairly independent. Moreover, (as explained in chapter 
3) the traditional powers of national Member States (and therefore their Parliaments and 
Governments) are reduced further with semiautonomous or operational agencies such as 
Europol, Eurojust and Frontex, which are another important group of actors in this policy 
10 As mentioned earlier in this research, this research is aware of the danners of assuming that Parliaments 
are a united actor. However, the evidence Suggests that in this particular policy field (EU's immigration 
and border policies) the party differences are not very relevant. All the evidence suggests that they all 
(except the House of Lords) prefer restrictive policies, which are strongly driven by their immigration 
elites. 
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field. What follows is that the policy-making in the field of immigration at the EU level is 
divided into many different layers. The only actors able to cope in this policy-making 
labyrinth are the immigration elite. Because of their dominance, this research suggests 
that separating the 'uploading' and 'downloading' perspectives of Europeanization does 
not provide a very helpful tool in explaining the participation of National Parliaments in 
the EU policy process in the JHA field. 
A third argument which questions the usefulness of separating these perspectives of 
Europeanization was found in chapter 6. That chapter demonstrated how Parliaments 
have effectively 'downloaded' EU policy outcomes as national laws without 'uploading' 
any preferences to the EU level. Instead, as the case of Finnish Parliament showed, 
national immigration laws have been prepared to fit with the future legislative plans at the 
EU level. This could be due to the process of Europeanization or it could mean that it is 
easier for Member States (and in particular for NPs) to rely on EU legislation instead of 
making any national strategies, because if national policies did not 'fit' with the EU 
outcomes, then they could create a national resistance, which could delay the national 
'downloading' process. One explanation is that the Finnish elite are divided over 
immigration questions and therefore the EU offers a trouble-free solution. Nevertheless, 
this Finnish example provides ftirther evidence to question the usefulness of separating 
the 'uploading' and 'downloading' dimensions. 
The fourth argument for questioning the usefulness of this traditional understanding in 
the field of JHA was found in the UK. This research observed that the 'downloading' has 
a different meaning in the case of the UK because it is only partially participating in the 
EU's immigration policies. This again reduces the meaningfulness of separating these 
perspectives of Europeaniýation from each other. Nevertheless, although only partially 
participating in this policy field, the evidence suggests that the House of Commons has 
not played an active role either by 'uploading' or by 'downloading' its preferences to the 
EU level. The main motivation for the Parliament in the UK to effectively 'download' 
those EU policies in which the UK has participated, has been that if it did not, the ECJ 
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would have forced the UK to respect its commitments regarding the supremacy of EU 
law. 
Lastly, the empirical evidence showed that in the case of Poland and Estonia, this 
traditional understanding, which separates 'uploading' and 'downloading' perspectives of 
Europeanization was even less useful. As chapter 6 illustrated, nafional immigration 
policies were created parallel with the preparations to the EU membership in these two 
countries. The EU's impact was visible in changing policies in Poland and Estonia to be 
more restrictive because the political sensitivity in the JHA sector from the EU's side 
grows over time. This was because if they did not fulfill the JHA acquis it would almost 
certainly have blocked their EU membership (Grabbe, 2006). The implication was that 
there was no room for 'uploadigg' any national preferences in Poland and Estonia if they 
wished to be EU members without delays. Therefore, as this research has shown, 
'downloading' most EU legislation went smoothly in these countries, and tile Parliaments 
shared the views taken by their Governments. Since being full members of the EU, the 
situation has continued. This is because the 'path' is difficult to break; for instance, if 
Poland and Estonia are looking for membership of the Schengen structures, they have to 
fulfill the existing Schengen requirements without the possibility of influencing the 
context. 
To sum up, this research argues that the traditional understanding which separates 
'downloading' and 'uploading' perspectives of Europeanization firorn each other is not as 
helpful as originally assumed on the basis of existing literature when operationalized as 
part of a research design. This research observed that the four Parliaments (except the 
House of Lords) did not 'upload' (or try to 'upload') their own preferences to the EU 
level in order to reduce the adaptation costs at the national level. In the case of Poland 
and Estonia, there were no real options to 'upload' any preferences even if they wished to 
do so. 
But what factors facilitated the 'downloading' in Poland and Estonia, especially if there 
Nvere no possibilities for 'uploading' any national priorities? The key explanation is the 
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strong role of elites both at the EU level and at. the national level. The elite played a key 
role in 'downloading' EU policies at the national level. The elite were also most often the 
sources of statements that confirmed the EU's immigration direction towards more 
restrictive measures. The Parliaments were mainly passing the legislation without really 
considering it. 
Section II. - Findings 
7.2. Hypotheses 
Formulated from the Europeanization literature and from empirical investigations 
(chapter 1) this thesis hypothesised that four factors which potentially affect the 
Europeanization of National Parliaments were the following: legal traditions; 
administrative resources available for the NPs; the socio-economic level of Member 
'States; and geopolitical location. However, as mentioned in chapter 1, the balance of 
theoretically informed Europeanization studies has been somewhat skewed: how Member 
States have adopted- the EU policies mainly in first pillar policies has been prominent, 
whereas National Parliaments and the particular the field of JHA have received less 
attention. This was a challenge for finding appropriate variables for this research. 
7.2.1. Legal Tradition 
This research hypothesised that legal traditions (and in particular the Roman Law 
tradition) would have an impact on the participation of the NPs because tile EC/EU legal 
system is strongly based on Roman Law traditions. This is mainly because the EC was 
founded as an international legal order by Member States sharing civil law traditions 
which were based on Roman law (Stone Sweet, 2003: 33). Typical for the Roman law 
tradition is that the legal order directs social life from the 'top down', which has an 
impact on tile EU's legal order and decision-making structures. As explained in chapter 
1, there exist strong critiques among EU scholars today which claim that this 'top-down' 
approach, which considers the EU Member States as 'passive', is no longer correct. They 
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argue that Member States are not just 'takers' of European impulses or pressures but also 
active 'shapers' of these same impulses (136rzel, 2003: 3). This may well be true in tile 
case of Member States as the difficulties in creating a common EU immigration policy 
have clearly indicated. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the EU Member States are not just 
taking policies set by the EU in immigration and border control matters. However, this 
research observed that the National Parliaments have not challenged this 'top-down' 
approach; on the contrary, this research suggests that in this respect the NPs are to a great 
extent 'policy-takers'. One explanation for that could be the legacy of Roman law. It has 
created a considerable ineasure of uniformity throughout tile legal systems of Western 
Europe. In addition, it has also influenced the common way of thinking about law and 
institutional hierarchy (Ibbetson and Lewis, 1994: 11). Moreover, the influence of Roman 
law has not been confined purely to legal contexts: it has had a profound influence on the 
development of western political theory. 
In the case of Finland the evidence suggests that legal traditions have some explanatory 
power in answering the question of which factors have affected the participation of NPs 
in the EU policy process in the field of JHA. The reason is that Finnish legal traditions, 
which are based to a large extent on traditions of codified law, aimed to create a modern 
liberal democratic state, similar to the other Western European examples, where the 
legacies of Roman Law were relatively strong (Kekkonen, 1999: 28). Another reason that 
could have affected participation of the Finnish Parliament and which could also have 
facilitated its process of Europeanization is the strong impact of EU legislation. This is 
because when Finland joined the EU, its negotiation options were limited. This means 
that Finland had to take to a great extent tile existing EU laxv as it was and had to 
'download' it to the national law. This argument applies to Poland and Estonia too, 
particularly as in these two countries EU influence has been even more extensive than in 
the case of Finland (Grabbe, 2002 and 2006; Goertz, 2005). This is largely because when 
they joined the EU, they had to implement existing EU legislation as it existed at the time 
without any real negotiation possibilities. In their case their legal traditions did not matter 
much because of the compulsory nature of EU obligations. In addition, after Communist 
rule, EU models were being presented in Poland and Estonia at the same time as national 
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policy-makers were seeking models to implement policies in many political areas 
(Grabbe, 2006; Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004). This means that EU models did not face 
any real national resistance because there were no competitive suggestions. 
In the UK, however, this research observed that Roman Law traditions through EU 
legislation have not had same impact on the Parliamentary participation in immigration 
policy as in the three other EU Member States chosen for this comparison. This could be 
explained by a different legal tradition but more importantly, by the fact that the EC was_, 
much smaller and had different functions when the UK joined. At that time there was no 
Community legislation in the immigration field and all the decisions were made 
unanimously. In addition, the UK has a long tradition of being a country of immigration. 
This means that British national legislation developed from domestic needs and that EU 
legislation faced more domestic resistance at the time it was first introduced in the UK. 
Part of this resistance can be explained by different legal traditions; the British legal 
traditions are based on Anglo-Saxon Common Law, which is less 'top-down' than the 
Roman Law system. Nevertheless, this research observed that the British Parliament's 
(Commons), participation structures and methods in the EU policy process follow tile 
same structure as the three other NPs regardless of the Anglo-Saxon Common Law 
traditions. This research suggests that this is pa rtly because of the strong Roman Lait, 
ti-aditions of the EU, which means that at the end of EU's decision-making process, 
where most of the decisions are made with Qualified Majority (QMV), if an NP refuses 
to implement a certain EU legislation to which the Member State has committed, the 
European Court of Justice can eventually force the Member State to implement the act. 
However, the supremacy of the EC law does not cover all aspects of immigration and 
border control questions and in this policy field the UK has negotiated an 'opt-out' 
option, which gives her more freedom. 
To sum Lip, this research argues that legal traditions as a variable explaining the 
Europeanization of NPs did have some explanatory power in tile case of tile UK arid 
Finland. This means that tile legal traditions could have facilitated the 'top-down' 
perspective adapted in the UK and Finland concerning their role in EU policy-making. 
245 
7.2.2. Administrative Resources 
The second variable, administrative resources available for the National Parliaments, was 
derived from the existing literature. Bbrzel (2002; 2005) has found evidence that 
administrative resources available for the Member States affect how they are able to 
'upload' their national preferences to the EU level and the same capacities are important 
when EU policies are 'downloaded' at tile national level. 
When analysing the use of dii-ect influence, which this research suggests as an important 
way for NPs to have more say in the EU policy process, this research assumed that 
administrative resources are an important factor explaining the Europeanization of NPs in 
the EU policy process. Chapter 5 introduced several different ways for NPs to make use 
of dii-ect influence channels. Tile empirical evidence suggests that administrative 
resources available for the NPs are particularly important for analysing their use of dii-ect 
influence. This is because exercising this opportunity to influence requires more expertise 
and resources from the NPs than exercising indii-ect influence, which takes place through 
the Government. Interview data showed that in each of the four NPs it was considered 
that the Governments have more resources and expertise compared to the NPs. This 
means that the MPs are regarded more as generalists in politics. This observation has the 
following implication: because the immigration policy field is characterised by its 
technical nature and elite dominance, it is difficult for 'non-experts' to get involved. To 
became involved is further complicated by the ever-growing tendency for tile EU to 
create highly complex decision-making procedures which oniy immigration experts 
understand and can therefore participate in. In addition, tile input role of semi- 
autonomous institutions with operative powers such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex has 
complicated further the participation possibilities of democratically chosen institutions. 
In the case of the UK and Finland, the data indicated that the administrative resources are 
considered adequate for the Parliaments to participate effectively in the EU policy 
process. For instance, the examples given in chapter 5 and 6 showed that the House of 
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Lords are structurally using and developing their direct influence opportunities in the 
. 
field of immigration and border control. But the four other NPs did not use these 
opportunities effectively. In the case of Estonia, on the other hand, the findings suggest 
that limited administrativ6 resources available for the Parliament have an impact on its 
participation in tile EU policy process in general. For instance, some Estonian MPs 
mentioned the lack of secretarial services and assistance as the main obstacle for MPs in 
searching for information in any EU policy field, which is necessary if MPs wish to 
influence EU policies. In Poland, similar findings were found. In addition, some Polish 
MPs complained that civil servants at the Governmental level are not always willing to 
help MPs find supplementary information. In Estonia, however, both MPs and civil 
servants emphasised the informal and good relationship that existed between MPs and the 
Governmental elite. In the case of Estonia, findings suggest that to a limited extent the 
lack of administrative resources available for NPs can be compensated for by good 
communication between the Government and the MPs. To conclude, this research 
Suggests that administrative resources available for the NPs have a certain explanatory 
power as a factor affecting the Europeanization of NPs, in particular in the case of 
Estonia and Poland, but not in the case of Finland and the UK. 
7.2.3. Socio-Economic Level 
This variable is also derived from empirical investigations (136rzel, 2002; 2005), with 
similar arguments as the previous variable (administrative resources). In the case of 
Poland and Estonia, the findings suggest a linkage between the Europeanization of the 
Parliament in immigration-related questions and the socio-economic level of the country. 
The main argument for this is that there are many more urgent political issues at the 
national level in Poland and Estonia than immigration. For example, both countries have 
faced difficulties reaching EU level standards in supporting asylum-seekers and 
immigrants because of a lack of money. However, the slowness in creating these 
domestic structures is not completely a financial issue. Another important reason is that 
there is no immigration tradition in Poland and Estonia and many MPs did not find it 
important to spend money on structures that are not serving 'the citizens'. This is also 
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linked to the socio-economics of the country: immigrants are not considered as beneficial 
for the economy in these two countries. For instance, Poland is suffering from a high 
unemployment rate at the time of writing this thesis (2003-2007), which means that it 
does not need immigrants for labour reasons. In Estonia, the question of immigration is 
linked to the large Russian speaking minority, which is a sensitive national issue (chapter 
6) and it is t lie main question that dominates immigration-related discussions among 
NIPS. 
These findings indicate that multiple domestic problems are the main reasons why 
immigration is not a politically interesting question in Poland and Estonia and these 
domestic problems are related to the socio-economic level of these two Member States. 
Interview data also proved that immigration is not a divisive issue among the political 
parties in these countries: party differences do not influence how Polish and Estonian 
Parliaments participate in the EU policy process in immigration questions. For Poland tile 
main interest among MPs was clearly the EU's agriculture policy, which has a strong 
impact at national level. With these questions, the behaviour of the Polish Parliament has 
indicated that if the question is important enough, the Parliament can make use of its 
opportunities to influence and make the Government change the Polish view at the EU 
level. 
Another observation is whether or not, the number of immigrants is considered as a 
positive matter for the economy. For instance, only recently in Finland the number of 
immigrants has been placed in the context of economic growth. In Finland it has been 
noticed that economic development will need more labour which Finland is not able to 
produce by itself. This suggests that change in ways of thinking develop over long time 
periods and is not purely related to the socio-economic level of the country. For instance, 
Finland has been a prosperous country for a relatively long time, but it was very poor 
country in the 1950s. This past is still in the national memory. This is in contrast to the 
UK, which has long traditions of considering immigration as a beneficial phenomenon 
for the economy. 
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To sum up, this research suggests that the socio-economic level of a Member State has 
some explanatory value in the case of Estonia and Poland as a factor affecting the 
Europeanization of these NPs in the EU's immigration policies, but this variable was not 
important in the case of the UK or Finland. 
7.2.4. Geopolitical Location 
The last variable which this research hypothesised affecting the Europeanization of NPs 
was geopolitical location. One reason why this variable was assumed to be important was 
that external borders of the enlarged EU became an increasingly important part of the 
EU's accession strategy towards the end of the 1990s, largely because of the political 
sensitivity of border issues among existing Member States (Grabbe, 2006: 150). An 
example of this change in thinking at EU level, which is related to geopolitics, is that of 
the Estonian accession negotiation process. 
In the early 1990s respecting Human Rights and principles of democracy were the main 
criteria for being considered as an EU Member State (see chapter 6). But in the late 1990s 
as the EU was enlarging to East and Central Europe, the security-based approach became 
the dominant approach in immigration policies at EU level, and the emphasis in accession 
criteria changed too. This change was also visible from Estonian annual progress reports 
towards EU membership, even though Estonia was not located on an), international 
immigration routes. In addition, Estonia did not have direct borders with any existing EU 
Member State as was the case with Poland. Nevertheless, instead of highlighting tile 
protection of Human Rights, these reports emphasised readmission agreements, border 
control capacities and law enforcement capacities as the most important policy goals for 
Estonia to become a member of the EU. This was one concrete *example to assume that 
geopolitical location has affected the Europeanization of NPs in the immigration field. 
As chapter 5 and 6 demonstrated, the NPs in each of the four Member States (except in 
the case of the House of Lords) strongly supported the policy that their Governments 
were driving at the EU level. This thesis suggests that main reason why NPs shared the 
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views taken by their Governments at the EU level is based on the general securitization 
of immigration policy in the EU. This approach is heavily driven by the immigration elite 
from the national and from the EU level (chapter 3). The findings suggest that 
geopolitical location has facilitated this change of thinking among the NPs in these four 
Member States: Finland, Poland and Estonia are EU states with long external borders and 
the UK is an island, which means that geopolitical realities put them at the front in 
immigration questions. This is because the existing understanding in the EU context 
assumes that most illegal movement of goods, services, and persons happens primarily at 
the borders (Huysman, 2006). This assumption has been incorporated in the EU context 
by assuming that abolishing internal border controls and facilitating transnational flows 
of goods, services and people will challenge public order and the rule of law (Huysman, 
2006; Konstakopoulou, 2006). After that, this understanding has been channelled to 
national level thinking. This was particularly visible in the case of Poland and Estonia, as 
they created their national immigration policies from scratch, parallel to their 
preparations for EU membership. They could have chosen liberal immigration policies 
too, but as explained in chapter 6, it was not possible, particularly in the case of Poland, 
because the border control issue was so important for Germany. 
To sum up, geopolitical realities had sorne explanatory value in explaining the 
Europeanization of NPs in the EU policy process when it is linked to the question of why 
they all prefer restrictive immigration policies instead of liberal ones. But the evidence 
did not support that geopolitical location alone could explain the Europeanization of NPs. 
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7.2.5 Explaining the Findings 
Table 7.1. Summaty of the hypotheses 
UK FINLAND POLAND ESTONIA 
LEGAL YES NO NO 
TRADITIONS 
ADMN NO NO YES YES 
RESOURCES 
SOCIO_ NO NO YES YES 
ECONOMIC 
FACTORS 
GEO- NO NO NO NO 
POLITICAL 
FACTOR 
The table above summarises the findings of these four hypotheses. It shows that legal 
traditions as a variable affecting the Europeanization of NPs did have some explanatory 
power in case of the UK and Finland, but did not'matter in the case of Poland and 
Estonia. By contrast, administrative resources, or the lack of administrative resources, 
clearly had an impact on the Europeanization of NPs in Poland and Estonia, but was not 
important in the UK and Finland, where administrative resources available for the NPs 
were considered adequate. The third variable, the socio-economic level of each Member 
State, was relevant for Poland and Estonia, especially in immigration matters, but was not 
important for the UK or Finland. The Parliamentarians in Estonia and Poland considered 
that there were man) more urgent problems domestically in both countries than 
establishing a common immigration policy for the EU. The last variable, geopolitical 
location, was relevant in explaining the Europeanization of NPs only if it was linked to 
the securitisation of EU's immigration policies, but not alone. To sum up, none of the 
variables alone was able explain the Europeanization of NPs but the table clearly 
demonstrated that there were more similarities in the factors that had some explanatory 
power in Poland and Estonia than in the factors that affected the UK and Finland. Based 
on these findings, one could have expected that the NPs in the UK and Finland Nvould 
have participated more effectively in the EU policy process in the field of JHA because 
they had more administrative resources and their socio-economic level is higher than in 
251 
Estonia and Poland, but the research did not find evidence of that. Therefore, the next 
section, drawing on the empirical data presented in chapters 5 and 6, will consider some 
other possible explanations that might account for this puzzling finding. 
Section III 
7.3 Other Possible Explanations 
As the previous section illustrated, the variables introduced in chapter I could not fully 
explain the Europeanization of National Parliaments in the EU policy process in field of 
JHA'. The puzzle presented in the section above suggests that some other variables could 
have been more useful in explaining the Europeanization of NPs. 
'7.3.1. Elite Dominance 
The data suggest that elite dominance together with the fact that immigration is 
considered a national issue could have more explanatory power than any of the variables 
presented in this thesis alone. Further, this elite dominance seems to be even more 
important because this present -practice of NPs relying heavily on the Governments' 
behaviour at the EU level,. leaves plenty of room fo r manoeuvre for the elite's operation at 
the EU level, which on the other hand can reduce the powers of NPs. This is because the 
elite at the national level are primarily the ones who also exert a great influence on the 
immigration policies at the EU level. In this sense, the differences between 'older', and 
'new' EU Member States were not very relevant, as the four NPs (except the House of 
Lords) were all relatively passive in participating in the EU policy process in this policy 
field. They did not try to 'upload' any of their preferences to the EU level policy-making 
by using either indii-ect or dii-ect opportunities to influence and their role was similar 
when the EU level outcomes where 'downloaded' nationally. 
7.3.2. State Traditions and Administrative Traditions 
Another factor, which may be important, is state and administrative traditions. In Finland, 
for instance, the relationship between state and society has traditionally been understood 
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as being built on collective values, where state-society relations form inseparable parts of 
the whole. This means that hierarchical structures are not questioned to a great extent and 
it is assumed that the Government will function in a way that is good for society (i. e. for 
individuals). At an everyday level this means that the relationship between the 
Governmental elite and the Parliament is smooth, based on effective contacts with (non- 
political) civil servants from both institutions. Both actors respect politicians but keep a 
certain distance from them. Contacts with citizens, for instance through civil society 
connections, are less developed and considered as unimportant for participating in the EU 
policy process. 
In contrast to the UK, the state is considered as a human-made construction deliberately 
installed by independent citizens (Norgaard and Winding, 2005: 3). What follows is that 
the British state traditions have always emphasised the division between state and civil 
society; the state has been seen as an entity separated from civil society, but which needs 
to be controlled by civil society. This tradition also has implications for the relationship 
between the Governmental elite and Parliament where the latter is often questioning tile 
action taken by the Government and acts more as though it is an advocate for civil 
society. In the case of the House of Lords, the connections to civil society are valued and 
well developed; NGOs (especially Statewatch) often draw the Lords' attention to things 
they think need looking at. 
In the case of Poland and Estonia, the state traditions are completely different from those 
in the UK and Finland: both countries were forced to follow the Communist state system. 
This means that in Poland and Estonia the state is clearly considered as an entity separate 
from civil society. Especially in Estonia, which was part of the Soviet Union, methods 
were developed to isolate the 'Estonian state' from foreign pressure and influence, but 
'this practice was based on an ethnic nation state under foreign threat. This research 
suggests that these state traditions still matter to a certain extent in these two countries 
and have an impact on how the role of Parliament is understood. For instance, the newly 
gained sovereignty is an important value for NPs in these countries, as the examples of 
implementing the common EU visa-policy in Poland and the rights of third country 
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nationals in Estonia showed (chapter 6). In these cases the Parliaments in both countries 
stood against the state elite who were 'downloading' EU policy. The main reason why 
these two EU polices faced such a strong national resistance was that these questions 
went to the heart of Poland's and Estonia's new-found sovereignty. These examples 
indicate that Poland and Estonia are likely to develop their state traditions in a similar 
direction to that of the UK (i. e. emphasising the difference between state and civil society 
where Parliament represents more 'national' values and beliefs against the elite which is 
considered to be more influenced by EU goals). Interestingly, a similar development has 
not taken place in Finland, although the gap between citizens and elite towards the EU is 
dramatically different. The Finnish public is one of the most eurosceptic in the EU, but 
this has not been channelled to the Parliament (see chapter 6). This is because in Finland 
the Parliament has acted more as part of the elite, not as a counterbalancing power to it. 
To SLImmarize, this research suggests that state traditions and the relations between 
Parliaments and the Governmental elite could have answered more precisely the question 
'which factors affect the Europeanization of National Parliaments in the EU policy 
process in the field of JHA' than the variables analysed in this research. However, taking 
into consideration that there still is only a limited number of research done with 
Parliaments and JHA, this would need ftirther research. However, the role of elite and 
-state traditions could be used for generating new hypotheses in the further research and 
they might provide some generaliable information about the participation of NPs across 
all the EU policy fields. 
7.4. What Implications for Democracy? 
This research suggests that the main method for increasing the Parliamentary 
participation in the field of JHA is to develop the dii-ect influence channels of the NPs. 
These channels are important because they provide opportunities to receive information 
independently from the Government. Channels to NGOs and civil society especially 
would help the NPs to transform more effectively the views of citizens to the formal 
decision-making level and therefore increase the democratic accountability in the EU 
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policy process. Looking at the low participation of NPs in the EU policy process in the 
longer term, the shortcomings of only elites being 'Europeanized' is that this way only 
the top layer of central state officials are participating in the EU policy process in 
particular in the field of JHA while the majority of Parliamentarians (and public) remains 
largely distant from EU policy-making. 
This research suggests that a concrete way to increase the participation of NPs as 
institutions is to intensify cooperation across the European Affairs Committees (EAQ 
with the Committees in the European Parliament (EP) (especially with those Committees 
responsible for immigration and border issues). Institutionalizing different forms of 
cooperation between Committees in the NPs and in the EP would bring more added value 
for NPs than just intensifying relations with individual Members of EP (MEPs) and 
-national Parliamentarians (MPs), which are based on individual skills and interests. The 
main reason is that the Committees in the EP, (in particular the LIBE Committee) have 
increased significantly their cooperation with the EU Council and with the EU 
Commission. For instance, the president of the LIBE Committee has regularly been 
invited to attend part of the informal meetings of JHA ministers, which none of the NPs 
are participating in. In addition, the EP Committees largely take evidence from NGOs 
and have more regular contacts with different experts working in immigration and border 
control issues than NPs. Further, this thesis observed that cooperation between the 
Committees in all four NPs and the EP level are still undeveloped (except in the case of 
the House of Lords). 
In Conclusion 
This comparative research proceeded from a question concerning the factors that affect 
the participation of National Parliaments in the UK, Finland, Poland and Estonia in tile 
EU policy process in Justice and Home Affairs, and more particularly in immigration and 
border control questions. It assumed that NPs would have a strong interest in 
participating in tile EU policy process in these matters because the EU still does not have 
a common immigration policy, and because immigration issues have long belonged to the 
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core questions of national policy-making. This research analysed tile Europeanization of 
NPs in two dimensions; first, how the NPs were able to 'upload' their national 
preferences to EU level policy-making; and. secondly, how the EU level outcomes were 
'downloaded' at the national level. This research has tried to generate insights into what 
factors affect the Europeanization of NPs in the EU policy process in immigration and 
border control issues. 
The main observations made in this research can be summarised as follows: (1) the four 
. 
NPs all have institutional structures which offer adequate opportunities for participating 
in EU policy-making and these structures have many similarities. This observation 
suggests that this is due to the process of Europeanization; (2) The main mechanisms 
through which Europeanization has influenced the NPs have been learning and 
socialising; (3) NPs are not using their opportunities to participate in the EU's 
immigration and border control policies as effectively as they could; (4) The NPs have 
very similar views regarding the context of what the EU's common immigration policy 
should be, which this research suggests is also due to the process of Europeanization; (5) 
The difference between 'uploading' and 'downloading' perspectives did not matter much 
to the participation of NPs in the EU policy process in this policy field. This thesis 
hypothesised that four factors would affect the Europeanization of NPs; (1) legal 
traditions; (2) administrative resources; (3) the socio-economic level of a Member State; 
and (4) geopolitical location. However, the evidence suggests that only administrative 
resources and the socio-economic level of Member States had some explanatory value in 
the case of Poland and Estonia, but none of them were able to answer fully the research 
question. This thesis observed that some other variables, such as elite dominance and 
state traditions could have had more explanatory power in explaining the factors that 
affect the Europeanization of NPs in the JHA policy field. These two observations could 
be used to generate future variables for analysing the participation of NPs in the EU 
policy process. In addition, aside from these two new variables this thesis wishes to add 
something to the literature of Europeanization on the problems of operationalizing 
Europeanization in a research design with the evidence by the problems in 'uploading' 
and 'downloading' perspectives. 
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This research started off with an expectation that the participation of NPs would vary in 
the EU policy process. In addition, this research expected that there would be differences 
in the structure of how NPs in these four countries participate in tile EU policy process 
and that these differences would matter when analysing their actual participation both at 
the EU and national level. This thesis observed that they all have developed similar 
instruments that could offer more effective ways of participating in the EU policy 
process, which is a strong argument for Europeanization. But *in the immigration field, 
these instruments were not effectively used, except in the case of the House of Lords. In 
this respect there was relatively little difference between 'new' and 'old' EU Member 
States. The party differences did not matter in any of the four Member States when 
considering participation in the EU immigration policies: all the Parliaments (except the 
House of Lords) were satisfied with the restrictive agenda driven by their Governments. 
This research demonstrated that the main explanations for the similar behaviour of the 
four Parliaments was the dominance of the elite. It Suggests that the way this elite 
function is due to the Europeanization process. However, this thesis suggests that this 
elite dominance could have serious implications for the democracy of the EU in 
particular in the field of JHA, which touches the fundamental rights of individuals. 
To correct this imbalance, and to increase the role of NPs in the EU policy process in this 
particular policy field, this research argues that the main tool for Parliaments is to 
develop their dii-ect influence channels independently from the Government. NPs should 
increase their channels to NGOs in the immigration field and intensify their connections 
with civil society. These ways would help NPs to more effectively transfer the views of 
citizens to the formal decision-making level. This thesis observed that at present only the 
House of Lords is using these channels. Another effective way for the NPs to increase 
their dii-ect influence would be to intensify their cooperation with tile Committees at the 
European Parliament (EP), especially because the EP has some legislative powers in the 
EU level which the NPs currently do not have. However, further analysis of how to 
intensify the participation of the Special Committees of the NPs and the Committees of 
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the EP is beyond the range of this thesis. This thesis suggests that further research which 
critically reviews the extent of the dominance of the elite in immigration policy-making, 
would supplement this investigation. 
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Appendix I 
List of Interviews and dates in the UK 
Intervie, wee Position at time of interview Place and time of 
and relevant past positions inteniew 
Hood, Jimmy Parliamentarian, Chair of the ESC in the 15.3.2006 in London 
House of Commons, Labour Party 
Borrow, David Parliamentarian, member of the ESC in 15.3.2006 in London 
the House of Commons, Labour Party 
David, Wayne Parliamentarian, member of the ESC in 15.3.2006 in London 
the House of Commons, Labour Party 
Cash, William Parliamentarian, member of the ESC in 15.3.2006 in London 
the House of Commons, Conservative 
Party 
Lord Corbett of Castle Member of the House of Lords, 15.2.2006 in London 
Vale Committee to Sub Committee F (JHA) 
Select Committee on the EU (Labour 
Party) 
Lord Avebury Member of the House of Lords, 15.2.2006 in London 
Committee to Sub Committee F (JHA) 
Select Committee on the EU (former 
member of Liberal Party) 
Viscount Ullsivater Member of the House of Lords, 15.2.2006 in London 
Committee to Sub Committee F (JHA) 
Select Committee on the EU, 
(hereditary peer, hence elected) 
Earl of Listowel Member of the House of Lords, 15.2.2006 in London 
Committee to Sub Committee F (JHA) 
Select Committee on the EU (hereditary 
peer, hence elected) 
Lord Wallace of Saltaire Member of the House of Lords (Liberal 16.3.2006 in Bristol 
Party) 
Collon, Michael Clerk of the House of Lords, on the EU 27.1.2006 and 16.2.2006 in 
(sub-committee F) London and through emails 
16.2.2006,19.5.2006,25.7.2006 
and 10.10.2006 
Patrick, Simon Clerk to the Select Committee (ESC) 27.1.2006 and 15.3.2006 in 
the London, through emails 
House of Commons 4.5.2006 and 25.5,2006 
Atkins, Martyn Liaison officer of the House of 2.6.2005 in Brussels and throuQh 
Commons to EU emails 23.1.2006 
Sir, Osmotherly, Clerk Adviser to the Select Committee i5.3.2006 and through emails C, Edivard (ESC) the House of Commons 27.7.2006 
Rhiannon, Hollis Second Clerk Through emails 28. -29.3.2006 
Education and Skills, the Select and 4.5.2006 
Committee the House of Commons 
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Cagsenher, Michael Legal Adviser to the Select Committee 15.3.2006 in London 
(ESC) the House of Commons 
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Appendix 2 
List of Interviews and dates in Finland 
Interviewee Position at time of Place and time of 
interview and relevant interview 
past positions 
Brax, Tuija Parliamentarian, the Chair of 30.10.2006 in phone and 
Constitutional Law 9.5.2003 in Helsinki 
Committee, Green Party 
Hautala, Heidi Parliamentarian, member of 4.5.2006 in phone 
the GC, Green Party, 
previously MEP 
KiIjunen, Kimmo Parliamentarian, Vice Chair 8.5.2003 in Helsinki 
of the GC, Social 
Democratic Party 
Koskinen, Johannes Parliamentarian, member of 25-26.4.2006 in Warsaw (The 
the GC, Social Democratic Finnish GC visited Polish Sejm) 
party, previous Minister of 
the Justice 
Merilainen, Rosa Parliamentarian, member of 17.11.2005 in email 
the Special Committee 
responsible for JHA, Green 
Party 
Thors, Astrid Parliamentarian, member of 15.8.2006 in Helsinki 
the GC, Green Par-ty, 
previous MEP 
Tiilikainen, Kimmo Parliamentarian, member of 25-26.4.2006 in Warsaw (The 
GC, Central Party Finnish GC visited Polish Sejm) 
Uotila, Kari Parliamentarian, member of 25-26.4.2006 in Warsaw (The 
the GC, Left Alliance Finnish GC visited Polish Sejm) 
Vil6n, Jari P arliamentarian, tile Chair of 22.12.2005 in Helsinki and 25- 
the GC, Conservative Party 26.4.2006 in Warsaw (The 
Finnish GC visited Polish Sejm) 
vaistb, Matti Parliamentarian, the Chair of 17.11.2005 in email 
the Special Committee 
responsible for JHA, Central 
Party, 
Saramo, Peter Director of the EU 3.4.2006 and 16.8.2006 in 
Secretariat in Finnish Helsinki, 25-26.4.2006 in 
Parliament, clerk to the Warsaw (The Finnish GC visited 
Grand Committee (GC) Polish Sejm) 
Pelttari, Antti Clerk to the GC 22.4.2003 in Helsinki 
Tuovinen, Timo Clerk to tile Special 22.4.2003 in Helsinki 
Committee responsible for 
Tuuri, Helena erk to the GC 22.4.2003 in Helsinki 
Vuorinen, Jarmo Clerk to tile Constitutional 22.4.2003 in Helsinki 
Committee 
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Kaukaoja, Sarita Liaison Officer of Finnish 2.6.2005 and 9.7.2006 in 
Grand Committee to EU Brussels 
Nurminen, Pekka Head of European 16.8.2006 
Parliament in Finland, 
previous clerk of the GC 
Store, Jan Ambassador of Finland in 26.10.2005 and 25-26.4.2006 in 
Poland Warsaw 
Hyvýrinen, Outi First Secretary in Finnish 26.10.2005 and 25-26.4.2006 in 
Embassy Warsaw 
Jarvib, Pekka High level Civil servant, 15.4.2003 and 14.8.2006 in 
Ministry of Interior Helsinki 
Yli-Vakkuri, Laura Civil servant, Ministry of 15.4.2003 in Helsinki 
Interior 
Aalto, Alec The Secretary of State, in 5.5.2003 in Helsinki 
Prime Minister's Office 
Peltomdki, Antti The Under Secretary of 5.5.2003 in Helsinki 
State, in Prime Minister's 
Office 
Maskinen, Niilo Judge in the Finnish 5.5.2003 in Helsinki 
Supreme Administrative 
Court, previous clerk of GC 




List of Interviews and dates in Poland 
Interviewce Position at time of interview Place and time of 
and relevant past positions interview 
Cepi I, J6zef Parliamentarian, Vice Chair of the 26.4.2006 (when the Finnish 
EAC in Polish (scjm), Self Defence EAC was visiting the Polish 
Party Parliament) in Warsaw 
Ciemniak, Grazyna Parliamentarian, Vice Chair of the 26.4.2006 (when the Finnish 
EAC in Polish (scjm), Left Alliance EAC was visiting the Polish 
Parliament) in Warsaw 
Galazewski, Andrzej Parliamentarian, Vice Chair of the 26.4.2006 in Warsaw 
EAC in Polish (scjm), Civil Platform 
Party 
Grzyb, Andrzej Parliamentarian, Vice Chair of the 26.10.2005 in Warsaw 
EAC in Polish (sejm), Self Defence 
Party 
Karski, Karol Parliamentarian, the Chair of the 26.4.2006 (when the Finnish 
EAC in Polish (scjm), Law and EAC was visiting the Polish 
Justice Party Parliament) in Warsaw 
Senator, Berent, Parliamentarian (Senate) 26.4.2006 (when the Finnish 
Przemyslaw, Civil Platform Party EAC was visiting the Polish 
Parliament) in Warsaw 
Senator, Michalak, Parliamentarian (Senate) 26.4.2006 (when the Finnish 
Paivel Law and Justice Party EAC was visiting the Polish 
Parliament) in Warsaw 
Senator, Zlotowski, Parliamentarian (Senate) 26.4.2006 (when the Finnish 
Kosma La%v and Justice Party EAC was visiting the Polish 
Parliament) in Warsaw 
Senator, Szymura, Jerzy Parliamentarian (Senate) 26.4.2006 (when the Finnish 
Law and Justice Party EAC was visiting the Polish 
Parliament) in Warsaw 
Senator, Wittbrodt, Parliamentarian (Senate) 26.4.2006 (when the Finnish 
Edmund Civil Platform Party EAC was visiting the Polish 
Parliament) in Warsaw 
Kowalska, Joanna Civil servant, Chancellery of the Through emails 24.5.2006 
Sejm, International Affairs 
Kraszewska, Marta Civil servant, Chancellery of the 25.10.2005 and 26.4.2006 in 
Sejm, International Affairs Warsaw and through emails, 
29.5.2006 xxxx 
Krawczyk, Kaja Liaison Officer of the Sejrn in the EU 2.6.2005 in Brussels and 24- 
25.10.2005 in Warsaw 
Skrzynska, Magdalena High level civil servant, Chancellery 24-10.2005 and 25-26.4.2006 
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of the Scjm, International Affairs in Warsaw 
Puzyna, Stanislaw Liaison Officer, Chancellery of the Through emails 25.4. and 
Senate of the Republic of Poland 2.5.2006 
Adams, Dudzig High level civil servant, the Ministry 25.10.2005 in Warsaw 
of the Interior 
Bobinski, Krzysztof Polish Institute for International 25.4.2006 in Warsaw 
Affairs 
Schnepf, Ryszard High level civil servant, in the Prime 25.4.2006 in Warsaw 
Minister's Office 
Krawczyk, Andrzej The foreign policy adviser in the 25.4.2006 in Warsaw 
Presidents' Office 
Smolen, Robert Polish Institute for International 26.4.2006 in Warsaw 
Affairs 
Laitinen, Ilkka The Dir ctor General, FRONTEX 26.4.2006 in Warsaw 





List of Interviews and dates Estonia 
Position at time of Place and time of Intervicivee intcrview and relevant interview 
past positions 
Ojuland, Kristiina Parliamentarian, the Chair of the 5.4.2006 in Tallinn 
Estonian EAC, previous Minister 
of the Foreign Affairs, Estonian 
Reform Party 
Parts, Juhan Parliamentarian, member of the 5.4.2006 in Tallinn 
Estonian EAC, previous Prime 
Minister, Res Publica Party 
Reinsalu, Urmas Parliamentarian, member of the 5.4.2006 in Tallinn 
Estonian EAC, Res Publica Party 
Nutt, Mart Parliamentarian, member of the 5.4.2006 in Tallinn 
Estonian EAC, Pro Patria Union 
Party 
Aarma, Olev Clerk of the Estonian EAC 15.7.2003,4.4.200-6 
5.4.2006 in Tallinn and through 
emails 22.3.2006,28.3.2006, 
24.5.2006,11.12.2006 
Neeve, Siret Clerk of the Estonian EAC Through emails 2.8.2006, 
3.8.2006,25.9.2006 
Valler, Piret Clerk of the Estonian EAC 4.4.2006 in Tallinn 
Ester, Jane Civil servant in the Ministry of 5.4.2006 in Tallinn and through 
Interior emails, 9.6.2006,. 4.7.2006, 
26.7.2006,11.10.2006 and 
8.11.200 
Didrichson, Kaili Civil servant in the Ministry of 5.4.2006 in Tallinn 
Interior 
Jakobson, Jenny Civil servant in the Ministry of 5.4.2006 in Tallinn and through 
Interior emails 8.11.2006 
Linnard, Kadri Civil servant in the Ministry of 5.4.2006 in Tallinn and through 
Interior emails 22.3.2006 and 28.3.2006 
Karotam, Arvi Liaison Officer of the Estonian 20.1.2006 through emails 
Parliament to the EU 
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Appendix 5 
List of Interviews and dates in European Parliament 
Intervie-wee Position at time of Place and time of 
interview and relevant interview 
past positions 
Laprat, Gdrhad High level civil servant in 10.7.2006, Brussels 
Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs in 
the EP 
Cahen, Anthony, High level civil servant in 10.7.2006, Brussels 
Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs in 
the EP 
Dr. Geoffrey Harris High level civil servant in Sub 10.7.2006, Brussels 
Committee on Human Rights 
in the EP 
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Appendix 6 
Interview questions in the UK and in the Finnish Parliaments 
In order to examine whether these factors affect the participation I would like to ask 
following questions: 
1) Do you think that the legal framework (i. e. the level where the participation has been 
identified; Constitution, law, norms) is important factor for national parliament to 
participate effectively in EU's policy process? 
2) It is considered that immigration questions have traditionally be'. onged to the core 
functions of the national decision-i-naking - Do you think your parliament plays an 
important role forming EU's immigration policy or EU's border control policy? 
3) Do you think your parliament is capable of scrutinizing effectively the government in 
these EU issues? 
4)? Is the information given by your government to the parliament sufficient in order to 
participate in the policy formation in the field of JHA? Does your parliament have other 
Nvays of getting information and if so, which are those? 
5) Do you think geopolitical location matters how interested the parliament is in 
participating on EU's policy-making in immigration/ border control issues? If so, how 
this affects to the policy-making? 
6) What kind of administrative resources your parliament has for participating on EU's 
JHA policy? Are they considered to be sufficient? 
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7) Do you think the socio-economic level of member state affects how the national 
parliament participates in the EU policy especially in the field of JHA? 
8) Do you think something else matters more to the question how interested your 
parliament as a whole is on EU's immigration / border control issues ( i. e. the role of 




Interview Questions in Polish and Estonian Parliaments 
In order to examine whether these factors affect the participation I Nvould like to ask- 
following questions: 
1) It is considered that immigration questions have traditionally belonged to the core 
functions of national decision-making - Do you think national parliament in your country 
plays an important role forming the EU's immigration policy or any other policy issue in 
field of JHA? 
If so how? 
And the other aspect; Do you think your parliament is capable of scrutinizing effectively 
tile government in the field of JHA? 
2) How your national parliament receives information from EU' Justice and Home 
Affairs? Is the information given by government to the parliament sufficient in order to 
participate in the policy formation? Does your parliament have other ways of getting 
information and if so, which are those? 
3) Do you think geopolitical location affect how interested the parliament is in 
participation EU's policy-making in JHA field -(i. e. does it matter whether your 
country has a border with non-EU member state or if it is an island? ) and how this 
affects to the policy-making? 
4) What kind of administrative resources your parliament has? Are they considered to be 
sufficient? Do you think administrative resources available for parliament matter when 
considering the participation in EU's policy process? 
5) Do you think the socio-economic level of member state affects ho%v the national 
parliament participates in the EU policy especially in the field of JFIA? 
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